An intro to my non-materialist view

[Edwardo Piet]

@BuryButthead.

So the correct way to spell something never looks right to you. Figures.

We say A-thee-ist so "atheist" makes more sense with how we pronounce it phonetically it's stimply got one less "e".

A-thi-est would be pronounced "A-thigh-est" which isn't how we pronounce it at all.

Do you not even believe in thighs?! How do you hold yourself up? I guess that would make sense though because it would be analogous to your failure to hold yourself up intellectually

I notice how you ignored that I pointed out the absurdity of your ridiculous notion that "subjective experience" is part of the material's paradigm. We already know what subjective experience means, it's experience of a subject. Far from being straight out of the materialist paradigm, materialism deals with objects so even if the subject may also be an object it isn't necessarily and subjectivity certainly doesn't presuppose materialism.

If you don't believe in subjective experience then you don't even believe in consciousness, which includes your own consciousness. And not believing in your own consciousness is the most deluded philosophical position a person can have.

[The Grand Nudger]

If you walk up to someone with a basic science background and ask them what "visual representations" in the brain represent, they will say something to the effect of "things it the world." To the average listener, it doesn't merely refer to This Experience, it says what it is and does, and implies a worldview. That's no neutral pointer. I don't think the neutral pointer concept is that complicated, nor is it in some way deceptive or vague.  It does exactly what it's supposed to do - no more, no less.  It refers, or "points to" to this experience we learn to call "the world," without implying a worldview.  Sometimes if we want to understand new ideas and perspectives we can't be rigid and insist on using old concepts from different paradigms - we need to accept and use new concepts.

That someone has applied their favored concepts to a nuetral term does not make that neutral term any less neutral.  A representationalist thinks that "this experience" is a representation, not "the world".  They don't think that the experience of a ball is a ball, regardless of what a ball is made of.  

If they are a materialist, they think it's a representation of a material world.  If they are a magic fluffy god-thought-ist...they think it's a representation of magic fluffy god-thought.  If they are dualists, they think it's a representation of some mix of both.   

Ultimately, I'm only offering this because, from the outset, the way you've framed these questions they can only be applicable to some form of direct realism.  All forms of representationalism have been omitted at the outset, since "the question" you're asking explicitly rejects that position without any consideration.  

How neutral is that?

Personally, I have a strong suspicion that you aren't actually advocating for neutral pointers, but disguising your own propositions about this subject -as- neutral pointers. Don't get me wrong, I don't think that you're doing it intentionally.

[Whateverist]

My impression is that it would be a great deal of trouble to substitute your playbook for the materialist playbook.  I can't imagine what the benefit would be.  I suppose one could argue that the mental gymnastics involved in so doing could be good for keeping your [appropriate substitute for "brain"] limber.  But it makes more sense to me to think of it as a luxury afforded by evolution as explained in the materialist playbook.  

In short, whether or not I can get my head around your playbook I'd need to believe there was some good reason to do so and I just can't think of one.  

*goes off to check out other threads*

[Edwardo Piet]

It's as though he thinks changing the label will change the reality.

Who does he think he is? Dan fucking Dennett?

[Angrboda]

Sounds like you're starting with solipsism and seeing where you can go from there. (not very far)

[Bunburryist]

I know what I'm trying to explain. If you understood it - which you clearly don't - I wouldn't be doing it in the first place. Many of your questions reveal exactly why I'm using something different and simple. "Representation" is like one of those party poppers where you pull the string and confetti shoots all over. It has so many connotations that it's just asking to be picked over forever. "Consciousness," is another example. It has no scientifically defined meaning. It's one of those philosophical greased pigs that is ripe for filling forum after forum of argument. I don't know what consciousness "is." I know lots of people use it, and they disagree about what it even means. You'll almost never heard me use the word. "Subject" (and it's variants) is another word that isn't necessary to explain what I'm trying to explain. I would guess from your posts that you're rather intelligent people, so I don't think it would be that hard for you to accept my use of "This Experience." I assume - at least I hope - that you're actually interested in understanding what I'm trying to explain, rather than just having fun debating terms. Maybe we're here at cross purposes.

[The Grand Nudger]

Ruh-roh, representationalism has clogged the machine..................

In any case, if representation is a party pooper with a billion connotations........that makes it a shoe in for a neutral pointer, doesn;t it? It could mean -anything-. Maybe it's a representation made out of cheese, not "this world". Maybe it's a representation made out of pixie farts, not "this world". Representationalism is open to anyone, regardless of what they think the representation is made of...but none of them think that the representation is "this world".

Meh, go ahead...but I have a feeling that this is going to come back and bite us in the ass real...real soon.

[Bunburryist]

I’m going to try and condense a little, so we’ll see how it goes.  

So we have a material world, processes in that material world (the sense process), and somehow the result of that is This Experience.  
Let’s take an example of “someone seeing a computer keyboard.”  Let’s call him “the experiencer.”  He’s just a regular guy who knows nothing about what we’re doing here.  There is a material keyboard some objective distance from his material brain, light goes from the material keyboard to his material eyes, and in that material brain, somehow, he has the experience he would call “seeing that beige keyboard on my brown desk.”  That experience consists of experiences of color and what seems to the experiencer to be a sense of space or distance.  

Some observations.  (I’m sure you’re thinking – yeah, yeah, ho hum, I know all this.  Patiently bear with me.)  

This Experience is not the material world – it is an experience happening in a brain that is in a material world.
The experiencer can experience nothing outside of his material brain.
What the experience thinks is “the world” is not a world, but rather his brain generated experience.  
What he experiences cannot be a material world.
Nothing in his experience can be “made of atoms.”
What he experiences as his body cannot be his material body.

The experiencer can experience nothing in the material world.  For any "object" he sees in his experience to exist in the material world it would have to be made of atoms.  Since his experience must happen in his material brain, any experience-object “made of atoms” would also have to be in his brain.  If the beige keyboard he experienced seeing was “made of atoms,” he would literally have a material keyboard made of atoms in his material brain.  (However, in his experience he might have experiences and “do experiments” from which he could deduce the concept of atoms (a very, VERY important point which we will revisit).

Since what he experiences as “his body” is also part of “This Experience,” it also cannot be made of atoms, or else he’d have a body made of atoms in his material brain.  

Since This Experience for him is not a material world, there can be no light going into what he experiences as his eyes.    

(I know you don’t like the “This Experience” thing, but just for information, I refer to what I experience as “my body” as This Body, the apparent spatial aspect of my experience as This Space, and (to the extent that I experience it) to the brain I think of as being in what I experience as my head as “This Brain.”  So there’s material world space, and there’s This Space.  There’s my material brain (where my mind and experience actually happen) and “This brain.”)

Since he can experience nothing in the material world, it is meaningless for him to speak of “locating” any particular object in the material world (or the material world as a whole) relative to any aspect of his experience, or vice versa.  He literally cannot locate or “find” the material world.  (It’s kind of like heaven.)

Ask the experiencer what he sees.  He says, “That beige keyboard.”  He does not say, “A material keyboard made of atoms in a material world I can’t experience.   If we ask him if the keyboard he sees is made of atoms, he will no doubt say “yes.”  He – and everyone I’ve ever met – actually believes that the keyboard he experiences seeing (the beige one) is made of atoms.  (It never ceases to amaze me how no one ever sees a problem with the belief that there are atoms where they experience color.)

So there are, in the Materialist Sense Story, two keyboards –one made of atoms, and one that is an aspect of the experience.  They are not the same, exist/happen at different places in the material world, etc.

Do you agree with the above?  I know there’s a lot here, and I’m trying my best to condense.
“Personal” questions -  Do you believe there are atoms where you experience color?  Do you believe what you experience as your body is made of atoms?

[The Grand Nudger]

I’m going to try and condense a little, so we’ll see how it goes.  

So we have a material world, processes in that material world (the sense process), and somehow the result of that is This Experience.  
Let’s take an example of “someone seeing a computer keyboard.”  Let’s call him “the experiencer.”  He’s just a regular guy who knows nothing about what we’re doing here.  There is a material keyboard some objective distance from his material brain, light goes from the material keyboard to his material eyes, and in that material brain, somehow, he has the experience he would call “seeing that beige keyboard on my brown desk.”  That experience consists of experiences of color and what seems to the experiencer to be a sense of space or distance.  

Some observations.  (I’m sure you’re thinking – yeah, yeah, ho hum, I know all this.  Patiently bear with me.)  

1 This Experience is not the material world – it is an experience happening in a brain that is in a material world.
2 The experiencer can experience nothing outside of his material brain.
3 What the experience thinks is “the world” is not a world, but rather his brain generated experience.  
4 What he experiences cannot be a material world.
5 Nothing in his experience can be “made of atoms.”
6 What he experiences as his body cannot be his material body.

-edited, numbers mine for clarity

See, I knew it would bite us in the ass quick.  These aren't observations, they are propositions.  Assertions about his experience. Just as your framing of the question excluded representationalism by fiat, your propositions seek to exclude representationalism by fiat.  2,3,4,5 and 6 all run afoul of this.

The experiencer can experience nothing in the material world.  For any "object" he sees in his experience to exist in the material world it would have to be made of atoms.  Since his experience must happen in his material brain, any experience-object “made of atoms” would also have to be in his brain.  If the beige keyboard he experienced seeing was “made of atoms,” he would literally have a material keyboard made of atoms in his material brain.  (However, in his experience he might have experiences and “do experiments” from which he could deduce the concept of atoms (a very, VERY important point which we will revisit).

Can't he, though, if he's capable of creating an accurate mental representation of that world?  Sure, any object he sees in the material world must be made up of atoms...ish (there are other dependencies as well, it must be structured such that his human eyes can see it, for example)...but that doesn't mean that the object of the representation actually has to be in your brain.  That would be a nightmare, how would we fit football stadiums inside our heads?  Why wopuld he literally have a beige keyboard made of atoms inside his head..just so he can see a beige keyboard?  That isn;t how sight works, that isn;t how our minds work..that;s not even how reality works..regardless of what beige keyboards and minds are made of........? To hell with keyboards...I could see a werewolf and that wouldn;t mean that there was a werewolf in front of me made of atoms -or- a werewolf doing backflips inside my skull..or whatever the hell it would be doing in front of me.

That, is full on batshit crazy.

Since what he experiences as “his body” is also part of “This Experience,” it also cannot be made of atoms, or else he’d have a body made of atoms in his material brain.

More of the same. 

Since This Experience for him is not a material world, there can be no light going into what he experiences as his eyes.  

-and more of the same. 

My opinion. These are non sequiturs built out of unsound propositions............all of which exclude a single position that answers every one of them...and -that- position is, itself, only one of many that directly contradict these propositions. Assuming that there were a non-material reality...this would be an exceedingly poor attempt to demonstrate that.

[Bunburryist]

You're going over the whole thing with a magnifying glass and missing the whole point. I'm simply trying to make the distinction between experiences happening in a material brain (what you would call "representations") and the material objects they are supposed to represent. The experience of "seeing a beige keyboard" (which cannot be "made of atoms") is not the same as the material keyboard (which being made of atoms can't have color as an aspect). What don't you understand?