What do you think of this argument for God?

[RoadRunner79]

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I'm afraid, that if you do not understand what "all knowing" or "all powerful" is, then I don't believe I can simplify those any more for you.

You misunderstand.

It is not that there is no understandable concept. It is that there is no working definition. In the same way, while the concept of "soul" is understandable, no actual working definition can be supplied. No mechanism or definitive limits and parameters can be given.

And they desperately need that, because without it, it can easily be argued that such properties are not possible, even speaking metaphysically - or, if you wish to be more generous, you could posit that they are possible, but incompatible due to omniscience and its interaction with the idea of free will or choice, or omnipotence and its interaction with concepts of logical possibility and coherence. And so on.

That's the problem with concepts like these. They've been around so long, and appear so simple, that people just sort of take it as written that they are coherently defined.

But if you are saying that nothing is objectively greater than anything else, then I disagree and find it absurd.  You are saying that knowledge is not greater than ignorance, and wisdom is not greater than foolishness.   That these are incoherent statements correct?  That these are just value judgements?

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Incoherent, no. Value judgments, and therefore subjective, yes.

Systems of measuring value can be defined, and certain properties can be compared to those systems to find that they are more valuable, by that standard, than another property. But the key phrase is that this can be done by that standard. There is no objective measurement of value possible, and the concept of a "maximum value" is nonsensical.

I think that you are working against your self here.   You say it cannot be defined, and therefore cannot be evaluated, yet proceed to evaluate it as subjective. Now correct me if I'm wrong, but you seem to be saying that there is nothing not subjective, that would make a being greater than another.   I would also consider "measuring of  the value possible" as a category error; and misunderstanding what is being said, if you prefer you could say the "greatest being possible".   And as I said before, the argument does leave this open for discussion of what exactly that entails.  And really there is only one pertinent to the argument.  But you cannot dispute that based on your previous conclusions (to so, would be self defeating).

Correct me if I'm wrong, but you appear to be saying here, that under the axioms of S5, that it must be shown epistemically possible in the actual world.  Now I'm just learning this stuff myself, but nothing I see, in the descriptions of S5 state this. Why have the semantics of other possible worlds at all, if this where true.

Again, I'm not a particular expert on modal logic myself. I could be entirely wrong, which is why I continue to point this out. I am continuing to read up on this, and, as I have said, this is not a particularly concrete conclusion on my part. I am currently working my way through - in my free time, which is why I don't have a more definitive answer - the various publications of Robert Stalnaker, who talks about exactly this issue. Specifically, I'm looking at "Propositions" and "Possible Worlds", which you can find on Google.

As a reminder, though, even if my admitted speculation was entirely wrong, it still doesn't actually help the ontological argument -

Now as discussed the argument does leave open the possibility that God is not logically possible.

For exactly that reason.

In addition to the above issues with needing a coherent definition for the various characteristics of God, the ontological argument fails to show that it is possible for an entity that is "maximally excellent" to have necessary existence in every possible world. As it is logically coherent to posit that there is a possible world where no entity possesses maximal excellence, this would not appear to be the case.

  

However as I stated; I tend to default to possible rather than impossible, if I do not find a reason to do so.

You are free to do so, but if you want to be rational about it, that is exactly the opposite of what should be done.

Possibility must be established, not merely assumed. As such, a coherent definition must be supplied, and a demonstration of how this definition is compatible with the universe must be made.

Again, given your first, and what I consider your main argument, I think you are defeating anything else you have to say on the subject (subjectivity and all)   Take power for instance;  something that has more power, has greater potential.  This is measurable and objective, and makes this thing greater in what it can do, than something of lesser power.  Now according to the argument a being of the greatest power possible is possible (it's in the definition).  Is this incoherent?  Now there could be discussions on what makes something great, but along this reasoning, if we can establish any property as able to be greater in an objective and purposeful sense; then it is possible for a being to have all these possible properties.  The one description that matters for this discussion is existence in a possible world. Again, existence provides a potential which any other property rests on.  Therefore a being that exists in all possible worlds (is necessary) has a greater potential than one that does not. 

One could also say that you are making assumptions in your counterargument, that are not being supported as well. In researching the subject, I notice that your objections are not found made by classical opponents of the argument, or referenced really at all.   It does make one curious if there is a reason for this.  So if you are saying, that there are no great making properties, I think that you need to support this.