The Modal Ontological Argument - Without Modal Logic

[Rational AKD]

And as I thought, you really didn't have an answer. If God, say, popped into existence ex nihilo his existence would be contingent, yet that has nothing to do with diminishing omnipotence in the slightest. If you got rid of that event, then you'd get rid of God, sure. But then it becomes a "so what?" moment. God is still capable of doing anything logically possible (for the most part) regardless. Now, you can add to the concept of omnipotence that it must include non-contingence, but you are trying to disguise what you're doing.
And again, if God were contingent, why would that mean he was made of matter?

to pop into existance ex nihilo is impossible. nothing is the absence of anything, which means no things, no properties, no anything. as such, nothing can't "do" anything. if something popped into existence, caused by nothing, you would essentially be saying nothing caused something which is logically absurd. if something exists and it is possible for it not to exist, there must be a reason it exists rather than not.

How can I know that when all I have is epistemic possibility?

so Stanford is wrong then? also i think it's funny you think something can only be known metaphysically possible if it is physically demonstrated. yet what if the metaphysically possibility is known a priori? for example, logic dictates its metaphysical possibility. then according to Kant, such a thing would be "necessarily possible" which can simply be reduced to possible using axiom S5 (the one you hate so much even though there's nothing wrong with it).

Er, hence "theoretical" in my post. But hey, ignoring words is your game so by all means continue.

you claimed it was theoretical as though that is proof it is metaphysically possible yet it's not even shown to be mathematically possible yet. this was after you claimed you can only show it is metaphysically possible if it is demonstrated. you were intentionally misleading as an attempt to avoid admitting defeat concerning the Stanford example.

In a real sense, all I have is epistemic possibility that it's possible. After all, it hasn't been demonstrated, and is as far as we know physically impossible in this world. So sure, within the language-game of an epistemic-metaphysical distinction, I only have epistemic possibility, and so do you, about certain things. Of course, whichever stance you take on this distinction, accept or reject, basically defeats your argument because on the former the argument is inert and on the latter it is stalemated, hence why I say it's useless for this sort of thing.

not even Kant would agree with you there. he gives distinction between a priori and a posteriori and both are said to prove metaphysical possibility or necessity. you're making your own baseless assertions.

Are you referring to Madoyle's argument? Both of tye versions of his argument run into the same problem as Plantinga's argument. How does Maydoyle know that "great-making" properties are better to have than to lack? How does Maydoyle know that certain

that is how they are defined. if X is a perfection, then it is better to have X than lack it. this would be what is called a priori, just as 2+2=4 is a priori. so how does this come into play?
1. greater making properties don't entail their negation of lesser making properties.
2. omnipotence is a maximally great making property.
3. therefore omnipotence cannot entail its negation of non-omnipotence.
since it can't entail its negation, it can't be impossible which means it is possible.

"great-making" properties are even compatible when held by the same object? Again, confusing epistemology with metaphysics.

in this case, there is only one great making property necessary here. so there's no conflict between multiple great making properties.

..WHAT? No. To be logically valid is to say the argument's conclusion follows from the premises

that's a rewording of what i said. the conclusion follows (or is true) from the premises. you can also say the truth of the conclusion is directly related to the truth of the premises. again, you're playing semantics. and the way i worded it is also worded similarly in many sources:

A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

An argument is valid just if it would be impossible for its premises all to be true and its conclusion false simultaneously.
http://logic.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/tutorial1/Tut1-07.htm

A valid argument is one in which the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of its conclusion.
http://www.unc.edu/~megw/Logic.html

i.e free from logical fallacies.

no. an argument without a logical fallacy can still be invalid. furthermore, an argument with an informal fallacy can still be a valid argument.

SOUNDNESS deals in the actual truth of the premises themselves.

yes, it is sound if it is valid and the premises are true.

If there is even a SINGLE possible world in which metaphysical naturalism is true, then God cannot exist, period. Why? Just think about your own argument and take into account what Alex K has been trying to tell you. God is defined as a necessary being. A being who, if and ONLY IF he exists, he exists in all possible states of affairs. But if there is even ONE possible world that is a Metaphysically natural one, God does not exist there. But if God does not exist in any possible world, he exists in none of them because God only exists if he exists in all possible worlds by your own argument.

is that not what i said from the beginning? you really need to learn how to listen..

what you seem to miss is that argument can only be valid given the modal ontological argument is valid (which you obviously don't think is true).

and i also answered why it's not a stalemate.

so if hypothetically we were to say the MOA is valid, then your modal naturalism argument would be valid; however, you can only show P1 is true by showing P1 of the MOA is false. so it still doesn't get around debunking the MOA even if your argument is valid.

so in other words if the MOA is valid then yes, if naturalism is true in one possible world God doesn't exist in any. but that also means in order to show naturalism is true in a possible world, you must show P1 of the MOA is false. so it still all comes down to proving P1 is false. the MOA in this case has a clear advantage because you must prove it is necessary God doesn't exist in order to prove P1 MOA false and i must only prove it is possible God exists to prove P1 MOA true. this is the problem you have in building the validity of your argument upon the validity of an opposing one.

Hence, the only way to to defeat this is to say that metaphysical naturalism is incoherent, and thus not true in any possible world.

wrong. again, you built the validity of that argument upon the validity of the MOA. if the MOA is invalid, so is your argument. but, if the MOA is valid, then if P1 is true then P1 in your argument is false. so you must prove P1 of the MOA false to prove P1 of your argument true. it is not a stalemate.

A god that is made of anything can be affected by some thing, even if not matter.

this is not the problem. the problem is if it can be broken down or destroyed. if something is comprised of an indestructible fundamental substance, then it can be omnipotent. i would argue mind is this substance.

The brain is produced by the mind?

yes, all matter is derived from mind.

So you admit to a lack of evidence?

no, i'm pointing out your lack of evidence.

At the very least, lack of evidence for independent sentiencies should not lead to the conclusion that they are likely to exist.

i never once said that. i said that means you can't rule it out.

I recall you saying that something is metaphysically possible so long as it is not internally contradictory. How about physically?

unless the concept is physical in nature and has a property that contradicts its physical nature then no.

Φ is metaphysically possible if and only if Φ is true in some metaphysically possible world.
Example: It is metaphysically possible that some physical particle moves faster than the speed of light.
...
Φ is physically possible with respect to physical laws L if and only if Φ is logically consistent with L.
Example: Given the actual laws of physics, it is physically possible for a train to travel at 150 mph.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modali...stemology/

Energy is not matter, agreed.

mind can't be broken down to energy either.

Is dualism falsifiable? If not, then there is no point in discussing it.

if you mean substance dualism, then yes actually. 2 substances can only interact if they share a property. for mind and matter to interact, either mind must have a physical property with matter or matter must have a mental property with mind. substance dualism states both mind and matter are fundamental. but if both are fundamental, they can't share a property and therefore they can't interact. this falsifies substance dualism. and this goes a little into the introspective argument.

Laws of nature and laws of logic, only.

first, you are making an arbitrary limitation. if those laws can be necessary, then why can't anything else be necessary? second, laws of nature are not necessary, or at least not metaphysically necessary. we can easily imagine a world where nature is different. what if relativity wasn't true? what if friction didn't produce heat but instead some other energy? what if energy can be created and destroyed? such things are physically impossible in our world, but they are not metaphysically impossible.

I don't think that the truths are necessary, per se, rather, they are axiomatic. For all I we know, the universe could have had very different laws of physics for whatever reason.

that goes back to what i just said. laws of nature can be different, laws of logic cannot. among non-falsifiable things are: law of identity, law of non-contradiction, and law of excluded middle.

So, if I define the wonderful cosmic cheeseburger as "a non-physical entity that projects the illusion of a cheeseburger into people's minds, whose existence is not contingent on anything, but is otherwise limited in power", does it now exist?

Déjà vu. we've been through this before and you've forgotten everything. a cheeseburger only has physical properties. an immaterial cheese burger would have no properties. so all you're doing is saying "what if this thing, which is nothing, had omnipotence?"

In fact, would said cheeseburger not be more likely to exist, because it is not infinite?

God is not infinite in a mathematical sense. he is only infinite in a valued sense.

Surely true omnipotence would require infinite power

no, it only requires total power over everything. if everything is not infinite, neither is omnipotence.

I again direct you to objection one.

the argument deduces that conclusion, not arbitrarily adds it. unless omnipotence is impossible, it is metaphysically necessary. thus an omnipotent being is either impossible or necessary.

Biologist Richard Dawkins, in his book The God Delusion, rejects the argument as "infantile". Noting that he is "a scientist rather than a philosopher", he writes: "The very idea that such grand conclusions should follow from such logomachist trickery offends me aesthetically." Also, he feels a "deep suspicion of any line of reasoning that reached such a significant conclusion without feeding in a single piece of data from the real world."

except it does feed a single piece of data from the real world. this is in P1. that premise is a statement about the real world, because modal properties can still be real world properties. for example, it is impossible for rocks to condensate. this is a real world property that is modal in nature.