Does a God exist?

[Ignorant]

Ok... with you so far... but I don't see how this relates to anything...

Hi pocaracas, I appreciate your feedback. Like i said initially, I don't pretend that my own presentation of an argument will be very convincing to you because I am very sure you're just as familiar with the arguments as I am. So in regard to what follows, I hope you will understand it to be my attempt to clarify misunderstanding or my own poor expression of ideas (as opposed to my 'digging in' and trying to 'win' any point). Again thanks for your thoughts.

You cannot say that something unobserved cannot exist. That's the whole point of there being agnostics.

I'd say that, in general, you are quite right, but I think anyone can and should say that a square circle cannot exist. It is not because we don't observe a square circle that we say it cannot exist. We say it cannot exist because, in principle, its existence is [not] possible. No one needs to be agnostic on the existence of square circles. An actual infinity of things is not as existentially contradictory as a square circle, but it is close (at least by my account).

To be clear, I did not put forth LA as deriving from EE(b). I proposed it because I hold it axiomatically. What is a finite aggregate of infinite elements? <= For me that is like asking what is a square circle.

It seems to me that you're trying to mix up two different concepts of "existing".
The empirical existing, that which is bound by the physics of our Universe.
And the meta-existing, that which is not bound by the physics of our Universe.

Well, if I made it seem that way, then I apologize. I meant to begin from the evident: some things exist "bound" (I chose the concept of conditional existence, but 'bound' works fine) by the existence of some other simultaneously existing thing (e.g. you proposed the physics of our universe). Logic only allows for two possibly true realities if that evidence is reliable: either ALL things are 'bound' in this way, or some things are not bound in this way. I don't pretend to fully know what it means to exist in a way that is not 'bound' by anything at all, but (I find) that the evidence points to the reality of this strange sort of existence, this meta-existing as you put it. This is why I thought defining god before the discussion seems backwards. Instead, the evidence of 'our' way of existing points to some 'thing' (if you can even call it a thing) which exists in a way radically different than everything else we observe. In addition, it seems that this 'meta-existing' 'thing' is actually more truly existing than empirically existing - it is just existence.

Your premise EE(a) was implying the empirical kind of existing... You can thus not apply it to the meta-existing.

Well I didn't apply it to meta-existing. The demonstration on goes so far as to show that the 'empirical kind' of existing (i.e. the kind of existing which simultaneously relies on some other distinct existence) cannot account for itself. As far as the 'demonstration' goes, empirical existence is not self-contained - it is conditional on the existence of some other sort of existence. This simultaneously conditional dependence cannot be an infinity of simultaneously conditionally dependencies. In order for any aggregate thing to exist at all, everything which forms the aggregate must begin upon something which is itself non-conditional (whatever that existence is actually like, meta or otherwise, is irrelevant... the question is whether or not it exists). Whatever that existence is like, all the demonstration allows us to say about such existence is simply and plainly: it is being. Or in other words: What is it? It is being. Not a being. Not the being. Just being.

Most apologetics fail at this kind of level - confusing two concepts under the umbrella of the same word.

It was a nice attempt... but you fail.

Well you may be right, but I am not sure I see the equivocation yet. The empirical kind of being cannot, of itself, account for its own kind of being. It points us to something radically more fundamental than the empirical kind of being: just being. Being, itself. Subsistent being. A thing cannot "be" in the empirical way if it cannot "be" in the first place.

Why an infinity?

The set of all things need not be and infinite set.

If ALL things exist on the condition the some other thing(s) simultaneously exists, then the existential chain is infinite. Can you explain how it could be otherwise?

Yes it's consistent with EE(b)... but I fail to see why (i) cannot be true.
All things are not necessarily an infinite set... didn't I just say this?
Actually, "all things" are very likely not an infinite set.
Ask any astrophysicist and he'll tell you that the Universe seems to be bounded.

Precisely. But if EE(a) is true, then every single thing exists as an aggregate 'whole' of an infinity of increasingly more fundamental simultaneously existeing elements and configurations of elements. The fact that it seems very likely to you that some things ARE NOT aggregates of infinite elements points more in the direction of some fundamental way of existing that does not have any conditional elements at all.

I think you need to discover how not to mix up concepts that share the same word and how to use infinities properly.

You are quite right, I can always do better with this. I don't think, however, that you have adequately shown where I have erred in these regards.