Justification for Foundational Belief

[The Grand Nudger]

Fair enough Genk. I have to point out that your ruling out emotion as a foundational belief due to a perception of functionality at this point (or a lack thereof, in this case). Emotion "doesn't work". Weren't we trying to avoid the implication that "functionality" and not "truth" is what we're actually after (or that functionality is actually what we mean by truth in the first place) ?

I wholeheartedly agree with you that there are problems with leveraging emotion as a foundational belief upon which a system of knowledge could be built. Problems also exist with our other offerings. I don't mind choosing between one or the other based on functionality alone. I was under the impression that you did. Or perhaps I just don't understand where the distinction lies (maybe I missed a post?).

[genkaus]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G-lN8vWm3m0

What I am saying is the categories you use to divide, box and deliver knowledge, are so tightly tied into our emotions they still have not been unpicked. I can see why many academics would wish to set up a hierarchy from, reflexes, through emotions to the intellect, but these categories are to my mind imposed, and cannot be set with distinct boundaries. If you think that is so much nonsense, these categories must be true, as so much has been built up from them, look at colour, everyone knows there are seven colours in a rainbow, it is just that everybody is wrong.

That is the part that you haven't established - or even offered arguments for. The example of the McGurk effect has nothing to emotions affecting the perceptions and neither does the color perception of the rainbow.

---

Fair enough Genk. I have to point out that your ruling out emotion as a foundational belief due to a perception of functionality at this point (or a lack thereof, in this case). Emotion "doesn't work". Weren't we trying to avoid the implication that "functionality" and not "truth" is what we're actually after (or that functionality is actually what we mean by truth in the first place) ?

I wholeheartedly agree with you that there are problems with leveraging emotion as a foundational belief upon which a system of knowledge could be built. Problems also exist with our other offerings. I don't mind choosing between one or the other based on functionality alone. I was under the impression that you did. Or perhaps I just don't understand where the distinction lies (maybe I missed a post?).

The functionality in question is the functionality as a foundational belief. For emotions to be considered foundational, not only must they be axiomatic in nature, they must also not lead to contradictory deductions.

As for "truth" and "functionality", I consider the latter to be the necessary consequence of the former (though not necessarily the other way around). If a system of beliefs or ideas is true then the deductions made upon it would work in the real world. If it seems logical and doesn't work, then either something is wrong or something is missing. If it seems irrational and still works, then there is a rational explanation as yet unknown. My point is, I don't see a necessary distinction between truth and functionality because I consider functionality to be a necessary consequence of the truth of the principle and therefore a reliable (though not flawless) indicator of it.

[Whateverist]

My point is, I don't see a necessary distinction between truth and functionality because I consider functionality to be a necessary consequence of the truth of the principle and therefore a reliable (though not flawless) indicator of it.

I know you do but this seems to be a bald faced point of faith with you. It is precisely what I think most needs establishing to support your views generally.

[genkaus]

I know you do but this seems to be a bald faced point of faith with you. It is precisely what I think most needs establishing to support your views generally.

Which part? That the truth is functional or that functionality indicates truth?

[Whateverist]

That functionality follows upon truth. Truth follows passively, recording what has been. Truth can never be raised up, self supporting from the history of what has been functional and lead the way. The truth has no stake in where we are going.

[genkaus]

I don't follow your argument here. Clear up a few things.

That functionality follows upon truth.

This would be the point of disagreement.

Truth follows passively, recording what has been.

So far so good. Though I'd add an "and is" at the end.

Truth can never be raised up, self supporting from the history of what has been functional and lead the way.

This would be the part I don't understand. What exactly are you trying to say here?

The truth has no stake in where we are going.

No one ever said it did.

[Angrboda]

I'm going to do my patented "rock skipping off a lake" impression and jump in and back out of the discussion. (I just got home after an all day American Atheists conference and don't know when I'll return again.)

First, I'll briefly remark on the question of whether reason or emotion is foundational. First note that, regardless of their biological nature, we attend to the biological needs of sleep, nutrition and sex because of emotional cues. We don't eat because we calculate how long it has been since we ate, we eat because we experience the emotion known as hunger; sleep because we feel tired; reproduce because of very powerful emotional imperatives. If you think we logically reason toward biological needs, I suggest the next time you are hungry or sleepy, you see how successful you are at logically reasoning yourself out of feeling hungry or sleepy. Dostoevsky said, "If everything on Earth were rational, nothing would happen." And while I don't depend on artists for my science, the psychological research seems to be trending that way. It's a well known result from studies of people with trauma to the areas of their brain responsible for emotion that they can be crippled by the simplest of decisions. Shopping for groceries becomes a herculean task for such people. If reason were primary, I think the reverse should be expected. (And neurologist V.S. Ramachandran postulates that the loss of connectivity to certain emotional responses in facial recognition results in Capgras delusion, where people recognize their family and friends, but are persuaded that they are imposters.) It's not conclusive at this stage, but there is plenty of evidence that emotion is at least as foundational as reason. (For an interesting exploration of this subject, see Dr. Robert Burton's book, On Being Certain, which, admittedly short on empirical backing, presents the compelling thesis that reason itself is based on an emotional response or responses.)


Anyway, generating yet another wall of text. The following two pieces are not refutations, but I think they should give any foundationalist program pause. They're rough and unfinished, but for what it's worth. (If someone wants to polish them for me, I'd be delighted, har har.)

First.

If foundationalism is true, then the proposition, 'there are foundational truths' has a determinate truth value. I will call this proposition P, and note it extends to "basic concepts" or whatever your chosen mots du jour happens to be.

A. If P is false, foundationalism is false.

B. If P is true, P itself is either a foundational belief, or it is derived from foundational beliefs.
B.i. If P is derived from foundational beliefs, then the truth that foundational beliefs need for their justification is derived from them, and thus circular and without logical force. (I believe circularity also implies a derivable contradiction, but my logic skills aren't that strong.)
B.ii. If P is true and P is not derived from foundational truths, then P itself must be a foundational truth.
B.ii. If P is itself a foundational truth, does it meet any of the typical criteria of foundational truths?
1. Is it self-evidently true. (I'd say no)
2. etc...
n. I suspect that P doesn't have any of the hallmarks of a basic concept or foundational belief,
therefore, either foundationalism is false, or vacuous.

(Like I said, it's still rather rough, and isn't a valid refutation.)


Second.

This is why I brought up Munchhausen's Trilemma earlier. Basically, according to the trilemma, in defining words, we have three possibilities:

A. Words are defined in terms of words, and so on into infinite regress; this is unsatisfactory.
B. Words are ultimately defined in terms of themselves in circular chains of definition; this produces vacuous definitions and is also unsatisfactory.
C. Words are ultimately defined in terms of basic concepts, which, by virtue of their property as needing no further definition, terminates the chain satisfactorily.


The problem with this is that it is not self-evident what is or is not a basic belief. If we wish to instantiate the third leg of the trilemma, we need some way to identify which are basic beliefs and which aren't basic beliefs, as it's not immediately apparent by inspection what are basic beliefs. In other words, we need to be able to partition the set of all beliefs into Basic Beliefs, and Non-Basic Beliefs. This requires a definition of what a Basic Belief is, or the properties it must satisfy. But this dumps us back into the trilemma for another crank of the grinder. So we look at 'A', but discard it as not satisfactory. We examine 'B' and do likewise. So we're left with option 'C', defining basic beliefs in terms of basic beliefs. However that's not actually option 'C', but option 'B', as we're defining basic beliefs in terms of basic beliefs, which is a circular definition. So unless which beliefs belong to the set of basic beliefs is itself a basic belief -- which it isn't -- the third leg of the trilemma is logically unreachable, leaving only options 'A' and 'B'. (And I would suggest that both can be viewed as a form of Coherentism.)

Anyway. Enjoy. I'm off to frolic with Buddhists and Humanists. I might return, I might not.

[genkaus]

@Apo. Okay, let's try this:

1. Regarding your statements in support of emotion being foundational - why would you equate physiological reactions with emotions? Emotions are descriptive of state of consciousness, whereas physiological reactions are automatic and do not require a particular state of awareness.

2. Regarding your first argument against foundationalism.
a) Wouldn't the statement "'there are foundational truths' has a determinate truth value" depend upon the type of foundationalism you are practicing. It is possible that the foundational axioms you choose end up classifying that statement as indeterminate.
b) You need to examine P a little better, because as I see it, it does have characteristics of foundational concepts.

3. I believe the third leg is being improperly represented. Words need not be ultimately defined in terms of basic concepts but as basic percepts. Any description of that percept would not be of any use in understanding it. For example, the color red would be a basic percept and any description would not help a blind man understand what it means.

[Angrboda]

1. Regarding your statements in support of emotion being foundational - why would you equate physiological reactions with emotions? Emotions are descriptive of state of consciousness, whereas physiological reactions are automatic and do not require a particular state of awareness.

I'm not sure what you are referring to here. We are aware of physiological reactions through qualitative experiences which we call emotion. (Or by scientific measurement.) I don't know what you mean by "equating physiological reactions with emotions". I did no such thing. An example here is the notion of referred pain. We may feel a pain in a certain part of our body, but the pain is caused by a physiological state occurring elsewhere in our body. We don't experience physiological reactions, we experience emotional states caused by physiological events or conditions. To speak of equating physiological reactions with emotions is nonsensical. Physiological reactions are physical phenomena. Emotions are mental phenomena. A physical phenomena can't be identical with a mental phenomenon, unless one is perhaps referring to brain states.

2. Regarding your first argument against foundationalism.
a) Wouldn't the statement "'there are foundational truths' has a determinate truth value" depend upon the type of foundationalism you are practicing. It is possible that the foundational axioms you choose end up classifying that statement as indeterminate.

If the statement that there are foundational truths has no determinate value, then the theory that is foundationalism is of indeterminate validity. You seem to be eagerly biting your nose off to spite your face. If foundationalism isn't asserting that there are foundational truths, or that it is true that there are foundational truths, then what is it asserting? Is it asserting that "there might be foundational truths but it's indeterminate whether there are or not" ? I don't think you have thought through the implications of proposition P being of indeterminate truth value. If proposition P has no determinate truth value, then foundationalism is dead.

2. Regarding your first argument against foundationalism.
b) You need to examine P a little better, because as I see it, it does have characteristics of foundational concepts.

Indeed I do, which is why I noted it wasn't a completed refutation. However, it is not clear to me that P is a foundational truth. So at minimum, you and I differ as to it being a foundational truth. I'd say that, prima facie, it's a bad sign for any hypothetically foundational concept or truth that two reasonably intelligent people are diametrically opposed as to whether it is a foundational truth. Since you're the one asserting that it is foundational, the onus is upon you to demonstrate why it, proposition P, or any basic concept / foundational truth is identifiably a foundational truth, as opposed to another proposition, say Q, which is not. What properties and characteristics must a proposition possess in order to be considered a foundational truth. What procedure do we use to partition the set of all beliefs, propositions, or concepts into basic and not basic? (And, "because Genkaus thinks it is" is not a satisfactory argument. Also note that this is why I brought up the trilemma: if you have to justify proposition P on the basis of other propositions or concepts, you've made foundationalism circular and thus vacuous. How do we identify basic concepts / truths?)

3. I believe the third leg is being improperly represented. Words need not be ultimately defined in terms of basic concepts but as basic percepts. Any description of that percept would not be of any use in understanding it. For example, the color red would be a basic percept and any description would not help a blind man understand what it means.

You're confusing the criteria by which we distinguish basic from non-basic concepts (or percepts) from the concepts or percepts themselves. It's a question of identifying a common property or properties which basic concepts share, regardless of the specifics of the concept / percept itself. If you can't determine how to separate the basic concept from a non-basic concept, foundationalism is, again, dead in the water. I find it rather interesting you would define foundational concepts in term of percepts. Firstly, that seems to lead down the hole of naive empiricism of the Humean sort, for which we know there are significant difficulties. Second, veridical and non-veridical percepts are not reliably distinguishable, so that would leave us with a purely phenomenological perspective, which is a rather barren landscape. But the most problematic is that percepts don't have truth values, nor do they explain many abstractions; so just like Perhaps, you would be bankrupting the explanatory and logical power that we require of foundationalism, at the expense of defensibility. A foundationalism that doesn't give rise to, at minimum, a logic, doesn't lead to many interesting places. Percepts as basic truths doesn't lead to anywhere useful. (Ignoring that phenomenological perspectives like Heidegger's and Sartre's do lead somewhere, just not the places we, in general, want to go with a foundationalist theory.) (On top of which, there are many important basic concepts, or potential basic concepts which aren't perceptual; the concept of a group of things and the transfinite being just two off the top of my head.)

[genkaus]

I'm not sure what you are referring to here. We are aware of physiological reactions through qualitative experiences which we call emotion. (Or by scientific measurement.) I don't know what you mean by "equating physiological reactions with emotions". I did no such thing. An example here is the notion of referred pain. We may feel a pain in a certain part of our body, but the pain is caused by a physiological state occurring elsewhere in our body. We don't experience physiological reactions, we experience emotional states caused by physiological events or conditions. To speak of equating physiological reactions with emotions is nonsensical. Physiological reactions are physical phenomena. Emotions are mental phenomena. A physical phenomena can't be identical with a mental phenomenon, unless one is perhaps referring to brain states.

I'm referring to your calling physical sensations such as hunger and sleepiness emotional phenomenon. Just because something is experiential in nature does not make it an emotion.

If the statement that there are foundational truths has no determinate value, then the theory that is foundationalism is of indeterminate validity. You seem to be eagerly biting your nose off to spite your face. If foundationalism isn't asserting that there are foundational truths, or that it is true that there are foundational truths, then what is it asserting? Is it asserting that "there might be foundational truths but it's indeterminate whether there are or not" ? I don't think you have thought through the implications of proposition P being of indeterminate truth value. If proposition P has no determinate truth value, then foundationalism is dead.

I'm simply pointing out the risk of generalizing that statement. Whether or not that statement has determinate truth value (or any statement for that matter) would depend upon the type of foundationalism chosen, i.e. which axioms one chooses to begin with.

For example, one of the axioms of a foundational theory might be "the truth of any statement depends upon the derivibility from foundational axioms", a definition which automatically makes those axioms as neither true, nor false, while at the same time not invalidating the theory as a whole.

Indeed I do, which is why I noted it wasn't a completed refutation. However, it is not clear to me that P is a foundational truth. So at minimum, you and I differ as to it being a foundational truth. I'd say that, prima facie, it's a bad sign for any hypothetically foundational concept or truth that two reasonably intelligent people are diametrically opposed as to whether it is a foundational truth. Since you're the one asserting that it is foundational, the onus is upon you to demonstrate why it, proposition P, or any basic concept / foundational truth is identifiably a foundational truth, as opposed to another proposition, say Q, which is not. What properties and characteristics must a proposition possess in order to be considered a foundational truth. What procedure do we use to partition the set of all beliefs, propositions, or concepts into basic and not basic? (And, "because Genkaus thinks it is" is not a satisfactory argument. Also note that this is why I brought up the trilemma: if you have to justify proposition P on the basis of other propositions or concepts, you've made foundationalism circular and thus vacuous. How do we identify basic concepts / truths?)

The measure I choose is whether or not its negative can be asserted without a contradiction.

You're confusing the criteria by which we distinguish basic from non-basic concepts (or percepts) from the concepts or percepts themselves. It's a question of identifying a common property or properties which basic concepts share, regardless of the specifics of the concept / percept itself. If you can't determine how to separate the basic concept from a non-basic concept, foundationalism is, again, dead in the water. I find it rather interesting you would define foundational concepts in term of percepts. Firstly, that seems to lead down the hole of naive empiricism of the Humean sort, for which we know there are significant difficulties. Second, veridical and non-veridical percepts are not reliably distinguishable, so that would leave us with a purely phenomenological perspective, which is a rather barren landscape. But the most problematic is that percepts don't have truth values, nor do they explain many abstractions; so just like Perhaps, you would be bankrupting the explanatory and logical power that we require of foundationalism, at the expense of defensibility. A foundationalism that doesn't give rise to, at minimum, a logic, doesn't lead to many interesting places. Percepts as basic truths doesn't lead to anywhere useful. (Ignoring that phenomenological perspectives like Heidegger's and Sartre's do lead somewhere, just not the places we, in general, want to go with a foundationalist theory.) (On top of which, there are many important basic concepts, or potential basic concepts which aren't perceptual; the concept of a group of things and the transfinite being just two off the top of my head.)

The point I'm trying to make is the error of classifying all forms of foundationalism under one umbrella. There can be many different criterion for separating the basic and derivative concepts and the self-evident percepts being the basic ones is only one of them. One may also consider the common concepts derivable form all percepts as a basic concept as well or use irrefutability as a criteria.

Also, how exactly is "percepts as basic truths" bankrupting the explanatory power of that particular foundationalism?

Finally, your insistence on classifying all statements as true or false implies a prior acceptance of another epistemological theory.