The Ontological Argument - valid or debunked?

[Gemini]

Also speaking as a mathematician, Craig is an ignorant bullshitting cretin swapping in bogus sophistry for substance.

...who has the audacity to defend one of the most widely rejected arguments in the history of philosophy, while appealing to "expert consensus" to dismiss the logical argument from evil and claim support for his "four facts" of the resurrection. 

Nevermind that real philosophers like Alex Rosenberg and actual historians like Bart Ehrman (in whose field Craig has no claim to expertise whatsoever) have flat out told him he's wrong. He still goes around posturing as though anyone who holds these positions is something akin to a science-denialist.

Oh, and then there's the Kalam. Doesn't seem to matter how many times actual physicists tell him he doesn't understand the relevant science, and that the overwhelming majority them of don't take the argument seriously. In his mind, he's stuck back in the dark ages when theology was the most important and prestigious field of study. He really does seem to consider himself at the top of the hierarchy of intellectual disciplines.

[Neo-Scholastic]

For example, a warning traffic sign is an objectively better example of a triangle than a spanakopita.

By an objectively better example of a triangle you are claiming that it's outline is a better fit for the definition of a triangle. A triangle has an objective definition of being a figure with three sides. This is not the case for greatness. There is no objective definition of what constitutes greatness, so whether or not a being fully exemplifies the notion of an objectively great being is a nonsense question. It has no sense in which it is true or false.

I am using the word "great" in the same way as in "x is greater than or equal to 3". I believe that is the proper interpretation of greatness as it relates to the argument. For any additive property the MGB has it to the greatest extent.

[Angrboda]

By an objectively better example of a triangle you are claiming that it's outline is a better fit for the definition of a triangle.  A triangle has an objective definition of being a figure with three sides.  This is not the case for greatness.  There is no objective definition of what constitutes greatness, so whether or not a being fully exemplifies the notion of an objectively great being is a nonsense question.  It has no sense in which it is true or false.

I am using the word "great" in the same way as in "x is greater than or equal to 3". I believe that is the proper interpretation of greatness as it relates to the argument. For any additive property the MGB has it to the greatest extent.

X is greater than 3 because both belong to an ordered set. There is no such ordered set for properties. You could just as easily be adding negatives as positives.

[Mister Agenda]

By an objectively better example of a triangle you are claiming that it's outline is a better fit for the definition of a triangle.  A triangle has an objective definition of being a figure with three sides.  This is not the case for greatness.  There is no objective definition of what constitutes greatness, so whether or not a being fully exemplifies the notion of an objectively great being is a nonsense question.  It has no sense in which it is true or false.

I am using the word "great" in the same way as in "x is greater than or equal to 3". I believe that is the proper interpretation of greatness as it relates to the argument. For any additive property the MGB has it to the greatest extent.

So the greatest extent isn't necessarily all that great. I would be more sympathetic to a deity like that: it's as great as it can be, which is moderately great, and thus the problem of evil is resolved because God couldn't prevent it and can't fix it, but he's doing the best he can.

[Cyberman]

The KCA, the Ontological Argument, TAG, are all desperate attempts to argue god into existence. They might persuade those that already want to believe or those not very well versed in logic or unable to comprehend what's being said. Not those with more training and ability to think.

That's sort of the thing I've been alluding to from the beginning that, curiously, continues to be ignored by the proponents of the argument: you can't talk a thing into existence. Logical arguments made in the absence of objective observations might work within the self-contained world of the argument, but there's nothing to bridge that hypothetical into the world we actually live in. A valid argument- which the ontological argument is not, but hey- can still be an untrue argument if the premises don't align with the world itself.

You'd think it'd be a red flag when most, if not all, logical arguments for the existence of "God" essentially boil down to "God must exist, otherwise this argument doesn't work".

[Angrboda]

@SteveII:
The argument assumes that a maximally great being would possess the property of necessarily existing.  If the greatness of a property is subjective, then it's not objectively true that a maximally great being would have the property of existing necessarily.  Premise 3 actually states that a maximally great being would exist necessarily.  Since it's not objectively true that maximal greatness includes necessarily existing, this premise is false, and the proof is unsound.  The only way around this objection is to show that necessarily existing is objectively great, and this you cannot do, for as explained the notion of objective greatness is incoherent.

I still have a problem with the claim that maximal greatness is subjective. We are not talking about the greatest being we can imagine. We are talking about the greatest being possible. Even if a complete picture of what that might mean is unclear, it does not matter.

What makes a specific property objectively great? If properties are objectively great or objectively bad, then you should be able to tell me what makes any specific property great or bad. But as I noted with Chad, properties do not form an ordered set from bad to good. You cannot rank any one property as being better or worse to possess except by subjective opinion. Therefore you can't rank necessarily existing as being better or worse than any other property aside from personal preference.

I mentioned this back a few pages: The difference is between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility. Epistemic possibility is simply "for all we know something is possible". On the other hand, to illustrate metaphysical possibility take a math equation 24673244/8=3005567. While we might say "for all we know" this might be true, but if it is true, than it is necessarily true if it is false than it is necessarily false. If a maximally great being exists, it exists necessarily in a metaphysical sense. Therefore, God’s existence is either possible or impossible.

Why? Because you think a maximally great being would have that property? You're still just tacking on 'exists necessarily' to a list of arbitrary attributes. A maximally great being is not like a mathematical equation except in the sense that it cannot be coherently and objectively defined, as some math equations are. 1/0=3 is simply undefined because you cannot divide by zero. It is neither true nor false, it is simply not defined to have a value. Simply asserting that a maximally great being must be metaphysically necessary is nothing more than you stating your preference that, if you were a great being, you would desire to be metaphysically necessary. And the question is why? What is it about existing necessarily that makes it desirable? Is it an objective feature of necessarily existing that makes it desirable?

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It's perhaps easier to show the problem with an analogous argument.

Premise 1: It's possible that a 'maximally beautiful being' exists.
Premise 2: If it's possible that a maximally beautiful being exists, then a maximally beautiful being exists in some possible world.
Premise 3: If a maximally beautiful being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
Premise 4: If a maximally beautiful being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
Premise 5: Therefore a maximally beautiful being exists in the actual world.
Premise 6: Therefore a maximally beautiful being exists.

We can see more clearly here that premise 3 is just an arbitrary assertion because it's clear in this case that beauty making properties are arbitrary preferences and do not compose an ordered set from ugly making to beauty making. Is necessarily existing a beautiful property to have? It's totally arbitrary, just as in the case of greatness.

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Regarding your objection to the parody, just as there are theodicies which explain evil in a world with a good God, there are theodicies for this. Suppose it is a greater evil if people commit evil acts of their own free will? Then a maximally evil being would maximize evil by creating a world full of creatures who have the possibility of doing good, but perform evil of their own free will.

Anyway, your objection to the maximally evil being lies outside the confines of the actual logical argument itself, so ultimately all one has to say is that "it's a mystery" why the maximally evil being has created the world in the fashion He has.

[Neo-Scholastic]

I am using the word "great" in the same way as in "x is greater than or equal to 3". I believe that is the proper interpretation of greatness as it relates to the argument. For any additive property the MGB has it to the greatest extent.

X is greater than 3 because both belong to an ordered set.  There is no such ordered set for properties.  You could just as easily be adding negatives as positives.

I was providing an analogy. I also specifically mentioned "additive". The argument is based on the idea that the MGB is the fullest manifestation of existence as opposed to non-existence. This interpretation is consistent with the Scholastic understanding that something that actually exists is greater than that which either does not exist or exists only in potential. I think your line of reasoning blurs the distinction between objective qualities and subjective ones. The Scholatic tradition recognizes degrees of completeness and purity without regard for personal preferences. Even if for some unspecified reason I prefer cola over water, that preference has no bearing on the fact that water is a more pure liquid than cola. You could I suppose argue that the axis of comparison is between refreshing and not, but I see that as a move to substitute objective criteria with subjective ones and not a helpful move if someone is serious about uncovering the nature of ultimate reality.

[Angrboda]

X is greater than 3 because both belong to an ordered set.  There is no such ordered set for properties.  You could just as easily be adding negatives as positives.

I was providing an analogy. I also specifically mentioned "additive". The argument is based on the idea that the MGB is the fullest manifestation of existence as opposed to non-existence. This interpretation is consistent with the Scholastic understanding that something that actually exists is greater than that which either does not exist or exists only in potential. I think your line of reasoning blurs the distinction between objective qualities and subjective ones. The Scholatic tradition recognizes degrees of completeness and purity without regard for personal preferences. Even if for some unspecified reason I prefer cola over water, that preference has no bearing on the fact that water is a more pure liquid than cola. You could I suppose argue that the axis of comparison is between refreshing and not, but I see that as a move to substitute objective criteria with subjective ones and not a helpful move if someone is serious about uncovering the nature of ultimate reality.

Your still missing the point, Chad. We can order things in terms of purity. We can't order things in terms of greatness, except by subjective preference. All your analogies are similarly flawed. And what the Scholastics have traditionally held to be the case is totally irrelevant. That's just a weak argument from authority.

[SteveII]

I don't think it is even broadly logical possible that a maximal evil being exists. With omnipotence alone, that being would be required to prevent all good in all possible worlds. Since that is not the case in this possible world, I think the parody fails.

By that token.... with omnipotence alone, a maximally good being would be required to prevent all evil in all possible worlds. Since that is not the case in this possible world, that would mean a maximally good being does not exist.

That would be a defeater except the Problem of Evil argument is not successful.

[KevinM1]

I don't need to give my family gifts but I do because I love them and I do so out of my abundance, not deficiency.

So, you don't hope to feel loved or appreciated in return?  Ever?

I ask because a self-contained, complete, perfect being would never have the desire to feel loved or appreciated in return.  There would be no impetus for creation because this creature can never be lonely, or emotionally empty, or bored, or curious.  A perfect being would be utterly unlike what is presented in most holy texts.  It wouldn't get angry (anger is a reaction to some perceived slight... what could inferior beings do to slight a perfect being?).  It wouldn't want to see our happy faces because our happiness wouldn't be a meaningful addition to its self-contained infinite happiness.

Creating a vast universe, with one planet (that we know of) that's populated by inferior creatures is absurd for a tri-omni being.  Period.  There's no justification for it, because perfection creating something in addition to itself is:

1. Inefficient.  The most efficient state of being is itself, alone.
2. Illogical.  Inferior creatures cannot give this creator being anything it doesn't already have.