Seeing red

[bennyboy]

@Benny

To be clear, I first learned of the term 'Idealism' (in the sense of consciousness) in that Rational AKD thread, where he was talking about Monistic Idealism. I got the idea from there that you were an Idealist but not a Monistic Idealist, from how you argued in that thread. But you've said that you're not one (or sort of not one), so since it was me that referred to you as one in this thread, I apologise for that mistake.

If I identify as a monist, rather than as an agnostic, then I'd probably identify as an Idealist rather than as a Materialist.

Now it's clear that you're arguing for a soul, or a homunculous,

That shouldn't be clear, since that's not my position. A homunculus implies a substance dualism, which I discard on the basis of the "bridge" requirement: you'd need some substance or property which can serve as a bridge between the spiritual homunculus and the body. Let's call this "spiritbody." Now, this "spiritbody" is not spirit, so I'd need a bridge between the spirit and the "spiritbody," let's call it "spiritspiritbody," and so on. So a dualism necessarily implies an infinite regress, which turns out to be a shell game.

I'm not a neuroscientist but nonetheless I have spent years thinking and theorising about psychology in terms of neural networks. I pay no attention to any psychological theory that I can't relate into neural network terms, so you could say I'm a self-made 'neuropsychologist', using and developing neuropsychological theories to understand myself and the mind, basically because I have a reductionistic/mechanistic need to understand everything. So for instance, the human tendencies of bias and stereotyping can be completely understood in neural network terms... indeed that almost sums up the essence of how a neural network functions. So I did a lot of writing and theorising about that, and addressed many other aspects of personality in the same way. So from my perspective it's not just wishful thinking that leads me to believe that if there were a soul it wouldn't have much to do, but rather that I actually have solid (to me at least) theoretical models of how the brain the could achieve certain aspects of personality. So that's why it makes it all-but-impossible for me to envision a soul with any more responsibility than a simple observer, and why the soul question is essentially closed for me, from a religious standpoint at least of a soul that is held accountable for choices.

I'm fine with all this, and share a similar interest. Selective brain damage, brain chemisty, etc. would have to be completely disregarded not to. My interest isn't so much in the content of consciousness, which we can easily relate to brain structure and function, than to psychogony-- the existence of mind in those structures rather than the lack of them. It is my position that the material world view has no really good take on mind, whereas an Idealistic position can see our entire body of physical observation as a collection of ideas, and easily move on without missing a beat.

I know you're not arguing for a soul in a religious sense, but the same sorts of questions apply as I would ask of any theist (or myself). First of all, do you disagree with my allocation of responsibility for the soul/homunculous that you envision? I.e. do you believe it is more than an observer?

You, like Rhythm (presumably in response to his most recent post) are responding to my support of Idealism with a "thing" that implies substance dualism. That's not my position, and I don't really care to argue about homunculi.

And second of all, why have a brain in the first place, that clearly handles at least some (and in my view, all) processing in the mind? If the 'soul' can handle some of it, why not all (this one is more aimed at theists)? In other words, what is your role for the brain, which you say is co-opted or subsumed in your view of reality?

Again, I'm not interested in the idea of soul, and won't take a position on it.

Here's where you are getting lost, as well as Rhythm. I see the brain as an organ which takes in data, processes it, and outputs behavior. That is its role, and we can easily enough see this by removing parts of an animal's or human's brain, temporarily freezing or numbing parts, using chemicals to affects its function etc.

Sound familiar? Yes, because it is my position that Idealism SUBSUMES THE MATERIAL VIEW. Rhythm keeps ignoring this statement as semantics, and I don't want you to make that same mistake. I see the universe as you do. The difference is that I never lose view of the fact that our experience of everything, including the process of observing the brain, of listening to professors talk about it, of reading about it in books, of watching doctors do surgery on it, is, to us, an experience of ideas. Whether all those experiences are taking place in a physical universe, in a brain in a jar, in the Matrix or in the Mind of God, or a software simulation is unknowable by us. Therefore, we should either see the experiences themselves as being at the root of our reality (which I would call Idealism but isn't really textbook Idealism), or take an agnostic position (which, as you can see from my sig, I identify as).

[The Grand Nudger]

Other people seem to have brains of a particular structure and chemistry, and to have their origins in the mating of two already-conscious human beings.

What you -must- mean is that your idea of other people seems to be like your idea of yourself(this is how you state your position without stolen concepts, take notes). Do you have full knowledge of this, are you sure that things are as they seem? Now do you see why your criticism fail to land on target?

 If the idea of an android seems to be conscious, as you do...but more important-from your pov- as I do...... then surely I would challenge any assumption that would be challenged by your android. No?  

 That's never been my position, though you will continue persistently with your ventriloquy, I'm sure.

It's entirely possible that you've failed to see your statements for what they are, in this regard, Benny.  I'm not sure why I'm being called to task for your inability to adequately describe your own position. You know me well enough to know I'm not out to get you by stuffing words into your mouth. Or at least I hope that you do.

-don't tell me...you've lost...that loving feeling. Oooah....that, loving feeling?

[The Grand Nudger]

I'm not ignoring your statements regarding what idealism subsumes as semantics.  I have been attempting to inform you, by way of the term used to describe this type of argumentation, that your statements do not provide a valid means of inference for your position.  They assume the truth of my own, contradictory position. I did not choose to make them contradictory, you did..as you always do, with the notion that materialism -cannot- explain something. From that point forward, you cannot use concepts arising from, comprised of , and dependent upon the materialists viewpoint in your own explanation of that "x". You have already declared them to be insufficient. The truth of your position is not being argued, nor is it being ignored. You cannot -arrive- at your position in this manner, rationally. Full stop.

Now, though, I think we may have a better version of the same statement, that I think might fit your position.  I'm interested to see if you would agree, and what elaboration (and perhaps even agreement) that might lead to.

[bennyboy]

Other people seem to have brains of a particular structure and chemistry, and to have their origins in the mating of two already-conscious human beings.

What you -must- mean is that your idea of other people seems to be like your idea of yourself(this is how you state your position without stolen concepts, take notes).  Do you have full knowledge of this, are you sure that things are as they seem?  Now do you see why your criticism fail to land on target?

I specifically said that this position was taken due to pragmatism: that in order to live my life, social interactions must seem meaningful. This is not the case with androids, unless I discover that most or all of the people I talk to are machines.

It's entirely possible that you've failed to see your statements for what they are, in this regard, Benny.  I'm not sure why I'm being called to task for your inability to adequately describe your own position.  You know me well enough to know I'm not out to get you by stuffing words into your mouth.  Or at least I hope that you do.

-don't tell me...you've lost...that loving feeling.    Oooah....that, loving feeling?

I'll still accept beer, though.

[bennyboy]

I'm not ignoring your statements regarding what idealism subsumes as semantics.  I have been attempting to inform you, by way of the term used to describe this type of argumentation, that your statements do not provide a valid means of inference for your position.  They assume the truth of my own, contradictory position.  I did not choose to make them contradictory, you did..as you always do, with the notion that materialism -cannot- explain something.  From that point forward, you cannot use concepts arising from, comprised of , and dependent upon the materialists viewpoint.  The truth of your position is not being argued, nor is it being ignored.  You cannot -arrive- at your position in this manner, rationally.  Full stop.

Now, though, I think we may have a better version of the same statement, that I think might fit your position.  I'm interested to see if you would agree, and what elaboration (and perhaps even agreement) that might lead to.

I don't need to assume the truth of your position.  In fact, I must assume the commonality of your experiences with mine.  The problem is that you have so conflated your experiences with your position that you can't imagine that anyone could separate them.  I do.

When I see a brain, I see what you see (I'm willing to assume).  When I listen to a professor, I hear what you hear.  When I hit someone in the head with a bat, they are as KO'd in my reality as they are in yours.  The difference is that you have the idea that those experiences represent a fundamental truth, and that you know what that fundamental truth is: that there is a material universe and nothing else. I do not take this position, which I see as both extra and unsupportable by our observations. 

Now, you will immediately say, "Aha!  You said 'observations.'  That means you are stealing from my position, since I also make observations." I do not accept this assertion, nor should you make it. You seem to think that unless I see reality as a collection of fairies and rainbows, I'm stealing from you.  That's BS.  You don't get to take a monopoly on the perception of the class of ideas called "things" just because your world view is that only things exist.

If I was in the Matrix, and I KNEW I was in the Matrix, I'd still experience frying pans and call them that. If I was in the Mind of God, and knew it, I'd still call a rose a rose. If I was a BIJ, and knew it, I'd still call a brain a brain. That's because objects are ideas: red + fluttery leaf shapes + green prickly thing = "rose." I don't have to take your philosophical position to think in this way, because I have never asserted solipsism.

[The Grand Nudger]

What you -must- mean is that your idea of other people seems to be like your idea of yourself(this is how you state your position without stolen concepts, take notes).  Do you have full knowledge of this, are you sure that things are as they seem?  Now do you see why your criticism fail to land on target?

I specifically said that this position was taken due to pragmatism: that in order to live my life, social interactions must seem meaningful.  This is not the case with androids, unless I discover that most or all of the people I talk to are machines.

The question I'm asking remains.  How have you determined that you are not discovering that, right now, with me?  In this case, that at least -1- of the "people" you are talking to, anyway.

I'll still accept beer, though.

I only buy drinks when it's going to end between the sheets.  So, cmon, loosen up baby.  

[The Grand Nudger]

I don't need to assume the truth of your position. 

No, you -don't- have to, but this is precisely what you do when you make the claim that your pov subsumes my own.   You are claiming explanations -for idealism- that you have declared to be -insufficient-.   Do you see what that does to your position?  Do you see the incoherency and inconsistency in this?  

"This stuff is insufficient to explain "x", and idealism works just like it."

When I see a brain, I see what you see (I'm willing to assume).  When I listen to a professor, I hear what you hear.  When I hit someone in the head with a bat, they are as KO'd in my reality as they are in yours.  The difference is that you have the idea that those experiences represent a fundamental truth, and that you know what that fundamental truth is: that there is a material universe and nothing else.  I do not take this position, which I see as both extra and unsupportable by our observations. 

It doesn't matter whether or not they do or they don't represent a fundamental truth. I could be a brain in a vat, things may not be as they seem.  How many times do I have to keep saying this?  In the context of the question I've asked you it's entirely irrellevant from the outset.  I seem to be conscious, the android seems to be conscious.  There is no dilemma presented to you by an android in the future that is not present for you here, in the present, with me. The rest of the similarities we share..the fingers eyes and toes...the brain..you tell me that this is -not- the mind..you keep insisting that this be so. Well, then it can't be used to disqualify the android...or rule me in. Understand?

I can't hope to sway you to materialism until we get some resolution on why I can't convince you of a standard logical fallacy, well described well defined and well demonstrated, and I don't care to until such time as we get that resolution. I think the area here were we can agree without either of us budging an inch on that count..and where you are inconsistent -to your own stated view and process- ..and regardless of that views truth, is in with-holding in the case of the android what you grant in my own, or vv.

Your comments earlier, regarding a pragmatic assumption and meaning fail to hold an ounce of water, here. The assumption of an androids consciousness is no more or less pragamatic, and no more or less meaningful...than the same pragmatic assumption, for the same reasons, in my own case..here in the present. This dilemma doesn't await you on on some distant horizon, it's staring you in the digital face and having a conversation about dilemmas with you...right now, right here.

[bennyboy]

The question I'm asking remains.  How have you determined that you are not discovering that, right now, with me?  In this case, that at least -1- of the "people" you are talking to, anyway.

I haven't, nor have I claimed to. I've said all along that it's a pragmatic assumption, which I've held as long as I can remember.

I only buy drinks when it's going to end between the sheets.  So, cmon, loosen up baby.  

This bromance is getting seriously out of control. Maybe we should step back down to the status of flamewars and tower-killing.

[bennyboy]

No, you -don't- have to, but this is precisely what you do when you make the claim that your pov subsumes my own.   You are claiming explanations -for idealism- that you have declared to be -insufficient-.   Do you see what that does to your position?  Do you see the incoherency and inconsistency in this?  

"This stuff is insufficient to explain "x", and idealism works just like it."

Well, do you accept experiences as intrinstically "known" or not? I do. I think therefore I am, and all that, right?

It doesn't matter whether or not they do or they don't represent a fundamental truth.  I could be a brain in a vat, things may not be as they seem.  How many times do I have to keep saying this?  In the context of the question I've asked you it's entirely irrellevant from the outset.  I seem to be conscious, the android seems to be conscious.

If seeming to be conscious is being conscious, then androids are conscious. That's not how I define things.

 There is no dilemma presented to you by an android in the future that is not present for you here, in the present, with me.  The rest of the similarities we share..the fingers eyes and toes...the brain..you tell me that this is -not- the mind..you keep insisting that this be so.  Well, then it can't be used to disqualify the android...or rule me in.  Understand?

I've never told you androids don't have mind. I've told you that I wouldn't find their physical mannerisms sufficient for me to put them under the umbrella of my pragmatic assumption that "If it seems sufficiently like me, I'll accept that it thinks like me."

I can't hope to sway you to materialism until we get some resolution on why I can't convince you of a standard logical fallacy, well described well defined and well demonstrated, and I don't care to until such time as we get that resolution.  I think the area here were we can agree without either of us budging an inch on that count..and where you are inconsistent -to your own stated view and process- ..and regardless of that views truth, is in with-holding in the case of the android what you grant in my own, or vv.

I'm not inconsistent. I have experiences, and form views from them. Insofar as my views represent my experiences, they are all known. Insofar as my views attempt to lay a philosophical framework for those experiences, I'm agnostic and must speculate. Therefore, I stop at the experiences themselves as the basis of my reality, with the underlying "reality" being unknown.

Your comments earlier, regarding a pragmatic assumption and meaning fail to hold an ounce of water, here.  The assumption of an androids consciousness is no more or less pragamatic, and no more or less meaningful...than the same pragmatic assumption, for the same reasons, in my own case..here in the present.  This dilemma doesn't await you on on some distant horizon, it's staring you in the digital face and having a conversation about dilemmas with you...right now, right here.

If my life was filled with androids, and I was raised by an android, and there were android freedom fighters and issues about android rights, etc. I might have to decide to extend that umbrella. However, none of that says anything about whether androids think or just seem to, or whether I should make two ADDITIONAL assumptions-- i.e. that the universe is not only material, but exclusively so?

[The Grand Nudger]

Well, do you accept experiences as intrinstically "known" or not?  I do.  I think therefore I am, and all that, right?

I have an addendum, "but I know not -what- I am".  But that's an aside.   Do you understand why your claim that idealism subsumes materialism is problematic now?  You managed to quote me, respond to me, and not comment at all.  I'll repeat;

"This stuff is insufficient to explain "x", and idealism works just like it."

If seeming to be conscious is being conscious, then androids are conscious.  That's not how I define things.

Then how have you determined -me- to be conscious?  

I've never told you androids don't have mind.  I've told you that I wouldn't find their physical mannerisms sufficient for me to put them under the umbrella of my pragmatic assumption that "If it seems sufficiently like me, I'll accept that it thinks like me."

Why is "physical" even in this response?  Their mannerisms.  Full stop.  That seems to be how you've determined that I am conscious.  

I'm not inconsistent.  I have experiences, and form views from them.  Insofar as my views represent my experiences, they are all known.  Insofar as my views attempt to lay a philosophical framework for those experiences, I'm agnostic and must speculate.  Therefore, I stop at the experiences themselves as the basis of my reality, with the underlying "reality" being unknown.

-You- may not be inconsistent, but you are being inconsistent here, in this.  The underlying reality is a non-issue, I made no mention of it whatsoever...and it it has no bearing on what I've asked.

If my life was filled with androids, and I was raised by an android, and there were android freedom fighters and issues about android rights, etc. I might have to decide to extend that umbrella.  However, none of that says anything about whether androids think or just seem so, or whether I should make two ADDITIONAL assumption-- i.e. that the universe is not only material, but exclusively so?

Your life -is- filled with just such philosophical androids.   What's all this material business.  It keeps cropping up...but I made no comments to that effect.

Perhaps now you see the cliff?  When you disqualified all this biology of mine, including my brain, (made of stuff, made of ideas...doesn't matter in the least in this regard) as mind, when you made a seperation of inference...you removed any ability for -you- to disqualify the android by pointing to all of it's machinery (made of stuff, made of ideas, again it does not matter) - or any dissimilarity between your biology and it's machinery.  Only one portion of your overall opinion on the matter can be maintained at once.

Take your version of idealism (leave my concepts), and run with it, but you'll then need to grant an android consciousness for the simple fact of seeming to be conscious.  Not much of a problem..since you granted me consciousness for no more, and no less. Or deny the android, referring to what -you- have claimed to be insufficient explanation -as- explanation....... and lose the foundation of your rationalizations for idealism while maintaining the singular and unique nature of your mind in relation to an android...even if it does manage to pull a neat trick and act just like you.....which it probably never will..in my opinion.

It seems to be a difficult choice for you to make.

Wanna know my position, on that? I think that regardless of whether or not a machine could have a mind, a consciousness... it would have a human mind or consciousness. I think that it may be convincing, but not convincingly human. I;m able to pick up tiny little differences in other humans that let me know they may be a little "less than human" as it were......pretty sure a machine couldn't pull off an act any more convincingly. Basically, I'm guessing that a native speaker of an awfully specific and quirky local dialect as "human" is going to be able to recognize an out of towner...even if they have plenty of occasion to comment upon how great his accent and inflection have become since learning our language. Perhaps we agree here, if nowhere else?

That's one of the beauties of the blind in the test...for ai... we can't know those details that might give it away obviously. Removes our bias.

(also, get rekt noob i'm in all the bushes, you can't know that I'm not! You gonna lol after work?)