[split] Theistic VS Naturalistic morality

[theVOID]

Do you even understand what morality is? It surely doesn't seem like it based on that utter nonsense.

I'm trying to explain what I mean to you, not classically define morals. You're being pedantic. And taking an aggressive attitude. Hardly conducive to learning.

I know what you mean, and to mean what you do makes you wrong. That's what i was trying to explain. You are wrong about morality being contingent upon justice.

And if your not using the standard definitions of morals then can you define exactly what you mean and it it's too different use another word.

No, I'm talking about the difference between a standard based on a narrow view of a subject and a complete view of a subject.

Standard and narrow in what way?

You need to be very specific if you are going to pull terms into the fray out of your own conception.

Basing your standard upon global rather than individual standards has to be better.

Agreed. Not just global though, this applies to all 'agents' or 'persons' that are relevant in the situation.

Justice has no influence on individuality because it can't. Therefore Kant is right. Looking at it globally, a rational morality founded on justice meted out makes for a different conclusion on what is moral (notice I'm not changing the meaning of moral. It means the same). If you cannot justify a moral action then how is it moral to you? If you can justify a moral action because you assume a posthumous judge, then you will arrive at a different moral conclusion.

You have bizarrely conflated 'Just' and 'Justice', it's as if you walked away from a philosophy text book with some massive flaws in your understanding.

Firstly, How can justice (the idea of) not have an impact on an individual? The known consequences if we are found guiltily of our actions, to an extent, informs one's decision making and their perception of morally right and morally wrong. If one is to be consistently condemned for immoral actions, praised for good actions and given examples of actions that will result in a just punishment then you can substantially change this persons sense of moral right and wrong, and you can affect their desires to perform actions that are morally right and morally wrong.

Secondly, I have no problem in 'justifying' morality (i'm using the word as it actually means now). A moral action in my meta-ethical framework, is an action that tends to promote more and greater desires than it thwarts.

Thirdly, i challenged you latter on in my prior post to name a moral conclusion that you can reach that i cannot, so i'll leave it till then.

You can suppose all you like that there is an ultimate justice, and while it would be nice to think that every immoral action will be accounted for, it remains both wishful thinking and irrespective of all known effects of moral conditioning.

It isn't irrespective though is it? It's proven here to be true. A moral decisions considering justice being rationally supported is different to a moral decision which accepts injustice. What Kant is saying is that a moral decision is as good as worthless without rational assent.

And as i have said numerous times now, I don't accept Kant's premise that rational morality is contingent upon justice. I have a moral framework that does not depend on justice to arrive at moral conclusions, nor does it require justice to justify acting morally. Desire utilitarianism is descriptive and prescriptive at the same time (there is no is/ought gap) because the things that a moral person would to are the things that should be done. You can't, as Kant said, have an ought to act without reason.

If i can establish an ought (which i have) then i simply do not need ultimate justice as a motivation to do moral things.

No one has suggested the responsibility is lifted from us except you in this fabrication of your own making. Please address the subject rather than your own fantasies if you'd like to honestly discuss this.

Can you or any other human or group of bring 'ultimate justice'? If not then it is perfectly true that you want ultimate justice but can't achieve it, therefore it is (correctly put) "Passed of to a deity". This is a trivially true statement based on the very conditions that you stated, those being that 1)humans can't bring ultimate justice 2) you want ultimate justice and 3) God can provide ultimate justice. So i don't see what your objection could be other than a misunderstanding.

I think it's more that the increased rational potential of my model means that I can adopt your model and add mine on top.

God is superfluous in Desire Utilitarianism, so you can adopt both if you like, but all you would have achieved is sticking god into a theory that doesn't require him. You've essentially made God a desire utilitarian Cop, after all, his nature would be one that promotes more desires than it thwarts, and the immoral decision is to do the opposite (both because it's against Desirism and God's nature), so everything moral is the same and we (and god's nature) have the same reasons for acting (or being in his case) moral. Because God is rational and moral yet not subject to justice, this again demonstrates that Justice is an extra and one can be fully compliant and rational in terms of a desire utilitarian morality without being subject to justice.

Also, you have not demonstrated that it is more rational to act in a system where there is ultimate justice. It is morally wrong to act when the desires thwarted are more and stronger than the desires promoted. If it is moral it is rational (Kant, again) and this is without morally wrong needing to be defined as "an act against the nature of a divine being that will be punished for being committed".

So again, justice just simply does not factor (as moral oughts are already rational). It certainly is extra, not rationally, but motivationally, because not morality coincides with self interest.

Well Kant's model is the subject here. No it doesn't make the application superior just the potential.

The potential to be good or rational? Something is either rational or not, moral oughts are already rational, therefore you can't become more rational than you are already are by being moral. The justice simply doesn't inform moral decisions, it only comes in later as an implication of being moral. Either way, if it provides no more reason for being moral then the only reason you have is because you want ultimate justice, and without a way to demonstrate or necessitate it, it's just plain wishful thinking.

Our moral conclusions are different, and that influences our actions.

Can you demonstrate that we come to different 'serious' conclusions? Not the conclusions that involve harm only being done to your God's feelings... As you know i couldn't care less for the feelings of a being that I do not believe exists.

Agreed. Morality is affected by the reasoning for it. The effect is what we're talking about here, not the concept of morality.

You already conceded that there is no difference in moral content or action that can be demonstrated, and now you admit that morality can be rational (the establishment of moral oughts) without ultimate (or any) justice. So what is the effect of moral action that you are talking about? If it involves offending your god then i don't give a shit honestly, i don't think he exists, but beyond that i can't think of any moral difference that isn't completely trivial and necessarily informed by some of God's preferences, and since i believe God's preferences exist you would be the one who has a moral theory in error (and that also means that neither you or the God are desire utilitarians, so you can't possibly adopt it plus extra).

That it's logical for me and illogical for you makes the moral answer different. Justice in the only factor in the two different answers.

You haven't in any way shown that it's illogical to act morally without justice. I have provided you with my model, shown that it can present ought statements about moral actions and shown that it does not in any way depend on justice, nor do any of it's conclusions.

For the last time. I reject the premise that justice is necessary for morality to be rational. If you have an argument that shows why my model requires justice then present it, but if not then you are arguing a strawman. You're idea of ultimate justice is wishful thinking, that's not something that comes close to satisfying my epistemic standard.

Well it becomes either rational or irrational... I don't see how you can agree on a moral standard that you think is irrational.

It's not irrational at all, you have not shown why cant's argument that rational morality is contingent upon ultimate justice is true and i have presented a moral theory that completely refutes that conclusion for the following reasons:

1) If something ought to be done then we have reason to do it
2) Because morality is rational and I have achieved moral oughts I therefore have a rational reason to act.
3) If i already had a rational reason to act irrespective of justice, then justice necessarily has no impact on the rationality of my moral decisions.

I would agree that rape is immoral. A moral framework that rationalised a chance of injustice would cause the rapist to consider if rape was really worth it. The odds are better for the rapist without the posthumous judge, therefore his moral 'standards' can be lower. It works the other way for praiseworthy acts too.

*Facepalm*

The rapist already thinks rape is worth it, irrespective of whether they acknowledge right and wrong. That is evinced by the rape it's self. Let me remind you that there are plenty of Christian rapists (proportionally more than non-religious) that have raped people, especially children. If ultimate justice were really as an effective deterrent as you think then the number of theistic rapists should be lower than those of a non-believer in ultimate justice.

You are making the very argument that you have said multiple times already was bullshit, the same argument that Kant himself shot down time and time again, you even said you'd hoped Kant would slap you in the face for making it! There is no correlation between the belief in ultimate justice and one's reasons for being moral, nor their ability to be moral. You have said before you agreed with Kant and now you have completely contradicted yourself!

You have a long way to go in hashing out this argument mate.

I didn't say morality 'happens' I said moral 'propositions happen'.

Which is also false... Moral propositions are phrased like "It is wrong to rape" and "it is good to give to charity". These are not things that can happen.