Jesus' Mission....

[GrandizerII]

Possible worlds semantics explicitly invoke necessity rather than contingency, since a thing contingent on one possible world cannot be said, by possible worlds semantics, to be true. Mostly because you only need one counterexample to show a statement is false.

"God" isn't the problem in the free will/omniscience dilemma, he's just collateral damage.

Could you provide a concrete example or two to illustrate what you're saying? I'm not following you at this point. Counterexamples to X does not mean X is not contingently true.

[LadyForCamus]

Yes, but if god chooses to actualize world A (of which he knows the future) from a set of possible worlds he could potentially choose from (say, A, B, or C),  then once he makes that decision to actualize world A, he is essentially revoking the free will of the people who are going to exist  in that world. Am I making any sense?

You are making sense, but I will have to counter. :p

If free will means you could have done not-X instead of X given the same conditions, then even if one choice ends up being actualized, it doesn't mean that you weren't free to do the other choice because in other possible worlds you do. God decides what world is actualized but does not eliminate the possibility of you having done otherwise.

I think it might help to see each world as a complete world from the start rather than progressively building over time. Maybe.

But if he already knows what I’m going to choose to do in each of the three worlds, and he then makes a conscious, rational intelligent decision to choose one for me over the other two, in what meaningful way am I actually free?

[GrandizerII]

You are making sense, but I will have to counter. :p

If free will means you could have done not-X instead of X given the same conditions, then even if one choice ends up being actualized, it doesn't mean that you weren't free to do the other choice because in other possible worlds you do. God decides what world is actualized but does not eliminate the possibility of you having done otherwise.

I think it might help to see each world as a complete world from the start rather than progressively building over time. Maybe.

But if he already knows what I’m going to choose to do in each of the three worlds, and he then makes a conscious, rational intelligent decision to choose one for me over the other two, in what meaningful way am I actually free?

Perhaps you aren't meaningfully free. And as I said earlier, I'm not disagreeing with this bit. I'm just saying that if we define free will in the libertarian sense and go with this definition, the incompatibility isn't inevitable.

[LadyForCamus]

I’m not sure this is a great analogy, but here goes. My husband and I are trying to decide where to take our sensory-impaired five year old for a fun day. Husband says, ‘let’s take him to Chucky Cheese.’ I say, ‘he’s too tired. He’s at high risk for sensory overload and will probably throw a tantrum; let’s take him to the library.’ If we decide take him to Chucky Cheese and he has a world class tantrum, aren’t we, as the arbiters of where he ends up, responsible for that outcome? We knew it would happen ahead of time. Was he really “free” to choose to not have a melt down under these very specific circumstances that were beyond his control?

Sorry for all the editing, lol.

[GrandizerII]

I’m not sure this is a great analogy, but here goes. My husband and I are trying to decide where to take our sensory-impaired five year old for a fun day. Husband says, ‘let’s take him to Chucky Cheese.’ I say, ‘he’s too tired. He’s at high risk for sensory overload and will probably throw a tantrum; let’s take him to the library.’ If we decide take him to Chucky Cheese and he has a world class tantrum, aren’t we, as the arbiters of where he ends up, responsible for that outcome? We knew it would happen ahead of time. Was he really “free” to choose to not have a melt down under these very specific circumstances that were beyond his control?

Sorry for all the editing, lol.

Nope, not free, but it's possible I'm still not being clear here as this doesn't seem to be the right analogy. :p

I'll elaborate later.

[LadyForCamus]

I’m not sure this is a great analogy, but here goes. My husband and I are trying to decide where to take our sensory-impaired five year old for a fun day. Husband says, ‘let’s take him to Chucky Cheese.’ I say, ‘he’s too tired. He’s at high risk for sensory overload and will probably throw a tantrum; let’s take him to the library.’  If we decide take him to Chucky Cheese and he has a world class tantrum, aren’t we, as the arbiters of where he ends up, responsible for that outcome? We knew it would happen ahead of time. Was he really “free” to choose to not have a melt down under these very specific circumstances that were beyond his control?

Sorry for all the editing, lol.

Nope, not free, but it's possible I'm still not being clear here as this doesn't seem to be the right analogy. :p

I'll elaborate later.

Yes, please do! I’d like to know if I’m making a logical error here. ❤️

[The Grand Nudger]

Possible worlds semantics explicitly invoke necessity rather than contingency, since a thing contingent on one possible world cannot be said, by possible worlds semantics, to be true.  Mostly because you only need one counterexample to show a statement is false.  

"God" isn't the problem in the free will/omniscience dilemma, he's just collateral damage.

Could you provide a concrete example or two to illustrate what you're saying? I'm not following you at this point. Counterexamples to X does not mean X is not contingently true.

In possible worlds semantics, they do - but not the way you're imagining, because possible worlds semantics don't work the way people expect and have absolutely nothing to do with any concrete world or example.  In possible worlds semantics, the existence of one possible world in which there is no god doesn't alter the truth value of the statement, from possible worlds semantics, that if gods existence is necessary in one possible world it's necessary in all possible worlds. Nor would one possible world in which there is a god alter the truth value of the statement, from possible world semantics, that if it is necessarrily true in one possible world that there is no god, then it is necessarrily true in all possible worlds that there is no god. Those two statements are, however, counterexamples to each other, each from possible worlds semantics...and one....necessarrily makes the other false. Whichever one that may be.

That's the point of mentioning that these semantics cant save the two positions from themselves or each other, though it's moot all round...since that defense wouldn't resolve them anyway, even if the semantics were applicable to contingent truth, which they aren't. It merely argues some other irrelevant point. Again, neither god, nor gods actions, nor gods abilities, are the cause of the dilemma between free will and the requirement of fatalism in knowledge of the future. If omniscience is to be coherent with free will, omniscience must exclude the possibility of such knowledge. This, ironically, is necessarily true in at least one world..and so, by possible worlds, it must be true in all worlds...unless it isn't. Unless there's one possible world in which the antithetical statement is equally true by necessity (I vote for my absurdist possible world!). Contingency isn't worth squat in worlds explicitly imagined to be free of each others contingencies.

I gave you an extra one for the pure lulz.

[GrandizerII]

Nope, not free, but it's possible I'm still not being clear here as this doesn't seem to be the right analogy. :p

I'll elaborate later.

Yes, please do! I’d like to know if I’m making a logical error here. ❤️

Maybe not a logical error, just maybe debating something different from what I'm talking about.

Let's say, for simplicity's sake, there are two possible worlds A and B. In A, you choose to order pizza. In B, you choose to order sushi. A and B are identical up till the point you differ in your choice.

If by free will, we mean that it is possible to have chosen to do X rather than Y given the same set of prior conditions, then it follows that:

If world A is actual, then you chose to order pizza ... but it was possible for you to have chosen to order sushi instead. Therefore, you had the free will to choose pizza or sushi in world A, even though you end up choosing pizza.

If world B is actual, then you chose to order sushi ... but it was possible for you to have chosen to order pizza instead. Therefore, you had the free will to choose sushi or pizza in world B, even though you end up choosing sushi.

Putting an omniscient being into the equation:

If world A is actual, you had the free will to choose pizza or sushi, ended up choosing pizza, and the omniscient being knew beforehand you would choose pizza.

If world B is actual, you had the free will to choose sushi or pizza, ended up choosing sushi, and the omniscient being knew beforehand you would choose sushi.

In either world, foreknowledge did not revoke your free will, and neither did the actualization of either world.

To repeat, whether you agree that it is possible to do X instead of Y given the same set of prior conditions and whether this could be reasonably deemed free will, this does not specifically address the matter of compatibility (or lack of it) between free will (as defined) and omniscience.

I said no to your question regarding your child partly because meltdowns is not something you choose to have.

[The Grand Nudger]

Putting an omniscient being into the equation, the omniscient being knew which you would "choose". It was a fatalist choice.

You don't have to, though, since it's knowing wasn't what revoked your free will anyway. Even if it didn't know, the fatalism inherent in the sheer possibility of knowledge, with no actualization of that knowledge in any being, and no actualization of any world by any being, precluded any other outcome.

If the outcome of a future choice is set at a point in the past...and it must be, for that outcome to be known in the past, then no interceding set of circumstances or entities are relevant to that outcome. Your possible worlds have within them the nested assumption of the very thing you want to conclude. As do all possible worlds.

If world B is actual, then you chose to order sushi ... but it was possible for you to have chosen to order pizza instead. Therefore, you had the free will to choose sushi or pizza in world B, even though you end up choosing sushi.

The question is not who or what knew, or which world is actual, but whether or not it's possible at all. If a being could know, even if a being did not know, it's not possible. If it was possible, then the being did not know..maybe it had a really good guess...but a good guess is not knowledge.

[GrandizerII]

Could you provide a concrete example or two to illustrate what you're saying? I'm not following you at this point. Counterexamples to X does not mean X is not contingently true.

In possible worlds semantics, they do - but not the way you're imagining, because possible worlds semantics don't work the way people expect and have absolutely nothing to do with any concrete world or example.  In possible worlds semantics, the existence of one possible world in which there is no god doesn't alter the truth value of the statement, from possible worlds semantics, that if gods existence is necessary in one possible world it's necessary in all possible worlds. Nor would one possible world in which there is a god alter the truth value of the statement, from possible world semantics, that if it is necessarrily true in one possible world that there is no god, then it is necessarrily true in all possible worlds that there is no god. Those two statements are, however, counterexamples to each other, each from possible worlds semantics...and one....necessarrily makes the other false. Whichever one that may be.

Ok, sure. It could go one way or the other. Depends on the starting point we go with.

I'll get to the rest later.