The Modal Ontological Argument - Without Modal Logic

[Whateverist]

you will find your answer here.
...When the text says that God hardened Pharaoh’s heart, it means that God would permit or allow Pharaoh’s heart to be hardened.

Ah yes, more of "when the Bible says... it really means..." apologetics. Always good fun. Even if true, it means the translators were inept which means that Yahweh allowed his Word to be mangled by incompetent humans. So much for omnipotence.

In all fairness, isn't it possible that an all powerful god would make sure his word was mangled as a test of human faith? Without a perfect degree of imperfection, god's word would draw to Him both the chaff and the wheat of humanity. Well played God.

[DeistPaladin]

In all fairness, isn't it possible that an all powerful god would make sure his word was mangled as a test of human faith? Without a perfect degree of imperfection, god's word would draw to Him both the chaff and the wheat of humanity. Well played God.

Depends what you're testing for, I guess.

If you're testing so that only the best and brightest get into Heaven, you'd want to rig the system so that the brightest problem solvers could figure it out. If that's the case, atheists and other free thinkers are going to Heaven.

On the other hand, if you're testing for gullibility and people who'll just do as their told without question, than Christianity is a great test for that.

[DeistPaladin]

Thought I'd share from another thread:

ONTOLOGICAL LOGIC APPLIED IN REAL LIFE

***Walks into a bank***
"Hi, I'd like to withdraw one million dollars from my checking account."

"Sir, you don't even have an checking account at this bank."

"Well, is it possible I could have an account at this bank?"

"Um, sure, but I don't see..."

"And is it possible that a checking account could have 1 million dollars in it?"

"Well, theoretically, but..."

"And an account with one million dollars would have a million dollars in it, right?"

"Sure but..."

"And if I didn't have an account at this bank, it couldn't have 1 million dollars in it?"

"Exactly, and..."

"So we can imagine that I have a checking account with one million dollars at this bank, such a thing could exist and if it didn't exist, it wouldn't have 1 million dollars in it. So my account with 1 million dollars in it MUST exist."

"Wait! What?"

"So I'd like to withdraw my million dollars, please."

***Get thrown out of the bank***

[Darkstar]

there are several things that are non-physical that exist. one I can easily name is the color red. what is the color red? is it a range of frequency in the electromagnetic spectrum? or is it a stimulation of nerve cells in your retina? or is electrical signals sent between neurons in your brain? the answer is none of the above. the color red is a process of your mind. it is not material, it is a concept called qualia. immaterial things certainly exist.

So...god is a concept in our minds, then? Makes sense...

if something exists but not because it is contingent upon an external factor, then the only other reason left as to why it exists is because of an internal factor. internal factors can't be contingent factors. as I said to DeistPaladin, A is A and A is necessarily A. God is God and God is necessarily God. so an internal factor must be a necessary one. so it is then an internal necessary factor for its existence which means it necessarily exists in and of itself.

And it is possible for something to rely on an internal factor for its existence? How would we know? Like I said before, I highly doubt that omnipotence is even theoretically possible. Aside from it not being self-contradictory, why would it be possible? Or are you suggesting that literally nothing is impossible so long as it is not logically impossible?

[Rational AKD]

I really think you need to take some courses on metaphysics and Immanuel Kant, the latter of which Plantinga - in my opinion - has a shit understanding of. But my main focus will be on your argument.

good because i would hate this to simply be ad hominem exchange.

Wrong from the word go. I would say the concept of god is logically contradictory, so your argument is a complete nonstarter for me.

if you read the purpose, you would realize this objection is irrelevant to the purpose. but you do seem to have a nag for missing details of my posts. and i'm sure you have several failed arguments to support your position such as the ones we most recently discussed. but that's your prerogative if you want to hold onto failed arguments.

Furthermore, P3 is patently false, and for now I'll ignore the fact that omnipotence is a vacuous word. What does the ability to do anything thing logically possible have to do with being contingent? Without answering this, you can add a bare assertion fallacy to the list of your argument's errors.

i'm sure you also didn't read the posts here. there are 2 parts to the definition of omnipotent, an active definition and a descriptive one as i said here:

there are 2 aspects of omnipotence. an active aspect: the ability to do anything logically possible; and a descriptive aspect: cannot be vulnerable or overcome by anything. the descriptive aspect is what makes P3 correct. if God were made of matter, he would be vulnerable which contradicts his omnipotence so he can't be made of matter.

and if you're dissatisfied with that definition then, like with most all your objections, i can simply change the semantics by replacing the word 'omnipotence' with 'omni-invulnerability' or something. maybe someday you'll realize how silly it is to argue semantics.

Now, the problem your argument runs into that it can't escape (and neither can Plantinga's modal version) is that it COMPLETELY looses track and confuses of epistemology with metaphysics. Saying that because something is *supposedly* conceivable is therefore possible is purely epistemic. All you are saying is that "As far as I know, X can exist".

not the way i'm using the word conceivable. i think the argument would look a little better if i replaced the word conceivable with coherent since that's a better word to use here. but regardless, i'm using metaphysical possibility from P1, showing it's logical implication of metaphysical necessity, and showing metaphysical necessity entails actual existence.

It isn't until the existence of X has been conclusively demonstrated that X can be said to be actually known to be a true metaphysical possibility.

sometimes i wonder if you deliberately make this stuff up. Stanford Encyclopedia obviously proves you wrong:

Φ is metaphysically possible if and only if Φ is true in some metaphysically possible world.
Example: It is metaphysically possible that some physical particle moves faster than the speed of light.

Φ is metaphysically necessary if and only if Φ is true in all metaphysically possible worlds.
Example: It is metaphysically necessary that Queen Elizabeth is a human.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modali...stemology/

lets see how many ways this proves you wrong. do you have to demonstrate something to show it's true in a metaphysically possible world? no. has it been demonstrated that physical particles move faster than the speed of light? no. yet is that listed as an example of a metaphysical possibility on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy site? yes. again, do you make up your own rules of philosophy?

But did I actually prove anything? NO. Valid modus ponens yes, and the ONLY way to dispute the argument is to say metaphysical naturalism is incoherent, but I haven't shown anything because, like with your argument, I'm making a retarded jump from epistemology to metaphysics.

what you seem to miss is that argument can only be valid given the modal ontological argument is valid (which you obviously don't think is true). otherwise possibility of naturalism in a possible world doesn't at all show impossibility of God in a possible world. so if hypothetically we were to say the MOA is valid, then your modal naturalism argument would be valid; however, you can only show P1 is true by showing P1 of the MOA is false. so it still doesn't get around debunking the MOA even if your argument is valid.

And without proving that God is an actual metaphysical possibility the argument is useless. But if you could do that (you can't) the you wouldn't need the argument.

again, that is not in the purpose of the argument; though i'm sure you didn't even read that part. but if i were to prove P1, i would probably do so with the modal perfection argument.

I have no clue how you got that. Being contingent is a red herring when discussing omnipotence.

it certainly is not a red herring. there are many who would agree that God (by the definition i used) is possible, or that he can exist in at least one possible world. if they disagree that he is necessary, then they would have to think he is contingent. since the majority of atheists don't think God is impossible, all of them would have to think he is contingent.

Again, a naive confusion of epistemic possibility with metaphysical possibility.

again, an abject failure on your part. according to Stanford "It is metaphysically necessary that Queen Elizabeth is a human." just like it is metaphysically necessary that Queen Elizabeth is a human, it is metaphysically necessary that God is omnipotent. from that, as we can see in the argument, this means it is also metaphysically necessary that he exists so long as it is not metaphysically impossible that he exists.

I'm like a mental midget when it comes to formal philosophy, but how is "omnipotent" not self-contradictory?

how is it self-contradictory?

And how is "god" not contingent when every instance of "god" derives from some idiot flapping their gums about "god?"

that's an assumption on your part. sounds like a wishful thinking fallacy "i don't want your conclusion to be true so your argument is wrong."

Haha, are you taking a piss? Here you changed from stating a few hypotheticals (e.g. if it exists, its existence must not be dependent upon an external factor because blabla) and in the next step just dropped the conditional "if it exists" and called it a proof? That's just a cheap exploitation of imprecise language, nothing more.

incorrect. P4 is speaking of metaphysical necessary since the definition is necessarily part of the concept. C2 is hypothetical in nature, but P5 is deductive in nature not hypothetical. it is P5 that has reduced the hypothetical nature from the premises, not P6; C3 is where the metaphysical possibility has been dropped from the premises and now it is a metaphysical necessity. P6 merely shows that metaphysical necessity of existence also entails actual existence.

P6 should actually read "if it exists, something that necessarilty exists must actually exist"

but that premise you made up is flat out wrong and isn't even close to representative of my P6. my P6 merely states that if something is metaphysically necessary, it must also be actually true.

P6 is a delayed begging the question, because it misrepresents C3: Why isn't C3 already your proof?

because the argument has many unnecessary steps for the purpose of thoroughness, as you should be able to see from the beginning. i didn't have to start with P1, i could have started from C1. i really didn't need P6 because everyone should be able to know necessary A= true A as the very definition of necessary is that it is impossible to be false. but you know, some people have horrific deduction skills so that's why P6 is there. it has nothing to do with C3 being hypothetical, it expresses metaphysical necessity.

Same already with the step to C2, where suddenly you conveniently forget that what you are actually arguing is that if God exists, his dependence cannot be dependent upon an external factor - because it would otherwise violate your definition of what a god is.

because, according to Stanford at least, definitions are metaphysically necessary to concepts. for example, non-square circularity is metaphysically necessary because square circularity is metaphysically impossible (this is what they would call in philosophy the principle of explosion). at the same time, because non-square circularity is necessary, non-square circularity is also true. again, that's what P6 is meant to show.

ONTOLOGICAL LOGIC APPLIED IN REAL LIFE

you obviously don't know the difference between de re and de dicto modality. to say "my bank account has $1 million" is a statement de dicto, and as such it is not a necessity of the bank account. in fact, it's 2 statements de dicto, first that the bank account is yours and second that it has 1 million dollars. as such, since neither of those things are necessary de re, they don't work in such an argument.

So...god is a concept in our minds, then? Makes sense...

no, as i said before God is an immaterial mind. since there are clear examples of things that are immaterial (color, sound etc.) it is certainly possible for the mind to be immaterial. and given most would claim there is no clear defeater for extreme solipsism, most have already admitted it is possible for mind to be immaterial. therefore, it is possible for God to be an immaterial mind.

And it is possible for something to rely on an internal factor for its existence? How would we know?

again, there are several things that necessarily exist. i also have an argument to support this: http://atheistforums.org/thread-21748.html

Like I said before, I highly doubt that omnipotence is even theoretically possible. Aside from it not being self-contradictory, why would it be possible?

that's the only reason i need. something can only be metaphysically impossible if it has a self contradiction, for example a square circle. this is why P1 is worded the way it is, because the argument only fails if P1 is false. everything else follows logically and inescapably.

Or are you suggesting that literally nothing is impossible so long as it is not logically impossible?

logical impossibility has to do with coherence within a system. metaphysical possibility has to do with coherence in itself since we can imagine numerous systems for different metaphysically possible worlds and it only needs to be possibly true in one of those systems to be metaphysically possible.

[Darkstar]

no, as i said before God is an immaterial mind.

The immaterial mind is produced by the material brain. No mind has ever been known to exist sans brain.

since there are clear examples of things that are immaterial (color, sound etc.) it is certainly possible for the mind to be immaterial.

In what sense? Colors, sounds, etc. are the result of energy (either directly or indirectly) and while they certainly exist, this does not lead to them being sentient.

and given most would claim there is no clear defeater for extreme solipsism, most have already admitted it is possible for mind to be immaterial. therefore, it is possible for God to be an immaterial mind.

Not really. The mind, as a concept, is indeed immaterial; however, the existence of the mind is inherently contingent on the physical brain. Or does a magical omnipotent mind not need a brain? I still fail to see why an omnipotent being must exist; I would still hold to the first objection.

again, there are several things that necessarily exist. i also have an argument to support this: http://atheistforums.org/thread-21748.html

I would posit that necessary truths, if they exist, cannot be known to us for certain. Solipsism cannot be disproven, so "necessary truths" are really more akin to things, such as gravity, that seem absolute, but can we really know for sure? There should, one would think, be a final layer, so to speak. That is, something that is not contingent upon another thing, but only the laws of physics come to mind. And the laws of physics are not sentient.

that's the only reason i need. something can only be metaphysically impossible if it has a self contradiction, for example a square circle.

So it follows that literally everything that is possible is also true?

logical impossibility has to do with coherence within a system. metaphysical possibility has to do with coherence in itself since we can imagine numerous systems for different metaphysically possible worlds and it only needs to be possibly true in one of those systems to be metaphysically possible.

It is metaphysically possible for their to be no god, then? I can certainly imagine a universe without one.

[JuliaL]

Is this argument an application of the "if you can't convince them, confuse them," principle?

As you are positing this omniscient God as being coherent, can you please tell us how He knows He is omniscient? Do you need another 'omnipotence means being able to do anything not logically impossible' crutch?

[Rational AKD]

The immaterial mind is produced by the material brain. No mind has ever been known to exist sans brain.

lets see... first you're making an assumption that the mind is produced by the brain, i would argue it is the other way around and i can give some evidence but that involves different arguments including the introspective argument and the implications of modern quantum mechanics such as the delayed choice quantum eraser experiment. such things are off topic of this thread but i will address them in the future. second, you're making an argument from ignorance fallacy in an attempt to support your assumption. just because no one has ever seen a mind function independent of the brain doesn't mean that can't be the case, there are many things that we haven't seen before that turn out to be true. lack of evidence has nothing to do with the truth of the statement.

In what sense? Colors, sounds, etc. are the result of energy (either directly or indirectly) and while they certainly exist, this does not lead to them being sentient.

i never suggested they were sentient, i simply stated they exist and can't be broken down to matter. as such, the mind can't be broken down to matter either. even Sam Harris agrees with this.

Not really. The mind, as a concept, is indeed immaterial; however, the existence of the mind is inherently contingent on the physical brain. Or does a magical omnipotent mind not need a brain? I still fail to see why an omnipotent being must exist; I would still hold to the first objection.

again, you're making baseless assumptions. from what we can observe, there is a clear connection between mind and brain. we can also clearly observe that the functional capabilities of the brain can determine how well the mind can interact with the brain. but none of that clearly shows that the mind is dependent upon the brain. there is nothing you have said that shows a necessity of a brain dependent mind. even if you indeed showed that our minds are brain dependent, that doesn't mean it's impossible to have one that isn't.

I would posit that necessary truths, if they exist, cannot be known to us for certain. Solipsism cannot be disproven, so "necessary truths" are really more akin to things, such as gravity, that seem absolute, but can we really know for sure? There should, one would think, be a final layer, so to speak. That is, something that is not contingent upon another thing, but only the laws of physics come to mind. And the laws of physics are not sentient.

i don't think you realize that by admitting necessary truths can exist, you have also admitted the possibility that something's existence can be necessary in and of itself. if something can be true because it is necessary for it to be true, then it can be true that something exists simply because it is necessarily true that it exists. the rest is irrelevant since the argument is ontological so it doesn't rely on our physical senses. the only way to refute the argument is to show P1 is wrong or to deny logic itself (which would have to be a baseless assertion BTW).

So it follows that literally everything that is possible is also true?

no, it follows that anything that is metaphysically possible but not metaphysically contingent is metaphysically necessary and anything that is metaphysically necessarily is also true.

It is metaphysically possible for their to be no god, then? I can certainly imagine a universe without one.

when you analyze the coherence of the statement in conjunction to the validity of the MOA, you can see that it is not. if it were possible for there to be no God, then this would mean it is impossible for God to exist, or God's existence is contingent. but upon further inspection, necessary existence is a necessary part of the property of omnipotence, and omnipotence is a necessary property of God. therefore, it is only metaphysically possible for there to be no God if it is metaphysically impossible for God to exist. so given the MOA is sound, it is not possible for there to be no God.

[Alex K]

Haha, are you taking a piss? Here you changed from stating a few hypotheticals (e.g. if it exists, its existence must not be dependent upon an external factor because blabla) and in the next step just dropped the conditional "if it exists" and called it a proof? That's just a cheap exploitation of imprecise language, nothing more.

incorrect. P4 is speaking of metaphysical necessary since the definition is necessarily part of the concept. C2 is hypothetical in nature, but P5 is deductive in nature not hypothetical.

The slippery part about your argument is that none of the language is precise enough to really nail down what is stated where, so you can shift back and forth the point where you switch from necessary properties of God to actual properties of God. This becomes more clear if one puts the argument in one sentence, where it is harder to do stealth shifts in meanings of words.

Because the concept of God includes omnipotence, God's existence is not dependent on an external factor, and therefore God's existence is necessary in and of itself, and God thus exists.

This is precisely a condensed version of your argument, no?

So what went wrong here? The second sentence is wrong if you mean it to talk about God's actual existence in the world rather than elaborations on the properties included in the concept of God.

You cannot conclude that God's existence is not dependent on an external factor from saying that the concept of God includes this necessity. Since you have before only said things about the concept of God, it only allows you to conclude statements about God's existence if he exists: something that does not exists does not have to fulfil the requirements laid out in its concept. This is confusing in this case because you put existence as a requirement into the concept.

If you let your logic work like this, it would mean that any idea you dream up is necessarily realized in the world if only you attach the necessity of existence in its definition.

[MindForgedManacle]

good because i would hate this to simply be ad hominem exchange.

Perhaps you should look up what an ad hominem is.

if you read the purpose, you would realize this objection is irrelevant to the purpose. but you do seem to have a nag for missing details of my posts. and i'm sure you have several failed arguments to support your position such as the ones we most recently discussed. but that's your prerogative if you want to hold onto failed arguments.

Part of the purpose of your argument is that you explicitly claim this argument "disproves atheism". So it is hardly my fault you forget the details of your own posts. Nor can I think of a failed argument that I hold on to, but I can think of at least 2 or 3 that you do.

there are 2 aspects of omnipotence. an active aspect: the ability to do anything logically possible; and a descriptive aspect: cannot be vulnerable or overcome by anything. the descriptive aspect is what makes P3 correct. if God were made of matter, he would be vulnerable which contradicts his omnipotence so he can't be made of matter.

and if you're dissatisfied with that definition then, like with most all your objections, i can simply change the semantics by replacing the word 'omnipotence' with 'omni-invulnerability' or something. maybe someday you'll realize how silly it is to argue semantics.

I actually did read it, but the second part was complete hand-waving. Again I'll repeat what you dodged: What does being contingent have to do, AT ALL, with being able to be overcome? You asserted that with no defense whatsoever. Nor would God being contingent mean he was made of matter.

Sure, you can change what you mean by words, you're not consistent. However, one day you'll get, as philosophers have longsince known, that semantics are actually important.

not the way i'm using the word conceivable. i think the argument would look a little better if i replaced the word conceivable with coherent since that's a better word to use here. but regardless, i'm using metaphysical possibility from P1, showing it's logical implication of metaphysical necessity, and showing metaphysical necessity entails actual existence.

This is why I said you need to read up some more. I wasn't insulting, I meant it because you have no idea what you're talking about. There is ONLY one way to demonstrate actual metaphysical possibility and that's by being shown to exist. The reason why is because simply being unable to find the incoherency in a concept doesn't actually mean it's coherent. Without a demonstration of existence, you ONLY have epistemic possibility because you only have your own limited set of knowledge.

To drive this home: How do you know what's coherent? Based on what you can conceive. So you're just pushing things back and doing exactly what I said: Pretending to have demonstrated metaphysical possibility.

Φ is metaphysically possible if and only if Φ is true in some metaphysically possible world.
Example: It is metaphysically possible that some physical particle moves faster than the speed of light.

Φ is metaphysically necessary if and only if Φ is true in all metaphysically possible worlds.
Example: It is metaphysically necessary that Queen Elizabeth is a human.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modali...stemology/

Hah! Do you even READ what you quote? For one, faster-than-light particles are ALREADY theoretically possible, such as Tacyons, so inasmuch as one accepts that science talks about the world as it is, FTL particles is possible. But we don't even need that. We already know that motion is possible, so motion at any particular rate implies not contradiction or impossibility given a different kind of universe.

what you seem to miss is that argument can only be valid given the modal ontological argument is valid (which you obviously don't think is true). otherwise possibility of naturalism in a possible world doesn't at all show impossibility of God in a possible world. so if hypothetically we were to say the MOA is valid, then your modal naturalism argument would be valid; however, you can only show P1 is true by showing P1 of the MOA is false. so it still doesn't get around debunking the MOA even if your argument is valid.

I'm using "valid" in the sense of logic. In other words, my argument has NO fallacies, ergo valid. It's soundness can be disputed, but only by disputing one of the premises, namely the 2nd one.

Now, what you've clearly missed is that this argument stalemates your argument and the MOA because both (or at least Plantinga's is) are valid, but they stalemate. This shows that using this kind of argument is completely useless here, because the opposing argument can be equally valid, which was the point of my argument: Neither it nor yours shows anything.