RE: Why fight ISIS?
June 11, 2015 at 4:31 pm
(This post was last modified: June 11, 2015 at 4:56 pm by Anomalocaris.)
The reason we want to Be able to freely meddle is not because everyone there hates us, although they do hate us. The reason is having a presence in the middleeast and southwest Asia gives us the option to:
1. Ferment instability of one kind or another to indirectly threaten any secure interiors line of communication between China, India, Russia and Europe.
2. Dictate actions to client states to threaten any secure interiors line of communication between China, India, Russia and Europe by proxy
3. Directly threaten any secure interiors line of communication between China, India, Russia and Europe by our own forces.
Incidentally, lack of prospect for a secure interior line of communities along the length of Euroasia means the most vital trades on the euroasian continent will be forced to stay on the exterior sea lanes. We have more than half of the world's total naval power, and so long as euroasian needs sea lanes to carry out its own internal vital trades, America will securely retain a dominating voice in all of euroasia continent. Asia and Europe together represent 65-70% of the world's economy and productive potential. Having a dominant say in their business means we stay the sole superpower.
At the end of WWII, American economy represented 60% of the world's productive potential. Everyone who had any sense had to come to us. So we are the superpower by default.
Now American economy represent barely 20% of the world's economy. Europe and East Asia each has larger economy and productive potential than the U.S. If Europe and east Asia were to stitch together some kind of close trade partnership with the ability to conduct most vital trade securely on interior route, America will gradually be maginalized. We will eventually be relegated to third for forth place, and possibly be a distinct odd man out. We don't want that. In fact east Asia potentially has several times our potential all by itself. That's why we are pivoting to the pacific now, in the hope of forestalling east Asia from attaining anything like its full potential.
That's why we will not give up either fermenting trouble in the Middle East, or having our troops and forces directly stationed there. That's also why we are trying to set up a system of economic treaties in the pacific that excludes china, while China is still not too large. We want to avoid the fate of Britain.
Think of it this way, when a country has only 20% of the world's economic and productive power, and still declining, but dominating influence in world events, it can't keep that dominating influence without making sure the other 80% remain fragmented and have less common interests with each other than with the U.S.
.
1. Ferment instability of one kind or another to indirectly threaten any secure interiors line of communication between China, India, Russia and Europe.
2. Dictate actions to client states to threaten any secure interiors line of communication between China, India, Russia and Europe by proxy
3. Directly threaten any secure interiors line of communication between China, India, Russia and Europe by our own forces.
Incidentally, lack of prospect for a secure interior line of communities along the length of Euroasia means the most vital trades on the euroasian continent will be forced to stay on the exterior sea lanes. We have more than half of the world's total naval power, and so long as euroasian needs sea lanes to carry out its own internal vital trades, America will securely retain a dominating voice in all of euroasia continent. Asia and Europe together represent 65-70% of the world's economy and productive potential. Having a dominant say in their business means we stay the sole superpower.
At the end of WWII, American economy represented 60% of the world's productive potential. Everyone who had any sense had to come to us. So we are the superpower by default.
Now American economy represent barely 20% of the world's economy. Europe and East Asia each has larger economy and productive potential than the U.S. If Europe and east Asia were to stitch together some kind of close trade partnership with the ability to conduct most vital trade securely on interior route, America will gradually be maginalized. We will eventually be relegated to third for forth place, and possibly be a distinct odd man out. We don't want that. In fact east Asia potentially has several times our potential all by itself. That's why we are pivoting to the pacific now, in the hope of forestalling east Asia from attaining anything like its full potential.
That's why we will not give up either fermenting trouble in the Middle East, or having our troops and forces directly stationed there. That's also why we are trying to set up a system of economic treaties in the pacific that excludes china, while China is still not too large. We want to avoid the fate of Britain.
Think of it this way, when a country has only 20% of the world's economic and productive power, and still declining, but dominating influence in world events, it can't keep that dominating influence without making sure the other 80% remain fragmented and have less common interests with each other than with the U.S.
.
