Any Moral Relativists in the House?

[vulcanlogician]

@Angrboda

I'm going to let James Rachels do a little work for me here:

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Cultural Relativism is a theory about the nature of morality. At first blush it seems
quite plausible. However, like all such theories, it may be evaluated by subjecting
it to rational analysis; and when we analyze Cultural Relativism we find that it is
not so plausible as it first appears to be.
The first thing we need to notice is that at the heart of Cultural Relativism there is
a certain form of argument. The strategy used by cultural relativists is to argue
from facts about the differences between cultural outlooks to a conclusion about
the status of morality. Thus we are invited to accept this reasoning:

1. The Greeks believed it was wrong to eat the dead, whereas the
Callatians believed it was right to eat the dead.
2. Therefore, eating the dead is neither objectively fight nor objectively
wrong. It is merely a matter of opinion, which varies from culture to
culture.

Or, alternatively:
1. The Eskimos see nothing wrong with infanticide, whereas Americans
believe infanticide is immoral.
2. Therefore, infanticide is neither objectively right nor objectively
wrong. It is merely a matter of opinion, which varies from culture to
culture.

Clearly, these arguments are variations of one fundamental idea They are both
special cases of a more general argument, which says:

1. Different cultures have different moral codes.
2. Therefore, there is no objective “truth” in morality. Right and wrong
are only matters of opinion, and opinions vary from culture to culture.

We may call this the Cultural Differences Argument. To many people, it is
persuasive. But from a logical point of view, is it sound?
It is not sound. The trouble is that the conclusion does not follow from the
premise—that is, even if the premise is true, the conclusion still might be false.
The premise concerns what people believe. In some societies, people believe one
thing; in other societies, people believe differently. The conclusion, however,
concerns what really is the case. The trouble is that this sort conclusion does not
follow logically from this sort of premise.

https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/...chels1.pdf

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I grant you that "incoherent" may be too strong a term. I don't mind redacting that claim. But my main criticism of relativism is that it says nothing about the status of moral facts. That's something I would prefer a metaethical position do. The nihilists do this: "morality is a fairy tale." That says something about moral realism: "it is false." I appreciate that.

How does "culture A has this moral code, and culture B has some other moral code" relate coherently to the issue at hand in metaethics? (Namely: Are there moral facts or not?) It doesn't.

And, yes. One can use customs and mores to explain cultural practices, just as one can cite injustice to explain civil unrest. But the latter is a genuine metaethical position (ie. there are moral facts, and here is an example of one.) Questionable as a moral skeptic may find such a view, it makes a genuine metaethical argument.

A sociologist who examines the beliefs of a Catholic population may find that many believe in the healing power of a nearby spring. This has explanatory power concerning the behaviors and practices of that specific population of Catholics. But it says nothing about the healing powers of the spring. Likewise, what a given culture propagates as a moral norm (while it is factual that they propagate it) has nothing to do with it's truth or falsity as a moral fact.

As for individual relativism. I don't really mind it in a broader philosophical sense. It has a kind of Albert Camus charm to it. But it suffers the same faults as cultural relativism when discussing metaethics. It also says nothing about the status of moral realism.