No reason justifies disbelief.

[LadyForCamus]

It's a good question, isn't it?  We find ourselves facing the same question with empirical knowledge.  How can we distinguish between accurate and inaccurate intuition, how can we distinguish between accurate and inaccurate sense experience?  Most would offer deduction in either case...or any of a number of other methodological ways of organizing our thoughts.     

Describing accurate intuition as a lucky guess leaves open the door for accurate sense experience to be, equally, a lucky guess.  I could, after all, look to my left and see a fairy outside the window.  I'm lucky that I don't..because if I did, then I would very likely be wrong about the issue of whether or not fairies are outside my window.  Ultimately, this weakest form of the other than empirical doesn't posit that we are or can be certain, that it will always be possible to distinguish between accurate intuitions -or- accurate experiences and inaccurate ones, it doesn't even make the claim that intuition is the foundation of all knowledge, or that a nominally rational person would have to accept a conclusion derived from intuition....it merely seeks to add intuition to the possible sources of knowledge.  It only establishes, if accepted, that the claim of empiricism is wrong.

I've been thinking about this intuition thing. It's totally bologna, lol. What is intuition in the first place? It's an unconscious assessment of empirical data, expressed as an innate, informed sense.  Without sense experience, there is no information, and so there couldn't be intuition.  Empiricism is the platform off of which intuition takes its leap. Sure, maybe its a "back of the house" assessment, like you said, but its still an assessment. That it feels different is irrelevant, and as you said, we use the same methods to distinguish between good/bad intuition and good/bad sense experience.  That's because they're essentially the same thing.  Giving something a different label doesn't magically transform it into something other than exactly what it is.


 

Innate knowledge.  The notion that there are some concepts known to us as a consequence of our rational nature.  You mention above that you've surveyed a long list of individual empirical instances of knowledge in order to arrive at the conclusion of your flakiness.  We've already discussed, however, that no number of individual instances of empirical knowledge can support a necessary truth in and of themselves.  You aren't necessarily flaky on account of those observations.  The classic example is that watching the sun rise a thousand times won't make it necessarily true that the sun rises tomorrow.  

So, how do we rescue necessary truth, and how do we contextualize what we take to be true in light of that?  Perhaps, instead of arriving at the conclusion that you are flaky, that flakiness exists, based on observation, you have an innate concept of flakiness, and every individual instance of empirical observation allows you to recognize some action as a representative of that concept?  If this were the case, then innate knowledge would be the foundation, and empirical observation would be additional verifying information.  We might say, "ah, but someone explained what flakiness was, to me" - and sure...but just as before, their having explained it to you might have done little more than provide you with the vernacular for some concept you already held.  "Ah, "flakiness", we say to ourselves...that's what we call this thing I am !".

What is an example of a concept we could have innate knowledge about in the absence of any empirical, sensory input?

This could place some knowledge, like knowledge of self, in the category of a priori knowledge.  Independent of sense experience... perhaps, even, the basis -of- sense experience.

How could I know that I exist without having a subjective experience first?