Subjective Morality?

[Belacqua]

The question is whether there are some things which are moral without regard to the subjective preferences of a thinking, feeling agent.  There are not, nor could be, unless you want to argue for God.

The point is to establish where mores come from, not what they are as they are being spoken or read.

Well, I don't think that any moral realist does argue that morals exist with no reference to thinking feeling agents. Morality is morality for people. Whether it depends on preferences or not is an additional question. I think it was pointed out earlier that if the cockroaches or the aliens take over, their morality might well be different. 

I'm afraid I may be going over ground already covered by Khemikal or vulcanlogic. They know the subject better than I do, and I haven't had the time to study the thread as I should. (My ancient mom-in-law comes home from her elderly day care in about 10 minutes.) 

But I think it is a true statement about the real world that robbery makes people feel bad in the vast majority of cases. It is true of the real world that robbery works against our desires and goals. It is true of the real world that no one would choose to live in a society where his stuff could be taken at any minute. So these are morally real statements, about objectively demonstrable reactions. Of course, if all the people in the world disappeared, the morals in question would be irrelevant. Moral realism doesn't posit that morals would continue to exist in such a case, in the way that (presumably) rocks and lizards would. 

So it may well be true, as you say, that morals are rooted, somehow, in people's feelings. And if that's the case, it seems to me to argue in favor of a certain kind of moral realism.