Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Metaphysics

[InevitableCheese]

Lately, I've been reading a book by Edward Feser, a Roman Catholic philosophy professor, entitled The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism. I have a few interrelated topics that I wish to discuss.

The purpose of the book, as stated by Feser (summarized by me), is to: 1) Show that the war between science and religion is actually a war between rival philosophical and metaphysical systems, namely the classical worldview of Plato/Aristotle/Aquinas, and naturalism. 2) Show that naturalism makes reason and morality impossible, and 3) Show that classical philosophical theism is the correct view of the world, of reason, and of morality.

I'm almost finished with it, and I would recommend it to anyone, as I believe it clears some of the muddied misunderstandings that, as a man who's been on and read both sides, tends to pop up in debates and arguments.

I'll give a brief overview of his arguments, and assume you are familiar with most of these terms and ideologies, which, if you aren't, you can easily find online.

His arguments (after a rather long chapter on how stupid the New Atheists are in philosophy), begins with Plato's theory of forms, and afterwards modifying it in terms of Aristotle's views of the theory. To summarize, universals exist in our world that objects appeal to. The Pythagorean theorem for example, gives us an idea of "triangularity", which isn't shown in the senses, but rather in the intellect. These ideas are pure essence of those objects, and any triangle we experience with the senses take part in that idea of triangularity, although not perfectly exemplifying it. Plato believed these universals existed in a "Third Realm", while Aristotle believed (as Feser does) that they exist in the objects themselves, also adding on his idea of actuality/potentiality, as well as hylomorphism. After this he introduces the four causes (material, formal, efficient, and final), which sets us up for his dealing with Aquinas.

Aquinas bases his arguments on Aristotelian philosophy, which most books tends to ignore. Aquinas did not make the argument that everything that exists has a cause, universe exists and has a cause, therefore God, etc. His arguments of Unmoved Mover, First Cause, and Supreme Intelligence are considered separate arguments of the same type. He gives these arguments and explains them in light of Aristotelian philosophy.

After this, he affirms that the soul (as Aristotle believed) is the "form" or "essence" of a living thing. There are three types: the nutritive soul (exists in plants, allows the taking in of nutrients, growth, and reproducing), the sensory soul (contains all aspects of nutritive soul, and adding that they are able to sense the world around it by sight, smell, etc.), and the rational soul (contains the previous two, but adds the ability to grasp forms, reason on the base of them, and freely choose actions based on intellect.) Morality for humans is deduced as "the habitual choice of actions that further the hierarchically ordered natural ends entailed by human nature". The intellects naturally searches for truth, the highest truth is God, therefore, the highest point of the human intellect is to be knowing God.

After this, he begins a section on natural law, proclaiming procreation as the final cause of sex, therefore sex outside of heterosexual marriage is wrong.

My main issue is that I feel the theory of forms tries to explain physical things metaphysically. We know know why things are "red". Not because there exists a form of redness that that object takes part in, but because of reflected light. Science has made this way of thinking obsolete, as far as I know.

I'll try to reply to anything you say with Feser's arguments, along with my own concerns, since I can't fit this whole book into one post, and to clarify anything I may have misrepresented or left out.

[Angrboda]

Does the #5 pass by this way?

[Ryantology]

After this, he begins a section on natural law, proclaiming procreation as the final cause of sex, therefore sex outside of heterosexual marriage is wrong.

Why is this never extrapolated? By that same reasoning, eating for any reason other than fulfilling minimum nutritional needs is wrong. Drinking more than is necessary for hydration is wrong. Clothing yourself for any reason other than protection from elements is wrong. Living in a house which does anything except provide basic shelter is wrong.

For all of Christianity's aversion to the fact of evolution, they sure seem determined to make sure we don't stray too far from our animal heritage.

[MindForgedManacle]

I can't seem to recall where, but I have an inkling that there is a real problem with trying to meld some Platonic and Aristotelian ideas, namely that of Aristotle's Prime Mover concept.

Aristotle also pointed out a rather fatal flaw with his teacher's Theory of Forms. Basically, if everything which shares a particular trait is in fact merely partaking in the Form of that trait (i.e beauty, courage, etc.), then the Forms themselves share a common property: they're "forms". So there must a Form of the forms.

It goes something like that, and proceeds to an infinite regress if I remember correctly.

[InevitableCheese]

I can't seem to recall where, but I have an inkling that there is a real problem with trying to meld some Platonic and Aristotelian ideas, namely that of Aristotle's Prime Mover concept.

From what Feser wrote, Aristotle changed and refined the theory into his own, and this is the theory Feser argues for. Plato was for background.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

I haven't read Dr. Feser's latest screed (not do I plan to do so - I'm familiar with his childish hissy fits), but I have to wonder if, in all his talk of the different kinds of souls, why non-procreative sex is bad, etc, he has even an inkling of a scintilla of a modicum of actualy evidence in support of his medieval viewpoints.

I understand that Dr. Feser doesn't care for naturalistic materialism. All well and good, he has a right to reject whichever viewpoints aggravate his jock itch. But perhaps it wouldn't be impolitic to remind him that, in 5000 years of trying, philosophical maundering has not solved one single problem of human existence.

Science has rather a better record.

Boru

[MindForgedManacle]

I haven't read Dr. Feser's latest screed (not do I plan to do so - I'm familiar with his childish hissy fits), but I have to wonder if, in all his talk of the different kinds of souls, why non-procreative sex is bad, etc, he has even an inkling of a scintilla of a modicum of actualy evidence in support of his medieval viewpoints.

I understand that Dr. Feser doesn't care for naturalistic materialism. All well and good, he has a right to reject whichever viewpoints aggravate his jock itch. But perhaps it wouldn't be impolitic to remind him that, in 5000 years of trying, philosophical maundering has not solved one single problem of human existence.

Er, no. Firstly, I assume by problems you mean things like developing vaccines etc. that helped extend the average human lifespan, and making life easier, yes? All well and good, but the problem then becomes "So what?" What do I do now that I have a longer lifespan than my predecessors and live more comfortably? What is the Good? How can I know it? How can I live it? How can we "build the just city"? These aren't really scientific, they deal in subject matter mostly out of ots purview.

This is the chief problem with looking at contributions to human problems in the way you are. The contributions you are [likely] talking about are, for the most part, means to get on with the business of life, not doing things that humans need (or at least feel a pull towards doing) to be happy and fulfilled, or as Aristotle might have said, to achieve 'eudamonia'. These are philosophical concepts by a long-shot.

As for specific solutions to the problems of human existence: political science much? The USA, despite the many corruptions - largely by corporations -, developed quite a good political system influenced by Enlightenment political thought by the likes of philosophers, namely Hobbes, Locke, Smith, Voltaire and so on.

Or how about developing the sciences and the empirical philosophy the underpins it? Or moral philosophy, which is largely inaccessible to science, and yet deals with perhaps the most important issues people have with one another?

Science has rather a better record.

It also has a record of developing things which threaten the very existence of its creators: atomic weaponry, biological and chemical weapons, military weaponry, etc.

[InevitableCheese]

By that same reasoning, eating for any reason other than fulfilling minimum nutritional needs is wrong. Drinking more than is necessary for hydration is wrong. Clothing yourself for any reason other than protection from elements is wrong. Living in a house which does anything except provide basic shelter is wrong.

Feser talks about seeing things in the relevant sense. It's not wrong to have bad eyesight and wear glasses, or ride bicycles, etc. It's not wrong for a form or action to be defective, it always will be. You will never drink exactly the amount you need for hydration, and you'll never only clothe yourself for protection, and so on and so forth. Also, one could argue that the clothing, or the house, could have benefits that allow you to further other natural needs. What would be wrong in the natural law sense would be to not drink enough water for hydration, etc. He means it as more of general statement to be thought of and fleshed out.

Honestly, I myself could give two shits for natural law, I don't agree with it either. I'm more interested in Aristotle's modified theory of forms and the implications it has on the existence of God.

[genkaus]

Lately, I've been reading a book by Edward Feser, a Roman Catholic philosophy professor, entitled The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism. I have a few interrelated topics that I wish to discuss.

The purpose of the book, as stated by Feser (summarized by me), is to: 1) Show that the war between science and religion is actually a war between rival philosophical and metaphysical systems, namely the classical worldview of Plato/Aristotle/Aquinas, and naturalism. 2) Show that naturalism makes reason and morality impossible, and 3) Show that classical philosophical theism is the correct view of the world, of reason, and of morality.

What I see Feser doing here is what Christian apologists have been doing for centuries - picking and choosing whatever philosophical arguments that seem to support their cause and ignoring the logical premises or conclusions that go contrary to them.

I agree that war between science and religion is, in fact, a war between rival philosophical systems - I do not agree with his choice of those systems. His choice of philosophical system - which he calls 'classical philosophical theism' - seems to be made out of bits and pieces different philosophies and the result is precisely what you'd expect - a Frankenstein like system that is self-contradictory.

His arguments (after a rather long chapter on how stupid the New Atheists are in philosophy), begins with Plato's theory of forms, and afterwards modifying it in terms of Aristotle's views of the theory. To summarize, universals exist in our world that objects appeal to. The Pythagorean theorem for example, gives us an idea of "triangularity", which isn't shown in the senses, but rather in the intellect. These ideas are pure essence of those objects, and any triangle we experience with the senses take part in that idea of triangularity, although not perfectly exemplifying it. Plato believed these universals existed in a "Third Realm", while Aristotle believed (as Feser does) that they exist in the objects themselves, also adding on his idea of actuality/potentiality, as well as hylomorphism. After this he introduces the four causes (material, formal, efficient, and final), which sets us up for his dealing with Aquinas.

Here's the first point where he goes wrong. He appeals to Plato's idealism because that would set up the existence of a spiritual/mental realm that is the primary and would render the material realm as secondary. That was the basis of Plato's idea - essence precedes substance. Plato's belief was that everything in the material realm was but a reflection of the 'ideal' realm. Aristotle's idea of essence was the opposite. For him, substance preceded essence.

Calling Aristotle's views on 'essence' to be a modification of Plato's views would be stretching logic. Feser is, in the same sentence, accepting the existence of the ideal realm (via Plato's beliefs) and denying it (via Aristotle's beliefs).

Aquinas bases his arguments on Aristotelian philosophy, which most books tends to ignore. Aquinas did not make the argument that everything that exists has a cause, universe exists and has a cause, therefore God, etc. His arguments of Unmoved Mover, First Cause, and Supreme Intelligence are considered separate arguments of the same type. He gives these arguments and explains them in light of Aristotelian philosophy.

So, here, he is doing precisely what Aquinas did - "modifying" Aristotle's philosophy just enough to suit his purpose.

After this, he affirms that the soul (as Aristotle believed) is the "form" or "essence" of a living thing. There are three types: the nutritive soul (exists in plants, allows the taking in of nutrients, growth, and reproducing), the sensory soul (contains all aspects of nutritive soul, and adding that they are able to sense the world around it by sight, smell, etc.), and the rational soul (contains the previous two, but adds the ability to grasp forms, reason on the base of them, and freely choose actions based on intellect.) Morality for humans is deduced as "the habitual choice of actions that further the hierarchically ordered natural ends entailed by human nature". The intellects naturally searches for truth, the highest truth is God, therefore, the highest point of the human intellect is to be knowing God.

Here's where the consequence and contradiction of mixing different philosophies becomes most obvious.

The "soul" or "essence" as Christians understand it is the logical consequence of Platonic idealism. The idea of an unchanging, immaterial soul can only exist in case of Plato's third realm. Aristotle's idea of soul is more about the entity's nature or function. Aristotle did not argue for the existence of soul independent of the substance. Therefore, while the deduction that morality is "the habitual choice of actions that further the hierarchically ordered natural ends entailed by human nature" may be correct - the proposition that those natural ends refer to God is based on Plato's metaphysics and is therefore not applicable within this context.

After this, he begins a section on natural law, proclaiming procreation as the final cause of sex, therefore sex outside of heterosexual marriage is wrong.

Now he's just going off the reservation completely - confusing 'final cause' as posited by Aristotle with moral commandment.

My main issue is that I feel the theory of forms tries to explain physical things metaphysically. We know know why things are "red". Not because there exists a form of redness that that object takes part in, but because of reflected light. Science has made this way of thinking obsolete, as far as I know.

Not quite. The question here is whether essence precedes existence or vice-versa.

According to Plato, the essence exists independently. That is, there exists a form of redness that all red objects take part in. According to Aristotle, this 'redness' is the derivative of all red objects. Because we can see a particular wavelength of reflected light, we've created a conceptual form called 'redness'.

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From what Feser wrote, Aristotle changed and refined the theory into his own, and this is the theory Feser argues for. Plato was for background.

If the changed form says the opposite of what the original thing said, regarding it as 'essentially the same' is pretty ridiculous.

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I haven't read Dr. Feser's latest screed (not do I plan to do so - I'm familiar with his childish hissy fits), but I have to wonder if, in all his talk of the different kinds of souls, why non-procreative sex is bad, etc, he has even an inkling of a scintilla of a modicum of actualy evidence in support of his medieval viewpoints.

I understand that Dr. Feser doesn't care for naturalistic materialism. All well and good, he has a right to reject whichever viewpoints aggravate his jock itch. But perhaps it wouldn't be impolitic to remind him that, in 5000 years of trying, philosophical maundering has not solved one single problem of human existence.

Er, no. Firstly, I assume by problems you mean things like developing vaccines etc. that helped extend the average human lifespan, and making life easier, yes? All well and good, but the problem then becomes "So what?" What do I do now that I have a longer lifespan than my predecessors and live more comfortably? What is the Good? How can I know it? How can I live it? How can we "build the just city"? These aren't really scientific, they deal in subject matter mostly out of ots purview.

This is the chief problem with looking at contributions to human problems in the way you are. The contributions you are [likely] talking about are, for the most part, means to get on with the business of life, not doing things that humans need (or at least feel a pull towards doing) to be happy and fulfilled, or as Aristotle might have said, to achieve 'eudamonia'. These are philosophical concepts by a long-shot.

As for specific solutions to the problems of human existence: political science much? The USA, despite the many corruptions - largely by corporations -, developed quite a good political system influenced by Enlightenment political thought by the likes of philosophers, namely Hobbes, Locke, Smith, Voltaire and so on.

Or how about developing the sciences and the empirical philosophy the underpins it? Or moral philosophy, which is largely inaccessible to science, and yet deals with perhaps the most important issues people have with one another?

Actually, the two issues are not independent. The same philosophical outlook required for studying science is also the cause of modern 'enlightenment' morality.

[InevitableCheese]

What I see Feser doing here is what Christian apologists have been doing for centuries - picking and choosing whatever philosophical arguments that seem to support their cause and ignoring the logical premises or conclusions that go contrary to them.

Feser didn't agree with Plato's theory, but gave it so that we could understand where Aristotle was coming from. Feser believes Aristotle's "moderate realism". His views come from Aristotle, on which Aquinas also based his theology. In what ways would this philosophy be contradictory with the Christian faith?

In Feser's words:

"while it holds that universals considered in abstraction form other features exist only in the mind, it also holds that they exist in the extra-mental things themselves (albeit always tied to other features) and that the abstracted universals existing in the intellect derive from our sense experiences of these objectively existing things, rather than being the free creations of the mind."

He also gives reasons why the "immaterial nature of these things entails that the intellect which grasps them must itself be immaterial as well" (I suppose he would mean a soul here, or that rationality depends on it, as he later states, and as I mentioned in an earlier post):

Consider first that when we grasp the nature, essence, for form of a thing, it is necessarily one and the same form, nature, or essence that exists both in the thing and in the intellect. The form of triangularity that exists in our minds when we think about triangles is the same form that exists in actual triangles themselves; the form of "dogness" that exists in our minds when we think about dogs is the same form that exists in actual dogs; and so forth. If this weren't the case, then we just wouldn't really be thinking about triangles, dogs, and the like, since to think about these things requires grasping what they are, and what they are is determined by their essence or form. But now suppose that the intellect is a material thing - some part of the brain, or whatever. Then for the form to exist in the intellect is for the form to exist in a certain material thing. But for a form to exist in a material thing is just for that material thing to be the kind of thing the form is a form of; for example, for the form of "dogness" to exist in a certain parcel of matter is just for that parcel of matter to be a dog. And in that case, if your intellect was just the same thing as some part of your brain, it follows that that part of your brain would become a dog whenever you thought about dogs. "But that's absurd!" you say. Of course it is'=; that's the point. Assuming that the intellect is material leads to such absurdity; hence the intellect is not material.