What would be the harm?

[Angrboda]

A primer on mind dependence as it relates to moral theory.

Mind dependence, in moral theory, is not a comment on whether or not some proposition x exists in a mind.  It is a comment on whether or not the thing to which it refer exists -solely- as an artifact of the mind that possesses it.  

All propositions are "mind dependent" in a sense meaningless to moral theory, in that all moral propositions exist in our minds.  This brute fact does not establish that they are neccessarrily subjective as a moral theorist is referring to subjectivity.  Any moral proposition that exists in our minds but -also- refer to some fact of a matter beyond that mind is, in moral theory, an objectivist fact of the matter x.  

So, two propositions.  X is bad because I don't like it.  X is bad because it hurts people.  Both propositions exist as a product of minds, but only one of them is necesarrily subjective (again, as moral theorists are discussing it, it's objectively true that the first persons opinion is that they don;t like something).  The other may be, insomuch as the person proposing it has gotten that fact wrong...but if that thing x does hurt people..regardless of whether or not our subject was aware of it or cared, it would still hurt people.

Since we weren't discussing morals but teleology, your digression, while cute, is rather irrelevant to the question under consideration.

And your belief that harm can be objectively described is a current point in contention, so asserting it here is just begging the question there.

[The Grand Nudger]

Teleology is meaningfully subjective.  This simply isn't the problem for moral objectivity that you think it is, is all.  The answer to the whole foundations of sand question is that moral objectivity cannot be, and in point of fact is not grounded on any teleology.  

Valid normative realist ethics proceed with teleology -after- having proposed a valid basis for moral objectivity.  Not before.  They have their arguments as to why you should be compelled..but, ultimately, not everyone will be and there's not much we can do about that. This is why, for example, Harris..as a consequentialist, always begins with his "the worst possible suffering for the most possible creatures, if bad means anything, is bad" bit. He proposes wellbeing as a goal insomuch as the goal of wellbeing would..ostensibly, prevent or reduce -that-.

[Angrboda]

Teleology is meaningfully subjective.  This simply isn't the problem for moral objectivity that you think it is, is all.  The answer to the whole foundations of sand question is that moral objectivity cannot be, and in point of fact is not grounded on any teleology.  

No, but benny's point was that the definition of bad was based on goals, and goals are inherently teleological, and teleology being subjective makes the definitions of bad you gave, being dependent on it, itself necessarily subjective. It isn't a problem for moral realism qua moral realism. It is only a problem for your moral realism. And benny's point appears to be sound. My point was that harm as a foundation of morals depends upon harm being bad, but if bad is necessarily subjective, and harm is defined in terms of bad, then harm is also necessarily subjective. You need to ground harm on something other than bad, otherwise you are just arguing in a circle and haven't justified an objective account of either harm or bad.

[The Grand Nudger]

The trouble with that assertion is that a realists bad aren't based on goals, even if their teleology is.  Teleology, for it's part, can't be based on anything but goals..simple matter of definition.  Though, that a natural teleology is at least sensible makes the claim that teleology is necessarily subjective a tenuous one.  We know that it can be, we know that our teleology is, again..meaningfully, but we can;t really rule out that our own teleology could match some natural teleology that is mind independent.

While this might seem seductive at first, aligning our own moral teleology to a natural teleology would be, as previously pointed out...unwise...from an ethical standpoint

As to your point, "if bad is necessarrily subjective"; The proposition harris offered is that harm -is- bad. Is harm necessarrily subjective? To continue with the ramifications of what would be if bad was necessarrily subjective you will have to maintain that harm is necessarrily subjective. Not our ability to see it, not whether or not we care about it. Not our teleology. Harm.

Can you not measure the depth of a wound and lay out further complications? Can you not note the pain of surgery, or the continuing ill effects on health? Can you not point to the rubble of a burnt down trailer? Can we not have the family cry into a cup and measure the volume of their tears? etc etc etc. Is it true that there are things considered harmful that are..meaningfully, subjective? Sure. Does that make harm necessarily subjective? Absolutely not.

It is far easier to criticize harris (or anyone elses) evaluative premises (or evaluative agency) than it is to impugn the objectivity of harm as a metric.

[Angrboda]

You're simply ignoring the elephant in the room, Khem. Neither harm nor bad has been given a foundation that is objective. You've simply defined each in terms of the other. You were the one who brought up the dictionary definitions as if they settled something. Now that it has been shown that they don't settle anything, you want to forget you brought it up and simply move on to something else. If you have an objective basis of harm that isn't based on the subjective notion of bad which your dictionary definitions supplied, or a definition of bad that isn't based on a mere ipse dixit assertion that the bad is things that are harm, then provide it.

You're just going around in circles here, Khem, because you don't have an objective foundation for harm or bad.

As to your specific examples, a wound is only harm if having a wound is bad. It's only bad if your goal is not to have wounds because living is a goal you have. A wound, in and of itself, is neither good or bad. It is just an arrangement of matter, essentially no different from any other arrangement of matter. That we're able to measure arrangements of matter does not make one such an arrangement of matter objectively preferable to another arrangement of matter. And I can make the point rather simply by counter-example. A depressed person who shoots himself in the head creating a massive wound because he desires to die is a good thing in his world. So a wound can be good or bad, depending on the viewpoint of the person in question. That's the very definition of subjective.

And similar things apply to the rubble of a burnt down trailer. They are only bad insofar as people want things other than their trailer being burnt out. A burnt out trailer is only bad because someone wants a different state of affairs. Again, a counter-example. Suppose the owner of said trailer is in dire straits and needs money (and as a result, he also is depressed and wants to die, just to cover all cases). He is planning to burn down his trailer to collect the insurance money, but you happened to beat him to the punch. Suddenly burning down the trailer is a good thing and your assumption that it is bad or harm is fucked once again.

[The Grand Nudger]

You're simply ignoring the elephant in the room, Khem.  Neither harm nor bad has been given a foundation that is objective. 

Haven't I, though?  Can we not demonstrate when harm has been done?  Is it impossible to do this?  If I tell you that someone has been harmed, am I completely bereft of any means by which to show you that this harm exists?  Benny sees the harm of some kid getting stomped and it turns his guts.  You and I can quantify the weight of the rubble and the volume of the families tears.  We can see the wounds and the pools of blood.  These are some of the things we are referring to when we employ the term "harm".  When we say "john has been harmed, john has harmed another, harm has been done".  We refer to other things as well..sure, some of them may not be objective as these are.

Obviously, if you contend that there is no or can be no such thing as objective harm in the sense that moral theorists are referring then you will also have issues with teleology based on it's reduction.

I -want- to burn down the trailer, remember? You're just asserting to the contrary to be contrarian, this objection has been dealt with multiple times. It may be the case that we want this or that thing, but that is moral compulsion (and moral failure), again, not the same question as the underlying moral justification for a realist system. You're not engaging with the proposition at all, just asserting otherwise.

Insurance fraud is bad...even if the guy who owns the trailer wants the money. But why? Because defrauding the insurer causes harm. OFC the insurer doesn;t want to be harmed, but him not wanting to be harmed is no more what makes it bad than the fraudster wanting money makes it good. Our desires are a subjectivist justification...and that's simply not what realism is talking about.

[Angrboda]

I -want- to burn down the trailer, remember?  You're just asserting to the contrary to be contrarian, this objection has been dealt with multiple times.  It may be the case that we want this or that thing, but that is moral compulsion (and moral failure), again, not the same question as the underlying moral justification for a realist system.  You're not engaging with the proposition at all, just asserting otherwise.

[The Grand Nudger]

Jorm...lol..exactly?

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I can want what is bad, and desire to avoid the good, or vv.  My wanting is not what makes some thing good or bad, as every example both you and I have brought forward shows..where our desires are in contradiction with some realists moral assessment.  

Yes, sometimes, we do want the good, the good may be desirable.  This, however, is the same as metal sometimes being precious to us.  That it is precious to us is not what makes it metal, and metal that is not precious to us is still metal.  

The same is true of wishing to avoid the bad, and specifically that bad which we call harmful.  OFC we want to avoid being harmed, but that's not what makes it bad.  

Here again we repeat with the example of bad things commonly being bad-for our survival.  Well, if bad things are often harmful things it's no surprise that bad things are bad-for our survival...but it's still the case that some bad things, at lkeast, are aces for survival.

Realists appeal to you/our desires to compel us, not to establish what is good or bad...because our desires are compelling. You've been asking whether realists are building the house on a foundation of sand.. by building their house..on something other than what they've built their house. The thing you take issue with is the manner in which they've tried to sell the house. Not how or upon what it was built. A consequentialist is, in effect, asking you..-if- you want to reduce the bad, then you should do this. Why would I want to reduce the bad, we might ask. Well, perhaps because it's in your own interests to do so.

To a realist, even if you don't want to reduce the bad, and even if reducing the bad actually isn't in your interests, it's still the bad. And that's when we hit you over the head with a brick or put you in a tiny room with a big observation window for ever and ever.

[Angrboda]

We have been discussing whether harm has an objective definition. Try to keep up. Saying that harm is immoral because it's bad, and it's bad because it's harm, and harm is bad because it's immoral is nothing more than one big circle jerk. In order to establish that harm is objectively immoral you have to establish that it is objectively bad. You can't appeal to your conclusion that harm is immoral to establish that harm has an objective definition when harm not having an objective definition is what puts your claim that harm is immoral in doubt. That's question begging 101. Since you appear not to be able to keep all these facts straight in your head simultaneously, I suggest you concentrate on the matter in front of you, showing that harm has an objective definition, before you go skipping off to other matters. You're only confusing yourself by doing so. Let's stick with the trailer burning for now to simplify discussion. You wanting to burn down the person's trailer because you wanted to achieve certain goals is not the only want you could have had. You could have wanted the person to collect on his insurance policy. Your wanting the one thing, regardless of whether it corresponds with an objective moral or not, is a contingent fact of the universe. You could just as easily have not wanted it, or wanted something different. Since it is not a necessary feature of the universe, it cannot be an objective fact of the universe and so it being bad isn't necessarily the case, but only contingently so based upon you having certain wants. Appealing to the wants in and of itself cannot objectively ground harm, and if you cannot objectively ground what is harm, then harm too becomes something that exists solely in the eye of the beholder. Something that exists solely in the beholder cannot possibly form the basis of an objective moral system. It's entirely possible that morals exist independently of harm or wants, but until you establish some other basis than harm, which as we've seen appears subjective, you haven't provided an objective basis for morals.

It has nothing whatsoever to do with whether a desire to do something can underwrite an objective moral or not, but rather whether the specifics here, namely harm, can underwrite an objective moral. In order to do that, you need to show that harm can be objectively defined. I do not need to show that harm is not objective, which seems to be your point in pointing out that harm being in some sense subjective doesn't necessarily rule out it also being objective, as I do not have a burden of proof in the matter. You on the other hand have claimed that harm is bad, and that it being bad is an objective fact. That is a claim you have yet to substantiate. You tried to appeal to the dictionary definition of bad to show that it correlated with harm, but since said dictionary definitions were shown to ultimately depend on subjective viewpoints, they failed to ultimately provide an objective foundation for the definition of harm. You brought up that you thought a burnt out trailer was objectively harmful. I pointed out that it is only harm from a specific perspective or viewpoint, the very definition of subjective. What else have you brought me to establish that harm has an objective definition? The only other thing, and this in your last reply, is that the act is immoral and therefore bad by definition. However since your goal in establishing that harm has an objective definition is so that you can justify your claim that harm is immoral, that's simply begging the question, and is a logical no-no. What else have you brought me which provides an objective definition of harm?

(The problem is not that other things can make something morally wrong but rather that the things that you are appealing to in order to define what is objectively wrong are not themselves objective facts. Harm, as far as I can see, has no objective basis. At the very least you haven't provided one. It's not my job to show that harm is not an objective basis for morals, but rather your job to show that it is. Referring to the possibility that it has an objective basis other than subjective desires is rather moot when following directly on the heels of your attempting to justify its objective nature by appeals to subjective motives. If you agree with me that a person's wants do not make something objective, and I agree, then what does make harm an objective description of things? Take the example of the burned out trailer. What is objectively bad about a burned out trailer? And if you say because it's harmful, I'm gonna hit you over the head with a brick or find you a room with a view.)

[The Grand Nudger]

You're still not engaging.  Harm -is- bad, that's the proposition.  You can create circular arguments all you like...but that's just you.  

Harris' schtick is an intuitivist argument.  Not "harm is bad because blah blah blah blah blah". Have I showed you the many ways in which harm is objective, yes. If you wish to maintain otherwise, the fact that you are not simply expressing what must necessarrily be your claim is for convenience sake, not that you aren't making one. You're tying yourself into knots, as noted at the outset.

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I understand why, btw, and on a great many points I'm certain that I would agree with you when it comes to the difficulty of basing moral objectivity on harm.  The difficulty, however, is not that harm is an insufficient basis or that harm is subjective.  

The problem is that -we- are. That's exactly the problem that realism is proposed as a response to. We do not always see the harm, we see harm where there is none, and sometimes...sometimes...we just don't give a shit either way.