The Problem of Evil, Christians, and Inconsistency

[Mudhammam]

Pickup. You ask why we would consider something virtuous. That to me is something I explore through my faith. I do have a trust that God is good (something all faiths share, despite those faiths coming from times of great hardships). And I trust that God calls us all to goodness, to virtue. Though we have the life and teachings of Jesus to help guide us as Christians, I think all people sense that in their conscience. The Catholic Church puts it rather poetically ....

"Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself but which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling him to love and to do what is good and to avoid evil, sounds in his heart at the right moment. For man has in his heart a law inscribed by God. His conscience is man's most secret core and his sanctuary. There he is alone with God whose voice echoes in his depths."

I could be wrong, but I sense that all people who are concerned about doing the right thing will end up with a lot in common, though the are always points of tension (the tension between justice and mercy being a key one, and that is still a tension and point of theological difference within Christianity).

So I explore virtue through my faith, through scripture (especially the life and teachings of Jesus), and through prayer and being quiet enough to let my conscience speak.

How would you explore goodness as an atheist? (And I don't mean that as saying you can't).

I'm a consequentialist, so I view good/evil and right/wrong as ultimately boiling down to pleasure/pain. My problem with the faith approach to questions of morality is that faith can lead to very disastrous actions, and there's no rebutting "faith in goodness and virtue" if a person's ideas of goodness and virtue deviate from the actual consequences of pleasure/pain in the real world (as they often seem to do). From my view, however, moral perceptions can (and in my view should) be corrected through reason because my basic assumption (pleasure=good, pain=evil) has measurable correlates in the physical and mental domain. Obviously, it's not so simple as I'm making it sound but that's the gist of it. One further point: basing morality on this rationale rather then some sort of vague notion of God's goodness allows us to argue in terms of universal morals, granted we accept that reason, if it is to be reason at all, must be consistent and universal. All that is to say is that the Golden Rule (and its reverse) are logical axioms. On the contrary, on the theistic view, which is supposed to be anti-relativistic, I find a wide variety of moral beliefs, not only between religions but in the same God himself (example, Old Testament versus New or personal revelations).

[Michael]

Thank you Pickup. That is obviously the classical Epicurian position. There seem, to me, to be three problems there (but that is not to say you must find them problems).

The first is that when applied to society I think, though correct me if I am wrong, that it must lead to utilitarianism. That is whatever produces a net increase in happiness is best: that is how Richard Dawkins recently argued for abortion of Down's Syndrome children, perhaps forgetting, to the consternation of many Down's families, that they are frequently very happy people. RD, putting aside his misunderstanding that Down's Syndrome children and families frequently aren't unhappy, is probably being consistent with an Epicurean view. But equally consistent is harvesting organs from live people against their will. One person can save multiple other people (if good matches are assured in advance), potentially producing a net increase in happiness. utilitarianism can led to a tyranny of the majority; but it appears hard to argue against using its own logic.

Another more classic problem with Epicureanism is a problem in formulating a justice system, because there is no inherent 'rightness' in penal justice. Imprisonment is a poor deterrent for crimes committed in the heat of the moment. Does that mean we should forgo any punishment, especially if no-one else is made happy by penal justice?

The third problem is on the foundation of the premise that it is good to reduce pain and increase pleasure. When we look at nature, red in tooth and claw, pain is warp and weft through the forces that drive nature. On what foundation is pain necessarily bad? Why should it become the primary of goal of humans to eliminate something that appears to be so 'natural'. Why not, for example, say that what is most important is the survival (or perhaps even improvement) of the human species, accepting any pain that might entail.

[Mudhammam]

Thank you Pickup. That is obviously the classical Epicurian position. There seem, to me, to be three problems there (but that is not to say you must find them problems).

The first is that when applied to society I think, though correct me if I am wrong, that it must lead to utilitarianism. That is whatever produces a net increase in happiness is best: that is how Richard Dawkins recently argued for abortion of Down's Syndrome children, perhaps forgetting, to the consternation of many Down's families, that they are frequently very happy people. RD, putting aside his misunderstanding that Down's Syndrome children and families frequently aren't unhappy, is probably being consistent with an Epicurean view. But equally consistent is harvesting organs from live people against their will. One person can save multiple other people (if good matches are assured in advance), potentially producing a net increase in happiness. utilitarianism can led to a tyranny of the majority; but it appears hard to argue against using its own logic.

When I first read about Dawkins' tweet, I thought it was douchey, mainly because it was inarticulate and appeared somewhat callous to exactly those families you mention. After his clarifications, however, I see his point, and don't actually think there's any problem with his opinion. In fact, from a consequentialist's point of view, it does indeed make a lot of sense. Dawkins was stating what he would advise in that situation, and apparently, a lot of people (as evidenced by their decision to abort fetuses with the extra chromosome) agree. There's a big difference between weighing the moral consequences and choosing whatever you feel is best for your family (and the future, potential child), and mandating that everyone else adhere to your decision as well. Dawkins was in no way advocating for the state to intervene and force women pregnant with a Downs fetus to have an abortion, and from the consequentialist perspective (at least mine anyway), such a form of eugenics would have horrific ramifications for everyone. Hence, really what we have here is 1) a recommendation that each individual who is responsible for bringing a person into the world make a decision that considers the morality of seeing a deformed fetus to full term, and 2) the freedom to make that decision for themselves. This is what the current situation, as mandated by the law in the U.S., is, and I'm okay with it.

As to your hypothetical about harvesting the organs of a live person to save multiple others, I think we can both see why such a policy would have terrible consequences for society, and would outweigh any alleged benefits. Since we're talking about individuals, and not simply numbers, I think Kant's categorical imperative that human beings be viewed as an ends rather than a means probably works in favor of the ideals that each of us strive for, including fair play, the freedom to pursue happiness, etc. Life isn't inherently fair, but our policies should strive to be so, and picking a healthy person's name out of a lottery to sacrifice their body parts wouldn't seem fair to not only that person and most of us, but probably the sick in need of those organs as well.

Mike, I'll grant that there are more hypotheticals you can think of that offer no easy solution, but consequentialism doesn't promise the answers to all moral questions; it simply serves as a guide that, I think, is most rational and humanistic.

Another more classic problem with Epicureanism is a problem in formulating a justice system, because there is no inherent 'rightness' in penal justice. Imprisonment is a poor deterrent for crimes committed in the heat of the moment. Does that mean we should forgo any punishment, especially if no-one else is made happy by penal justice?

The third problem is on the foundation of the premise that it is good to reduce pain and increase pleasure. When we look at nature, red in tooth and claw, pain is warp and weft through the forces that drive nature. On what foundation is pain necessarily bad? Why should it become the primary of goal of humans to eliminate something that appears to be so 'natural'. Why not, for example, say that what is most important is the survival (or perhaps even improvement) of the human species, accepting any pain that might entail.

As to your question about the penal system, I'm not for retributive justice. Punishment ought to be conducive to either: 1) the rehabilitation process, if possible, or 2) serve as a deterrent to others, and 3) should always be in proportion to the crime committed. Not to take a cheap shot or deviate from the current subject matter, but I might add that the Christian conception of final judgment and punishment fails on all three accounts, and for that reason, is rightly seen as excessive, inhumane, and almost sado-masochistic.

Why is pain necessarily bad? Well, clearly, it's not in every instance, but as a human being with feelings and sensations, it's not difficult to distinguish between states of misery, tragedy, affliction, horror, etc., and states of happiness, bliss, joy, etc. As human beings, who are guaranteed only this one life to live, this experience that is only as good as the present moment, what more could possibly matter other than moving towards the latter states of being and doing what's in our power to avoid the former? Again, considering our place in a society where interests conflict, a morality that takes these various qualities of experience seriously must strive to be internally consistent, allowing that new situations require renewed attention to the rationale and potential effects (and the effects of those--and those--and so on) that result.

May I recommend a book? Check out the The Moral Landscape by Sam Harris. I think that is a good outline of the rationale behind the arguments I'm making in brief here (not that you're unfamiliar with them, but his formulation is far more eloquent than mine).

[RobbyPants]

I started a similar thread to this a while ago, and you're right about the inconsistency. When the apologists come in, they'll start to run a real wide circle, hoping you won't notice once they revisit something that's already been refuted.

It's super important that we have free will so God can know who really loves him. We need to be tested in order to deserve heaven. Sure, God could create us in heaven without the test, but that wouldn't be just. Sure, that notion of justice seems arbitrary, but it's God's nature. You can't understand God's nature, but just know that he loves us and wants what's best for us. The best thing is for us to love God and him to love us back, which is why we have free will. Oh, shit. A circle.

I haven't heard any sort of defense of this that isn't arbitrary, ad hoc, and speculative.

[Dawsonite]

I have a lot of admiration for the skillful writing and clear thinking of the author of this thread, but I am flabbergasted at his blithe acceptance of the fact of free will.

I find no more evidence of the existence of free will in humans than I find for the presence of a god in this universe. And the fact that free will is a foundational aspect of religious dogma raises my eyebrows another notch.

Can someone help me understand this apparently contradictory set of attitudes among self-proclaimed skeptics?

[The Grand Nudger]

The first is that when applied to society I think, though correct me if I am wrong, that it must lead to utilitarianism. That is whatever produces a net increase in happiness is best: that is how Richard Dawkins recently argued for abortion of Down's Syndrome children, perhaps forgetting, to the consternation of many Down's families, that they are frequently very happy people. RD, putting aside his misunderstanding that Down's Syndrome children and families frequently aren't unhappy, is probably being consistent with an Epicurean view. But equally consistent is harvesting organs from live people against their will. One person can save multiple other people (if good matches are assured in advance), potentially producing a net increase in happiness. utilitarianism can led to a tyranny of the majority; but it appears hard to argue against using its own logic.

A system in which one can be trodden on at the behest of the many in fact -does not- lead to any net increase in happiness. It leads to spikes of local happiness whereby misery is shifted around to produce the illusion of a net increase. If you find yourself on the business end of such a system you may immediately recognize your blunder - or, you could think it through and realize that the system is not actually providing the benefit it claimed before it ever gets around to harvesting your organs against your will - and is not actually a strictly utilitarian system. The tyranny of the majority is a case in which the net happiness is being ignored by a group of people looking to impose their will (and often shuck off their misery) on some smaller, less potent group of people, the nature of such a system means that there will -always- be someone to step on. We just have to keep making subdivisions. Today it's working for you, tommorrow it's cutting you open and leaving a lipstick message on the bathroom mirror. So, I wouldn't say that utilitarianism leads to any of that, personally. I'd say that a particularly bent fuck might try to borrow some weight and authority in making that argument - but he could borrow that from anywhere.

Why not, for example, say that what is most important is the survival (or perhaps even improvement) of the human species, accepting any pain that might entail.

Because we don't want to merely -survive-, and the notion of improvement is so nebulous that it defies being nailed to the wall sufficiently as to act as the basis of a moral system? We could say either, of course. I just don't think they'd be as useful as a basis for morality.

[orangebox21]

I'm sure everyone here is familiar with the standard problem of evil argument and the typical conception of the Christian God as the omnipotent and omnibenevolent

Are you taking the position that the existence of evil is a valid argument for the non-existence of God?

Absolute of all things...well almost all things, as his will is apparently unable to oversee the abolition of grotesque evil in the world.

Please defend your knowledge claim that: 'God's will is unable to oversee the abolition of grotesque evil in the world.'

---

Christians regularly tout free will as the impediment to his omnipotence; they like to say, "Well, this is the best of all possible worlds because a world without any grotesque evil would also be a world with severely limited wills" (as if our wills aren't already severely limited by physical determinants). Anyway, putting aside the issue of free will and accepting the intelligibility of the concept as Christians would have us do (for the sake of my argument, not because I think it's intelligible), I would like to press this issue more to the point as I think it will demonstrate the vicious and utter vacuousness rampant in their philosophical outlook.

It appears obvious that here we see a problem with the "best-of-all-possible-worlds" scenario arise. If this is truly the best possible world God could create, then what's all the fuss about heaven? If heaven is an even better domain to live in than earth (and I would sure like to think so), then Christians would seem obliged to revoke any notion of their sacred free will in heaven.
"But, ah!" the Christian is likely to retort, "in heaven, we choose to be good all the time! Our freedom is not impugned because we have made our choice on earth, since that is the purpose of our free will here, that it allows us to choose God, and that makes heaven an even better possible domain to dwell in! Therefore, no one in heaven will want to do evil!"

So, we're free in heaven, and it's even better than earth. If that seems consistent to you, just wait, because it gets worse. You see, from what I have gathered, Christians like to think that the aforementioned retort negates any objection that God could have just foregone this creation altogether and transported his children to this even better existence called heaven. Apparently, that we "choose" God is very important.

---

[vorlon13]

Children that die at birth are raised by angels in the spiritual world and prepared to take their place in heaven. I cannot answer as to why those of us here on earth were not afforded the same opportunity.

Nah.

If they die without that first breath and the concurrent ensoulment, they aren't anything and nothing happens to them because they aren't.

If they do gasp and then die, since they have not accepted Jesus they will be incinerated in boiling lava and diced with rusty razor blades FOREVER in Hell because of original sin.

Jesus, didn't the nuns teach you anything ???

[Mudhammam]

I have a lot of admiration for the skillful writing and clear thinking of the author of this thread, but I am flabbergasted at his blithe acceptance of the fact of free will.

I find no more evidence of the existence of free will in humans than I find for the presence of a god in this universe. And the fact that free will is a foundational aspect of religious dogma raises my eyebrows another notch.

Can someone help me understand this apparently contradictory set of attitudes among self-proclaimed skeptics?

Thank you for the compliment. I'll try to clarify my view as I see no contradiction in the use of the words "free will."

When I talk about free will, as I've stated previously, I don't believe that it's sensible in terms of meaning that I have in any way chosen what my will at any given moment will be; however, once a state of mind has arisen, I do believe I am free to weigh the various potential consequences of alternative, hypothetical acts, and proceed freely on whatever particular will the present compels within me. At the present moment, I feel compelled to make more coffee, yet I also feel lazily restricted by the thought of waiting for the water to boil and preparing the French press. I could also drive a quarter mile to Dunkin Donuts and buy one, which sounds a bit more pleasant for various reasons, but I'm also tight on cash until payday and don't know if I want to spend money on coffee when I can make some at home. My girlfriend is waking up now and her imminent entry into the room might also alter the course of my action. On top of all this I am typing this message to you. Even if there are thousands, or millions, of unforeseen physical factors in my brain and environment which this situation can be reduced to, it doesn't make sense to me to speak of whatever outcome may ultimately prevail as somehow, in retrospect, forced upon me (obviously, it's forced in the sense that one outcome must eventually win out, but as to which one, that involves a great deal of my choice). If we speak of this event, whatever it may result in, as an example of physical coercion of some sort, then when something actually does intervene to force my hand, I don't see what you would want to call that--super-coercion? I'm about as free as I can possibly imagine by the definition of the word in this circumstance to act on my will, not choose the various states that my will be, and in that sense, I see no contradiction in the term "free will."

[ShaMan]

My girlfriend is waking up now...

And you're typing on the computer.... because? Make that woman some breakfast and coffee man!