It could be stated, at least in part, this way:
1. If naturalism is true, then meaning is indeterminate.
2. Meaning is determinate (a presupposition of reason and science).
3. Therfore, naturalism is false.
Thus, if the naturalist claims meaning is indeterminate, she undermines the basis for reason and science. But if the naturalist says meaning is determinate, she must give an explanation for this could be in a purely physical universe. Whether intentionality is accounted for by conceptual, causal, biological, or instrumental theories, the problem of determinate meaning remains.
1. If naturalism is true, then meaning is indeterminate.
2. Meaning is determinate (a presupposition of reason and science).
3. Therfore, naturalism is false.
Thus, if the naturalist claims meaning is indeterminate, she undermines the basis for reason and science. But if the naturalist says meaning is determinate, she must give an explanation for this could be in a purely physical universe. Whether intentionality is accounted for by conceptual, causal, biological, or instrumental theories, the problem of determinate meaning remains.
