Is 10,000 people suffering identically equal bad as one of them?

[theVOID]

Apparently, 10,000 people suffering absolutely identically to any one of them is 'worse' than one of those identical person's suffering because it matters more in the 'big picture'. I say that it obviously doesn't matter and there is no 'big picture' because only individual's suffer so when you add up the suffering of many individuals you pretend that such a big picture actually exists when it doesn't. It equates to pretending that all the suffering of many different people can be treated as if it was all in the same organism.

Against a 'big picture' it makes no sense to say that the suffering of 10,000 has a greater negative value than against a single person, because the big picture does not exist, as you pointed out, however there are other means of evaluation.

You can for instance assign the suffering a value based on it's relationship with a state that is subjectively considered not-suffering. For this example we are assuming all else is equal, thus you simply need to take into account the situation with a greater negative value, that being the suffering of the 10,000 has a higher negative value than the 1 person, by a factor of 10,000:1.

You can also apply the methodology in Desirism, which situation has a greater negative value in relationship to the number of desires thwarted. 10,000 desires thwarted has a greater negative value than one. We have an aversion to suffering so we have more reason for action to deal with the greatest suffering first.

I'm sure you could come up with many more valid relational values.

Assuming a hypothetical where one was to chose if 10,000 would suffer Vs 1, based on any valid relational value you can determine the better choice.

I'm sure we all agree that we are not a mass organism. But clearly Adrian and Shiny don't seem to see how adding up suffering of many is treating individuals as if they were a mass organism. If this is not what this so called 'big picture' is about then I don't know it is!

How on earth is evaluating group values treating the group as a mass organism? That makes absolutely no sense. Statistics wouldn't work at all if that was the case.

In the event that the 10,000 suffering are a conceptual organism, and assuming that each of the 10,001 individuals suffer the same in relationship to their other values, then the suffering giant organism would suffer proportionately the same as the 1 person (say 80% of his being is in a state of suffering, after combining 10,000 entities 80% of the being is still suffering).

This only causes a problem if there is a singular giant organism, but your case for this being the result of Adrian's evaluation is completely unfounded. With group values each being is at 80% suffering just like before, but there is a 10,000:1 ratio between groupings in the total suffering experienced.

My philosophy is that those who suffer worse should be prioritized obviously.... but those who suffer equally feel all the same amount and people only feel their own individual pain. So it makes no sense to pretend they add up.

Prioritized why?

And you're ignoring all relational values. You CAN add them up, we do it every 3-4 years with elections, to name one of an large number of relational values. Now, last time I checked it seemed to work just fine without treating the nation as a giant organism.

People who suffer worse don't add up with those who suffer less bad either.... they are merely prioritized because suffering worse is... worse.

You're just trying to sneak that in there. Why does something being worse than something else mean we should prioritize it? It sounds to me like you are assigning an intrinsic value to 'worse' that requires action (priority), and as you know, intrinsic value doesn't exist.

Adrian suggested how we should add them up for the same reason that we add up any value like 10 Ferraris rather than 1 for instance. But people already do value those things and it makes sense economically.

Any why are existing economic values allowed in consideration but not existing relational values or even existing democratic values?

That is a descriptive matter, that is not about why we morally should value something. And what I'm saying is why should we value many individuals more than one if all those individuals are suffering absolutely identically? It makes no sense to me, as I've said, for reasons given.

Where's the if? As in "IF you have an aversion to suffering" - If you don't then there is no reason why you should give a shit about suffering at all. This question is addressed to people who do care, we have that aversion to suffering, so we have an If for your hypothetical 'should'. There is no problem here.

IF you have an aversion to suffering, then suffering has a negative value against your desires. A group of 10,000 suffering has a greater total negative value than a group of 1 suffering.

To go a bit more into detail: In what I will call alternative reality 1 (AR1): If one person of the 10,000 suffering is saved it is not equally moral to all 10,000 being saved but only because there are still 9,999 individuals suffering, not because they add up, they don't.

Oh so you have 'real' moral value now? Where'd you get that from? Because all it seems to me is that you have intrinsic 'suffering' based value, making less suffering better with no justification, making your reasoning logically invalid, even if your conclusion is right that 1 prevented case of suffering has less value than 10,000.

In AR2(Alernative reality 2) if there is only 1 individual being tortured who is saved that is equally moral to all the 10,000 being saved in AR1 because in both cases all the equal individual pain in existence was eliminated.

However if both realities exist simultaneously (which is necessary for comparison) then only 1 of 10,001 existent cases of suffering was eliminated. Following from your AR1 example it should be worse than saving everyone in AR1.

EDIT: And another thought though too.... to approach it another way.... is 10,000 people who are equally happy better than one? I think not because everyone experiences exactly the same level of happiness as if it was just one of them.... so to act as if more is any 'better' is to pretend there is something extra here.

Right, intrinsic value. Happy is not necessarily better, though in relation to desires it certainly is. Relational values are your 'something extra'.

However, your dismissal of happiness having intrinsic value contradicts your above 'less suffering' value. You can't have both (or either, in reality)