What would be the harm?

[Angrboda]

Burning my neighbors out of their trailer.

How in the world is that NOT advantageous to me and my genes? Anyway, that's not generally considered a moral proposition under most moral theories, and those theories under which it is a valid moral proposition have obvious evolutionary underpinnings. I don't think you're even trying.

[The Grand Nudger]

Exactly, jorm.  Exactly.  It's very advantageous to me from the standpoint of evolutionary biology (hell, it's advantageous to the species), and yet, as a moral proposition....wrong. Is that not out-thinking our biology, or unmooring our moral propositions from an evolutionary underpinning that may not describe "the good" only the "good-for"?

I didn't actually -have- to try that hard to present such an example..but I did mention that our moral landscape is rife with them..so why would it require that much effort in the first place?

---

Let's try another, just as easy as before.  Rape and Pillage.

[Angrboda]

Exactly, jorm.  Exactly.  It's very advantageous to me from the standpoint of evolutionary biology (hell, it's advantageous to the species), and yet, as a moral proposition....wrong.  Is that not out-thinking our biology, or unmooring our moral propositions from an evolutionary underpinning that may not describe "the good" only the "good-for"?

Oh, gotcha. I thought you were suggesting burning out our neighbors was a moral proposition. Now that I understand, allow me to object to what you meant. As an individual act, burning out my neighbors has advantages. However if I further a world in which people are allowed to burn each other out ad libitum, then that threatens the security and safety of me and mine. I have a definite biological interest in the safety of me and mine, so I have a biological motive for forbidding such things, and refraining from them for fear that doing so might prompt others to do likewise to me, regardless of how advantageous it might be for me to act thus otherwise. So, no, this is not an example where morals are in contradiction to evolved needs and biology. The problem is the lack of universalizability of the act. An act which is in accord with my interests can quickly become contrary to my interests if universalizing said behavior would impinge upon the survivability of me and my genes. This is why most moral frameworks, such as Kant's, have universalizability as a key feature. Same goes for pillaging. Rape is a slightly different animal. It has similar drawbacks, especially since universalizability of rape would yield a world in which I was likely inefficiently spending my resources raising someone else's seed, a situation which is directly opposed to the interests of my genes.

[The Grand Nudger]

Exactly, jorm.  Exactly.  It's very advantageous to me from the standpoint of evolutionary biology (hell, it's advantageous to the species), and yet, as a moral proposition....wrong.  Is that not out-thinking our biology, or unmooring our moral propositions from an evolutionary underpinning that may not describe "the good" only the "good-for"?

Oh, gotcha.  I thought you were suggesting burning out our neighbors was a moral proposition.  Now that I understand, allow me to object to what you meant.  As an individual act, burning out my neighbors has advantages.  However if I further a world in which people are allowed to burn each other out ad libitum, then that threatens the security and safety of me and mine.  I have a definite biological interest in the safety of me and mine, so I have a biological motive for forbidding such things, and refraining from them for fear that might prompt others to do likewise to me, regardless of how advantageous it might be for me to act thus otherwise.  So, no, this is not an example where morals are in contradiction to evolved needs and biology.  The problem is the lack of universalizability of the act.  An act which is in accord with my interests can quickly become contrary to my interests if universalizing said behavior would impinge upon the survivability of me and my genes.  This is why most moral frameworks, such as Kant's, have universalizability as a key feature.

None of that matters to evolution.  Aggressive and lethal competition for resources benefits the individual who prevails and weeds out those lesser genetics from the pool.

You may have a definite interest, but to call it a definite biological interest is to subtly conflate that with the interests of evolutionary biology, which don;t give a shit about you and your interests.  Additionally, while you posit that you have such a rational self interest..if you really were the biggest and the baddest in the land your rational self interest would rationally lead you to burn out the weaklings.

In all of this, remember, that by mooring your moral propositions (not your apparatus, your moral propositions themselves) to the whims of evolutionary biology or survival you are explicitly tanking the meaningful objectivity of a moral system in ethical terms.  You are setting it up to be knocked down, and with ease-

-naturalistic fallacy.

If that which is good is, more properly, that which is good for survival, it is an instrumental good, and not an intrinsic good. It is not a matter of the fact x, but some other fact, y, to which x is applied as leverage. The good, rather than the good for, could very well be (and often is) z. It may be natural to do x, because of y, but that won't change the fact that it is z, and not x or y which is good (obviously, supposing that there is such a fact)...and that the fact z is that x is bad.

[Angrboda]

Oh, gotcha.  I thought you were suggesting burning out our neighbors was a moral proposition.  Now that I understand, allow me to object to what you meant.  As an individual act, burning out my neighbors has advantages.  However if I further a world in which people are allowed to burn each other out ad libitum, then that threatens the security and safety of me and mine.  I have a definite biological interest in the safety of me and mine, so I have a biological motive for forbidding such things, and refraining from them for fear that might prompt others to do likewise to me, regardless of how advantageous it might be for me to act thus otherwise.  So, no, this is not an example where morals are in contradiction to evolved needs and biology.  The problem is the lack of universalizability of the act.  An act which is in accord with my interests can quickly become contrary to my interests if universalizing said behavior would impinge upon the survivability of me and my genes.  This is why most moral frameworks, such as Kant's, have universalizability as a key feature.

None of that matters to evolution.  Aggressive and lethal competition for resources benefits the individual who prevails and weeds out those lesser genetics from the pool.

You may have a definite interest, but to call it a definite biological interest is to subtly conflate that with the interests of evolutionary biology, which don;t give a shit about you and your interests.  Additionally, while you posit that you have such a rational self interest..if you really were the biggest and the baddest in the land your rational self interest would rationally lead you to burn out the weaklings.

In all of this, remember, that by mooring your moral propositions (not your apparatus, your moral propositions themselves) to the whims of evolutionary biology or survival you are explicitly tanking the meaningful objectivity of a moral system in ethical terms.  You are setting it up to be knocked down, and with ease-

-naturalistic fallacy.

If that which is good is, more properly, that which is good for survival, it is an instrumental good, and not an intrinsic good.  It is not a matter of the fact x, but some other fact, y, to which x is applied as leverage.  The good, rather than the good for, could very well be (and often is) z.  It may be natural to do x, because of y, but that won't change the fact that it is z, and not x or y which is good (obviously, supposing that there is such a fact)...and that the fact z is that x is bad.

All that matter is whether there is a selective pressure against it or not. People who belong to societies where such things are accepted do not prosper as well as societies where such behavior is not tolerated. If the society suffers, so do the individuals. If the society benefits, so do its individuals. As they say, a rising tide floats all boats. It has nothing to do with reasoning toward it being in one's interest. So, no, you're simply wrong about it not being a biologically based impulse. It most definitely is.

I don't know what your point about mooring morality to its evolutionary roots is, you're not particularly clear here. Moreover, for someone who takes harm as the objective basis of morality, I find this a rather strange position to take, as it seems to undermine your contention that harm is an objective moral standard. The moral standard of harm is quite obviously tied to biological interests. Have I misunderstood you?

[The Grand Nudger]

All that matter is whether there is a selective pressure against it or not.  People who belong to societies where such things are accepted do not prosper as well as societies where such behavior is not tolerated.  If the society suffers, so do the individuals.  If the society benefits, so do its individuals.  As they say, a rising tide floats all boats.  It has nothing to do with reasoning toward it being in one's interest.  So, no, you're simply wrong about it not being a biologically based impulse.  It most definitely is.

Evo bio doesn't care about societies prospering, either.  

I don't know what your point about mooring morality to its evolutionary roots is, you're not particularly clear here.  Moreover, for someone who takes harm as the objective basis of morality, I find this a rather strange position to take, as it seems to undermine your contention that harm is an objective moral standard.  The moral standard of harm is quite obviously tied to biological interests.  Have I misunderstood you?

Harm is an objective moral standard because it can be quantified.  It can be observed and demonstrated.  Things being in the periphery of biological interests doesn't mean that their basis -is- a biological interest.  

The only interface evolutionary biology has with ethical objectivity is in whether or not it provided us with the apparatus to make objective assessments.  It may not have done so (I'd say certainly didn't do so)  for the purposes of making moral assessments..but so long as it provided a meaningful apparatus capable of both noting and forming an objective proposition then it doesn't matter much that this ability was originally there to help us find lunch and it certainly doesn't mean that this objective proposition is lunch based.  

Is it true that good and bad have some reference to harm?  Yes.  Can harm be demonstrated, and thus shown to be some true fact of a matter x.  Yes.  

That these facts of the matter sometimes align with our biological interests is fortunate, but it's also possible for them to be in contradiction to those interests or to the thing which they evolved in pursuit of.  Doing the right thing can be disadvantageous to you.  Doing what is natural for you, can be wrong. Sometimes, the way you find your lunch can be the worst possible thing to do..ethically speaking, on basis of harm.

I'll reiterate that while you are seeking to tie moral objectivity explicitly to biology, that is very literally the last thing that moral objectivists want to do. That's why I mentioned that you tied yourself into a knot, earlier.

[Angrboda]

All that matter is whether there is a selective pressure against it or not.  People who belong to societies where such things are accepted do not prosper as well as societies where such behavior is not tolerated.  If the society suffers, so do the individuals.  If the society benefits, so do its individuals.  As they say, a rising tide floats all boats.  It has nothing to do with reasoning toward it being in one's interest.  So, no, you're simply wrong about it not being a biologically based impulse.  It most definitely is.

Evo bio doesn't care about societies prospering, either.  

Evo biology does care about the individual's in those societies prospering, and individuals in your societies don't prosper. That's definitely an evo concern.

I don't know what your point about mooring morality to its evolutionary roots is, you're not particularly clear here.  Moreover, for someone who takes harm as the objective basis of morality, I find this a rather strange position to take, as it seems to undermine your contention that harm is an objective moral standard.  The moral standard of harm is quite obviously tied to biological interests.  Have I misunderstood you?

Harm is an objective moral standard because it can be quantified.  It can be observed and demonstrated.  Things being in the periphery of biological interests doesn't mean that their basis -is- a biological interest.  

The only interface evolutionary biology has with ethical objectivity is in whether or not it provided us with the apparatus to make objective assessments.  It may not have done so (I'd say certainly didn't do so)  for the purposes of making moral assessments..but so long as it provided a meaningful apparatus capable of both noting and forming an objective proposition then it doesn't matter much that this ability was originally there to help us find lunch and it certainly doesn't mean that this objective proposition is lunch based.  

Is it true that good and bad have some reference to harm?  Yes.  Can harm be demonstrated, and thus shown to be some true fact of a matter x.  Yes.  

That these facts of the matter sometimes align with our biological interests is fortunate, but it's also possible for them to be in contradiction to those interests or to the thing which they evolved in pursuit of.  Doing the right thing can be disadvantageous to you.  Doing what is natural for you, can be wrong.

The length of penises can be quantified, too, that doesn't make the length of penises the objective basis for morals. Harm becomes a basis for morals because we care about harm, for biological reasons. If we didn't care about harm and were indifferent to it, it would not form a basis of morals. It is our caring about harm that is the basis of its moral significance, not it's quantifiability or its existence period. You only have to ponder the meaning of the word 'harm' itself to see that. Things that don't adversely affect peoples' interests are not harm. It is that harm is contrary to peoples' interests that makes it a moral concern. Not this quantifiability nonsense. And interest is as biological as it gets.

[The Grand Nudger]

Evo biology does care about the individual's in those societies prospering, and individuals in your societies don't prosper.  That's definitely an evo concern.

It really doesn't..and we're taking liberties here even in discussing it this way, but evolutionarily speaking, a society constantly at war with itself is a good gene mill.  If it offs itself, oh well, fuck it, obviously the good genes were still shit...more space for something else to do the same all over again.

Red in tooth and claw.  

The length of penises can be quantified, too, that doesn't make the length of penises the objective basis for morals.

Is the length of a penis a reference to good and bad in the same way that harm obviously is so?  Poor analogy.

Harm becomes a basis for morals because we care about harm, for biological reasons.

That may be how it evolved, how we originally came to be in this state of affairs... but it is no longer the justification.   Again..contending otherwise is to tank objectivity from an ethical standpoint.  

If we didn't care about harm and were indifferent to it, it would not form a basis of morals.

It would still be the conceptual basis of a harm based objective system.  It doesn't matter, to an objectivist, whether or not you or some other or some group doesn't see it or care about it.  It still causes harm regardless of your ability or level of emotional investment.  That would be a you or a them problem, not a harm based objectivity problem.

It is our caring about harm that is the basis of its moral significance, not it's quantifiability or its existence period.  You only have to ponder the meaning of the word 'harm' itself to see that.  Things that don't adversely affect peoples' interests are not harm.  It is that harm is contrary to peoples' interests that makes it a moral concern.  Not this quantifiability nonsense.  And interest is as biological as it gets.

Plenty of things that don't adversely affect some persons interests are harmful.  Often enough, things that actively promote peoples personal interests are explicitly harmful, themselves.  You;re falling down the same rabbit hole that others have stumbled into time and time again in these thread.  

The justification for a moral schema and a person caring about it are not the same thing. That the apparatus with which we engage in this was leveraged for survival does not mean that the system that we have now will side with survival or that the current system is, as I put it, lunch based. It's the apparatus that's lunch based, but that isn't a problem for objectivity. The only problem for objectivity is if the apparatus were incapable of objectivity.

[bennyboy]

If we want to look to evolution, I'd go a step further, and say that the sense of individual agency is an illusion, and that we ourselves are each a kind of community which arrives at rules by a process of negotiation.

"That fucking bitch wouldn't put out even after I paid for that expensive dinner" is an expression of the perfectly natural subjection of rationale to the libido.
"What am I even saying?  Jesus, man, I'm better than that!" is an expression of the equally natural social instincts for acceptance.
"Given the state of modern contraceptive techniques, my best chances of reproduction depend on going to school and getting a paying profession" is an expression of the rational mind, if it's aware enough of what the rest of the community has made as its goal.

It seems to me that each of us is a set of archetypal homunculi struggling for control over the same dummy.

This raises a side of the issue that I tangentially explored with my questions about empathy.  If our morals are a product of evolutionary processes yielding determinative conclusions about the right or wrong of a thing based upon our contingent history as biological beings, what do we do once we realize this and can hypothesize answers that lie beyond the dictates of our biology, and on what basis do we make conclusions then, released from their mooring in our evolutionary history?  Can we out think our biology, and if so, how?

Again, it depends which ones of those archetypal demons are most at work, either in people's natures or by training to match perceived societal norms.

I'd say in general we seem to have some kind of homeostatic mechanism-- one generation tilts toward anger, outrage and war, the next tilts toward peace and restraint.  Surely one generation cannot suddenly have a superior moral mechanism than its immediate predecessor.

I think the freedom you are talking about leads to another set of philosophical problems: if self-realization of evolved moral instincts frees us from them, then what next?  Do we go full-on Machiavellian / Ayn Randian / LaVeyan?  Or do we develop a much greater capacity to understand, forgive, and cooperate with others?

[Angrboda]

Plenty of things that don't adversely affect some persons interests are harmful. 

Since you have yet to provide a valid example of such, this is simply an unproven claim. You even acknowledge the possibility that having the shitty morals of valuing personal interest against that of a generalizable interest might lead to the extinction of such persons. There can be no greater selective pressure than that of extinction. If you aren't alive, then you most certainly can't pass on your genes. (You need to show that people who don't forbid such things at least break even in the genetic race with those that do. And we have plenty of reason to believe that they don't.)

---

This raises a side of the issue that I tangentially explored with my questions about empathy.  If our morals are a product of evolutionary processes yielding determinative conclusions about the right or wrong of a thing based upon our contingent history as biological beings, what do we do once we realize this and can hypothesize answers that lie beyond the dictates of our biology, and on what basis do we make conclusions then, released from their mooring in our evolutionary history?  Can we out think our biology, and if so, how?

Again, it depends which ones of those archetypal demons are most at work, either in people's natures or by training to match perceived societal norms.

I'd say in general we seem to have some kind of homeostatic mechanism-- one generation tilts toward anger, outrage and war, the next tilts toward peace and restraint.  Surely one generation cannot suddenly have a superior moral mechanism than its immediate predecessor.

That's nice. Not relevant to the question, but okay.

I think the freedom you are talking about leads to another set of philosophical problems: if self-realization of evolved moral instincts frees us from them, then what next?  Do we go full-on Machiavellian / Ayn Randian / LaVeyan?  Or do we develop a much greater capacity to understand, forgive, and cooperate with others?

Both of those options are rooted in biology. Without biology, we have neither impulse. As Dostoevsky said, “If everything on earth were rational, nothing would happen.” Our interests, whether altruistic or selfish, are rooted in biology. The question is how to transcend them. If we abandon our biologically rooted motivations and methods, the only thing left to appeal to is reason, but reason is neutral in the matter, and does not prefer one way t' the other. If we depend upon reason alone to move us to action, we simply will cease to act.