God is so quiet

[SteveII]

It would be up to the atheist to explain everything without logical contradictions. Proving that possible worlds semantics must assume existence is a far cry from having an explanatory ultimate for it. You can't use logic to create existence (a concept has no causal power)--you must answer the actual question--why is there something rather than nothing. If you listen to Dean Rickles again, you will notice that he never actually answers the question posed to him. You can say that is a meaningless question, but that is really just part and parcel to admitting you are stuck with a brute fact--a fact you can't explain.

We know the universe exists, and we can prove it.  Have you an example of a nothing that could exist in it's place?

What you don't want to do is interchange the word 'universe' (a concrete contingent object) with 'exist' (a concept). They are not even synonyms. You can easily posit a possible world where something else besides our universe exists. 

To ask why is there A and not B, we first both have to be sure that A and B are possibilities, we know that A (The universe) does exist, there is no, not universe to exist is there ?

Actually, we are NOT asking why there is A and not B. We are asking why is there A instead of not A. In other words "why is there a universe where there didn't have to be one?" 

The reason he says it is meaningless as I understand it is because nothing is not a possible scenario.  It's a bit like asking why is that cloud not a non cloud.

When you say "nothing is not a possible scenario", okay, I don't think that nothing is a possible scenario either (for different reasons). However it seems you might be taking that sentence to mean that the universe must then exist necessarily, in which cae you are very much mistaken. Rickles makes it quite clear that concrete objects (and he mentions the universe as one of his examples) are all contingent entities--relying on something else for their existence. His answer is that the concept of existence must necessarily exist because you need it as a foundation to explain literally everything else. Concepts cannot cause anything. He never told us what he thought the cause of everything else was.

[LadyForCamus]

My position is that God could not have failed to exist

Sure, in the exact same sense that you already conceded reality could not fail to be. Again I ask: Why do we need to add a god into the equation if it’s perfectly logical for reality to be necessary and eternal?

It would be up to the atheist to explain everything without logical contradictions.

Explain what, exactly?

Proving that possible worlds semantics must assume existence is a far cry from having an explanatory ultimate for it.

Oh, so modal logic is small potatoes now?  When it works in favor of your position you hang your whole argument on it, and chastise other people for being so woefully under-educated on such an imperative subject that they dare comment on, lol.  My position is logical.  That’s all I’ve been saying this whole time.

You can't use logic to create existence (a concept has no causal power)

Oh, the irony...

you must answer the actual question--why is there something rather than nothing. If you listen to Dean Rickles again, you will notice that he never actually answers the question posed to him.

And I still don’t think you fully understand what I’m saying.  My answer, and Rickles’ answer (I think) is this: reality exists necessarily, because there is no logical alternative.  Non-reality, or a state of non-reality, cannot be.  You use the exact same argument for your god!  Why is your uncaused, eternal cause a logical solution to an illogical (according to you) infinite regress, but mine is an unexplained, brute fact?  

I have to ask you again because it’s important and you haven’t answered yet. You seem to think there is a meaningful difference between reality and cosmos, and I’d like to know what you think that difference is.

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The hurdle in the discussion was proving that the cosmos is a contingent entity. There were several who thought it was not contingent.  

I tried to show this using the conception of a possible world that had 'nothing' in it. That brings up other problems about what 'nothing' is. I realized my mistake and changed my point to say there is a possible world where there is something else besides our cosmos. This possible world could consist of just God (or something akin to God), perhaps just minds, perhaps some other substance (I used the word medium) that contained other entities. It really doesn't matter what the example is because the the point I was trying to prove is the very conservative claim: our cosmos is contingent. 

The conversation really had not gotten to any objections about God being the first cause yet  because of near constant pressing the issue on whether the cosmos was a necessary entity or not. Are you willing to grant that the cosmos seems to be a contingent entity?

Here is my take on the question you are proposing.  You want to arrive at the result that the universe is contingent.  There are multiple paths toward that end, and I think it would be instructive to examine some of them.  The first such path is to argue that the universe is contingent by way of analogy with objects existing within the universe.  Unfortunately that path is open to numerous objections which render it of little use in greater arguments.  So I think that is all that needs to be said about that.

Another path is to assume that the universe is necessary, and then in a reductio ad absurdum demonstrate that this leads to a contradiction, either logically or a contradiction with known properties of the universe (e.g. Craig's attempt to show that there was a "time" when the universe did not exist via the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem).  This approach has both advantages and disadvantages, but since this doesn't appear to be the path you've taken, I will simply leave it at that.

A third path is to simply assume the universe is contingent without justification.  As a matter of definition, it is the very meaning of the term contingent that the entity in question does not exist in all possible worlds.  When people argue ala possible worlds with respect to God, they typically assume as a matter of definition that God is necessary unless doing so results in a contradiction.  If one applies the same principle to the universe, there does not appear to be any inherent contradiction with assuming that the universe is necessary, if one is going solely by the arguments about possible worlds you've presented here.  Rather than having demonstrated that the universe is contingent, you've simply expressed the proposition that the universe is contingent using the semantics of possible worlds.  You assume the universe is contingent, to derive the result that the universe doesn't necessarily exist in all possible worlds, to turn around and use that as justification that the universe is contingent.  But "not necessarily existing in all possible worlds" is the definition of contingency, so to all appearances, you have simply assumed that the universe is contingent, then used a discussion of possible worlds to camouflage that assumption.

If indeed you are simply assuming the contingency of the universe without justification, as I've suggested here, I have no problem entertaining the notion ex hypothesi as in, "if the universe is contingent, then X, Y, and Z follows," however given the arguments I suspect you are likely to make, such a move won't profitably suit your ends.  If one simply wishes to assert the proposition that the universe is contingent without justification, as I believe you have done, then that opens one's argument to the simple expedient of simply rejecting your assumption, equally without justification.  Regardless, if I'm correct here, your detour into the field of possible worlds does not substantively advance your claim that the universe is contingent, so any argument based upon the proposition will have to depend upon other arguments than this possible worlds business.

You would have seen the smoke coming out of my ears had you watched me read this.  Why do you guys have to be so god damned smerrrt!  😛

[possibletarian]

What you don't want to do is interchange the word 'universe' (a concrete contingent object) with 'exist' (a concept). They are not even synonyms. You can easily posit a possible world where something else besides our universe exists.

To ask why is there A and not B, we first both have to be sure that A and B are possibilities, we know that A (The universe) does exist, there is no, not universe to exist is there ?

Actually, we are NOT asking why there is A and not B. We are asking why is there A instead of not A. In other words "why is there a universe where there didn't have to be one?" 

We can imagine all kind of things not existing, but could the universe actually not exist, as to imaginary not exist ?
Could anything that exists actually not exist ? Sure i can imagine me not existing , but it wouldn't be the truth or any measure of reality.
We can imagine any number of things being different than they are, but simply, they are not, imagining a possibility does not make it so.

The reason he says it is meaningless as I understand it is because nothing is not a possible scenario.  It's a bit like asking why is that cloud not a non cloud.

When you say "nothing is not a possible scenario", okay, I don't think that nothing is a possible scenario either (for different reasons). However it seems you might be taking that sentence to mean that the universe must then exist necessarily, in which cae you are very much mistaken. Rickles makes it quite clear that concrete objects (and he mentions the universe as one of his examples) are all contingent entities--relying on something else for their existence. His answer is that the concept of existence must necessarily exist because you need it as a foundation to explain literally everything else. Concepts cannot cause anything. He never told us what he thought the cause of everything else was.

If we have already established that things exist, that's because you don't need to, do things that exist actually need a cause (as in creator)?. I think it's a clearer more honest question to ask what factors or circumstances came together to trigger the big bang. To imagine it otherwise is just that, imagination.

[Amarok]

1. Existence is a concrete entity . the floor your standing on is existence.As is the air your breathing . And the light entering your eyes. But those are contingent things i'm asm talking about the grand totality of everything .

2. Your assuming nothing is an option . And assuming again it is not it's own final explanation . 

3. I can easily conceive of a universe with every attribute we have now . But no god.

4. Simply asserting god could not fail to exist is useless unless he could actually have formed .

[GrandizerII]

Ok, back home, and quite a bit to go through. So I'll just do a brief post here instead of directly responding to Steve's last posts here. So to start with, Jormungandr eloquently pointed out what the apologetics agenda is. The way Steve is arguing for the necessity of his God, one can use a similar approach to argue the universe/cosmos is necessary as well. And the grander the cosmos (especially with multiple universes and even multiple multiverses), the more "appropriate" it is to argue that the cosmos, by definition, is necessary because then it wouldn't be the cosmos. But Steve can't have that, as he needs God to be the only being to be necessary. He's also not adequately addressing how God is not contingent considering he needs "somewhere" to be (as Khemikal pointed out several times by now). And as LadyofCamus pointed out, if reality/existence is necessary, then why need God in the first place? And one of the points I raised is why we should even consider the logical possibility of Steve's personal God when he is described in such absurd ways as "spaceless" and "timeless" when he is/acts otherwise. Steve talks a big talk about how this isn't logically problematic, but whenever I work this on paper, it does seem like there are some logical contradictions going on. Handwaving these logical concerns isn't solving them.

By the way, pretty sure Sean Carroll ended the debate on what the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem implies regarding time by having Vilenkin (I think) make it clear to WLC and the listeners of their debate that the theorem doesn't imply there was a beginning to time or universe or whatever.

[SteveII]

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Here is my take on the question you are proposing.  You want to arrive at the result that the universe is contingent.  There are multiple paths toward that end, and I think it would be instructive to examine some of them.  The first such path is to argue that the universe is contingent by way of analogy with objects existing within the universe.  Unfortunately that path is open to numerous objections which render it of little use in greater arguments.  So I think that is all that needs to be said about that.

Another path is to assume that the universe is necessary, and then in a reductio ad absurdum demonstrate that this leads to a contradiction, either logically or a contradiction with known properties of the universe (e.g. Craig's attempt to show that there was a "time" when the universe did not exist via the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem).  This approach has both advantages and disadvantages, but since this doesn't appear to be the path you've taken, I will simply leave it at that.

A third path is to simply assume the universe is contingent without justification.  As a matter of definition, it is the very meaning of the term contingent that the entity in question does not exist in all possible worlds.  When people argue ala possible worlds with respect to God, they typically assume as a matter of definition that God is necessary unless doing so results in a contradiction.  If one applies the same principle to the universe, there does not appear to be any inherent contradiction with assuming that the universe is necessary, if one is going solely by the arguments about possible worlds you've presented here.  Rather than having demonstrated that the universe is contingent, you've simply expressed the proposition that the universe is contingent using the semantics of possible worlds.  You assume the universe is contingent, to derive the result that the universe doesn't necessarily exist in all possible worlds, to turn around and use that as justification that the universe is contingent.  But "not necessarily existing in all possible worlds" is the definition of contingency, so to all appearances, you have simply assumed that the universe is contingent, then used a discussion of possible worlds to camouflage that assumption.

If indeed you are simply assuming the contingency of the universe without justification, as I've suggested here, I have no problem entertaining the notion ex hypothesi as in, "if the universe is contingent, then X, Y, and Z follows," however given the arguments I suspect you are likely to make, such a move won't profitably suit your ends.  If one simply wishes to assert the proposition that the universe is contingent without justification, as I believe you have done, then that opens one's argument to the simple expedient of simply rejecting your assumption, equally without justification.  Regardless, if I'm correct here, your detour into the field of possible worlds does not substantively advance your claim that the universe is contingent, so any argument based upon the proposition will have to depend upon other arguments than this possible worlds business.

You would have seen the smoke coming out of my ears had you watched me read this.  Why do you guys have to be so god damned smerrrt!  😛

Jorm is probably the smartest person on these boards. It takes 3x the time to respond to her because she has zeroed in on the underlying issues and you have to be careful answering because she will spot any mistakes. Of course smart people can be wrong. Obviously!

I think my answer to her post will be at the beginning of a new thread. I want to take some time to set it up properly.

[GodisintheTV]

Religion is the exploitation, by narcissistic individuals, of a need inherent to creatures that realize the inevitability of their own end, to imagine otherwise. He's never quiet for long. There's a long line of people eager to translate his words for the rest of us.