Evolutionary explanation of morality self-refuting?

[genkaus]

You seem to assume that our faculties can know truth though. I'm asking how can we know that we can know what's true. For instance, maybe 'x' can really equal 'non-x' in reality but because of evolutionary processes, we can't comprehend that truth because it wasn't beneficial to our survival. Theists would say that because God is good and that God is truth, he'd ensure mankind would have the ability to know truth. I'm not seeing any such guarantee from a naturalistic point of view.

Firstly, the same argument that works against evolution, works against the theistic perspective as well. Suppose god is actually evil and he is the god of lies, then he would not give us the capacity to know the truth. In which case, we would actually think that X is non-X and that god is good and god is the truth.

You see how that works? Whether or not we actually have the capacity to know the truth cannot be determined by where that capacity came from. The only way to determine it is by finding out if that capacity actually works.

Now, how do we determine if we actually have that capacity or not? You do it by measuring your knowledge against reality and seeing if measures up. To start measuring, you first need a starting point.

Let's start by asking how do we determine truth? Forget for a moment whether we actually have the capacity to know the truth and ask how any entity having this capacity would determine what is true. It would check the statement made against what is real. Suppose the statement is "an apple is red", then the entity would check whether a real, physical apple is actually red or not.

Now, let's go a step further and look at the example you provided. "Can X equal non-X"? Suppose, in reality, X can equal non-X. If this is possible in reality, then something can and cannot be itself at the same time. A statement can be true and false at the same time. This would mean that there can be no such statement such as truth. Then it wouldn't matter if you have the capacity to know the truth or not, because there wouldn't be such a thing as "truth" to begin with. Therefore, we can establish X is not non-X as a basic fact of reality that doesn't depend on whether we know it. Incidentally, this is the Law of Identity, the basic premise of all logic.

So, we've determined that for there to be such a thing as truth, the X can only be equal to X and since we have used our reasoning faculties to determine this, we can say that they work pretty-fucking-well. We have established two lines of reasoning here:
1. If there is such a thing as truth, then we have the capacity to know it. (as demonstrated here).
2. If there is no such thing as truth, then there is such a thing as truth (basically a self-refuting and meaningless statement).

Does this clear up why we safely say that our rational faculties actually determine the truth irrespective of where they came from? If this is too complex, there is a simpler argument, though I don't think it'd be as convincing. I'm presenting it anyway.

Can you actually know the truth?

1. There are only two possible options. Either you can know the truth or you cannot know the truth.

2. If you cannot know the truth, then all statements of knowledge you make are false.

3. This includes the statement of knowledge that "You cannot know the truth".

4. Therefore, that position is essentially self-refuting and the only option you are left with is "you can know the truth".

[Minimalist]

-Okay - first thing to see is that Craig and the rest of his ilk exist for the sole purpose of selling books to the gullible. Once you realize how he earns his living you can dismiss his self-serving drivel a lot easier.

Evolution has a single end result. An organism either has or lacks traits which will enable it to reproduce in a given environment. Period. Jerks like Craig try to saddle a totally natural process with a lot of jesus-shit which matters not a whit.

[Tea Earl Grey Hot]

You seem to assume that our faculties can know truth though. I'm asking how can we know that we can know what's true. For instance, maybe 'x' can really equal 'non-x' in reality but because of evolutionary processes, we can't comprehend that truth because it wasn't beneficial to our survival. Theists would say that because God is good and that God is truth, he'd ensure mankind would have the ability to know truth. I'm not seeing any such guarantee from a naturalistic point of view.

Firstly, the same argument that works against evolution, works against the theistic perspective as well. Suppose god is actually evil and he is the god of lies, then he would not give us the capacity to know the truth. In which case, we would actually think that X is non-X and that god is good and god is the truth.

You see how that works? Whether or not we actually have the capacity to know the truth cannot be determined by where that capacity came from. The only way to determine it is by finding out if that capacity actually works.

Now, how do we determine if we actually have that capacity or not? You do it by measuring your knowledge against reality and seeing if measures up. To start measuring, you first need a starting point.

Let's start by asking how do we determine truth? Forget for a moment whether we actually have the capacity to know the truth and ask how any entity having this capacity would determine what is true. It would check the statement made against what is real. Suppose the statement is "an apple is red", then the entity would check whether a real, physical apple is actually red or not.

Now, let's go a step further and look at the example you provided. "Can X equal non-X"? Suppose, in reality, X can equal non-X. If this is possible in reality, then something can and cannot be itself at the same time. A statement can be true and false at the same time. This would mean that there can be no such statement such as truth. Then it wouldn't matter if you have the capacity to know the truth or not, because there wouldn't be such a thing as "truth" to begin with. Therefore, we can establish X is not non-X as a basic fact of reality that doesn't depend on whether we know it. Incidentally, this is the Law of Identity, the basic premise of all logic.

So, we've determined that for there to be such a thing as truth, the X can only be equal to X and since we have used our reasoning faculties to determine this, we can say that they work pretty-fucking-well. We have established two lines of reasoning here:
1. If there is such a thing as truth, then we have the capacity to know it. (as demonstrated here).
2. If there is no such thing as truth, then there is such a thing as truth (basically a self-refuting and meaningless statement).

Does this clear up why we safely say that our rational faculties actually determine the truth irrespective of where they came from? If this is too complex, there is a simpler argument, though I don't think it'd be as convincing. I'm presenting it anyway.

Can you actually know the truth?

1. There are only two possible options. Either you can know the truth or you cannot know the truth.

2. If you cannot know the truth, then all statements of knowledge you make are false.

3. This includes the statement of knowledge that "You cannot know the truth".

4. Therefore, that position is essentially self-refuting and the only option you are left with is "you can know the truth".

I think I understand now. This at least helps put atheism and theism on equal footing in terms of epistemology in my mind. Some theists might try to use the transcendental argument though but I've seen some good refutations of that.

Back to morality. Craig's comment was a response to an atheist's objection to a premise of the moral argument for the existence of God. Here's the argument (He assumes of course that morales aren't subjective and says that those who think so have an "impairment"):

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2. Objective moral values and duties do exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.

The hypothetical atheist's response that sociobiological account invalidates moral experience was to premise 2.

Instead of summarizing Craig's entire response, you can read here: Click me

He says that the sociobiological account doesn't undermine the truth of moral beliefs. This answer seems to contradict his notion that the sociobiological account undermines the truth of our ability to know truth, correct?

[genkaus]

I think I understand now. This at least helps put atheism and theism on equal footing in terms of epistemology in my mind. Some theists might try to use the transcendental argument though but I've seen some good refutations of that.

Back to morality. Craig's comment was a response to an atheist's objection to a premise of the moral argument for the existence of God. Here's the argument (He assumes of course that morales aren't subjective and says that those who think so have an "impairment"):

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2. Objective moral values and duties do exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.

The hypothetical atheist's response that sociobiological account invalidates moral experience was to premise 2.

Instead of summarizing Craig's entire response, you can read here: Click me

He says that the sociobiological account doesn't undermine the truth of moral beliefs. This answer seems to contradict his notion that the sociobiological account undermines the truth of our ability to know truth, correct?

Actually, I'd say that both of Craig's premises are wrong.

Taking it one at a time:

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist. - This is another way of saying "Objective moral values come from god". I can prove this statement wrong by a simple logical formulation

1. For moral values to be objective, they need to exist independently from any entity's mind.
2. If moral values came from god, they would depend on god's mind.
3. Therefore, if moral values come from god, then they are not objective moral values.
4. Therefore, objective moral values can exist only if god does not exist.

There you go. His first premise should be the opposite of what he said.

2. Objective moral values do exist. Well, this just hasn't been shown to be true.

Thus his argument is a complete failure.

By the way, whether or not he treats the socio-biological accounts of morality and reason consistently is irrelevant. He is wrong on both counts.

[Tea Earl Grey Hot]

Actually, I'd say that both of Craig's premises are wrong.

Taking it one at a time:

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist. - This is another way of saying "Objective moral values come from god". I can prove this statement wrong by a simple logical formulation

1. For moral values to be objective, they need to exist independently from any entity's mind.
2. If moral values came from god, they would depend on god's mind.
3. Therefore, if moral values come from god, then they are not objective moral values.
4. Therefore, objective moral values can exist only if god does not exist.

There you go. His first premise should be the opposite of what he said.

2. Objective moral values do exist. Well, this just hasn't been shown to be true.

Thus his argument is a complete failure.

By the way, whether or not he treats the socio-biological accounts of morality and reason consistently is irrelevant. He is wrong on both counts.

That was an interesting argument. I don't see though why it follows that god cannot exist along with objective moral values. It at most shows that objective values could possibly (if there are any) exist whether or not God exists.

Most theists I know to avoid the euthyphro dilemma don't think that God "defines" morality. If I remember correctly they say morality exists as reflection of God's character or nature. In way, you might say, God is morality, just like they say God is truth, and God is logic, etc (rather than God having to create these things). Craig summarizes this response as "God's nature is the Good, and God's will necessarily expresses His nature" (p. 145). I'm not sure if you're argument addresses this specific view of God.

[genkaus]

That was an interesting argument. I don't see though why it follows that god cannot exist along with objective moral values. It at most shows that objective values could possibly (if there are any) exist whether or not God exists.

Yes, that was a bit of a reach, but the argument still stands.

Most theists I know to avoid the euthyphro dilemma don't think that God "defines" morality. If I remember correctly they say morality exists as reflection of God's character or nature. In way, you might say, God is morality, just like they say God is truth, and God is logic, etc (rather than God having to create these things). Craig summarizes this response as "God's nature is the Good, and God's will necessarily expresses His nature" (p. 145). I'm not sure if you're argument addresses this specific view of God.

Yeah, this escape clause doesn't work. Theists use this switcharoo, like they use many others, to avoid properly defining what god means to avoid the concept being disproven. Formally, its known as "moving the goalposts".

If god actually did create everything, if he created himself then his nature and his character are dependent upon his consciousness as well. Thus, the reflection of his nature and character, i.e. morality, is subjective. If he didn't create himself and he did not determine his own nature, then he is not god. My argument addresses this view as well. You just have to go one step further.

[Tea Earl Grey Hot]

That was an interesting argument. I don't see though why it follows that god cannot exist along with objective moral values. It at most shows that objective values could possibly (if there are any) exist whether or not God exists.

Yes, that was a bit of a reach, but the argument still stands.

Most theists I know to avoid the euthyphro dilemma don't think that God "defines" morality. If I remember correctly they say morality exists as reflection of God's character or nature. In way, you might say, God is morality, just like they say God is truth, and God is logic, etc (rather than God having to create these things). Craig summarizes this response as "God's nature is the Good, and God's will necessarily expresses His nature" (p. 145). I'm not sure if you're argument addresses this specific view of God.

Yeah, this escape clause doesn't work. Theists use this switcharoo, like they use many others, to avoid properly defining what god means to avoid the concept being disproven. Formally, its known as "moving the goalposts".

If god actually did create everything, if he created himself then his nature and his character are dependent upon his consciousness as well. Thus, the reflection of his nature and character, i.e. morality, is subjective. If he didn't create himself and he did not determine his own nature, then he is not god. My argument addresses this view as well. You just have to go one step further.

I don't know of any theists who believe God "created himself." They think he exists necessarily or eternally. And I'm not sure why you think God not "creating himself" entails that he isn't God.

Though I think one of the biggest points against God is much of his nature as defined does seem arbitrary.

A similar problem for theists who hold to objective values is that they don't seem to be decided as to what exactly those values are. It reminds me of the problem creationists face when trying to define "kinds."

[genkaus]

I don't know of any theists who believe God "created himself." They think he exists necessarily or eternally. And I'm not sure why you think God not "creating himself" entails that he isn't God.

Though I think one of the biggest points against God is much of his nature as defined does seem arbitrary.

Let's put it in a more acceptable form then: Does god determine his own nature?

A similar problem for theists who hold to objective values is that they don't seem to be decided as to what exactly those values are. It reminds me of the problem creationists face when trying to define "kinds."

Oh, you are so wonderfully naive.

Creationists never try to define kinds. Evolutionists keep trying to get them to define kinds so that the ridiculous idea can be disproven once and for all and creationists run all over the place avoiding having to define it.

[Tea Earl Grey Hot]

Oh, you are so wonderfully naive.

I don't know whether to take that as compliment or an insult, but I'll continue being "wonderfully naive" and assume it was a compliment.

Let's put it in a more acceptable form then: Does god determine his own nature?

From all my years as a theist, I'd say no. I'm guessing you'd say he's not then all-powerful, and I would respond that he's only all-powerful as is logically possible.

[genkaus]

From all my years as a theist, I'd say no. I'm guessing you'd say he's not then all-powerful, and I would respond that he's only all-powerful as is logically possible.

Actually, I was gonna say:

Then his nature is determined by something else then - some even greater standard?