Moral Argument for God's Existence

[bennyboy]

How do you go from individual objective moralities to a group objective morality? If we can't do that, we basically have "people are different, and they do stuff that affects others."

Guys, I have loved reading your back and forth on this. Since this above quote appears to be how the world actually is, how does that fit into the framework you're constructing?

My point in saying that is that its seems to me more a-moralistic than a good description of morality. Or, to put it another way, "moral" is just a label for the "stuff that affects others" that people in a population generally accept: there's nothing objectively good or bad about it, it's just a description of state.

Finally, about individual morality vs group morality. As is indicated by most of my arguments, I regard morality as more of a private concern than a public concern.

What if there WERE no social context? What if the entire world died of the not-genkaus disease, and only you were left? Would it make sense to say then that any of your behaviors were moral or immoral? I would say no-- the word "morality" only makes sense when individuals are being considered in a group context.

Let's take a case study: a famine and a fruit. There are in the store a dozen people hoping to find some food, and in the store there remains only one measly orange. Now, we can assume that ALL the people want that one orange, and that they all recognize that the others want it as well. So what's the moral response? Give it to the weakest, who is most likely to die of starvation in the near future? Let the strongest take it because he is needed to protect the weaker members of the group? Divide it among all, so that nobody gets enough energy to live another day, but it's "fair?" Should men defer to women, or single people to parents?

The God idea, to some degree, can be seen as an arbitrary objective measure, much as the cubic centimeter is. A purely Christian culture might decide to reconcile the many objective moralities (I call them subjective) to an independent measure: scripture. And if they've all been raised as Christians, they don't even need to ask "How shall we decide who gets the orange?" Instead, they'll be flipping pages looking for the answer. And here's where the morality kicks in: 11 will voluntarily die, giving the 1 the orange, in honor of the social contract called Christian morality.

Now, I don't happen to think scripture is any less ambiguous than a room of 12 hungry people, and I don't think this process will work. And that's why you end up with priests. Their moral weight has nothing to do with their own behavior, or an actual endowment of God. It has more to do with the need to represent the competing mores of individuals in a single deciding entity.

[genkaus]

What if there WERE no social context? What if the entire world died of the not-genkaus disease, and only you were left? Would it make sense to say then that any of your behaviors were moral or immoral? I would say no-- the word "morality" only makes sense when individuals are being considered in a group context.

I would say yes-- in fact, my answer to this question has been yes from the very beginning. That there is no one else left does not mean my life is over as well. I'd still want to live and I'd still want to be happy - as much as I can be given all my loved ones are gone. So yes, my actions towards that goal are moral and those contrary to it are immoral.

Let's take a case study: a famine and a fruit. There are in the store a dozen people hoping to find some food, and in the store there remains only one measly orange. Now, we can assume that ALL the people want that one orange, and that they all recognize that the others want it as well. So what's the moral response? Give it to the weakest, who is most likely to die of starvation in the near future? Let the strongest take it because he is needed to protect the weaker members of the group? Divide it among all, so that nobody gets enough energy to live another day, but it's "fair?" Should men defer to women, or single people to parents?

Fine, let's consider it. The orange didn't appear there magically - it belongs to the store-owner. The group of people didn't come in there independently and at once, they have, most likely, formed a group for their survival. If the store-owner is around, then he is free to sell the orange to the highest bidder. If there is no store-owner, then it's first-come-first-serve. If the group is together then they should already have a system for survival - depending upon their conditions - and that would tell them to whom the orange goes. Going by your indication that it is a famine, I'd say, give it to the farmer of the bunch, because his survival gives the rest their best chance at survival.

[bennyboy]

I would say yes-- in fact, my answer to this question has been yes from the very beginning. That there is no one else left does not mean my life is over as well. I'd still want to live and I'd still want to be happy - as much as I can be given all my loved ones are gone. So yes, my actions towards that goal are moral and those contrary to it are immoral.

I don't agree that morality can mean what you are having it mean. Morality is about rightness and wrongness, not just another word for "behavior."

Let's take a
Fine, let's consider it. The orange didn't appear there magically - it belongs to the store-owner. The group of people didn't come in there independently and at once, they have, most likely, formed a group for their survival. If the store-owner is around, then he is free to sell the orange to the highest bidder. If there is no store-owner, then it's first-come-first-serve. If the group is together then they should already have a system for survival - depending upon their conditions - and that would tell them to whom the orange goes. Going by your indication that it is a famine, I'd say, give it to the farmer of the bunch, because his survival gives the rest their best chance at survival.

It's a reasonable try at identifying a maximally good behavior, but it is founded on subjective ideas about what is good. I think the other tries I mentioned also work as possible candidates.

The point is not so much your judgment, but the fact that the social process must deal with subjective mores-- and if they are rooted in objective processes like instinct, no matter. The variation among opinions is real, and so the objective morality of each idividual cannot stand as objective when applied to that group context.

So what represents an objective moral code in a group context? A God who created all those individuals is one try. The only other try I can think of is an arbitrary choice of a black-and-white standard measure (as with the metric system). For example, maybe complex lab work and statistics over populations of millions of tests could lead to a maximal improvement in the pleasure/pain balance in the population. I don't think either of these tries is very convincing, though.

[genkaus]

I don't agree that morality can mean what you are having it mean. Morality is about rightness and wrongness, not just another word for "behavior."

But you did agree - right here:

Fair enough. We all agree that morality is a guidline for how people should act.

So are you retracting your agreement now? And no, this does not make morality another word for behavior. It makes morality an evaluation for it.

It's a reasonable try at identifying a maximally good behavior, but it is founded on subjective ideas about what is good. I think the other tries I mentioned also work as possible candidates.

Except, I've already given an example about what an objective idea about "good" would be and you haven't addressed that.

The point is not so much your judgment, but the fact that the social process must deal with subjective mores-- and if they are rooted in objective processes like instinct, no matter. The variation among opinions is real, and so the objective morality of each idividual cannot stand as objective when applied to that group context.

Like I said before - there is no "objective morality of each individual". The part of the individual's morality that is objective - if a part is shown to be that - then it would be the same for the whole group and thus applicable in group context.

So what represents an objective moral code in a group context? A God who created all those individuals is one try.

And why would that god's desire be any more representative of an objective moral code than that of a human?

The only other try I can think of is an arbitrary choice of a black-and-white standard measure (as with the metric system). For example, maybe complex lab work and statistics over populations of millions of tests could lead to a maximal improvement in the pleasure/pain balance in the population. I don't think either of these tries is very convincing, though.

Or, there is the third option I've presented - figure out the fundamental drive characteristic of being a moral agent and figure out what the necessary premises are for the existence of this moral agent. The moral code derived from this would be objective and universal in its application to all moral agents.

[bennyboy]

Or, there is the third option I've presented - figure out the fundamental drive characteristic of being a moral agent and figure out what the necessary premises are for the existence of this moral agent. The moral code derived from this would be objective and universal in its application to all moral agents.

You'll have to specifiy what you think this "fundamental drive" characteristic of being a moral agent is. It seems to me that you'll have to (arbitrarily) look for whatever you think is moral behavior, and then define the processes that arrive at it. For example, you'll have to define morality as "the willingness to serve the greater good even at the expense of the self," or whatever, and then look for the behavioral mechanism that arrives at altruistic ideas or behaviors. But this is really just subjective morality with access to a microscope.

How would you discover this fundamental drive without first subjectively defining morality, throwing yourself into a vicious circle?

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And why would that god's desire be any more representative of an objective moral code than that of a human?

Because where there are variations in mores among the individuals in a group, then situations like food shortages lead to moral conflict. There must be some non-subjective "standard measure" of morality, so everyone can refer to it and say, "Okay, the cripple gets the orange" or whatever.

The God idea, or more specifically a social institution based on the God idea, provides priests, whose job is (among others) to reconcile moral tensions by pronouncing God's will. Therefore, it has been established that the various individuals in the community will treat the subjective morality of the priest as an objective measure for everyone else.

In turn, all priests, when pondering especially difficult moral issues, should turn to higher levels of moral authority, until you're left with the pope. He's infallible by definition-- not because he makes decisions anyone else would make and call good, but because in a Catholic community, his will is taken as the standard measure, i.e. the ultimate social tie-breaker. His infallible because if he's not, then everyone's going to end up grabbing for the orange.

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Like I said before - there is no "objective morality of each individual". The part of the individual's morality that is objective - if a part is shown to be that - then it would be the same for the whole group and thus applicable in group context.

Not necessarily. That mechanism may be a device for taking experience and forming a world view, including ideas of what's "right." So even though the moral mechanism is objective (for example if you could exactly clone your brain and body and drop a million genkauses all over the world), the moral ideas that mediate behavior will still vary, and therefore be subjective.

[genkaus]

You'll have to specifiy what you think this "fundamental drive" characteristic of being a moral agent is. It seems to me that you'll have to (arbitrarily) look for whatever you think is moral behavior, and then define the processes that arrive at it. For example, you'll have to define morality as "the willingness to serve the greater good even at the expense of the self," or whatever, and then look for the behavioral mechanism that arrives at that kind of behavior. But this is really just subjective morality with access to a microscope.

How would you discover this fundamental drive without first subjectively defining morality, throwing yourself into a vicious circle?

Look to the given example of a "moral man".

I'd start with the most generic definition of morality - "a conceptual guide regarding what a moral agent should do" - which is applicable to and descriptive of all the views regarding morality out there. Similarly, I'd look to the qualities essential to all beings we regard as a moral agents. For example, "the capacity to reflect rationally upon one's thoughts, desires and motivations and act accordingly" - unless the entity has this quality, we do not regard it as a moral agent.

Now, if we find out a particular drive or motivation to be the automatic result of that quality - and therefore, the automatic result of being a moral agent - then that would not be a subjective desire or motivation based on the unique experiences and biology of that moral agent, but objective, as in, inherent in the nature of a moral agent.

One way to look for it is to consider the hypothetical "moral man" - stripped of all subjective experiences to see what motivations he displays. Second would be to look for evidence in human population - hypothetically, any such drive would be evident in all existing moral agents. However, this isn't foolproof, because moral agency is not the only thing that defines humans and other motivations resulting from subjective experiences may overcome this drive of moral agency. Third way would be creation of a rational intelligence and seeing if it displays any such drive.

Right now, given that the desire to live and to be happy is the most common feature seen in humans - the only examples of moral agents available to us - I'm assuming that that is the fundamental drive resulting from being a moral agent. So far as psychology has been able to determine the fundamental needs present in humans - it seems to agree to this. However, I do accept that it is not an established fact and am open to alternatives.

Given this methodology, I don't see any subjective definition with the specific purpose of concluding a moral code according to my arbitrary desires. Which means, your criticisms here fall flat.

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Because where there are variations in mores among the individuals in a group, then situations like food shortages lead to moral conflict. There must be some non-subjective "standard measure" of morality, so everyone can refer to it and say, "Okay, the cripple gets the orange" or whatever.

Except, there is no reason why god's morality would be non-subjective or non-arbitrary.

The God idea, or more specifically a social institution based on the God idea, provides priests, whose job is (among others) to reconcile moral tensions by pronouncing God's will. Therefore, it has been established that the various individuals in the community will treat the subjective morality of the priest as an objective measure for everyone else.

That people would regard it as objective does not make it so.

Not necessarily. That mechanism may be a device for taking experience and forming a world view, including ideas of what's "right." So even though the moral mechanism is objective (for example if you could exactly clone your brain and body and drop a million genkauses all over the world), the moral ideas that mediate behavior will still vary, and therefore be subjective.

If that mechanism varies from individual to individual, then it is dependent on the individual and therefore subjective. If there is a standard to which it must conform, only then it can be regarded as objective and in which case the results of that mechanism would not vary.

[bennyboy]

Look to the given example of a "moral man".

I'd start with the most generic definition of morality - "a conceptual guide regarding what a moral agent should do" - which is applicable to and descriptive of all the views regarding morality out there. Similarly, I'd look to the qualities essential to all beings we regard as a moral agents. For example, "the capacity to reflect rationally upon one's thoughts, desires and motivations and act accordingly" - unless the entity has this quality, we do not regard it as a moral agent.

Agreed.

Now, if we find out a particular drive or motivation to be the automatic result of that quality - and therefore, the automatic result of being a moral agent - then that would not be a subjective desire or motivation based on the unique experiences and biology of that moral agent, but objective, as in, inherent in the nature of a moral agent.

Wait a minute. We've agreed on one of the criteria in establishing moral agency: "the capacity to reflect rationally upon one's thoughts, desires and motivations and act accordingly" However, this quality is not sufficient to establish moral agency. The thoughts must be based on certain kinds of ideas, and these must come from experience. The motivations must involve a desire for the well-being of others, or at least a fear of being socially castigated for violating that well-being.

Otherwise, a sociopath could say, "Hmmmm. I have a desire to see what people do when I peel off their skin in my basement. If I present candy to enough children, I will eventually find one willing to follow me into my house," and be called a moral agent by your definition.

At some point, we have to accept that morality depends on ideas about what is good or bad, and that these ideas require experience, and that experience varies from person to person. The acceptance of some ideas (keep children safe) vs. others (eat them in your basement) is a matter of democracy: more people prefer to keep children safe, and they will act against the fewer who prefer to eat them with A1 sauce.

Right now, given that the desire to live and to be happy is the most common feature seen in humans - the only examples of moral agents available to us - I'm assuming that that is the fundamental drive resulting from being a moral agent. So far as psychology has been able to determine the fundamental needs present in humans - it seems to agree to this. However, I do accept that it is not an established fact and am open to alternatives.

I'm not so sure the desire to be happy IS foundational to human behavior, moral or otherwise. The majority of people are largely unhappy, I believe, and this is due to their decision-making and to the ideas they adopt. If you really wanted to be happy, you could choose to see goodness in your current circumstances, and not to desire change.

I think a better try would be something like, "The willingness to remove self-bias from consideration of social behaviors." So whether I work for happiness or not, I shouldn't knowingly do things that will impede the happiness of others. A moral sociopath would say, "Yes, my quickest path to happiness is clearly eat little Jenny, but she doesn't want to be eaten, and her parents don't want her to be eaten, so I won't." Rather than serving his motivations, he is deliberately denying them, and may possibly suffer for it. He may not even have the ability to feel sympathy-- it may be that it is only the IDEA of morality that causes him to behave properly.

[genkaus]

Wait a minute. We've agreed on one of the criteria in establishing moral agency: "the capacity to reflect rationally upon one's thoughts, desires and motivations and act accordingly" However, this quality is not sufficient to establish moral agency. The thoughts must be based on certain kinds of ideas, and these must come from experience. The motivations must involve a desire for the wellbeing of others, or at least a fear of being socially castigated for violating that wellbeing.

I disagree. Irrespective of what the thoughts are based on or where they come from, if the agent has the capacity to reflect on them, then he is regarded as a moral agent. There are other criteria - such as he must be free to act according to them - but the objection here is not one of them.

Otherwise, a sociopath could say, "Hmmmm. I have a desire to see what people do when I peel off their skin in my basement. If I present candy to enough children, I will eventually find one willing to follow me into my house," and be called a moral agent by your definition.

And he is regarded as a moral agent. Which is why he is held responsible for his actions.

At some point, we have to accept that morality depends on ideas about what is good or bad, and that these ideas require experience, and that experience varies from person to person.

Its the other way around. The ideas about what is good or bad depends on the morality you've chosen. That your choice of morality can vary due to subjective experience does not preclude the possibility of there being an objective one.

I'm not so sure the desire to be happy IS foundational to human behavior. The majority of people are largely unhappy, I believe, and this is due to their decision-making and to the ideas they adopt. If you really wanted to be happy, you could choose to see goodness in your current circumstances, and not to desire change.

While I've already said that it is not an established fact that the desire to be happy is foundational to human behavior - however, the fact that most people are unhappy is not evidence against it. Just because you desire to be happy does not mean you'd automatically know how to be. Further, "In order to be happy, you could choose to see goodness in your current circumstances and not desire change" - is not an established fact either.

[bennyboy]

In the end, I think it comes down to this: morality is about "right" behavior, and establishing rightness of action requires a goal for that action.

If the goal is happiness, the cannibal is right to eat the child. If the goal is preservation of the world, removing people probably doesn't hurt. If the goal is to maintain the social contract, extending mutual safety to all, then the cannibal is wrong to eat the child.

But what objective goals could we look to as a measure for the "rightness" of behaviors? Survival? Pleasure/pain ratio? Adhering to scripture? Choosing any of these is ITSELF a subjective process.

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Its the other way around. The ideas about what is good or bad depends on the morality you've chosen. That your choice of morality can vary due to subjective experience does not preclude the possibility of there being an objective one.

How would you know if you ever found one? What non-arbitrary or non-subjective criteria could you use to establish that any morality is objective?

[genkaus]

In the end, I think it comes down to this: morality is about "right" behavior, and establishing rightness of action requires a goal for that action.

And determining if the goal is right requires a pre-existing moral code.

If the goal is happiness, the cannibal is right to eat the child. If the goal is preservation of the world, removing people probably doesn't hurt. If the goal is to maintain the social contract, extending mutual safety to all, then the cannibal is wrong to eat the child.

And without a some form of morality, it is not possible to pick which of these goals should be chosen to follow up on and which should be disregarded.

But what objective goals could we look to as a measure for the "rightness" of behaviors? Survival? Pleasure/pain ratio? Adhering to scripture? Choosing any of these is ITSELF a subjective process.

Only if you can find a fault in the argument I just gave. Otherwise, there is an objective way to make that choice.

How would you know if you ever found one? What non-arbitrary or non-subjective criteria could you use to establish that any morality is objective?

I've answered this question thrice already. Is something not getting through?