If free will was not real

[bennyboy]

No, let's take a heroin addict.  He forms intent, on his own, and seeks out heroin.  Does his addiction compel him, or is it a part of his nature, and thus his intent and its expression as behavior free will?  This is the hardest case, along with the intent of schizophrenics and other dyfunctionals.  Is crazy something that happens to you, or is it what you are?  Does medication that normalizes your behavior give you BACK free will, or prevent you from forming intent as a free agent?  These are the interesting questions-- not whether free will is real, but how we should define the self.  In the end, I'd say it's not the free will that will likely turn out to be illusion, but the sense of the self as a thing, and ALL that means-- love, responsibility, etc.

If there is no self, then what has free will?  You haven't defined free will (as loose as your definition is) without explicit reference to the self.  It's -your- ability to form intent.  Something -you- do free of external obstruction or compulsion.  Pull the rug out from under that and there's no reason to even discuss free will, as you define it.  In what sense could self be illusory, but free will, even as you define it, be otherwise?  

If you pull out the idea of the individual self, then the whole house of cards comes tumbling down, doesn't it? Sometimes it seems we are picking at this or that aspect of human agency, but very tenderly avoiding the inevitable "not-self" thread. I'm not suggesting this, I'm just pointing out that it's getting pretty close to the surface.

I don't think that med's give people back anything they lost...that's certainly not how the effect of those meds are described in any meaningful sense, more like ad copy and testimonials.  Since I don't -assume- free will in asking that question... shrugs.  A significant number of mood altering chemicals are inhibitors of some stripe.  Inhibit the clockwork- alter the self, the will, the intent, the pursuant behavior which is expressed and forms all of our examples one way or another.  Related to the above...that these chemicals work certainly -seems- to suggest that the self is a thing that other things act upon in predictable ways.  It's as if our will can be manipulated with something as simple as alcohol.  Our sense of self (and will) doesn't seem to be the sort of thing we could describe as illusory, even if we could describe either as being hilariously inaccurate.  When you ask "does x give us back our free will" I'd say no.  I'd say that x (or some inhibiting x, or a few too many drinks) affect our will.  

Yep, you might be confused, because I'm exploring an idea that seems contrary to my position on free will. But that's not an accident-- trying to hide from issues that challenge your views is intellectual dishonesty, and that's not what I aspire to. I will happily throw my entire world view under the bus if it will generate just a few posts worth reading and writing.

In most of us, the self isn't really that malleable. We hold reasonably consistent views across time, have reasonably consistent habits, etc. But a single stroke can change all that, or another life event.

It never went anywhere.  What you describe as free will is merely a description of what will you experience when you don;t realize you're under the influence of y and z.  Your SOP.   Forest for the trees sort of thing.

Maybe. That's because I want to discuss my definitions of will under the condition of a highly malleable personhood. So my definitions yet again:
1) Will is the capacity to express intent as a behavior.
2) Free will is the capacity to express intent without compulsion or obstruction from outside the agent forming the intent.

One might say the essence of self is the capacity to form and act on intent, and nothing more than that. But circles are circles, and they are bad.

Let's say I've have a stroke, and now I have an overwhelming desire to fuck a goat, and an inability to move my right leg. The goat desire comes from my brain, which has been damaged-- but not from any outside influence, but from a malfunction in my brain, which if there's a self you'd agree is it, I believe?

Furthermore, the leg no longer responds to my will-- my intent to move it. It just sits there. But the fault, again, is in the brain-- the neuronal structures involved in moving the leg have been damaged. My question now is this, is the damaged structure a part of the self which is dysfunctional, or is it actually itself a mechanism, called upon BY the self, but contained inside the head.

I'm guessing you can see how I'm going to reduce the brain to the essence of the self, and you know if we do this what we will/won't find. But what say you so far?