Supreme Court Same Sex Marriage Argumet

[Esquilax]

1.  Anthropologically speaking (and in accordance with history within the United States) marriage was primarily an institution to establish the legitimate heir (procreation centric), particularly of nobility (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marriage#Re...tom_or_law).  This is made more evident in that historically women were not allowed to own property in which case her property and security were determined by the inheritance of her child.  Marriage served this same function unchanged in the US until the 1970s (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legitimacy_...ily_law%29) at which time marriage did not abandon its procreation centric definition, but was expanded to include illegitimate heirs.

First of all, it's interesting to see that now you acknowledge that the definition of marriage can be altered or expanded without allowing every other kind of expansion; could you tell us why the expansion you mention doesn't fall victim to the slippery slope, but the other does?

Secondly, marriage has changed quite a bit more than just that one expansion, and it would not only be remiss not to take the current social climate surrounding it into account, it would actually be an argument from tradition; in fact, that's one of the larger overarching problems with your contention to begin with. "That's the way we've always done it," does not entail that that's the way it should be done, nor does it preclude a selective shift in the way we approach the topic, as you've claimed that it does; if we take away the procreative focus of marriage, if I were to fully accept your premises, that does not prohibit us from replacing that focus with something more in keeping with the current conception of marriage that robs you of your slippery slope. Even if your premises are correct, your conclusion doesn't follow.

Another thought occurs; considering your previous claim that marriage is for procreation, some of the things you listed in your gay marriage slippery slope stick out as odd. Why would polygamy be on that list, if marriage is for procreation? Multiple wives means multiple pregnancies, which only serves to enhance what you seem to see as the definition of marriage, so why preclude it? Oh, and children reach the biological age where they can bear children before the age of consent, so why would you be against child marriage, given your previous premises?

These are all objections I could use, cheap shots I could take, were I to accept your premise, but I don't particularly want to because I don't think they serve either of us very well; it's plain to see that, in fact, there are more than one factor involved in determinations of marriage, for both our positions. I suggest that we both accept that and move on; this would require that you drop this false dichotomy that either marriage has this procreative focus, or no focus at all. In practice, we both understand that there is a more complicated matrimonial metric involved.

2.  Regarding marriage of infertility, elderly, and those with out the intention to procreate (a point brought up in the oar arguments by Ginsburg).  Respondents stipulate inquiry into the procreative ability or intention of parties to marry would constitute a violation of 4th amendment rights to privacy.  Respondents further state that any definition of marriage shall be over and under inclusive (http://definitions.uslegal.com/o/over-inclusive/), where procreative over inclusiveness allows for the legal marriage of infertile, elderly, and non-procreation intending parties.  Respondent further emphasizes the Supreme court has held that over or under inclusivness in and of itself does not constitute invidious discrimination and a violation of the equal protection clause.  Respondent also comments how a heterosexual couple in their elder years are still fertile (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pregnancy_over_age_50) and have natural conception.

Wouldn't a consistent application of this over-inclusiveness permit gay marriage under the same principles? If you can't inquire into the procreative intentions or ability of straight couples without violating their fourth amendment rights, then the same applies to gay couples; or do their fourth amendment rights not matter in this equation? Gay people may not be able to literally procreate in the first possible way we might think of, but they can still have and raise offspring, via surrogacy or adoption, so the assumption that they just cannot procreate holds no value, especially since we don't question the legitimacy of straight adoptive or surrogate parents. There is simply no argument against this point that doesn't special plead in some way.

3.  As argued by respondent, the only right the government or states have in regards to marriage is due to the children.  The government does not have a right to police private relationships unless said policing satisfies strict scrutiny.  Strict scrutiny requires the government to have a compelling interest, which respondent stipulates the state's have in regards to children and population under marriage as procreation centric.  Respondent further argues that were marriage to be adult centric and not procreation centric than the state could not approve or disapprove as the state would lack a compelling interest to interject in the private associations of people.  

Which still bears out an inconsistency regarding adoption and so on; even under your premises, gay couples can still have and raise children in a way that you would accept if the couple were straight. If a straight couple raising an adopted child would satisfy your definition of a procreative marriage, then there is no reason to exclude a gay couple from that category. If a straight couple raising an adopted child would not satisfy your definition then you are contradicting the way the law operates in these cases, and bringing into question the legitimacy of adoption practices. Either way, you're stuck.
 

Indeed they are being overly broad and simplistic.  But it may be stated that you are being unrealistic.  To endeavor to go on a case by case basis is to say there is particular application of the law(s) and thus we should opt to act against equal protection for a more tailored approach (regardless of limited time and resources)

By "case by case" I don't mean individual cases, though; I mean individual legal terms. Essentially, you'd have gay marriage considered on its own terms, by its own merits, and the same would be true of polygamous marriages, etc etc, and you'd get different determinations based on the benefits and detriments inherent to each of them, rather than treating them all as one homogenous slippery slope, which is disingenuous given that it's easy to see the differences between them.