Elsewhere Metis claimed to have a Masters of Divinity and that he teaches Thomist theology. That boast puzzles me since all his objections have nothing to do with the actual demonstrations found in the Summa.
Against Objections to the First Way
First, Metis asserts that the argument is fallacious but makes no attempt to identify a faulty premise or gaps in its logic. By asking “What motivated God to make the first move?” and “If nothing can move itself, how then was God able to move himself?” he simply restates the ancient dilemma debated by Parmenides and Heraclitus: “How is it that things preserve their being while undergoing change?” Metis ignores the fact that Aristotle solved that dilemma 1,500 years before Aquinas penned the 1W. Aristotle distinguished between what could potentially exist and what actually does and that distinction serves as the foundation for the 1W. As the first member of the essentially order series Aquinas’s Unmoved Mover sits on the far end of the potential-actual spectrum in full actuality. There is nothing into which He could change, thus questions about what changes/moves God and what motivated God to make the first move are meaningless.
Secondly, Metis proposes that an impersonal force could meet all the requirements of an unmoved mover (thereby admitting that an Unmoved Mover is required). Two points: 1) Aquinas calls the Unmoved Mover God, because the UMM satisfies the divine role of Creator and 2) it was never the intent of the 1W to demonstrate the intelligence of the Unmoved Mover. That honor goes to the 5W.
Metis further makes reference to modern cosmology. However the UMM argument concerns what is logically prior to the subjects of modern cosmology. The 1W shows that regardless of whether the Unmoved Mover is intelligent or not, it must be something distinct from the physical universe, since the pre-Big Bang singularity represents the universe ‘in potentia’ and in need of another, the UMM, to actualize.
Against Objections to the Second Way
Admittedly my defense of the 2W in my opening remarks was brief. This may explain why Metis’s attempt to refute the First Cause (FC) of the 2W, sets up a straw man with rhetorical questions like, “What caused God to exist?” These objections are based on a widespread misunderstanding that Metis should, as a M.Div. have avoided. The 2W works regardless of whether the universe eternally exists, fully encloses space-time, or began at a time 0. The FC sustains subsequent causes not from eternity (in kalam-style formulations); but rather sustains them eternally across time. As I explained in my opening remarks, the FC operates at the most metaphysically fundamental level of reality, sustaining every subsequent efficient cause during any given single process. that occurs at any given time.
This interpretation is clearly supported by Aquinas’s statement that the 2W concerns the nature of efficient causes. As such, the 2W rests on a basic understanding of cause-effect relationships. An efficient cause is that which performs the effect as part of a process. The effect is the state of affairs produced during that process. Efficient causes are things. Effects are the resulting actions. What broke the window? A brick. What did the brick do? It shattered glass. The brick was present during the shattering but the shattering depends on the presence of the brick.
Metis suggests that quantum fluctuations are better models for explain the creation of particles. Here he repeats the mistakes of Democritus and Epicurus. If there were indeed an infinite number of indivisible parts (quarks & leptons) popping in and out of a plenum (quantum vacuum) The vacuum does not represent a fully actualized being; but rather, existence ‘in potentia’ and could not serve as the UMM of the 1W.
Against Objections to 3W
Metis’s objection to 3W is “so bad it isn’t even wrong”. No wonder he thinks that modern physics has no strict definitions of the Scholastic terms when he states, “…matter and energy are indeed mutually dependent and their contingency and necessity are reflexive.” Anyone that knows Thomist philosophy should knows the proper terms and how they are used. Potential stands opposite actuality, not necessity. Necessity stand opposite possible, not contingency.
Secondly Metis makes the surprising assertion that “In a universe as chaotic as ours, things may exist without necessarily being dependent of other things.” Since, he provides no examples of fully independent things then I can only speculate.
Against Objection to 4W
Metis’s objection to the 4W can be summarized thus: “If God is absolute perfection then surely that must also mean he is the perfection of all the negative attributes too?”
The very idea that negative attributes can be perfected is absurd. The very notion of perfection is based on how completely something instantiates an ideal form. For example, a yield sign, three dots on a paper, and a piece of spanakopita all, to various degrees embody the idea of a triangle. Anyone can see that some instances of triangles are better examples than others. The worse examples are those that most lacking with respect to triangularity. Negative attributes, like evil, ugliness, and falsity are privations, nothing more than the lack of goods that ought to be present.
Against Objection to 5W
Ready, fire, aim. Metis conflates the 5W with intelligent design. He also conflates the immanent teleology of Aristotle with the extrinsic teleology of Paley. The teleology of Aquinas is more subtle than either. Aquinas accepts Aristotle’s distinction between art and nature, thus he knows better than to compare biological systems, like giraffes, with objects designed for a purpose, like watches. Instead the Angelic Doctor, attributes teleology only to true substances (regardless of whether they are animate or not) and not accidental ones. If Metis wishes to present an objection to the 5W, he would be wise to make an objection to the argument Aquinas makes rather that the argument he wishes Aquinas had made.
Secondly, Metis asks, “If a complex object needs a creator or designer, what could be more complex than a super-intelligent, all-powerful God?” If he was truly a student of divinity he would know that Aquinas demonstrates the Simplicity of God in Question 3 of the Summa Theologica, which is beyond the scope of this debate.
Against Objections to the First Way
First, Metis asserts that the argument is fallacious but makes no attempt to identify a faulty premise or gaps in its logic. By asking “What motivated God to make the first move?” and “If nothing can move itself, how then was God able to move himself?” he simply restates the ancient dilemma debated by Parmenides and Heraclitus: “How is it that things preserve their being while undergoing change?” Metis ignores the fact that Aristotle solved that dilemma 1,500 years before Aquinas penned the 1W. Aristotle distinguished between what could potentially exist and what actually does and that distinction serves as the foundation for the 1W. As the first member of the essentially order series Aquinas’s Unmoved Mover sits on the far end of the potential-actual spectrum in full actuality. There is nothing into which He could change, thus questions about what changes/moves God and what motivated God to make the first move are meaningless.
Secondly, Metis proposes that an impersonal force could meet all the requirements of an unmoved mover (thereby admitting that an Unmoved Mover is required). Two points: 1) Aquinas calls the Unmoved Mover God, because the UMM satisfies the divine role of Creator and 2) it was never the intent of the 1W to demonstrate the intelligence of the Unmoved Mover. That honor goes to the 5W.
Metis further makes reference to modern cosmology. However the UMM argument concerns what is logically prior to the subjects of modern cosmology. The 1W shows that regardless of whether the Unmoved Mover is intelligent or not, it must be something distinct from the physical universe, since the pre-Big Bang singularity represents the universe ‘in potentia’ and in need of another, the UMM, to actualize.
Against Objections to the Second Way
Admittedly my defense of the 2W in my opening remarks was brief. This may explain why Metis’s attempt to refute the First Cause (FC) of the 2W, sets up a straw man with rhetorical questions like, “What caused God to exist?” These objections are based on a widespread misunderstanding that Metis should, as a M.Div. have avoided. The 2W works regardless of whether the universe eternally exists, fully encloses space-time, or began at a time 0. The FC sustains subsequent causes not from eternity (in kalam-style formulations); but rather sustains them eternally across time. As I explained in my opening remarks, the FC operates at the most metaphysically fundamental level of reality, sustaining every subsequent efficient cause during any given single process. that occurs at any given time.
This interpretation is clearly supported by Aquinas’s statement that the 2W concerns the nature of efficient causes. As such, the 2W rests on a basic understanding of cause-effect relationships. An efficient cause is that which performs the effect as part of a process. The effect is the state of affairs produced during that process. Efficient causes are things. Effects are the resulting actions. What broke the window? A brick. What did the brick do? It shattered glass. The brick was present during the shattering but the shattering depends on the presence of the brick.
Metis suggests that quantum fluctuations are better models for explain the creation of particles. Here he repeats the mistakes of Democritus and Epicurus. If there were indeed an infinite number of indivisible parts (quarks & leptons) popping in and out of a plenum (quantum vacuum) The vacuum does not represent a fully actualized being; but rather, existence ‘in potentia’ and could not serve as the UMM of the 1W.
Against Objections to 3W
Metis’s objection to 3W is “so bad it isn’t even wrong”. No wonder he thinks that modern physics has no strict definitions of the Scholastic terms when he states, “…matter and energy are indeed mutually dependent and their contingency and necessity are reflexive.” Anyone that knows Thomist philosophy should knows the proper terms and how they are used. Potential stands opposite actuality, not necessity. Necessity stand opposite possible, not contingency.
Secondly Metis makes the surprising assertion that “In a universe as chaotic as ours, things may exist without necessarily being dependent of other things.” Since, he provides no examples of fully independent things then I can only speculate.
Against Objection to 4W
Metis’s objection to the 4W can be summarized thus: “If God is absolute perfection then surely that must also mean he is the perfection of all the negative attributes too?”
The very idea that negative attributes can be perfected is absurd. The very notion of perfection is based on how completely something instantiates an ideal form. For example, a yield sign, three dots on a paper, and a piece of spanakopita all, to various degrees embody the idea of a triangle. Anyone can see that some instances of triangles are better examples than others. The worse examples are those that most lacking with respect to triangularity. Negative attributes, like evil, ugliness, and falsity are privations, nothing more than the lack of goods that ought to be present.
Against Objection to 5W
Ready, fire, aim. Metis conflates the 5W with intelligent design. He also conflates the immanent teleology of Aristotle with the extrinsic teleology of Paley. The teleology of Aquinas is more subtle than either. Aquinas accepts Aristotle’s distinction between art and nature, thus he knows better than to compare biological systems, like giraffes, with objects designed for a purpose, like watches. Instead the Angelic Doctor, attributes teleology only to true substances (regardless of whether they are animate or not) and not accidental ones. If Metis wishes to present an objection to the 5W, he would be wise to make an objection to the argument Aquinas makes rather that the argument he wishes Aquinas had made.
Secondly, Metis asks, “If a complex object needs a creator or designer, what could be more complex than a super-intelligent, all-powerful God?” If he was truly a student of divinity he would know that Aquinas demonstrates the Simplicity of God in Question 3 of the Summa Theologica, which is beyond the scope of this debate.
