The Modal Ontological Argument - Without Modal Logic

[Darkstar]

this is the philosophical view I have taken. we are a part of God's thoughts, and as such this explains many problems that I won't go into on this thread. the point is, God is everywhere relative to us because we are a part of his thoughts.

Interesting concept. It doesn't seem like something that could ever be proven or disproven, though. Kind of like a more extreme version of the Brain in a vat concept.

[Rational AKD]

I mean like them holding each other in check. If unicorns don't exist, they continue to not exist. If they do, they continue to exist. But...that would still mean there would be something they could not do, so...

yes, it would involve one will overpowering the other. it's like considering what happens when an unstoppable force meets an immovable object.

heard Christians claim that god created the laws of logic. If so (you can still reply that he didn't), why would he be bound by them?

I don't claim he created the laws of logic. I hold the idea that the laws of logic are necessarily a part of God himself. the laws have always existed with God in eternity.

Also, how do you know a non-physical being is invulnerable for certain?

I don't think a non-physical being is invulnerable for certain, but it is certainly possible. on the other hand a physical being is vulnerable, so God can't be physical. because a non-physical being can be invulnerable, there is no contradiction in terms of a non-physical invulnerable being. since there is no contradiction in terms, God is conceivable... and the argument takes over.

---

Interesting concept. It doesn't seem like something that could ever be proven or disproven, though. Kind of like a more extreme version of the Brain in a vat concept.

I will post some evidence in the future in support of this concept. you may have heard of it before as "The Introspective Argument."

[Darkstar]

yes, it would involve one will overpowering the other. it's like considering what happens when an unstoppable force meets an immovable object.

They would both be annihilated, or so the theory goes. But when has there ever been either an unstoppable force or an immovable object? Could an omnipotent being create both, or is the notion of either one logically impossible? And if such infinites are impossible, then why is not the infinity of omnipotence impossible as well? What if a god did something so mundane as clap his hands? Would not one hand stop the other from moving when they collided? (Or is that last one a bit of a stretch?)

I don't think a non-physical being is invulnerable for certain, but it is certainly possible.

Assuming that any non-physical being at all is possible in the first place. How do you know it is even possible? No one has ever so much as detected a non-physical being, so we would not be expected to know anything about one.

P5: if something's existence is not dependent upon an external factor, then it necessarily exists in and of itself (given it is conceivable).

Could you elaborate on this? I don't think I see why this must necessarily be the case.

---

Must sleep now; will respond later

---

[max-greece]

Just to be clear, the purpose of this argument is to prove the mere possibility that God exists implies his actual existence. with the success of this argument, the only burden I have to fulfill is to prove God is possible, then logic dictates he actually exists.

Prove? I'm not sure any logical argument can do this. A unicorn is possible, as are centaurs, dragons, fairies, The Alien, E.T. and my friend Billy with a 10 foot willy.

God here is defined generically as an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being. this definition may be consistent with any monotheistic or deistic theology. this argument does not prove Christianity is correct. it does prove atheism is incorrect.

There are innumerable conundrums that God cannot solve so we will end up playing with the definition of the word omnipotent. Can God make a weight so heavy he cannot lift it? And so on.

Omniscient suffers from the same issue, only worse. Can God know both the location and the direction of travel of an election, for example?

Morally perfect. Either this is self referential or we are measuring God against an external measure. If its self referential then its meaningless. If its against an external measure then your definition of God is dependent on an external factor.

Argument:
P1: the concept of God has no contradictions in itself.
P2: if the concept of God has no contradictions, it is conceivable.
C1: therefore God is conceivable.
P3: if God's existence were dependent upon an external factor, he wouldn't be omnipotent.
P4: the concept of God includes omnipotence.
C2: therefore God's existence is not dependent upon an external factor.
P5: if something's existence is not dependent upon an external factor, then it necessarily exists in and of itself (given it is conceivable).
C3: therefore God's existence is necessary in and of itself.
P6: something that necessarily exists must actually exist.
C4: therefore God exists.

As you recognise P1 is already problematic, but P2 is also problematic in that there are contradictions in the morally perfect being which is not dependent on an external factor (C2).
P5 is questionable. If something is not dependent on an external factor that it can exist but I do not see why it has to. Suppose we re-define God to be morally reprehensible - do any of the arguments collapse? I can't see any of P1-P6 that are undermined in any way by this change. Therefore a morally reprehensible God exits, given that it can exist in the same way.

A morally reprehensible God is the basis of maltheism. Can a morally reprehensible God exist at the same time as a morally perfect God?

---

Oh crap - spent an hour composing a post and almost every point you make has already been raised by the time you actually add it.

[Rational AKD]

They would both be annihilated, or so the theory goes. But when has there ever been either an unstoppable force or an immovable object? Could an omnipotent being create both, or is the notion of either one logically impossible? And if such infinites are impossible, then why is not the infinity of omnipotence impossible as well? What if a god did something so mundane as clap his hands? Would not one hand stop the other from moving when they collided? (Or is that last one a bit of a stretch?)

in essence, I would say God is both the unstoppable force and immovable object. both are descriptive of portions of the term omnipotence. but I don't think God could create such things since that would result in several contradictions. he is the only unstoppable force and immovable object there can be. what if God clapped his hands? I don't think he has hands, but if he did provide himself with some I would say he would use a limited amount of force to clap. if he did create hands, I don't think he could make them move such that they're unstoppable.

Assuming that any non-physical being at all is possible in the first place. How do you know it is even possible? No one has ever so much as detected a non-physical being, so we would not be expected to know anything about one.

there are several things that are non-physical that exist. one I can easily name is the color red. what is the color red? is it a range of frequency in the electromagnetic spectrum? or is it a stimulation of nerve cells in your retina? or is electrical signals sent between neurons in your brain? the answer is none of the above. the color red is a process of your mind. it is not material, it is a concept called qualia. immaterial things certainly exist.

Could you elaborate on this? I don't think I see why this must necessarily be the case.

if something exists but not because it is contingent upon an external factor, then the only other reason left as to why it exists is because of an internal factor. internal factors can't be contingent factors. as I said to DeistPaladin, A is A and A is necessarily A. God is God and God is necessarily God. so an internal factor must be a necessary one. so it is then an internal necessary factor for its existence which means it necessarily exists in and of itself.

[max-greece]

Fair enough. Just wondering, does your argument give any reason to stop at just one god, or would it justify an infinite polytheism? I still find the notion that omnipotence is even possible (logically or otherwise) to be dubious at best.

the argument doesn't, but there is a separate reason that shows multiple omnipotent beings are logically impossible. the reason is the possibility of conflict of wills. if there are 2 omnipotent beings, for example, one of them wants unicorns and the other doesn't. if they are both omnipotent, nothing should be able to stop their wills, thus unicorns should exist and not exist simultaneously. this is incoherent. since this incoherence can't be possible, there can only be one omnipotent being.

Got it - I think.

In that a morally corrupt God can be justified in exactly the same way as a morally perfect one then both cannot exist from your argument above.

If, however, the justification holds true - that if it can exist then it must exist then, logically it can't exist as its moral opposite would also have to exist.

[DeistPaladin]

you will find your answer here.
...When the text says that God hardened Pharaoh’s heart, it means that God would permit or allow Pharaoh’s heart to be hardened.

Ah yes, more of "when the Bible says... it really means..." apologetics. Always good fun. Even if true, it means the translators were inept which means that Yahweh allowed his Word to be mangled by incompetent humans. So much for omnipotence.

In this case, the context is supportive of my interpretation and not theirs, since Yahweh made it clear why he was "hardening" or "allowing the heart to harden". He wanted to demonstrate his terrible power to the Hebrews so they would know he was lord. That couldn't be done if the Egyptian king would just say, "OK, go on and go".

Additionally, my argument did not rely exclusively on this part of the story of Exodus. The New Testament, for example, has many more passages that supports the idea of predetermination than choice. The concept of "free will", which even if Biblically sound is a dubious defense of Yahweh's omnibenevolence, enjoys little support in scripture.

Neither is "free will" logically consistent with an omnipotent, omniscient god with a plan. If Yahweh has a plan and unlimited power to implement it, we can't have free will because everything will have been predetermined, including our choices and actions.

which is why I clearly defined it in the Purpose portion of my post.

Right, you defined what you mean when you say "God". I'm just pointing out that it's not everyone's definition.

I showed this is not true in objection 2.

Maybe your spurious logic is moving so fast that I missed it.

"Yahweh is defined as omnipotent. Such a being is possible. So since he's omnipotent, he must exist because if he didn't exist, than he wouldn't be omnipotent, would he?"

Looking again as I write this, you're right, it isn't circular, it's a complete non sequitur. The conclusion doesn't follow at all. I can underscore the logical problem with a few other examples:

"The cyclops is defined as a giant with one eye. Such a being is possible. Since he has one eye, he must exist because if he didn't exist, he wouldn't have any eyes, would he?"

"The unicorn is defined as having one horn. Such a being is possible. Since it has one horn, it must exist because if it didn't exist, it wouldn't have any horns, would it?"

You see, we can imagine all kinds of mythical beings. We can define them as having certain traits. But we can't then skip to the conclusion that they must exist because these hypothetical creatures have these traits and they could exist.

The specific problem with your logic, if you need me to spell it out, is this step:

b. if it is possible God exists, then God exists.

Just because it's possible, doesn't mean it is. This is the part of your argument that doesn't follow.

I keep repeating, is this the best you can do? If so, here's my video on the pre-failure of apologetics:

[MindForgedManacle]

Purpose:
Just to be clear, the purpose of this argument is to prove the mere possibility that God exists implies his actual existence. with the success of this argument, the only burden I have to fulfill is to prove God is possible, then logic dictates he actually exists. God here is defined generically as an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being. this definition may be consistent with any monotheistic or deistic theology. this argument does not prove Christianity is correct. it does prove atheism is incorrect.

I really think you need to take some courses on metaphysics and Immanuel Kant, the latter of which Plantinga - in my opinion - has a shit understanding of. But my main focus will be on your argument.

Argument:
P1: the concept of God has no contradictions in itself.
P2: if the concept of God has no contradictions, it is conceivable.
C1: therefore God is conceivable.
P3: if God's existence were dependent upon an external factor, he wouldn't be omnipotent.
P4: the concept of God includes omnipotence.
C2: therefore God's existence is not dependent upon an external factor.
P5: if something's existence is not dependent upon an external factor, then it necessarily exists in and of itself (given it is conceivable).
C3: therefore God's existence is necessary in and of itself.
P6: something that necessarily exists must actually exist.
C4: therefore God exists.

Wrong from the word go. I would say the concept of god is logically contradictory, so your argument is a complete nonstarter for me. Furthermore, P3 is patently false, and for now I'll ignore the fact that omnipotence is a vacuous word. What does the ability to do anything thing logically possible have to do with being contingent? Without answering this, you can add a bare assertion fallacy to the list of your argument's errors.

Now, the problem your argument runs into that it can't escape (and neither can Plantinga's modal version) is that it COMPLETELY looses track and confuses of epistemology with metaphysics. Saying that because something is *supposedly* conceivable is therefore possible is purely epistemic. All you are saying is that "As far as I know, X can exist". It isn't until the existence of X has been conclusively demonstrated that X can be said to be actually known to be a true metaphysical possibility. And this is where I would run an ontological argument for metaphysical naturalism to make said point:

P1) If metaphysical naturalism is true in any possible world, then God cannot exist.

P2) Metaphysical naturalism is true in some possible world.

C) Therefore, God cannot exist.

But did I actually prove anything? NO. Valid modus ponens yes, and the ONLY way to dispute the argument is to say metaphysical naturalism is incoherent, but I haven't shown anything because, like with your argument, I'm making a retarded jump from epistemology to metaphysics.

the argument was constructed such that there should only be one controversial premise, the first premise. every other premise and conclusion logically follows from that one premise. thus, the only way atheism could be correct is if it is impossible for God to exist. the mere possibility of his existence implies his actual existence.

And without proving that God is an actual metaphysical possibility the argument is useless. But if you could do that (you can't) the you wouldn't need the argument.

Objections:
3. why is P3 true?-- because of God's existence were dependent upon an external factor, that would be a weakness for him. for example, if God were made of matter, then he wouldn't be omnipotent because we can break down matter therefore we could break down God. God must therefore transcend matter, not depend on it.

I have no clue how you got that. Being contingent is a red herring when discussing omnipotence.

4. I don't get how you get C2-- C2 is derived from C1, P3, and P4. the fact that God is conceivable means it is not impossible for him to exist. P3 shows that it is impossible for God's existence to depend upon an external factor due to his omnipotence, yet P4 shows that omnipotence is part of the conception of God. this inevitably means C2 is correct.

Again, a naive confusion of epistemic possibility with metaphysical possibility.


This is why most philosophers aren't theists (73% atheist, 12% non-theistic positions, 14% theist). They don't try to play fast and loose with their ontologies. I beg of you, read up some Kant because this is just old and longsince given up (except by apologists).

[houseofcantor]

I'm like a mental midget when it comes to formal philosophy, but how is "omnipotent" not self-contradictory? And how is "god" not contingent when every instance of "god" derives from some idiot flapping their gums about "god?" I might have more respect for these concepts if I saw my dog building an altar or something, but that doesn't seem to happen.

[Alex K]

P4: the concept of God includes omnipotence.
C2: therefore God's existence is not dependent upon an external factor.
P5: if something's existence is not dependent upon an external factor, then it necessarily exists in and of itself (given it is conceivable).
C3: therefore God's existence is necessary in and of itself.
P6: something that necessarily exists must actually exist.

Haha, are you taking a piss? Here you changed from stating a few hypotheticals (e.g. if it exists, its existence must not be dependent upon an external factor because blabla) and in the next step just dropped the conditional "if it exists" and called it a proof? That's just a cheap exploitation of imprecise language, nothing more. P6 should actually read "if it exists, something that necessarilty exists must actually exist", which does not allow C4. Your little sleight of hand is facilitated by dropping the word "concept" midway.

P6 is a delayed begging the question, because it misrepresents C3: Why isn't C3 already your proof? Because it really is still a hypothetical. C3 subsequently is misrepresented
in the first half of P6 to mean that God necessarily exists, no further condition.

Same already with the step to C2, where suddenly you conveniently forget that what you are actually arguing is that if God exists, his dependence cannot be dependent upon an external factor - because it would otherwise violate your definition of what a god is. It can of course still simply not exist, then it doesn't have to fulfil any of these premises which you establish.

The technique which you use is to stretch out an argument over many steps in which you choose imprecise language to reach a fake conclusion. I'm sure if you add three more intermediate premises, it will be even harder to spot.

If you like proofs, you should study real mathematics. Don't waste your time with this bogus stuff.