[split] Theistic VS Naturalistic morality

[theVOID]

That's bullshit fr0d0, my morality is not based on injustice at all

Yes your morality is based on injustice, because you accept that justice rarely happens. Of course your morality on the micro level has a solely positive purpose, there is, on the macro level, a huge limitation to that positivity, that would prevent your morality from being effective, and the point of the premise here, is that macro morality (as you seem confused about how to apply it) is only based on justice, and without the supernatural justice enforcer is illogical.

Do you even understand what morality is? It surely doesn't seem like it based on that utter nonsense.

And what do you mean by 'micro-level' and 'macro-level' morality? You're making up terms that don't exist in ethics, which isn't in it's self problematic, but you haven't defined and distinguished between the two. Are you talking about objective vs absolute morality?

Morality is a standard by which we judge action. We use the threat of justice as a deterrent for actions that are morally wrong and praise for actions that are morally right. The idea behind praise and condemnation is to instill moral ideas in ourselves and each other in order to remove or lessen the desire to commit wrong actions, thus there is no contingency upon justice being done because the threat of justice alone is sufficient in shaping behavior.

You can suppose all you like that there is an ultimate justice, and while it would be nice to think that every immoral action will be accounted for, it remains both wishful thinking and irrespective of all known effects of moral conditioning.

You need to read more of Kant's thoughts on morality, because you are making claims about applied morals that he never did, nor did he ever use 'macro' and 'micro' morality (whatever that means). I don't know of any ethicist who makes that distinction and that certainly wasn't what Kant was attempting to prove, he was trying to demonstrate that moral standards (the standards by which we judge action) are dependent on their being a God who balances all moral and immoral decisions. Kant has been long refuted on his false premise that morality is contingent upon justice (no surprise there, the argument is about 250 years old!)

No one is passing off responsibility, that's a red herring. The only reason posthumous justice could be required is if one accepts it as fact. Under or over addressing justice in the now would be equally wrong. This is supplementary to the topic in hand, and something which I hope we'd both agree upon.

I disagree, you want justice for all immoral action but there is none that can be demonstrated, so you pass responsibility for your 'ultimate justice' off to the deity. While it may satisfy you emotionally to hold those beliefs there remains no necessity for them.

I already agreed that in either model we have reason to bring justice, in your case it is to prevent further injustice, in mine it is both to prevent injustice and to satisfy the idea of justice it's self (to build the strength of the deterrent).

If we accept that our ideals will never be met, then what informs our morality is that injustice. Our conclusions have to be based on the reality of that shortfall. When our conclusions are based on perfect morality, then we are motivated to realise that moral standard.

We accept that justice may never be issued in all circumstances, that does not make morality based on 'injustice' in any way, it simply means that justice, while not being absolute, is still an effective deterrent against immoral behavior. Like I've said already, determining an action to be moral or immoral is not contingent upon justice being done.

You cannot in any way demonstrate that your belief in absolute justice makes your applied morality superior to those who do not believe in said justice (refer to Kant on this since you seem to base everything else on the argument from justice).

If we can both have 'real morality' that is indistinguishable from each other's while only one of us believes in ultimate justice, it clearly shows that belief in ultimate justice does nil in the way of determining right and wrong, nor does it affect our motivations for action. If we can establish a reason why we ought to act (categorically obligatory), and our competing moral theories provide entirely equal oughts (with the exception of blasphemy), then it can be demonstrated that ultimate justice is not a contingent factor in the establishment of moral standards.

Again, morality is a standard by which actions are judged, not the act of bringing justice to all action.

You always come back to this "command", which externalises God. To you that may be the case, but for Christians God inspires to love and never forces it.

It was an example of one of the two main theistic moral theories, I also referenced Divine attitude theory, you probably conform to that moral theory. Either way it does not change the point, ultimate justice simply has no impact on moral standards.

Morality is made perfect factoring in the posthumous supernatural judge. Take away that and morality is flawed because it isn't always the rationally correct solution. I think you're stumbling with the definition of morality Kant is using.

The deliverance of justice is made perfect by a just deity, the moral content does not change and you have failed to demonstrate how it does. Something does not become more or less moral because justice is now absolute. Rape is wrong whether justice is done or not, because it thwarts more and stronger desires than it promotes. Thus what I deem to be moral (under the framework of desire utilitarianism) is not contingent upon justice.

Kant was arguing that objective morality is dependent on ultimate justice, this is plain wrong. I have more than made it clear already, there are naturalistic moral frameworks that deliver equal ought statements without necessitating justice be done.

Perhaps you should stop using 250 year old moral arguments and catch up with the massive amount of progress that has been made in meta-ethics.

If justice isn't given then morality isn't rational.

From this point on it seems i will be repeating myself over and over... Hopefully by now you have understood that one's determination of what is morally permissible, obligatory and forbidden can be reached without the need for ultimate justice. I can achieve objective moral oughts without such an idea, and thus your assertion that i cannot is completely misguided. The event of justice does not change the moral standards in my framework.

You might be right in saying that the absence of ultimate justice in theistic moral theories renders morality inert, but I don't defend theistic morality, so you're shooting at a non-existent target.

Your moral conclusions are dogged by injustice.

My moral conclusions do not depend on justice. Moral decisions are the decisions that a moral person would make, and a moral person will always act in a way that tends to promote more and stronger desires than they thwart.

Justice achieves two things in this model: 1) A deterrent that we can use to impact ones consideration prior to action 2) Satisfaction for those affected by immoral action.

If that is the standard by which i arrive at moral oughts then there is clearly no necessity for justice under my moral framework. You seem to be stuck with a strawman stemming from your misguided understanding of what morality is.

How do you cope with the fact that justice isn't done? ...You accept the realism of life being unjust.. that's how. Therefore your moral conclusions are different.

How do i feel? Saddened, who wouldn't?. I would love it if every rapist was punished for their actions, but do I have any reason to believe that ultimate justice exists? No. Therefore i conclude that it does not. Luckily (and as i have demonstrated) morality can exist independent of ultimate justice.

I am more concerned with reality as it is known to be, not supposing the existence of factors that cannot be indicated or necessitated in order to make a model work. As always, if you can demonstrate or necessitate ultimate justice then I would change my mind, but you haven't done either so i have no reason to accept your moral theory (and thus your deity),

Also, Name one moral conclusion (unrelated to the vanity of your deity) that you would arrive at that I would not. I can tell you now that if it exists it will be trivial and very much debatable (like premarital sex).

Once you realise that you cannot you would have demonstrated what Kant was quick to point out, moral content is independent of belief in ultimate justice, as are the oughts that one concludes upon from various moral theories. Again, Kant argued for justice as being a necessary component for the existence of morality, this is no longer believed to be the case by the vast majority of (if not all) meta-ethicists, including theistic ones.

They're jaded. Mine are not jaded, because I believe justice is being done. My morality is based on a firm understanding where yours is baseless. How can the two be similar?

We attribute the origin of objective moral standards to different things, yours to a deity and thus ultimate justice may be necessary, however i do not require either a deity or ultimate justice for my moral standards.

Also, my morality does not depend on the non-demonstrated, thus is is epistemologically superior.

That's a flippant comment. Again you raise God as an external enforcer rather than a loving inspirer.

It was simply an example of one common theistic moral theory, i was not arguing against your position. Either theistic moral theory can be used to demonstrate my point. If i was specifically addressing you i would have used Divine attitude theory (which i assume is the theory you hold to? that being: "moral truths are grounded in the attitudes (or nature) of the deity").

What we would be saying by God condemning it would be that in true justice... it's wrong. We see that injustice, but we can't easily affect justice. With our limited knowledge we can try to correct the balance, but in actual fact, we don't know where that balance lies.

I would argue that we can know where the balance lies (due to the conclusions of desire utilitarianism) but we may not be able to enforce this balance.

We're inspired by our ideals of justice, and try to enact them. Factoring in God is the same thing, except we believe he is the ultimate judge. This takes away none of our responsibility to be just.

I am not inspired by justice, because as i have pointed out justice is a deterrent and a satisfaction, and my moral oughts come from neither.

And i never said it takes away our responsibility to be just, under no model is that the case. However the nature of justice does slightly change from naturalistic to theistic morality. Justice for you is at the most a way of preventing further injustice and satisfaction for the people affected by immorality. Under naturalistic models it is both a deterrent, a satisfaction and a necessity in all instances where enforcement is available, as it is the enforcement of justice in some cases that makes it a deterrent.

I would hope Kant would slap me in the face should I ever state such a thing. I don't have to demonstrate that I am more moral, that has nothing to do with it. The inclusion of a posthumously supernatural judge just makes me ABLE to be rationally moral, where the lack of the same makes you unable to.

I hope by now i have made it clear that justice is not required for morality in all moral theories, i am able to be moral based on standards that are not contingent upon ultimate justice being done (morality is always rational so I don't see what your conflation was for).

God (or same) is not required to establish the truth of moral propositions, he is required to make them happen.

I think this sentence alone shows your misunderstanding better than any, morality does not 'happen' it is a standard by which things are judged. The debate in ethics between theists and naturalists is in the establishment of these standards. If you want to argue about our ability to establish true moral propositions then that is a completely different debate.

You admit that we can establish the truth of moral propositions without God, and since all moral propositions are true (obligatory or forbidden) they ought or ought not to be done, therefore we can have oughts without god and without ultimate justice. If that is the case (which it is) then as Kant said "if you ought to do something then you have a reason to do it".

Thus, again, we have reasons to be moral without the existence of either a deity of ultimate justice.