Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Metaphysics

[Chas]

Lately, I've been reading a book by Edward Feser, a Roman Catholic philosophy professor, entitled The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism. I have a few interrelated topics that I wish to discuss.

The purpose of the book, as stated by Feser (summarized by me), is to: 1) Show that the war between science and religion is actually a war between rival philosophical and metaphysical systems, namely the classical worldview of Plato/Aristotle/Aquinas, and naturalism. 2) Show that naturalism makes reason and morality impossible, and 3) Show that classical philosophical theism is the correct view of the world, of reason, and of morality.

I'm almost finished with it, and I would recommend it to anyone, as I believe it clears some of the muddied misunderstandings that, as a man who's been on and read both sides, tends to pop up in debates and arguments.

I'll give a brief overview of his arguments, and assume you are familiar with most of these terms and ideologies, which, if you aren't, you can easily find online.

His arguments (after a rather long chapter on how stupid the New Atheists are in philosophy), begins with Plato's theory of forms, and afterwards modifying it in terms of Aristotle's views of the theory. To summarize, universals exist in our world that objects appeal to. The Pythagorean theorem for example, gives us an idea of "triangularity", which isn't shown in the senses, but rather in the intellect. These ideas are pure essence of those objects, and any triangle we experience with the senses take part in that idea of triangularity, although not perfectly exemplifying it. Plato believed these universals existed in a "Third Realm", while Aristotle believed (as Feser does) that they exist in the objects themselves, also adding on his idea of actuality/potentiality, as well as hylomorphism. After this he introduces the four causes (material, formal, efficient, and final), which sets us up for his dealing with Aquinas.

Aquinas bases his arguments on Aristotelian philosophy, which most books tends to ignore. Aquinas did not make the argument that everything that exists has a cause, universe exists and has a cause, therefore God, etc. His arguments of Unmoved Mover, First Cause, and Supreme Intelligence are considered separate arguments of the same type. He gives these arguments and explains them in light of Aristotelian philosophy.

After this, he affirms that the soul (as Aristotle believed) is the "form" or "essence" of a living thing. There are three types: the nutritive soul (exists in plants, allows the taking in of nutrients, growth, and reproducing), the sensory soul (contains all aspects of nutritive soul, and adding that they are able to sense the world around it by sight, smell, etc.), and the rational soul (contains the previous two, but adds the ability to grasp forms, reason on the base of them, and freely choose actions based on intellect.) Morality for humans is deduced as "the habitual choice of actions that further the hierarchically ordered natural ends entailed by human nature". The intellects naturally searches for truth, the highest truth is God, therefore, the highest point of the human intellect is to be knowing God.

After this, he begins a section on natural law, proclaiming procreation as the final cause of sex, therefore sex outside of heterosexual marriage is wrong.

My main issue is that I feel the theory of forms tries to explain physical things metaphysically. We know know why things are "red". Not because there exists a form of redness that that object takes part in, but because of reflected light. Science has made this way of thinking obsolete, as far as I know.

I'll try to reply to anything you say with Feser's arguments, along with my own concerns, since I can't fit this whole book into one post, and to clarify anything I may have misrepresented or left out.

Daniel C. Dennett is one of the "new atheists". To claim he is "stupid ... in philosophy" is absurd.

And the claim that naturalism makes reason and morality impossible is ignorant.

[genkaus]

Feser talks about this in the 5th chapter, "Descent of the Modernists". He pushes that our immorality is because we abandoned Aristotelian metaphysics, and the morality it implies. He also talks about how science never refuted Aristotle's metaphysics (although disproving his science, of course), and that the main reason modern philosopher's began leaving them is because "we'll end up spending more time contemplating first principles and the state of our souls and less time thinking up new gadgets." The push for science, and the desire to better this material life, spawned modernists. He also blames Martin Luther and John Calvin for pushing that wealth is good/poverty is bad, and supporting individual conscience over Aristotelian Scholasticism.

That's ironic. Because Aristotle's explanation of a good life is "the happy person is one who expresses complete virtue in his activities, with an adequate supply of external goods, not just for any time but for a complete life." Clearly, he is of the opinion that wealth is good/poverty is bad - if not as a primary but as logical consequence.

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Daniel C. Dennett is one of the "new atheists". To claim he is "stupid ... in philosophy" is absurd.

And the claim that naturalism makes reason and morality impossible is ignorant.

I like it.

Simple. Elegant. And doesn't leave much room for counter-argument.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Daniel C. Dennett is one of the "new atheists". To claim he is "stupid ... in philosophy" is absurd.

Agreed. He's not stupid; he's a zombie. It's the people who take him seriously that I wonder about.

And the claim that naturalism makes reason and morality impossible is ignorant.

Actually, those are are the logical conclusions of naturalism.

[InevitableCheese]

[2] - Here, even with rejection of Plato's theory, he is implicitly assuming that Plato's Forms and Aristotle's forms refer to one and the same concept.

I would say this is what he agrees with. He considers forms to be the same thing in both philosophers' views. A summary of Aristotle, in Feser's words:

Like Plato, Aristotle is a realist in the sense we've been discussing. But he thinks Plato needs to be brought down to earth a bit. For Aristotle, universals or forms are real, and they are not reducible to anything either material or mental. Still, he thinks it is an error to regard them as objects existing in a "third realm" of their own. Rather, considered as they are in themselves they exist only "in" the things they are forms of; and considered as abstractions from these things, they exist only in the intellect. Furthermore, even the intellect relies on the senses in coming to know them.

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Daniel C. Dennett is one of the "new atheists". To claim he is "stupid ... in philosophy" is absurd.

Agreed. He's not stupid; he's a zombie. It's the people who take him seriously that I wonder about.

And the claim that naturalism makes reason and morality impossible is ignorant.

Actually, those are are the logical conclusions of naturalism.

I'd assume you're not a naturalist. Haha. What do you mean by zombie? Just curious of your whole take on the subject.

[genkaus]

And the claim that naturalism makes reason and morality impossible is ignorant.

Actually, those are are the logical conclusions of naturalism.

Are they? How so?

[MindForgedManacle]

Lemme guess: Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism? Snore.

[genkaus]

I would say this is what he agrees with. He considers forms to be the same thing in both philosophers' views. A summary of Aristotle, in Feser's words:

Like Plato, Aristotle is a realist in the sense we've been discussing. But he thinks Plato needs to be brought down to earth a bit. For Aristotle, universals or forms are real, and they are not reducible to anything either material or mental. Still, he thinks it is an error to regard them as objects existing in a "third realm" of their own. Rather, considered as they are in themselves they exist only "in" the things they are forms of; and considered as abstractions from these things, they exist only in the intellect. Furthermore, even the intellect relies on the senses in coming to know them.

Thus demonstrating his poor understanding of the two metaphysical systems. The difference between Plato's universals and Aristotle's universals is so great that it cannot be described as a 'reinterpretation' as he does.

[MindForgedManacle]

Gen, would you say this tension (or irreconcilability) of the two systems is a problem for Christian philosophy in general? Rather, do you know of any instances in Christian philosophywhere this conflict surfaces (other than this instance :p)? It was influenced by them after all (Neoplatonism, Thomism), so I would expect it to.

[InevitableCheese]

Thus demonstrating his poor understanding of the two metaphysical systems. The difference between Plato's universals and Aristotle's universals is so great that it cannot be described as a 'reinterpretation' as he does.

Started reading other sources about Aristotle's Universals, and it definitely is a big difference. And if God is this "ultimate form" or "form of good" or whatever, that definitely contradicts with Christian theological ideas about God, namely his omnipresence, for example.

Aquinas moves on to God being a being of Pure Actuality, and in his Unmoved mover argument, since everything that is actualized is actualized by something outside of itself to reach it's potentiality, this leads to an infinite regress. So, there would have to be a being that causes that first actualization in every actualization that occurs at every moment of reality. Every movement of these keystrokes would have to be "sustained by God".

Different from this was the First Cause argument. Basically, just because we have an "essence" or "form", doesn't entail that we actually exist. Our essence or nature can't be what accounts for our "continuing to exist". In Feser's words, the rest of the argument:

Now, relative to matter, the form or essence is "actuality" - it actualizes the potential in the matter, in this case making it [a human being] a living human body rather than a cat or an apple. But as we've just seen, there's nothing about a form or essence per se that guarantees that it exists or informs anything. Like George Bush, Socrates, and Bruce Wayne, being human beings, are composites of form and matter, but unlike Bush they aren't real, since Socrates is dead and Bruce Wayne is fictional. So, though "actual" relative to matter, a form or essence is only "potential" relative to existence or being. Existence or being is what "actualizes" a form or essence.

Now if the essence of a thing and the existence of the thing are distinct in this way - there is nothing int he former that entails the latter - then something needs to put them together if the thing is to be real. That "something" obviously can't be the thing itself, for to give itself existence, a thing would have to exist already, and the whole point is that since existence still needs to be added to its essence it doesn't exist already. So, nothing can cause itself; whatever comes into existence, or more generally whatever must have existence added to its essence in order for it to be real, must be caused by another. This is the "principle of causality" (also sometimes known as a version of the "principle of sufficient reason"). Notice that it does not say that "Everything has a cause" - something which, as I have said, Aquinas never asserted or would have asserted. The principle says only that what does not have existence on its own must have a cause.

The conclusion is drawn that there has to be a "being to whom the essence/existence distinction doesn't apply at all, who is pure existence, pure being, full stop: not a being, strictly speaking, but Being itself."

And lastly, the argument of Supreme Intelligence:

Now go back to the vast system of causes that constitutes the physical universe. Every one of them is directed toward a certain end or final cause. Yet almost none of them is associated with any consciousness, thought, or intellect at all; and even animals and human beings, who are conscious, are themselves comprised in whole or in part of unconscious and unintelligent material components which themselves manifest final causality. Yet it is impossible for anything to be directed toward an end unless that end exists in an intellect which directs the thing in question toward it. And it follows, therefore, that the system of ends or final causes that make up the physical universe can only exist at all because there is a Supreme Intelligence or intellect outside that universe which directs things toward their ends.

[genkaus]

Gen, would you say this tension (or irreconcilability) of the two systems is a problem for Christian philosophy in general? Rather, do you know of any instances in Christian philosophywhere this conflict surfaces (other than this instance :p)? It was influenced by them after all (Neoplatonism, Thomism), so I would expect it to.

I think Christian "Philosophy" has much bigger problems than borrowing from two contradictory metaphysical positions. However, I'm not intimately familiar with many of them - only to the extent that they reflect other schools of thought. I see it as an extraordinary mental gymnastic exercises just to achieve putting your head in your ass.

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Started reading other sources about Aristotle's Universals, and it definitely is a big difference. And if God is this "ultimate form" or "form of good" or whatever, that definitely contradicts with Christian theological ideas about God, namely his omnipresence, for example.

The contradiction is greater than that. Regarding god as an "ultimate form" is based on Platonic idea of Forms. Here the assumption is that god is a Form - existing ontologically in a separate plane and independently from all physical matter. Within Aristotelian metaphysics, god existing would imply that he is a substance - that he has both matter and form - and any existence as pure form would mean that he exists only in intellect.

Aquinas moves on to God being a being of Pure Actuality, and in his Unmoved mover argument, since everything that is actualized is actualized by something outside of itself to reach it's potentiality, this leads to an infinite regress. So, there would have to be a being that causes that first actualization in every actualization that occurs at every moment of reality. Every movement of these keystrokes would have to be "sustained by God".

Ironically, the type of "mover" that Arstotles argues exists is very different from the Christian god.

Different from this was the First Cause argument. Basically, just because we have an "essence" or "form", doesn't entail that we actually exist. Our essence or nature can't be what accounts for our "continuing to exist".

Putting aside the fact that he is once again confusing the words "essence" and "form" - I was under the impression that "essence" was the property of existing things.

In Feser's words, the rest of the argument:

Now, relative to matter, the form or essence is "actuality" - it actualizes the potential in the matter, in this case making it [a human being] a living human body rather than a cat or an apple. But as we've just seen, there's nothing about a form or essence per se that guarantees that it exists or informs anything. Like George Bush, Socrates, and Bruce Wayne, being human beings, are composites of form and matter, but unlike Bush they aren't real, since Socrates is dead and Bruce Wayne is fictional. So, though "actual" relative to matter, a form or essence is only "potential" relative to existence or being. Existence or being is what "actualizes" a form or essence.

Now if the essence of a thing and the existence of the thing are distinct in this way - there is nothing int he former that entails the latter - then something needs to put them together if the thing is to be real. That "something" obviously can't be the thing itself, for to give itself existence, a thing would have to exist already, and the whole point is that since existence still needs to be added to its essence it doesn't exist already. So, nothing can cause itself; whatever comes into existence, or more generally whatever must have existence added to its essence in order for it to be real, must be caused by another. This is the "principle of causality" (also sometimes known as a version of the "principle of sufficient reason"). Notice that it does not say that "Everything has a cause" - something which, as I have said, Aquinas never asserted or would have asserted. The principle says only that what does not have existence on its own must have a cause.

The conclusion is drawn that there has to be a "being to whom the essence/existence distinction doesn't apply at all, who is pure existence, pure being, full stop: not a being, strictly speaking, but Being itself."

Its funny how all the arguments for god can be reduced to the same bunch of sentences. Cutting through the philosophical jargon and the essence/existence distinction, here is his argument in a nutshell:

1. Everything that begins to exist (has existence added to essence) has a cause.
2. God is the first cause of everything.
3. God never began to exist (never had existence added to essence or no essence/existence distinction).

We've seen this argument many times and refuted it many times.

And lastly, the argument of Supreme Intelligence:

Now go back to the vast system of causes that constitutes the physical universe. Every one of them is directed toward a certain end or final cause. Yet almost none of them is associated with any consciousness, thought, or intellect at all; and even animals and human beings, who are conscious, are themselves comprised in whole or in part of unconscious and unintelligent material components which themselves manifest final causality. Yet it is impossible for anything to be directed toward an end unless that end exists in an intellect which directs the thing in question toward it. And it follows, therefore, that the system of ends or final causes that make up the physical universe can only exist at all because there is a Supreme Intelligence or intellect outside that universe which directs things toward their ends.

And here is the problem with this argument. Without the unjustified bolded assumption the whole argument falls apart.