Subjective Morality?

[Angrboda]

Morality isn't predicated on feelings, but rather upon the supposed facts to which those feelings refer.  If morality were solely predicated on feelings, you would be right in saying that morality is subjective.  Since they are not, your belief that morality is subjective seems unsupported.

I'd like an example of any moral idea that isn't predicated on negative feelings.  Maybe I'm wrong, though you can imagine that I kind of doubt it.

Fine. Rape is wrong. That isn't predicated upon negative feelings. I may have negative feeling about rape, but my belief that it is wrong isn't predicated on them. Satisfied?

Remember my original description of morality-- that it is a mediation among feelings, ideas, and environment, but that it is predicated upon the feelings-- without them, there's really nothing that could sensibly be called morality.  The Googletron Mind might have lots of ideas about how people should behave, but they are only moral ideas if it cares.  If not-- they are just behavioral recommendations (or demands).

Something caring about the morality of something isn't a demonstration that morality is predicated upon those feelings. We might not be motivated to do anything about immoral acts if we have no feelings about them, but that doesn't mean that the moral facts themselves are predicated upon feelings. If murder is objectively wrong, us having feelings about it isn't evidence that morals are predicated upon those feelings, only that we can have feelings about objective facts. If a rapist violates my consent to sex, his act is immoral because the act is wrong, not because I have bad feelings about it. Your entire argument is a non sequitur. I can have feelings about someone's dick being less than 6" long, but that does not imply that the length of his dick is predicated on my feelings about its length. Your argument simply doesn't follow unless you beg the question by defining morals that way. Doing so doesn't refute moral realism so much as make you out to be a dick.

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Let's be clear hear.  I'm not saying there are no facts which are considered in the process of moral consideration.  I'm saying there are no facts which are categorically moral in nature-- especially, which are objectively right/wrong valued.  There's no particular fact about a murder, for example, which may be objectively observed, and known by anyone who observes them to represent a moral wrong.

This view, that rightness exists out there independent of subjective agency, and that some people correctly perceive it, and some do not, is quite dangerous, actually. 

And it's been pointed out repeatedly that you don't have an argument which adequately supports your view that there are no such facts. As I pointed out earlier, moral facts refer in much the same way that physical facts refer, and phenomenologically they refer in a way that is similar to numbers. If you don't have a good argument why numbers don't refer, and you don't, then you don't have a good argument that morals may not in fact refer. When this was pointed out to you, you deflected that it comes down to definitions, and that with your definitions, morality is subjective. Well I have to ask you then, what is your definition of morals and moral. And try to define it without begging the question as to whether morals are subjective or not.