The Modal Ontological Argument - Without Modal Logic

[MindForgedManacle]

good because i would hate this to simply be ad hominem exchange.

Perhaps you should look up what an ad hominem is.

if you read the purpose, you would realize this objection is irrelevant to the purpose. but you do seem to have a nag for missing details of my posts. and i'm sure you have several failed arguments to support your position such as the ones we most recently discussed. but that's your prerogative if you want to hold onto failed arguments.

Part of the purpose of your argument is that you explicitly claim this argument "disproves atheism". So it is hardly my fault you forget the details of your own posts. Nor can I think of a failed argument that I hold on to, but I can think of at least 2 or 3 that you do.

there are 2 aspects of omnipotence. an active aspect: the ability to do anything logically possible; and a descriptive aspect: cannot be vulnerable or overcome by anything. the descriptive aspect is what makes P3 correct. if God were made of matter, he would be vulnerable which contradicts his omnipotence so he can't be made of matter.

and if you're dissatisfied with that definition then, like with most all your objections, i can simply change the semantics by replacing the word 'omnipotence' with 'omni-invulnerability' or something. maybe someday you'll realize how silly it is to argue semantics.

I actually did read it, but the second part was complete hand-waving. Again I'll repeat what you dodged: What does being contingent have to do, AT ALL, with being able to be overcome? You asserted that with no defense whatsoever. Nor would God being contingent mean he was made of matter.

Sure, you can change what you mean by words, you're not consistent. However, one day you'll get, as philosophers have longsince known, that semantics are actually important.

not the way i'm using the word conceivable. i think the argument would look a little better if i replaced the word conceivable with coherent since that's a better word to use here. but regardless, i'm using metaphysical possibility from P1, showing it's logical implication of metaphysical necessity, and showing metaphysical necessity entails actual existence.

This is why I said you need to read up some more. I wasn't insulting, I meant it because you have no idea what you're talking about. There is ONLY one way to demonstrate actual metaphysical possibility and that's by being shown to exist. The reason why is because simply being unable to find the incoherency in a concept doesn't actually mean it's coherent. Without a demonstration of existence, you ONLY have epistemic possibility because you only have your own limited set of knowledge.

To drive this home: How do you know what's coherent? Based on what you can conceive. So you're just pushing things back and doing exactly what I said: Pretending to have demonstrated metaphysical possibility.

Φ is metaphysically possible if and only if Φ is true in some metaphysically possible world.
Example: It is metaphysically possible that some physical particle moves faster than the speed of light.

Φ is metaphysically necessary if and only if Φ is true in all metaphysically possible worlds.
Example: It is metaphysically necessary that Queen Elizabeth is a human.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modali...stemology/

Hah! Do you even READ what you quote? For one, faster-than-light particles are ALREADY theoretically possible, such as Tacyons, so inasmuch as one accepts that science talks about the world as it is, FTL particles is possible. But we don't even need that. We already know that motion is possible, so motion at any particular rate implies not contradiction or impossibility given a different kind of universe.

what you seem to miss is that argument can only be valid given the modal ontological argument is valid (which you obviously don't think is true). otherwise possibility of naturalism in a possible world doesn't at all show impossibility of God in a possible world. so if hypothetically we were to say the MOA is valid, then your modal naturalism argument would be valid; however, you can only show P1 is true by showing P1 of the MOA is false. so it still doesn't get around debunking the MOA even if your argument is valid.

I'm using "valid" in the sense of logic. In other words, my argument has NO fallacies, ergo valid. It's soundness can be disputed, but only by disputing one of the premises, namely the 2nd one.

Now, what you've clearly missed is that this argument stalemates your argument and the MOA because both (or at least Plantinga's is) are valid, but they stalemate. This shows that using this kind of argument is completely useless here, because the opposing argument can be equally valid, which was the point of my argument: Neither it nor yours shows anything.