Determinism Is Self Defeating

[The Grand Nudger]

I see them as identical. "Pre" just means "before now." But with a 1:1 causal relationship for EVERY t and t+1, then all things are both determined and predetermined. Except maybe the Big Bang itself, for which it's very hard to argue determinism since it supposedly has no cause.

The only actual difference I can see is that the word "predetermined" implies mind with foresight and intent (i.e. God), whereas "determined" does not.

Determinism is a position that states that for any event, there are certain conditions that will lead only to that event. That certain conditions have only one outcome.

Predetermination is a position that states that some event will happen.....conditions are irrelevant. A predetermined event x happens -even if- circumstances should yield event y. 1+1= (pre)8.

That makes the two positions mutually exclusive.
(the situation for fatalism is similar. choice or not, your actions can have no effect, you are removed from causality even if it holds as an overriding principle. You are insignificant and unable to affect change )

This is really an argument about whether future time is "real," i.e. whether it's an actual dimension along which events are arrayed. If you see time as a dimension, then inevitability = actuality (but just currently inaccesible to us).

LOL, no...it's a friendly discussion about all of the ways in which these positions are not the same. I fear that the only reason you feel that they are "the same" ultimately boils down to their common threat to "free will" or "mind" or what-have-you. You've lumped them in as enemies to the cause. As I've stated, fatalism and predetermination -do- allow choices, they do allow non deterministic (or events based on probability, or even random) events.

If we're to the point now where discussing the subject at hand requires us to debate or redefine time...I don't think that I'll "have the time" for that one. Imma be off the interwebs in 6 days..lol.

[bennyboy]

Determinism is a position that states that for any event, there are certain conditions that will lead only to that event. That certain conditions have only one outcome.

You seem to be talking about sufficient causes: the existence of state t guarantees that state t + 1 necessarily arises; specifically, there is no free will, and no hidden variables to interfere with the hypothetical predictability that we could have if all the other impediments to perfect prediction (like digit precision and calculation power) were removed. I have not defined it otherwise.

Predetermination is a position that states that some event will happen.....conditions are irrelevant. A predetermined event x happens -even if- circumstances should yield event y. 1+1= (pre)8.

That makes the two positions mutually exclusive.

This is a weird situation. I've never suggested any such position, but you introduced the word in response to one of my posts. Either I didn't explain my position well enough, or you didn't read it carefully enough, or both.

LOL, no...it's a friendly discussion about all of the ways in which these positions are not the same. I fear that the only reason you feel that they are "the same" ultimately boils down to their common threat to "free will" or "mind" or what-have-you. You've lumped them in as enemies to the cause. As I've stated, fatalism and predetermination -do- allow choices, they do allow non deterministic (or events based on probability, or even random) events.

This would all be relevant, except that you introduced the terms into the discussion. I would be more than happy to discard fatalism and predetermination, because the thread was doing fine without them. I believe that you only introduced them because you mistook my meaning when I said the words "set in stone." All I meant by that was that in causal determinism, for any given time, no matter how far in the future, there is only one possible state of the universe. If you think there is any openness in the future states that the universe will arrive at, you should probably explain its mechanism. If you think there is not any openness, then understand that's what I was referring to.

[The Grand Nudger]

You seem to be talking about sufficient causes: the existence of state t guarantees that state t + 1 necessarily arises; specifically, there is no free will, and no hidden variables to interfere with the hypothetical predictability that we could have if all the other impediments to perfect prediction (like digit precision and calculation power) were removed. I have not defined it otherwise.

It shouldn't be surprising that determinism sounds like some invocation of cause - as this is precisely what it is. Correct, if determinism held through and through what we mean when we say "free will" will have been a gross error. But so what? I don't argue from or against consequences.

This is a weird situation. I've never suggested any such position, but you introduced the word in response to one of my posts. Either I didn't explain my position well enough, or you didn't read it carefully enough, or both.

Its the name of the position that adequately encapsulates what you expressed and -called- determinism, or identical with determinism. It is neither.

This would all be relevant, except that you introduced the terms into the discussion.

Yes, I did, as you seemed to be unaware that the positions you were describing already had their own terminology distinct from determinism for very good reasons. Had you argued against determinism itself, rather than offering up these positions and arguments against them or consequence of them then there would have been no need to correct you.

I would be more than happy to discard fatalism and predetermination, because the thread was doing fine without them.

I don't think that you would. Because those two positions are ones which allow free will and mind as you seem to conceive it. Those two are not enemies of free will or mind as we conceive it - your main cause and the origin of our disagreement.

I believe that you only introduced them because you mistook my meaning when I said the words "set in stone." All I meant by that was that in causal determinism, for any given time, no matter how far in the future, there is only one possible state of the universe.

Which would be untrue, in the case of a deterministic model - but true in the case of a predetermined model. You believe wrong, as is so often the case with beliefs. You have expressed a viewpoint and argued against it- concluding that some other thing must then be held in this light. Fatalism is not predetermination is not determinism. Arguing against one is not arguing against another. If the position you;re arguing against is more adequately called something other than what you have concluded...what have you done?

If you think there is any openness in the future states that the universe will arrive at, you should probably explain its mechanism. If you think there is not any openness, then understand that's what I was referring to.

Under the deterministic model there is "openness" with regards to some non-specific future event. Under predeterminism there is not, and under fatalism there may be but it doesn't matter anyway as you are unable to affect it.

[bennyboy]

I saw where this was going, and was able to predict it. That means there is at least that degree of determinism in the universe. I could link 20 dictionaries and half a dozen philosophy sites that says determinism is just what I think it, but no matter how I reword or rephrase it, you'll insist that the 1:1 causal chain that I call causal determinism isn't what it is. We're no longer doing the interesting job of debating philosophy, and are now undergoing the less interesting process of debating semantics. Well, here we go, and then I'm out of this conversation because rather than stimulating, I'm finding it tedious:

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

"Fixed" is "set in stone," and is not "open."

Determinism often is taken to mean simply causal determinism, which in physics is the idea known as cause-and-effect. It is the concept that events within a given paradigm are bound by causality in such a way that any state (of an object or event) is completely determined by prior states.

Not open.

(World English Dictionary)
1. Compare free will Also called: necessitarianism the philosophical doctrine that all events including human actions and choices are fully determined by preceding events and states of affairs, and so that freedom of choice is illusory

2. the scientific doctrine that all occurrences in nature take place in accordance with natural laws

3. the principle in classical mechanics that the values of dynamic variables of a system and of the forces acting on the system at a given time, completely determine the values of the variables at any later time

"completely determine," as in don't allow any "openness" with regard to any aspect of the future.

(Online Etymology Dictionary, © 2010 Douglas Harper)

1846, in theology (lack of free will); 1876 in general sense of "doctrine that everything happens by a necessary causation," from Fr. déterminisme, from Ger. Determinismus, probably a back formation from Praedeterminismus

Oh wow, this looks like historically, "determinism" is just "predeterminism" with the suffix chopped off.
_____

At this point, I can only assume that you are getting into goofy philosophy like this:

Since modern physics shows that the universe in indeterministic, with profound effects on the atomic scale of microscopic processes, we will find it valuable to distinguish pre-determinism (inevitable causal chains) from the adequate determinism that we have in the real world and obvious in the classical physical laws that apply in the macrocosmos.

I do not accept this process, because it is moving goalposts: "Oh, you meant the determinism in which a state at t ACTUALLY is sufficient cause for the state at t + 1, which I want to avoid because the physics seems shaky to me. I was talking about the apparent determinism in which the state of the system can be very different, but all the things we care about (like bouncing billiard balls) still behave predictably." This is not a declaration of a physical (or philosophical) truth: it is an admission of the very course way in which humans interact with that physical truth: in course concepts.

Okay, I'm out. The last word goes to. . .

[Angrboda]

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

"Fixed" is "set in stone," and is not "open."

The natural laws as we currently understand them are stochastic, being composed of random and non-random elements, thus no future event is "set in stone" by the natural laws if randomness plays a defining role in its causation.

[bennyboy]

"Fixed" is "set in stone," and is not "open."

The natural laws as we currently understand them are stochastic, being composed of random and non-random elements, thus no future event is "set in stone" by the natural laws if randomness plays a defining role in its causation.

Okay. So then the world is not governed by determinism.

[The Grand Nudger]

"Fixed" is "set in stone," and is not "open."

"given t".

Not open.

"completely determined by prior states".

"completely determine," as in don't allow any "openness" with regard to any aspect of the future.

"determined by preceding events" and "variables".

Oh wow, this looks like historically, "determinism" is just "predeterminism" with the suffix chopped off.

I'd have chopped it as well, the prefix causes problems with the position which are difficult to reconcile with what we understand of causation.

Again, I think that having a discussion about this we ought not to short change the different positions available, or lump them all together as though they were one and the same - otherwise it's difficult to see how we could reach a powerful or compelling conclusion. If I was a predeterminist I'd be pissed if someone tried to argue against determinism or fatalism as though they were arguing against my position. I'd expect at least enough respect for the disagreement to have the differences between these positions appreciated. -On my end- If, for example, I said that the universe appears to behave in a manner such that human beings could predetermine future events - I could not argue for fatalism (because we clearly are capable of having an effect within the context of the claim) or determinism (because I have abrogated the role of cause and invoked a power all itself - the power of predetermination to be an events "cause" rather than precending events or variables) from that claim. Understand?

[little_monkey]

Magic would falsify determinism, I said that before. But we don't observe magic. But we do observe that the universe can be understood with scientific laws.

Magic, if provably magic and not a new technology or product of an as-yet discovered law, would falsify determinism. So let's say I produce a rabbit out of a hat. Are you going to run out the door screaming "Science is proven false. Determinism is wrong!" or are you just going to say "Hmmmm. . . we do not yet understand all the causal factors leading to this event. (Because of lack of information)

I can't imagine ANY observable event in which this wouldn't be the approach.

Unless you're gullible, the right way to approach any new phenomenon is by studying it through the scientific method. However, if it is real magic, that is, it defies all scientific explanation, then the next question would be why that single event is magical? and are there other events that are also magical? Now if we can explain the magical, then would it be real magic?

Regardless of the lack of knowledge, if something were magical, that would reveal itself quite easily, and determinism would then be defeated.

Mind.
Can't see it. Can't touch or feel it. Can't manipulate on it in any way. Still claimed as part of physical determinism.

Mind as separate from the brain has been postulated a long time ago. The problem is that it doesn't add anything to what we know if we don't postulate as a separate entity. This reminds me of the luminiferous aether. No one ever disproved its existence. But there is no equation or even a term in an equation, that we can say, "oh this is due to the aether'. So you can take physics course without mentioning the word 'aether', and not a single equation would change. That's why the aether was abandoned as a concept - it served no purpose at all.

But no one is saying that you must prove determinism, no more than one is required tp prove the existence of quarks. But assuming their existence, QCD unfolds. Similarly assuming determinism, then science unfolds.

This, I accept. The point of science (at least to me) seems to be taking systems which aren't currently predictable, and learning how to predict them. In a sense, I'd accept this as a kind of statistical determinism. Don't think that I don't love science, and most especially the amazing things people have learned doing it.

Well it's not an immediate goal to find out that a system is predictable. The immediate goal is to understand how a system works. That it turns out that a given system follows certain laws is what we have found so far.

However, all the specifics of the system are unknowable: for example, the spin on very particle. And in some cases, the causal chain confounds us in making useful and important predictions (for example about weather), and there's good reason to believe that will never change due to the butterfly effect (I prefer to call it "precision creep" or something).

We do know what spin is, but what we don't know is why a spin zero follows the Klein-Gordon equation; spin 1/2, the Dirac equation; spin 1 the Maxwell's equation, and spin 2 (gravitons), should be a quantized General Relativity equation - tho' this hasn't been accomplished so far.

As to the butterfly effect, this comes from chaos theory, but it's not what people think about chaos. In physics, it means that a very small change in the initial conditions can produce humongus, drastic effect.

Okay. If you want to say, "Assuming determinism is what allows us to provide real-life results, and generates an understanding of the unvierse that no other philosophical position would allow," then I'm 100% behind you, and science, and the use of that assumption.

However, sometimes we forget that assumptions are assumptions, and because we're so used to them, we start treating them as brute facts. This leads to things like, "We know the universe is deterministic, so the mind must be only an expression of deterministic processes. Therefore, free will is at best an illusion." Since this is at odds with my own observations and experiences, I cannot allow that line to go unchecked without challenge: it must be proven, not believed on principle.

We don't have a very good theory on free will. So there's lots of work to be done before we can say what free will is.

Let me say this-- if science can really show WHY mind exists in a supposedly objective universe, and can really show a good basis for how some physical processes arrive at actual sensation, then my view on determinism could potentially change, since the existence of mind is my main obstacle to determinism. So far, some evidence has been provided-- but it is still very crude, and because of the way the brain processes, I'm really not sure that it's possible to go much farther. It's an exciting age, this is, because we can at least give it a pretty good try.

What if we can produce a robot that would be sentient and would exercise free will? Would you then conceed that we have an understanding of those concepts and there is no other reality but this physical world?

[bennyboy]

"completely determined by prior states".

I think this is being a bit tricky. You must also say that the prior state is sufficient cause for the current one. If state (1) has 4 possible (random) outcomes, and you arrive at state (2), I do not accept looking back at state (1) and saying it caused state (2) to be deterministic.

Again, I think that having a discussion about this we ought not to short change the different positions available, or lump them all together as though they were one and the same - otherwise it's difficult to see how we could reach a powerful or compelling conclusion. If I was a predeterminist I'd be pissed if someone tried to argue against determinism or fatalism as though they were arguing against my position. I'd expect at least enough respect for the disagreement to have the differences between these positions appreciated. -On my end- If, for example, I said that the universe appears to behave in a manner such that human beings could predetermine future events - I could not argue for fatalism (because we clearly are capable of having an effect within the context of the claim) or determinism (because I have abrogated the role of cause and invoked a power all itself - the power of predetermination to be an events "cause" rather than precending events or variables) from that claim. Understand?

Of determinist, fatalist or "predeterminist," I am none of the above. To paraphrase the standard atheist statement: I lack any of these beliefs. That is because none of them is provable in any way, or to any degree, that I care about.

All I really want to say about determinism is that I do not accept equivocation between scientific determinism (where, for example, two massive objects will always be attracted by the force of gravity) and a general philosophical determinism, whereby the state of all physical objects at time t is assumed to be sufficient cause for t+1.

---

Unless you're gullible, the right way to approach any new phenomenon is by studying it through the scientific method. However, if it is real magic, that is, it defies all scientific explanation, then the next question would be why that single event is magical? and are there other events that are also magical? Now if we can explain the magical, then would it be real magic?

One of the positions I hear from science is "We don't know the answer. . . yet. Maybe someday we will." This means that there are two possible states for Mystery X: 1) explained (perhaps by a new scientific theory a la QM); 2) not yet explained. There is no option 3, ever: 3) Fuck me, that's magic, and there's no point trying to fit it into science, ever. So there will never be anything you'd call magical: there are only things explained, and not yet explained.

But anyway, I don't consider randomness, or free will separate from causation, or even God (if such a being could exist, and don't think I'm going there) "magic." They would just be new variables that need to be added to new equations.

If you want magic, look to magnets instead.

Mind as separate from the brain has been postulated a long time ago. The problem is that it doesn't add anything to what we know if we don't postulate as a separate entity.

The problem isn't explaining the physical mechanism that organizes thoughts and behaviors. It's explaining why matter, in any shape or form, develops the ability to experience sensation: not just to process light, but to experience colors.

It's an important question, and just saying "well, no brain means no experience" is not the same as explaining why brains experience. Throwing in evolution, the benefit to an organism, etc. is just playing a shell game-- at the end of the day, we do not normally think of objective mechanisms as having the potential to become sentient, and any system that cannot explain why this has happened is an incomplete one, and in a very important way.

We don't have a very good theory on free will. So there's lots of work to be done before we can say what free will is.

I disagree. Free will is the ability of a sentient agent to make decisions arbitrarily based on some aspect of its nature that is not part of a chain of causal determinism. The work that has to be done is to "find out" if this is a real thing-- quotes because the scientists working on the problem are already convinced that it isn't.

What if we can produce a robot that would be sentient and would exercise free will? Would you then conceed that we have an understanding of those concepts and there is no other reality but this physical world?

How would you know it was sentient? You'd ask it-- in which case you're simply extending the existence assumption of non-solipsism to new objects. Or you'd make some other operational definition of sentience which was actually observable, like degrees of self-reference in data flow, or the ability to reword abstract concepts and have a human listener understand them.

As for free will-- I can see where this is going. Some scientist is going to say, "[technical sciency-sounding jargon], therefore we can define free will as the degree to which an organism can apply symbols learned from experience to new situations" (or any other BS that free will doesn't actually mean). Then any schmoe like me who wants free will to mean "free" + "will" will get mocked. I don't like this process, because solving problems by redefining them is not a very good solution. If you don't believe me, then tell me how many people are willing to accept that "mind" is exactly equivalent to "that process of brain function of which a person is aware." That's great if you want to get good use of your fMRI machine; it sucks if you are interested in why there is sentience rather than not.

Am I right or am I right?

[The Grand Nudger]

I think this is being a bit tricky. You must also say that the prior state is sufficient cause for the current one. If state (1) has 4 possible (random) outcomes, and you arrive at state (2), I do not accept looking back at state (1) and saying it caused state (2) to be deterministic.

All I did was quote from the response you gave me........

Of determinist, fatalist or "predeterminist," I am none of the above. To paraphrase the standard atheist statement: I lack any of these beliefs. That is because none of them is provable in any way, or to any degree, that I care about.

None are proven. Provable would be en entirely separate claim. None of which has much to say on my only dog in the race, which is that it is a position -in evidence-.

All I really want to say about determinism is that I do not accept equivocation between scientific determinism (where, for example, two massive objects will always be attracted by the force of gravity) and a general philosophical determinism, whereby the state of all physical objects at time t is assumed to be sufficient cause for t+1.

Could you elaborate on the difference between the two in the same way that I elaborated upon these three diff positions we've been bandying back and forth? Doesn't the example of t to t+ adequetely describe the event in the first example offered (two objects)? IOW, in the same way that I described a claim of predeterminism and how it would be incompatible with the other positions - can you describe a claim in which those two examples are at odds with each other?