RE: Jesus' Mission....
November 13, 2019 at 10:54 pm
(This post was last modified: November 13, 2019 at 11:47 pm by The Grand Nudger.)
(November 13, 2019 at 8:34 pm)Grandizer Wrote:(November 13, 2019 at 8:20 pm)Gae Bolga Wrote: Possible worlds semantics explicitly invoke necessity rather than contingency, since a thing contingent on one possible world cannot be said, by possible worlds semantics, to be true. Mostly because you only need one counterexample to show a statement is false.
"God" isn't the problem in the free will/omniscience dilemma, he's just collateral damage.
Could you provide a concrete example or two to illustrate what you're saying? I'm not following you at this point. Counterexamples to X does not mean X is not contingently true.
In possible worlds semantics, they do - but not the way you're imagining, because possible worlds semantics don't work the way people expect and have absolutely nothing to do with any concrete world or example. In possible worlds semantics, the existence of one possible world in which there is no god doesn't alter the truth value of the statement, from possible worlds semantics, that if gods existence is necessary in one possible world it's necessary in all possible worlds. Nor would one possible world in which there is a god alter the truth value of the statement, from possible world semantics, that if it is necessarrily true in one possible world that there is no god, then it is necessarrily true in all possible worlds that there is no god. Those two statements are, however, counterexamples to each other, each from possible worlds semantics...and one....necessarrily makes the other false. Whichever one that may be.
That's the point of mentioning that these semantics cant save the two positions from themselves or each other, though it's moot all round...since that defense wouldn't resolve them anyway, even if the semantics were applicable to contingent truth, which they aren't. It merely argues some other irrelevant point. Again, neither god, nor gods actions, nor gods abilities, are the cause of the dilemma between free will and the requirement of fatalism in knowledge of the future. If omniscience is to be coherent with free will, omniscience must exclude the possibility of such knowledge. This, ironically, is necessarily true in at least one world..and so, by possible worlds, it must be true in all worlds...unless it isn't. Unless there's one possible world in which the antithetical statement is equally true by necessity (I vote for my absurdist possible world!). Contingency isn't worth squat in worlds explicitly imagined to be free of each others contingencies.
I gave you an extra one for the pure lulz.
I am the Infantry. I am my country’s strength in war, her deterrent in peace. I am the heart of the fight… wherever, whenever. I carry America’s faith and honor against her enemies. I am the Queen of Battle. I am what my country expects me to be, the best trained Soldier in the world. In the race for victory, I am swift, determined, and courageous, armed with a fierce will to win. Never will I fail my country’s trust. Always I fight on…through the foe, to the objective, to triumph overall. If necessary, I will fight to my death. By my steadfast courage, I have won more than 200 years of freedom. I yield not to weakness, to hunger, to cowardice, to fatigue, to superior odds, For I am mentally tough, physically strong, and morally straight. I forsake not, my country, my mission, my comrades, my sacred duty. I am relentless. I am always there, now and forever. I AM THE INFANTRY! FOLLOW ME!
