Arguments for God's Existence from Contingency

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The Argument from Contingency (Leibnizian)

To restate the specific formulation of the argument I used from earlier in the thread:
(1) Anything that exists has an explanation of its existence (either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause).
(2) If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
(3) The universe exists.
(4) Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence. (from 1, 3)
(5) Therefore, the explanation of the existence of the universe is God. (from 2, 4)

Before you start responding that such and such premise is false, these are not just assertions. There are reasons supporting each one.

Discussion on (1). The Causal Principle (CP) tells us that causes always yield explanations. However, we can make a stronger case that simply the CP. Therefore, Premise 1 is supported by The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). To avoid a discussion about conjunctive contingent facts and free will, we can use the revised-PSR (R-PSR) which can be defined as

(6) Every proposition that possibly has an explanation actually has an explanation.

The R-PSR is a metaphysical principle that seems reasonable to take as a necessary truth. Therefore, necessarily, every proposition reporting a wholly contingent, positive state of affairs can have an explanation. Reasons to believe the R-PSR:

a. it is self-evident.
b. the epistemological argument. If we admit that some contingent states of affairs has no explanation, then empirical truths cannot be known because you can never be sure if any state of affairs has no explanation. 
c. Theories like that of evolution depend on a version of the PSR
d. Inference to the Best Explanation (a foundation of science) relies on a version of the PSR.
e. Lack of examples where the R-PSR does not apply.
f. Alethic modality relies on a version of the PSR.
g. Philosophical and Moral reasoning relies on a version of the PSR. 

(7) Let the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact (BCCF) be defined as the conjunction of all contingently true propositions. 

Lets make the BCCF p and according to the PSR, p has an explanation, call it q. What is q like? There are two options: either q is contingent or it is necessary. If q is contingent then q is contained in p and is therefore self-explanatory. So, q must be self-explanatory or necessary. But self-explanatory means that contingent entities must be able to collectively or individually explain their own existence. But the existence of a cause must be explanatorily prior to the existence of the effect but nothing can be explanatorily prior to itself. So the cause of the BCCF must be something necessary. 

I will address the next two premises and conclusions in a future post, but wanted to stop here in case anyone wants to debate premise 1 or object to the PSR. 

Reference: the discussion on the PSR and R-PSR relies heavily on information found in The Leibnizian Cosmoloical Argument, Essay by Alexander R. Pruss; Blackwells Companion to Natural Theology, 2012; pages 24-100

So basically, your argument boils down to demonstrating that the universe is contingent. I'm not sure how you can credibly make that case, given the fact that we can't say anything with certainty about the state of affairs 'prior' to the expansion ("big bang" if you prefer). Nevertheless, I look forward to reading your argument in favor of (2).