Turning the Euthyphro Dilemma around on atheists

[Vincenzo Vinny G.]

Vinny, evolution doesn't have "whims". It's not a conscious entity. It has no agenda. It "dictates" nothing.

I think you're making the common theist error of interpreting the atheist "view of the universe" as one broadly similar to the theist one with "God" taken out and "evolution" inserted in its place.

There are two problems with this: 1. There IS no "atheist world view" as such; there are world views which are atheistic in nature but "atheism" is not a world view in itself. It's a single answer to a single question. 2. Evolution is not only NOT a conscious entity like a God, it isn't even an unconscious force like gravity.

Evolution is a CONSEQUENCE. It's what happens when life forms reproduce under environmental pressure. It's the RESULT of forces, not a force in itself. It doesn't "want" anything.

As such your "what if evolution dictated that torturing animals was good?" question is nonsensical*. Evolution dictates nothing and has no concept of "good". It merely favours characteristics which aid reproduction. By definition sadism doesn't aid anything. It wastes time and energy and creates unnecessary hostility.

God, by contrast, ABSOLUTELY has whims, and his morality is subject to those whims. He cheerfully orders genocide and infanticide while also commanding people to love their neighbours. He drowns the whole world then regrets it and promises never to do it again. He's anti-shellfish but pro-slavery.

It's theistic "morality" which is whimsical. Can you imagine a secular philosophy which would have mandated cutting little girls' vaginas off? You need God for that sort of depravity.

*Don't assume that asking an unanswerable question constitutes "victory". It might just be that the question makes no sense. What colour is fear? What does seven smell like? How tall is time?

That was an anthropomorphism, a figure of speech. Of course evolution doesn't have whims. "Whims" refers to the arbitrariness of evolutionary outcomes.

Evolution reflects the environment, promoting traits that provide evolutionary advantages in that particular environment. So one type of environment, one set of traits. Another type of environment, another set of traits. The traits selected for in polar bears is different from in swamp locusts.

So if you believe in evolved morality:
1) morality depends on the environment,
2) different environments produce different moralities, and
3) there can be an environment where harming strangers for no reason can be morally good.

You don't need "God" or an "atheist world view". Just understand natural selection.

Think about that further.

The standard human response to harm is negative, you say. But where does that standard human response come from? From evolution.

But like I've said before, evolution could have turned out differently such that we responded positively to unethical conduct.

Given a different path that evolution took, would you then consider animal torture a moral good, on par with feeding the homeless? Or even if your evolution made you respond positively to it, you would stop and think "Hey, there's something not right about this..."

There's a couple of things wrong with this, though: one is that... so what? Saying things could be different doesn't invalidate that things are as they are now. We've got to deal with reality, and there's no devaluing of events because there are so many other potentials.

Also, harm, by definition, is that which is harmful. I'm not saying harm is immoral because of our response to it, but because of what it objectively does in the real world. It invalidates the well-being of another creature, and therefore, regardless of how it makes us feel, it's an immoral act. As I said in my initial post, sadism isn't a sufficient justification for a harmful action; those positive feelings can be invoked using means that do no harm, and therefore there's no excuse.

It seems thus that the atheist can't escape the Euthyphro dilemma by appealing to human response, because all human reactions boil down to evolution.

And if our moral codes are predicated on the whims of evolution, then the rapist and the killer and the torturer are not truly evil, but have just evolved differently from us.

This isn't a matter of "everything we think is necessarily true, and therefore our morals are determined solely by our own pleasure," it's a matter of the physical facts of the world that exist objectively, externally to us. This is why Euthyphro doesn't apply here: the "objective source" of morality is simply the fact that we exist in a consistent world.

The rapist, murderer and torturer are performing objectively evil acts. Why? Because those acts cause demonstrable harm to their victims, beyond the responses of the actors themselves. It's just a fact, and their responses aren't justification. It's the same reason we restrict certain harmful chemicals, despite the fact that they produce favorable responses in those that ingest them; response isn't the premise for morality.

We're just asking a question: If evolution had taken a different path, for instance, making the torturing of children morally good, would you consider it morally good and torture children, or still consider it wrong? This is a realistic question because we are still evolving and morality might evolve in the future. So how do you answer?

You say harm is bad because it objectively causes damage in the real world by invalidating the well-being of others. This makes the well-being of others (or "conscious creatures", as Sam Harris' version purports) the arbiter of morality. But what makes well-being so special? If someone decides that "unwell-being" should be the arbiter of what is morally good, could you prove them wrong?

You couldn't- there's nothing special about well-being, it's just something one species desires. Does morality boil down to whatever a set of species desires? Or whatever makes you feel good?

Don't just listen to me, deconstruct it yourself. Ask yourself why "human well-being" but not "termite well-being"? Discrimination against species, you dirty speciesist.

Same question here- if morality is determined by families and societies, then if families and societies determined animal torture to be morally good, would you consider animal torture morally good?

If I was raised in a society that found animal torture good, say in torturing and sacrificing animals to a deity, and I had little to no exposure to other viewpoints as I was developing, then YES, I'd think it was morally good. I'd think my deity wanted it, and that I'd be offending him if I didn't do it. If I was raised in an old US Southern plantation family, I'd think slavery was morally right. If I was raised in fundamentalist Islam, I'd think it was moral to cut my clitoris off.

What's so fucking hard to understand about this?

The question isn't "WOULD YOU THINK IT'S GOOD?"

The question is "IS IT ACTUALLY GOOD?"

Don't get cantankerous with me, just pay attention to the discussion. It's ontological, not epistemological.

I think some of you have to remember the context the dilemma was made in. Plato put the dilemma in the mouth of Socrates. It boils down to whether or not morality is prescribed by the gods or merely recognized by them. Christian apologists essentially take Plato's answer to the dilemma: Plato said that what is good is the Form of the Good itself, and thus seemingly good things are but a pale reflection of that form, so it's a false dilemma for Plato. Apologists merely swap 'Form of the Good' with 'God'.

I think Swinburne takes a different answer. I always thought he was an original thinker.

Why stop there?

If the good exists independently of your existence, why can the good not exist independently of everyone's existence? If so, independently of all of existence, and thus good and evil exist independent of the material world, and thus metaphysical naturalism has some serious unanswered questions.

I stop there because that is all I can logically conclude from the given position. Taking a simplistic position and running with it to whatever conclusion may seem alright - like you have done - is not something a logical person would do.

Plato had the same facts as you, and he reasoned further. Was he illogical? Many great ethicists and philosophers pondering morality reasoned further.

Is everybody illogical except The Great Genkaus? Are we all building a center for ants, when you wanted a center for children who can't read good that is at least three times larger?

Perhaps you are right. It is your vision!

[Lemonvariable72]

Well Vinny since you proposed that there is a situation where everyone killing random is morally correct via evolution, could describe the evolutionary situation where that would arise?

[genkaus]

Plato had the same facts as you, and he reasoned further. Was he illogical? Many great ethicists and philosophers pondering morality reasoned further.

Is everybody illogical except The Great Genkaus?

The given conclusion is all that can be concluded from the given facts, so if Plato and the other ethicists did reason further, then either they were using other facts not in question here or they were being illogical.

[houseofcantor]

Since genkaus was here, it is safe to assume the purely philosophical aspect has been addressed.

Beyond that, the answer is both. A sense of goodness is a social construct and a learned behavior reinforced by the release of happy chemicals in the brain. Yet the first can be deconstructed and reevaluated and a new learned behavior instituted to favor the second.

[Esquilax]

We're just asking a question: If evolution had taken a different path, for instance, making the torturing of children morally good, would you consider it morally good and torture children, or still consider it wrong? This is a realistic question because we are still evolving and morality might evolve in the future. So how do you answer?

I would answer that, regardless of what I might think, it would be wrong, because pleasure responses aren't the determining factor, for morality. As I said last time.

You say harm is bad because it objectively causes damage in the real world by invalidating the well-being of others. This makes the well-being of others (or "conscious creatures", as Sam Harris' version purports) the arbiter of morality. But what makes well-being so special? If someone decides that "unwell-being" should be the arbiter of what is morally good, could you prove them wrong?

I absolutely could prove that strange person wrong; I just have to show them, in one way or another, what "unwell-being" feels like, and in a broader sense, how it would affect the social structure.

At this point, I can't imagine that the problems with your own example haven't occurred to you, and so the only conclusion that I can come to is that you're being intransigent. That's fine, but I'll point out that I've said multiple times that what people decide singularly or in groups aren't the sole factor involved here; there are objective facts about reality that surpass individual opinion. So asking me what I think of individual opinions, as you have three times in a row, now, isn't actually asking a question that's a problem for my position.

Damaging people is bad. There is no sense in which damage allows one to better perform useful, helpful, or even enjoyable acts. Being damaged is a less than preferable state, objectively speaking. I shouldn't have to explain why indiscriminate killing and harm would be damaging to us as individuals and social groups.

You couldn't- there's nothing special about well-being, it's just something one species desires. Does morality boil down to whatever a set of species desires? Or whatever makes you feel good?

Don't just listen to me, deconstruct it yourself. Ask yourself why "human well-being" but not "termite well-being"? Discrimination against species, you dirty speciesist.

That's part of the problem: you're asking to boil down a complex concept to a single element, when there isn't a single element involved. There's a series of checks, balances and contextual issues to be applied to a number of different concepts that make up morality, of which well being- and not just human well being- is one.

[Vincenzo Vinny G.]

Plato had the same facts as you, and he reasoned further. Was he illogical? Many great ethicists and philosophers pondering morality reasoned further.

Is everybody illogical except The Great Genkaus?

The given conclusion is all that can be concluded from the given facts, so if Plato and the other ethicists did reason further, then either they were using other facts not in question here or they were being illogical.

Or you're wrong and people can reason further. I'm leaning towards that hypothesis, because your response sounds like a taxicab fallacy.

For instance, if people cannot ground ethics in themselves or others, or rocks, or trees or carpets or horseflies or even the universe, and no material causal relationship can be demonstrated between ethics and behavior, one could very well reason that it's unlikely that metaphysical naturalism is true.

I don't see why that's an unreasonable conclusion, unless you want to go the other way and appeal to moral nihilism.

Well Vinny since you proposed that there is a situation where everyone killing random is morally correct via evolution, could describe the evolutionary situation where that would arise?

Everybody killing random? I don't understand.

But for an analogous example, look up forced copulation in the animal kingdom. Ie, what we would call rape. It happens a lot.

So the question remains: If evolution dictates so, do you rape or do you not?

Since genkaus was here, it is safe to assume the purely philosophical aspect has been addressed.

Beyond that, the answer is both. A sense of goodness is a social construct and a learned behavior reinforced by the release of happy chemicals in the brain. Yet the first can be deconstructed and reevaluated and a new learned behavior instituted to favor the second.

Social contracts fall to the same counterfactual as evolution. If you grew up in a society where the social construct of good entailed torturing people, would you consider it good?

I'm kinda coming to realize Genkaus' answer is the most plausible options for atheists who want to avoid moral nihilism. Which is ironic considering Dawkins is (or was?) a moral nihilist.

We're just asking a question: If evolution had taken a different path, for instance, making the torturing of children morally good, would you consider it morally good and torture children, or still consider it wrong? This is a realistic question because we are still evolving and morality might evolve in the future. So how do you answer?

I would answer that, regardless of what I might think, it would be wrong, because pleasure responses aren't the determining factor, for morality. As I said last time.

You say harm is bad because it objectively causes damage in the real world by invalidating the well-being of others. This makes the well-being of others (or "conscious creatures", as Sam Harris' version purports) the arbiter of morality. But what makes well-being so special? If someone decides that "unwell-being" should be the arbiter of what is morally good, could you prove them wrong?

I absolutely could prove that strange person wrong; I just have to show them, in one way or another, what "unwell-being" feels like, and in a broader sense, how it would affect the social structure.

At this point, I can't imagine that the problems with your own example haven't occurred to you, and so the only conclusion that I can come to is that you're being intransigent. That's fine, but I'll point out that I've said multiple times that what people decide singularly or in groups aren't the sole factor involved here; there are objective facts about reality that surpass individual opinion. So asking me what I think of individual opinions, as you have three times in a row, now, isn't actually asking a question that's a problem for my position.

Damaging people is bad. There is no sense in which damage allows one to better perform useful, helpful, or even enjoyable acts. Being damaged is a less than preferable state, objectively speaking. I shouldn't have to explain why indiscriminate killing and harm would be damaging to us as individuals and social groups.

You couldn't- there's nothing special about well-being, it's just something one species desires. Does morality boil down to whatever a set of species desires? Or whatever makes you feel good?

Don't just listen to me, deconstruct it yourself. Ask yourself why "human well-being" but not "termite well-being"? Discrimination against species, you dirty speciesist.

That's part of the problem: you're asking to boil down a complex concept to a single element, when there isn't a single element involved. There's a series of checks, balances and contextual issues to be applied to a number of different concepts that make up morality, of which well being- and not just human well being- is one.

Okay, so things are complex, and well-being and social structure are but one component of the complex, multifaceted issue. Granted.

But is this complex, multifaceted mutable or immutable (ie changable or unchangable). If it's mutable, and it changes to, say, considering some abhorrent act like spousal abuse to be ethical, would it be ethical or not?

Cards on the table: If it's ethical, then your complex machination is the source of morality, but you're forced to concede the morality of sick and disgusting behavior like child abuse. If not there must be something that transcends it.

[houseofcantor]

Social contracts fall to the same counterfactual as evolution. If you grew up in a society where the social construct of good entailed torturing people, would you consider it good?

I don't know, 'cause I didn't grow up torturing people.

But I did grow up around some racist homophobes, and the happy chemicals in the brain told me those things weren't the things I wanted to be.

[Esquilax]

Okay, so things are complex, and well-being and social structure are but one component of the complex, multifaceted issue. Granted.

But is this complex, multifaceted mutable or immutable (ie changable or unchangable). If it's mutable, and it changes to, say, considering some abhorrent act like spousal abuse to be ethical, would it be ethical or not?

Cards on the table: If it's ethical, then your complex machination is the source of morality, but you're forced to concede the morality of sick and disgusting behavior like child abuse. If not there must be something that transcends it.

It's mutable to a degree allowable by circumstance, context, consequences and intent; the answer is a third option, here. Again, the way to determine whether or not your example could be ethical would involve consideration of the facts surrounding it, and not just the act itself. From my current position the only thing that I can really say is that I can't envision a realistic scenario in which spousal abuse could be an ethical action to take. That doesn't mean one doesn't exist, just that our current reality doesn't seem to support it.

That being said, though I haven't selected an option that places me in either of your two categories, I still have to take issue with the consequences you're ascribed to both; if there is a scenario in which spousal abuse is the ethical pathway, it doesn't necessarily entail that every immoral act suddenly become moral. Mutability doesn't equate to a free for all, because I've been saying from the beginning that any action must be weighed against the factors of reality to determine if it's justifiably moral or not. We don't have to discard that justification when we accept that things can change.

For example, I've mentioned elsewhere- possibly here- that while murder is an immoral act by most standards, we do have caveats where it becomes the most moral option available, like in self defense or defense of others. In those situations, murder may be the most moral option present, though notably it still isn't the preferred option; we're looking at a situation where the most moral thing, and the best moral option, aren't the same. We live in a universe where we are constrained by what's possible, and given the facts of that, the situation helps in determining what's moral, without meaning that everything becomes moral.

I guess what transcends moral relativism, if you want to put it that way, is reality; in some alternate timeline where I kill a baby and call that moral, the determination can still be made by the facts outside my control that no, in fact it was immoral. It's the same with every other moral dilemma one can pose.

[Darkstar]

Or perhaps you lived in some society where it was the consensus that torturing people was morally good, would it be morally good to you?

Well, if it were the consensus that torturing was morally good, I can only assume that everyone was masochistic to come to that consensus. And if everyone was masochistic, they would thoroughly enjoy it, so yes, it would be good (assuming no serious injury was caused).

If they weren't masochistic, then I cannot see how this consensus would come about. It's like the golden rule: how would you feel if someone tortured you? Would you really vote that torture is okay if you hated being tortured, knowing that some well-being person might kick you in the groin one day as a random act of kindness? And if you were the masochist, and everyone else wasn't, then you would be outvoted.

Or, what if most were masochists but not all? Then: would I want to be tortured [if I weren't masochistic]? No. So the morality of torture differs to the non-masochists.

This is just a basic example for now.

Look up the word consensus. It doesn't mean what you think it means.

All that is needed for consensus is the general opinion. Individual dissenters can exist.

But for your sake we'll use another example: If the consensus was that animal torture is good, would you agree with the consensus of people or decide there must be some external standard of goodness by which animal torture is still evil despite consensus?
[/quote]
The part of my reply that is bolded more or less answers your question. I would elaborate, but it is 1 am where I live, and I really need to go to sleep.

[genkaus]

Or you're wrong and people can reason further. I'm leaning towards that hypothesis, because your response sounds like a taxicab fallacy.

For instance, if people cannot ground ethics in themselves or others, or rocks, or trees or carpets or horseflies or even the universe, and no material causal relationship can be demonstrated between ethics and behavior, one could very well reason that it's unlikely that metaphysical naturalism is true.

I don't see why that's an unreasonable conclusion, unless you want to go the other way and appeal to moral nihilism.

You are one of the dumber trolls, aren't you?

The scope of your question was limited to turning the Euthyphro's dilemma against atheists, which means the only relevant facts were about whether or not an atheist regards morality to be dependent on him and why.

Plato wasn't an atheist, so this question doesn't apply to him.

Going any further and asking what else morality does or doesn't depend on would be going beyond the scope of the question.