The Ontological Argument - valid or debunked?

[SteveII]

I still have a problem with the claim that maximal greatness is subjective. We are not talking about the greatest being we can imagine. We are talking about the greatest being possible. Even if a complete picture of what that might mean is unclear, it does not matter.

What makes a specific property objectively great?  If properties are objectively great or objectively bad, then you should be able to tell me what makes any specific property great or bad.  But as I noted with Chad, properties do not form an ordered set from bad to good.  You cannot rank any one property as being better or worse to possess except by subjective opinion.  Therefore you can't rank necessarily existing as being better or worse than any other property aside from personal preference.

It does not matter what we discern to be a great making property--that would be subjective. As Anselm put it: by definition, there cannot be anything greater than God. You might object what is the purpose of defining God this way if we don't know what it means. Well, depending on your purposes in discerning what God is like, you can look at scripture or natural theology (or both) as a kind of control.

I mentioned this back a few pages: The difference is between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility. Epistemic possibility is simply "for all we know something is possible". On the other hand, to illustrate metaphysical possibility take a math equation 24673244/8=3005567. While we might say "for all we know" this might be true, but if it is true, than it is necessarily true if it is false than it is necessarily false. If a maximally great being exists, it exists necessarily in a metaphysical sense. Therefore, God’s existence is either possible or impossible.

Why?  Because you think a maximally great being would have that property?  You're still just tacking on 'exists necessarily' to a list of arbitrary attributes.  A maximally great being is not like a mathematical equation except in the sense that it cannot be coherently and objectively defined, as some math equations are.  1/0=3 is simply undefined because you cannot divide by zero.  It is neither true nor false, it is simply not defined to have a value.  Simply asserting that a maximally great being must be metaphysically necessary is nothing more than you stating your preference that, if you were a great being, you would desire to be metaphysically necessary.  And the question is why?  What is it about existing necessarily that makes it desirable?  Is it an objective feature of necessarily existing that makes it desirable?

I would be interested to hear your thoughts on Plantinga's defense of his formulation (from wikipedia): The conclusion relies on a form of modal axiom S5, which states that if something is possibly true, then its possibility is necessary (it is possibly true in all worlds). Plantinga's version of S5 suggests that "To say that p is possibly necessarily true is to say that, with regard to one world, it is true at all worlds; but in that case it is true at all worlds, and so it is simply necessary."

[Edwardo Piet]

I am starting to get tired of people like Ham acting like assholes for no good reason.

Who are these people like me?! I am the only turtle around here! Wherever they are there's only room for one turtle in these forums so they can fuck off.

They should stop acting like assholes for no good reason too. At least I don't. Damn people like me -- like me in every way except I don't act like an asshole. The buttheads!

[GrandizerII]

It's just that in one system of logic, which you are certainly free to reject but it means you have to consistently reject it, possible existence is existence in a possible world (it's actual in the sense that it's true in that kind of world).

Possible existence is just existence that is possible. Actual existence in a possible world isn't merely existence that is possible. To conflate the two is a mistake.

What do you mean when you say that something actually exists in a possible world? Just so we're on the same page.

Because in that system of logic, existing in some possible world is the equivalent of possibly existing.

[Edwardo Piet]

This world is a possible world that actually exists. Many other possible worlds are possible worlds which may or may not actually exist.

No it's not equivalent in any system. It's an equivocation to suggest that any possibility of existence implies an actuality of existence in any way.

[GrandizerII]

This world is a possible world that actually exists. Many other possible worlds are possible worlds which may or may not actually exist.

No it's not equivalent in any system. It's an equivocation to suggest that any possibility of existence implies an actuality of existence in any way.

But what does it mean, to you, to exist in a possible world?

[YahwehIsTheWay]

Proving Yahweh is just so easy, as demonstrated by his many proofs.

Step 1: Blah blah blah
Step 2: Blah blah blah
Step 3: Therefore Jesus. 

Here's my favorite:
Step 1: Wksaidhf lowha j rhtiuhs dfje ryhsadfjhaskjehtiuhd jartiuhadg iuowertykjh bdgfjhyo hq2w54kjhdfabiouy qtwe kijuhbadgf
Step 2: Nobody has ever disproved step 1.
Step 3: Threrefore, Jesus

[robvalue]

Look what the cat dragged in!

I take issue with both of those methods They aren't sound, valid, logistical, favourable or tasty and quite frankly they irritate my elbows!

[Cyberman]

There's hundreds of proofs for yahweh. Only the most fundie atheist would deny them all.

http://www.godlessgeeks.com/LINKS/GodProof.htm

[Veritas_Vincit]

There's hundreds of proofs for yahweh. Only the most fundie atheist would deny them all.

http://www.godlessgeeks.com/LINKS/GodProof.htm

Amazing! That is a thoroughly comprehensive list of arguments!

[robvalue]

Who needs one good argument when you can have hundreds of terrible ones!