The Modal Ontological Argument - Without Modal Logic

[fr0d0]

The point is that like all angles in a triangle always adding up to 180, God is possible. God can't be known... that's part if his make up. The proof is never meant to show that.

[MindForgedManacle]

MysticKnight, I'm fairly certain that's only the case with Euclidean geometry, which isn't even the way our own universe is spatially set-up as Rasetsu mentioned. Otherwise, I think you bring up a good point. As I said earlier, since you have to first demonstrate God's existence in the actual world. But if you could do that, what is the point of ontological arguments in the first place?

[DeistPaladin]

Does anyone remember that scene from Star Wars: A New Hope when Darth Vader is in a briefing room with a few skeptical admirals? At one point in the scene, one of the admirals openly mocks Vader and his "sad devotion to that ancient religion."

Does anyone remember what Darth Vader did to demonstrate the existence of The Force and the validity of what he believed?

I seem to remember he used the Ontological Argument for The Force.

Or did he use the Transcendental Argument?

Or was is the Moral Argument for The Force?

Oh wait, that's right, I remember. He accepted the burden of proof and provided an extraordinary demonstration to prove his extraordinary claims. He met the burden of proof with a demonstration that could be confused neither for coincidence nor for natural occurrence. It was a rather violent demonstration but nonetheless quite persuasive. I can promise you that if the story had been true, not a single aforcist admiral would have left that briefing room that day, including the one who had ridiculed the belief.



The fact that the best Christian apologists can do is babble on with these nonsensical and abstract arguments says a great deal about how little they can offer.

So AKD, is this the best you can offer?

[Rational AKD]

Uhg. You are very dense if you are fooling yourself into this metaphysical conclusion by merely using VERY imprecise language. To say that something came into existence ex nihilo is not to say "nothing caused something to exist" (<- the imprecise language), it is to say that something exists but had no prior ontic reference or antecedent cause.

really, lets put that to the test. let cause=C and effect=E. for every C the result is E, and i think we can agree with this. if we were to say X exists without C, effectively this is saying C=nothing. thus given C=nothing, E=X which of course is logically absurd. i'm not abusing impersice language, i'm showing logical equivalence. if something has no value then its value is nothing. if something has no mass its mass is nothing. if something has no cause its cause is nothing. just like the associative property in math, you can switch words around and it still means the same thing.
and BTW, the way you worded it is wrong. it isn't to say something exists but had no cause, but it's to say something's existence came out of nothing (ex nihilo). and if something came from nothing, then nothing caused something, but of course that's logically absurd.

And again, to say there MUST be a reason why something exists seems to be something contemporary philosophers have effectively rejected, most notably continental philosopher Quentin Meillasoux in his book "After Finitude"

if that were true then they would also reject the principles of science since all of science is based on the PSR. the laws of thermodynamics would be false. matter can be created or destroyed... spontaneously... for no reason... energy can go from higher entropy to lower entropy... spontaneously... for no reason... you see the problem here? rejecting the PSR undermines all of science.
plus, it seems rather odd that there would be a large amount of philosophers claiming the PSR is not necessarily true since as far as i know, there hasn't been a single successful attempt at showing it is in fact possible for something to exist without cause. to claim such a thing is possible is a baseless assertion and an unreasonable one at that. one that you certainly can't prove so why should anyone be compelled to believe that what you can't prove?

When did I say "physically" demonstrated? I didn't. Regardless, yes, unless something has been demonstrated to exist you ONLY have epistemic possibility in assessing its possible existence because to claim otherwise is to make claims beyond what you know by definition.

so you're saying Stanford is wrong... because it hasn't been shown a particle can move faster than the speed of light, physically or mathematically, it is not necessarily metaphysically possible. Stanford is wrong... and i should take your word for it...

I don't 'hate' S5, what I detest are people who don't actually understand S5 (you), much less what you NECESSARILY give up when working with the S5 axiom(s) - namely talking about metaphysics - and prat on about having disproved atheism.

i really don't know what you're talking about. there's nothing to misunderstand about axiom S5. it is an axiom to reduce redundancy. necessarily necessary=necessary. possibly possible=possible. necessarily possible=possible. possibly necessary=necessary. there's nothing controversial about it and it doesn't even get into metaphysics. the part of the MOA that gets into metaphysics are the definitions of the modal terms.
possible-true in at least one possible world.
necessary-true in all possible worlds
contingent-true in at least one possible world and false in at least one possible world.
impossible-not true in any possible world.
and BTW, these modal definitions aren't disputed either. they are standard in the use of all modal logic.

I'm perfectly willing to revise my views on what can be said to be metaphysically possible.

wait, so do you agree with Stanford or not? you haven't made that clear.

And anyway, how does one KNOW which possible worlds are metaphysically possible in the first place?

logical coherence. it's not hard to analyze one thing and see if it is free of contradictions. if you're gonna claim you can't possibly know if one thing is free of contradiction, then you might as well claim there's no way to know if an argument is valid. i'm sure there are plenty of arguments you've made you think are valid, but apparently there's no way you can know that.

Again, trying to make strong metaphysical claims on the basis of S5 is vacuous.

then all your arguments are likewise vacuous because there's no way to know if they're valid. self refutation detected.

Yes and Kant turns out to have been wrong on a number of things. For one thing, Kant though (if I remember correctly) that Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics were metaphysically necessary, but nowadays we know that is completely false.

so because Kant was wrong about some things, he's wrong about this... you're a smart guy perhaps I'll let you tell me what fallacy that is.

Too easy man. For one, "better" necessarily entails a value judgement which gives the argument a different logical standing. Now you're not talking about an objective thing, but what you happen to like.

when i say "better to have" in this argument, i mean ontologically better. not ethically better, not politically better, ontologically better. if you think this is false, you must provide a possible world where power is not ontologically beneficial. you must give reason to back up your claim, not just be skeptical and assume that's good enough.

That is NOT a priori in any sense of the term, anymore than the statement "Castling makes chess better" is an a priori truth.

...that's not the part i said was a priori... i said that great making properties are better to have than to lack is a priori because that's how they are defined. it's just as a priori as claiming a bachelor is an unmarried man, or 2+3=5. they are so because of how they are defined. a better chess comparison is "the capture of good pieces is a better position to be in."

Not entailing a lesser-making property (again, a subjective value judgement) simply means an omnipotent be can't be impotent, not that omnipotence is possible.

incorrect. according to the principle of explosion, if X is impossible then not X must be entailed in all things including impossible statements like not X. if X cannot entail its negation of not X, then X is not impossible.

Aren't you forgetting omniscience and omnibenevolence?

with the construction of this argument, i've found that "maximal excellence" is a category of different properties that can indeed be separated. when separated, we can see omnipotence still works in the argument in the same way maximal excellence did. however, none of the other maximally excellent properties do work. since the other properties aren't necessary to omnipotence, omnipotence can be the only property which is necessary for God to have by this argument.

now, i would like to apologize for my blunder concerning your definition of valid. your definition is indeed adequate, but so is mine. the truth of the conclusion directly corresponds to the truth of the conclusion in a valid argument. this also means it must be free of fallacy. basically valid means of P's are true, C is true and sound means P's are true and it's valid.

Now, you keep saying I built my counter argument such that it needs the MOA to be valid.

it does, because the only justification you gave for P1 of your argument is this:

But if God does not exist in any possible world, he exists in none of them because God only exists if he exists in all possible worlds by your own argument.

so if you didn't have "my own argument" what would justify that statement? you didn't give any further justification so that's why it seems at least you build your argument upon mine.

If we take the route of thinking S5 can actually tell us anything strong about metaphysics

oh here we go... S5 doesn't tell us anything about metaphysics. all it does is reduce possibly necessary to necessary in the MOA. and guess what? because this argument is not modal in nature, it doesn't even use S5. S5 is only used in the MOA to go from "God exists in some possible world" to "God exists in all possible worlds." but you can see i gave an entirely different reason to make that step, and i did it with a little more steps.

All my argument does is take the claim that God has to exist in all possible worlds if he exists

which you can't justify unless you give the MOA its validity.

and shows how that allows for a counter argument by showing an, under the aforementioned assumption about S5, that there must be a possible world in which God doesn't exist.

S5 doesn't do that at all. S5 can reduce necessarily possible to possible, or possibly necessary to necessary; but you don't have any of that to begin with. you must assume the MOA is valid to justify P1 of your argument, and you must prove P1 of the MOA is false to justify P2 of your argument.

The whole point is that by your own standard of using S5 in this way, you necessarily have to demonstrate that metaphysical naturalism is indisputably incoherent before even attempting your argument.

you didn't even use axiom S5 in your argument, and the fact you think you did only shows your own ignorance of modal logic.

My argument is in no way built on assuming the truth of your from the get-go.

because i'm sure you have a reason to justify P1 of your argument other than "by my own argument..."

It assumes the claim that for God to exist he must be in all possible worlds

which again, you can't justify without the MOA.

and points out that there is at least 1 possible world God can't exist in

which you also can't justify unless you prove P1 of the MOA is false.

So rather than just pretend your argument has primacy, try to actually show it.

i did... several times. every time you say "by your own argument, this is true" you're using my argument in your argument. i can't believe you're too thick to see that.

You don't have knowledge. That's what this whole argument stems from. And your claiming you do is just bare assertion.

so the definition of nothing is a bare assertion? so then the definition of bachelor is also bare assertion. heck, the definition of every word is bare assertion. the definition of numbers are bare assertion, thus 2+2=4 is also bare assertion. is that really where you want to go, or will you just give up and admit the definition of nothing is not an assertion?

But by all means, cite the section of the KVR in which Kant claims that something can't come from nothing is an a priori truth so that I can read it for myself.

i don't have to, because such a thing would already contradict the concept of nothing. an action must be performed by a thing. a run can't jump, a go can't fly, a beautiful can't play etc. an action must be performed by a thing, and nothing isn't a thing, hence nothing. you might as well say Has Anyone Really Been Far Even as Decided to Use Even Go Want to do Look More Like?

I meant yours.

mine isn't non-falsifiable. you can point out it's impossible for mind to exist apart from brain by showing that concept contradicts itself. if not, then it hasn't been falsified.

You said that particles can metaphysically go faster than light speed. The laws of nature beg to differ.

i would like to emphasize the word 'metaphysical.' laws of nature don't matter when looking at metaphysical possibility.

The fact that even axiomatic physical laws aren't necessary is why I said there may not be any necessary truths.

and as i said before, laws of logic cannot very. identity, non-contradiction, and exclusive middle are necessary. they must be true in all possible worlds.

But not the other way around.

again, that's an assumption. brain can't function without them, but you haven't established necessary relationship between brain and mind.

But we can reduce A.I to energy, along with whatever physical hardware is is programmed onto. So, why not the brain?

first, A.I. doesn't reduce to energy, it reduces to information. second, we haven't been able to build true A.I., at least not to the extent anywhere near our intelligence. third, just because we can produce A.I. that appears even to be conscious, that doesn't eliminate the possibility of minds capable of functioning independent of brains.

Neither a monist nor dualist perspective is metaphysically impossible

i pointed out how substance dualism is metaphysically impossible. 2 fundamental substances can't interact, because they can't share a property.

Quite. But if you are suggesting that said things aren't actually real, and only come from our perceptions

if matter is derived from mind, then this world (though it's created by minds) is as real as it gets. it's so real it fools many to believe in realism, and some to even go as extreme as to believe in materialism. the introspective argument brings a sound argument against materialism and realism, and the implications of quantum mechanics bring strong evidence against them as well.

How about any mind? Can a mind be destroyed?

it depends on the origin of such mind. in my beliefs, we are all independent minds created as a construct of a single necessary mind. this would show how all our minds, though all independent, can interact and share experiences. with this view, the one necessary mind (who would be God) can't be destroyed. however, since all our minds are mental constructs of God's mind, he can easily destroy them simply by willing it. now will he destroy them? i don't think so.

By non-contingent, do you necessarily mean that it cannot be destroyed? I was under the assumption that it simply referred to something that came to be/always existed without something else influencing it to come about. So if I say this "cheeseburger" is non-contingent, that is false; in the sense that its existence is contingent on it not being hypothetically destroyed?

if it is not contingent, and it exists, then it must be necessary. if it is necessary that means it can't possibly not exist. if that is the case, then that also means it can't be destroyed.

Technically, solipsism cannot be disproven.

though there is no firm defeater for solipsism, i would argue idealism is more reasonable. with solipsism, only your mind exists and everything else is a construct of your mind (keep in mind this is metaphysical solipsism, not epistemological solipsism). if that were the case, then you could directly control everything since you can directly control the contents of your own thoughts. since you can't, that's pretty good evidence solipsism isn't true.

Maybe I haven't read enough about it, but it doesn't look like the idea that everything is merely a product of your mind, and...the idea that everything is merely a product of your mind, are all that different.

no, you didn't read enough. in your same wiki source it says:

Modern Idealists, on the other hand, believe that the mind and its thoughts are the only true things that exist... Religious thinking tends to be some form of idealism, as God usually becomes the highest ideal... On this scale, solipsism can be classed as idealism.

they key here is idealists think 'the' mind and its thoughts are the only true things that exist. this means idealism can hold the belief that multiple minds exist whereas solipsism cannot. in this way solipsism is classed as idealism, but they are not equivalent.

What you have to keep in mind, to shown to be possibly necessarily in all possible worlds, you have to first prove it is so in this world

why? since when do you have to prove something exists in this world in order to give a state of modality of something? also, the argument doesn't state it is possibly necessary that God exists. that is a statement de dicto whereas the first premise of the MOA is de re. in de dicto, you are claiming the necessity as part of the statement whereas in de re you are claiming the necessity as a part of the thing. necessity is part of the concept of God rather than the claim of the premise.

Because it seems with every other necessary thing, we first know of it being true in this world, before we say it's true in all possible worlds.

so because that's how it was when we determined the necessity of previous things, that's how it must be? you must prove that is a necessary criteria, not merely state it and expect that's sufficient. i don't see why that is necessary. in order to show something is necessary, we only need to show impossibility if its negation; mainly through the use of deduction. the MOA does something only slightly different. it shows the equivalence between the possibility of a MGB and the necessity of one. even Plantinga said it's not a proof of God's existence, but he stated that because it's more reasonable to believe the first premise of the MOA that therefore it's more reasonable to believe it's conclusion than not. i think there have been improvements to the argument since he said that but that's another discussion altogether.

But what you have to show is that it would be so in every possible world, not that it's only possible so in every possible world. Or otherwise, it's not possibly necessarily, but possibly that, which is a different premise.

again, you confuse where "possibly necessary" comes from. the "necessary" part is part of the concept of God, de re. the possible part of part of the statement, de dicto. you can't take the "necessary" part away from the first premise without changing the concept altogether, which would be avoiding the argument rather than addressing it. in order to dispute the first premise, you must challenge the statement, de dicto.

[StuW]

The point is that like all angles in a triangle always adding up to 180, God is possible. God can't be known... that's part if his make up. The proof is never meant to show that.

I'll just leave this here...
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spherical_geometry

[Rational AKD]

I'll just leave this here...
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spherical_geometry

perhaps you should relearn the definition of triangle...

Triangle- A closed figure consisting of three line segments linked end-to-end. A 3-sided polygon.
http://www.mathopenref.com/triangle.html

Polygon- A number of coplanar line segments, each connected end to end to form a closed shape.
http://www.mathopenref.com/polygon.html

that "triangle" as you call it certainly is not comprised of coplanar line segments... and you can even tell the lines aren't strait yet you seriously think it's a triangle? it resembles a triangle, which is why they call it one, but it is not a triangle.

[StuW]

I'll just leave this here...
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spherical_geometry

perhaps you should relearn the definition of triangle...

Triangle- A closed figure consisting of three line segments linked end-to-end. A 3-sided polygon.
http://www.mathopenref.com/triangle.html

Polygon- A number of coplanar line segments, each connected end to end to form a closed shape.
http://www.mathopenref.com/polygon.html

that "triangle" as you call it certainly is not comprised of coplanar line segments... and you can even tell the lines aren't strait yet you seriously think it's a triangle? it resembles a triangle, which is why they call it one, but it is not a triangle.

Maybe you should re-read the definition of coplanar

In geometry, a set of points in space is coplanar if all the points lie in the same geometric plane. For example, three distinct points are always coplanar; but a fourth point or more added in space can exist in another plane, or, incoplanarly.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coplanarity

[Rational AKD]

Maybe you should re-read the definition of coplanar

In geometry, a set of points in space is coplanar if all the points lie in the same geometric plane. For example, three distinct points are always coplanar; but a fourth point or more added in space can exist in another plane, or, incoplanarly.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coplanarity

yes, 3 points are always coplanar. however, in the example you gave the lines (though they aren't technically lines) do not remain in the same plane. they curve outside the plane of the three points. because the lines curve they are not line segments, and because they curve outside the plane of the 3 points they are not coplanar either.

[fr0d0]

Semantic derail! Argh!

[SteelCurtain]

I think the point is that the statement that the sides of a triangle always add up to 180 degrees is not truthful. Just like the majority of your arguments here AKD, they depend totally upon defining things how you want them. In spherical geometry or hyperbolic geometry, triangles (yes they are triangles, not Euclidean triangles, but triangles) can have angles that add up to more or less than 180 degrees. In fact, there are ideal hyperbolic triangles whose angles add up to 0 degrees (whose lines are actually straight, but appear curved when projected on a Euclidean plane).