Can we trust our Moral Intuitions?

[vulcanlogician]

First thoughts:
I'm not sure of the difference between the two inputs "Proximal cues in the environment" and "other emotional triggers". Is the implication that proximal cues are emotionless?

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Stich is saying proximal cues from the environment cause things that end up in the norm box. Let's take something not really morally loaded as an example. You are a young child in an indigenous tribe. You see that every morning all the women and girls are sent to obtain water from a nearby river, while all the men go hunting or tend to the crops. Those are the proximal cues in the environment.

From there leads a solid line (not a dotted line)... to the left-most box. The left-most box has two items: "identify norm implicating behavior" and "infer contents of normative values." So here, a a boy in the tribe being exposed repeatedly to the proximal cue of the women getting water and the men hunting would infer a norm using your "rule-relating reasoning capacity" (the next box). This would be something like: "The women get water. The men hunt." Even if such a rule is not explicitly stated, one could come to accept it as a norm. Explicit statement of the rule would be another proximal cue, but it isn't necessary for something to end up in the norm box.

The next bit is counts a serious argument against the efficacy of moral intuitions. The norm box is empirically verified to influence emotional states. For example, you, as a young tribal boy go on the hunt with the men, and you see (for the first time in your life) that a woman has come along for the hunt. This causes an emotion in you (ie... this doesn't SEEM right... this isn't NORMAL... there is something WRONG with this...) and this in turn (solid line) affects your judgment.

These things operate at a subconscious level. And Stich wants to argue that this sort of emotional entanglement (kluges) seriously undermines our moral intuitions. The big point is the empirically verified link between emotion and judgment.

Now... for "other emotional triggers"... Stich recognizes that not every emotional trigger is resultant from an idea in the norm box. Let's say, you (as the tribal boy) were bitten by a tarantula multiple times one day, and the next day your friend wants to bring his pet tarantula along on the hunt. There's nothing in your norm box that says "this is a bad idea" (there's no rule against it that you've inferred from proximal cues) but your emotional system (triggered by the memory of being bitten) urges you to make the judgment that this is a bad idea.

The output appears to be a) "judgement" and b) post-hoc justification.  OK.  Not behaviour?  Hmmm.

Stich is concerned with judgments, and not behavior. That's why. Post-hoc justifications are also not really a concern of his either. It puzzles me that he put them on the chart, but, maybe he did so to show where they are in the causal chain.

The two motivations (compliance and punitive) appear to be output (is that the 'behaviour' part?) when I'd expect them to be baseline references and therefore part of 'beliefs' (articulated ones or otherwise).

Compliance is a dotted line, so you aren't expected to take the link TOO seriously. Although the line between beliefs and judgments (which most philosophers take as axiomatic) is also dotted, so...

I see the link between emotion and compliance. I'm not exactly sure how it's relevant or why Stich included it on his chart. I'd LOVE to read the academic papers where he outlines this. I, like you, am hungry for an in-depth analysis on the items in the chart, but frustratingly (in the 10-ish lectures I've watched, he always spends like 5 minutes on it and moves on).

The main thrust of the chart is that we educated Westerners aren't really so different from the tribal boy. We have proximal cues that result in different norms in the norm box. And the moral norms that the tribal boy has (ie. don't hit other people, don't kill other people) are fundamentally similar to norm conventions about women getting water and men hunting.

Stich argues moral nihilism. He doesn't identify as a moral nihilist. He calls himself a moral skeptic. He even said that he's open to the possibility of moral objectivism (and presents a few bits of evidence in favor of it), but he ultimately feels that the arguments for nihilism are very strong.

Here's my version on a similar vein.  Note that I'm using the (as previously discussed) distinction between morals and ethics (with 'morality' as container for both).



I think that Mr Stich's diagram could be (kinda, sorta) associated with my 'b', 'c' and 'g'.  

Thanks for the series.  I'll definitely have a look when I find a spare 12 hours.

Would you mind walking me through your diagram? Does the tribal boy example fit it? Because then (since I already described that example) we could explore parallels. (It's cool if it doesn't work. Any summary/description of how your chart works is fine.)

What about b, c, and, g run parallel to Stich's model?

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My take on objective morality since exiting the church has been that there is none; all morality is subjective and subject to exactly the things you're talking about, culture, society, experience and so on.  This comes up often in debates with Christians about morality because they see god as the source of all morality and it is absolute and objective in their view despite the many variations in morality that humans have displayed, even within Christianity.  I'm less familiar with this notion of intuitive morality.

Great topic.  About 10 levels deeper than the usual fare on this forum.

I was a moral relativist for 8 or so years after I dropped religion. Now, I tend to think that morality is objective. (Although I'm not sold on the idea of moral objectivity... I just think it's better than I once thought it was.) I'm open-minded about ethics. And I love exploring arguments for and against moral objectivity. 

I've recently been challenging my own views on the subject by listening to Stephen Stich's thoughts on the subject. Stich tends toward moral nihilism... the idea that moral beliefs are made up. (Just like an atheist thinks god/religion are just made up things that are transmitted culturally, a moral nihilist thinks that morality is not real... ie. it only exists as a belief and that belief is false.)

Not all objectivist moral theories depend on us having sound moral intuitions to make good moral judgments. But some do. And my favorite theory moral non-naturalism seems to rely on such intuitions. Moral theories like hedonism have no trouble with faulty moral intuitions because there is a hard and fast rule (making people happy is good, making them sad is bad) that they apply to each moral dilemma in order to solve it.

Anyway, I'd love to hear your input on the matter. You seem like you have the head for it. I hope I'm not scaring you off by rattling off these long ass theory names. Philosophers like to make big complicated names for simple ideas that everyone can understand. It's gatekeeping. Just hop into the discussion feet first. What's your opinion on Stich's chart? (I gave a brief explanation of the nuts and bolts of it in my reply to DLJ directly above).