What would be the harm?

[Angrboda]

You're still not engaging.  Harm -is- bad, that's the proposition.

And when asked why it is bad, you end up chasing your tail. I am engaging the proposition. You have failed to support it. If you cannot provide a rational reason for believing that harm is objectively bad, I'm under no compulsion to believe it.

Have I showed you the many ways in which harm is objective, yes.

No, you haven't. What way have you shown that harm is objective? I count two. First that harm is objective because it is contrary to goals. But goals are subjective, so that doesn't make harm objectively bad. The other thing you've appealed to is that harm might be bad based on something other than subjective desires. That something might be bad does not in any sense demonstrate that it is bad and so that objection goes nowhere. You keep claiming to have provided things that you have not in fact provided. If you feel otherwise, you need only show one thing that makes harm objectively bad, whatever it may be. And that one thing can't be that 'harm is bad' for the obvious reason.

[The Grand Nudger]

I can toss you a lifeline, btw, give you something to chew on that actually -is- problematic for moral realism and realist moral theory and theorists as it relates to consequentialist ethics and those who advocate for them, such as Harris. 

What if doing The Good™ actually leads to some terrible consequence?  What if doing The Bad™ leads to the The Good End™?  Far more worrisome than cornering oneself into arguing for absurdities, eh?

---

You're still not engaging.  Harm -is- bad, that's the proposition.

And when asked why it is bad, you end up chasing your tail.  I am engaging the proposition.  You have failed to support it.  If you cannot provide a rational reason for believing that harm is objectively bad, I'm under no compulsion to believe it.

Again, you are not, because the contention offered by harris and other intuitivists is not that "harm is bad because" in any way, shape, or form.  There is no because.  Your circular arguments that follow from "because" are your own, not theirs.  

Follow?

In that framework, there is no because or why. Harm is bad as a brute fact, it's what, or one of, the things we are talking about when we say "bad"....and we are capable of observing harm...objetively, though this ability is not uniform and not all things considered harmful are valid examples of that thing. The frustrating thing about intuitivist arguments is their ability to implicate all other intuitions..such as your intuition that they may be wrong.

For reference, Harris underlying claim - that the greatest possible suffering for the greatest number of beings..if bad means anything...is........ bad. Well, okay. Is this not a sensible statement, do you object?

No, you haven't.  What way have you shown that harm is bad?  I count two.  First that harm is bad because it is contrary to goals.  But goals are subjective, so that doesn't make harm objectively bad.  The other thing you've appealed to is that harm might be bad based on something other than subjective desires.  That something might be bad does not in any sense demonstrate that it is bad and so that objection goes nowhere.  You keep claiming to have provided things that you have not in fact provided.  If you feel otherwise, you need only show one thing that makes harm objectively bad, whatever it may be.  And it can't be that harm is bad for the obvious reason.

Then you are making a claim.  That we can show the depth of a wound or a pile of rubble is not, you contend, objective. An implicit claim is still a claim..and, you know me..I'll tell you right up front that at some level, if you drill it down far enough, I can't give you a satisfactory explanation of objectivity or even demonstrate that there -is- an objective world. It's that, however, that you'll have to object to in order to object to the objectivity of harm...and as soon as you do..I'll object to the objectivity of your objection on the very same grounds.

So, another possible answer to your question, of whether or not realists are building their house on a foundation of sand..is..maybe, but no more or less so than any other house, including your house of objection, is built on the same.

---

I still think, btw, that you'd benefit from being more careful in separating moral justification from moral compulsion, and moral justification and compulsion from moral agency.  

It's not that I think you'd end up agreeing with me if you did..I know that you wouldn't in point of fact.  I think you'd be able to field more damning arguments -against- my advocacy - and that would be a hell of alot more fun.

There are, after all...positively destructive arguments against each of those three things and their relationship to each other.

[Angrboda]

I can toss you a lifeline, btw, give you something to chew on that actually -is- problematic for moral realism and realist moral theory and theorists as it relates to consequentialist ethics and those who advocate for them, such as Harris. 

What if doing The Good™ actually leads to some terrible consequence?  What if doing The Bad™ leads to the The Good End™?  Far more worrisome than cornering oneself into arguing for absurdities, eh?

First off, I'm not arguing on the basis of consequentialism and as far as I can see, this conversation has little if anything to do with consequentialism. You keep imagining my position has something to do with consequentialism because doing so gives you a convenient handle to use in overturning my argument. But since consequentialism is not my argument, you're simply appealing to your ability to defeat a straw man which is doing nothing more than boring me to tears and giving me furtgher reason to doubt you.

And when asked why it is bad, you end up chasing your tail.  I am engaging the proposition.  You have failed to support it.  If you cannot provide a rational reason for believing that harm is objectively bad, I'm under no compulsion to believe it.

Again, you are not, because the contention offered by harris and other intuitivists is not that "harm is bad because" in any way, shape, or form.  There is no because.  Your circular arguments that follow from "because" are your own, not theirs.  

If their and your contention is that harm is bad, not for any reasons but just because it is so, then it's nothing more than ipse dixit and can be summarily tossed. Please tell me you're not arguing that harm is bad not for any reason but rather because you said so. If they do not have reasons for their conclusion, then their conclusion can be dismissed. Ipse dixit arguments have a strong tendency to be subjective. If you and Harris cannnot provide objective reasons for your assertion, even in principle, then your belief is subjective out of necessity. That harm cannot be objectively defined on its own provides evidence that the statement "harm is bad" is not an objective statement and so cannot be anything but a subjective truth. And the circular argument is implied because Harris is implying that his belief that harm is bad is a rational belief. Rational beliefs have reasons for them by definition. You're confusing my pointing out that a subjective reason for something cannot form an objective basis for something with me believing that the only reason something might be objectively bad is because of a subjective reason. I'm perfectly sympathetic to the possibility that moral realism is in fact valid, just not to you and Harris' reasons or definitions about what is or is not bad. That philosophers have uniformly panned such notions as you and Harris are promoting even after having examined the arguments strongly suggests that you and Harris are out to lunch.

In that framework, there is no because or why.  Harm is bad as a brute fact, it's what, or one of, the things we are talking about when we say "bad"....and we are capable of observing harm.

Since you aren't even able to provide an objective definition of harm, the idea that harm is bad is a fact is laughable. It's one of the things that you are talking about when you say bad because you have a subjective belief that harm is both objectively definable and an objective foundation for badness. Persons such as myself who do not hold such beliefs don't necessarily view harm and bad being related in the way you suggest.

No, you haven't.  What way have you shown that harm is bad?  I count two.  First that harm is bad because it is contrary to goals.  But goals are subjective, so that doesn't make harm objectively bad.  The other thing you've appealed to is that harm might be bad based on something other than subjective desires.  That something might be bad does not in any sense demonstrate that it is bad and so that objection goes nowhere.  You keep claiming to have provided things that you have not in fact provided.  If you feel otherwise, you need only show one thing that makes harm objectively bad, whatever it may be.  And it can't be that harm is bad for the obvious reason.

Then you are making a claim.  That we can show the depth of a wound or a pile of rubble is not, you contend, objective.

That a wound has a certain depth or that something is a pile of rubble does not in itself make it bad. And yes, I'm making a claim, namely that you have not provided an objective definition of harm or something objective that makes something harm, and the evidence for my claim is your inability to provide such when asked to do so just now. Wounds and piles of rubble are not objectively bad. They are just states of affairs in the world. I am not disputing that we can measure wounds or piles of rubble. Our ability to measure something does not make something bad by virtue of our ability to measure it. So providing me with a wound or a pile of rubble do not, by themselves, show that these states of affairs are bad. You were asked to show that wounds and piles of rubble are bad, not merely that they exist. I have no disagreement as to that they exist and are measurable. That you think that a wound or a pile of rubble is necessarily bad stems from what exactly?

[The Grand Nudger]

Then you have a problem with brute facts.  Well, okay, and?  Good luck fleshing out any of your objections without a reference to one.

: shrugs :

If, however, you actually have no disagreement to the existence of harm and it's status as a measurable and thus objective thing, then you have no valid objection to a harm based objectivity as moral theorists are discussing it. Yes, you also have desires. Yes, those desires are compelling. Yes, those desires can be in concordance with harm based objectivity and they may not be. Yes, those desires and that harm can be in concordance with instrumental goods like survival benefit...and sometimes they may not be.

What's the problem...wheres the sand?

---

(It's because it's not satisfying, lol, imo.   You were looking for more.  Moral objectivity is kindof a letdown, but that doesn't make it less than or other than objective. If you want to cogently object, and this is another schtick of Harris' object at the very beginning..because if you don't...well, tough luck. Everything follows from there...even if what follows is entirely less than as awesome as we hope for it to be. That's either the weakness or the strength of arguments like his, depending on how satisfying a person finds their conclusions.)

[Angrboda]

Then you have a problem with brute facts.  Well, okay, and?  Good luck fleshing out any of your objections without a reference to one.

: shrugs :

If, however, you actually have no disagreement to the existence of harm and it's status as a measurable and thus objective thing, then you have no valid objection to a harm based objectivity as moral theorists are discussing it.  Yes, you also have desires.  Yes, those desires are compelling.  Yes, those desires can be in concordance with harm based objectivity and they may not be.  Yes, those desires and that harm can be in concordance with instrumental goods like survival benefit...and sometimes they may not be.

What's the problem...wheres the sand?

I don't have an objection to brute facts in general but to your specific proposal that "harm is bad" is a brute fact, which makes your opening salvo here yet another straw man. You can't even define harm objectively, much less show that it is a brute fact. I have every objection to harm being objective as you have defined harm as bad, and there is nothing objectively bad about a wound or a pile of rubble. It is a bare assertion, not a brute fact. That you think it is a brute fact when you can't establish that it is a fact at all is laughable. Moral theorists do not talk about it in the way you have, so again, the objection is not to moral theorists and moral theories but specifically to you and Harris' moral theories. I have no objection to the existence of and measurability of wounds and piles of rubble, because they are not themselves necessarily harm. You've skipped a step there. I do have an objection to the existence of harm as a measurable and existing thing because I have an objection to your notion that wounds and piles of rubble are necessarily harm. So no, your belief that I have no disagreement as to whether harm exists or is measurable is a product of your confusion regarding the distinction between piles of rubble and wounds as objective things and them being things that objectively constitute harm. You're simply confused here, Khem, and your blatant misrepresentation of my position here shows it.

(ETA: As a practical matter, brute facts need to be mutually agreed upon as they cannot be established through reasoned argument. Is it possible that harm is bad is a brute fact? Sure, but two things marshall against it. First, it's not universally agreed that it is a brute fact. Second, harm doesn't have an objective definition. A brute fact must be a fact first, and something that lacks an objective definition is not a fact. As far as this discussion goes, I'm not going to be persuaded by facts that aren't mutually agreed upon just as you would not be persuaded by someone claiming that X or Y is true because the fact that God exists is a brute fact. Be a little realistic. The idea that harm is bad appears necessarily subjectivist, as it does not appear that harm even has a definition outside of such.)

[The Grand Nudger]

That is the contention of an intuitivist argument, Jorg.  To then respond that this is circular because they're saying that harm is bad because "blah blah blah" is straw. It's not about misrepresenting you, I'm pointing out that you've -profoundly- misrepresented them. Your arguments...your arguments that harm is bad because x y and z may in fact be circular, but they are yours.

Follow?

That's not what they saying.

And, sure, brute facts do need to be agreed upon. Do you disagree with Harris formation of the brute fact of harm? That the greatest suffering for the greatest number of things, if bad means anything, is bad? I'm sure that you can appreciate the absurd position that disagreement with this very sensible statement will put you in. This, alone, is enough to establish that harm is morally relevant...and since harm at least -can be- objectively quantified..you would have to put yourself into further absurdity to disagree with it's validity as an objective metric. As an evaluative premise. You further contend that there is no agreement of harm..and that's a claim, and an assertion (so there's no hiding behind "well, I'm not claiming anything".,.yes, yes you are)..and it would take alot of discussion to unpack that one...but at least, for the moment, consider that you may be wrong there as well.

It's still unsatisfying. Harris argument does not give me, or you, the warm fuzzies and fill us with certainty in the accuracy of our moral propositions. Oh well.

That still leaves you with the easiest avenue of criticism, though. Our agency. Our spotty ability to see harm, or care when we do. This is exactly where you went, though you confused our agency or compulsion for the foundations of objective justification.

---

-all of these things, btw, known quantities in moral theory,  and acknowledged by realists.

You haven't exactly cracked the nut and disproved moral objectivity or even mounted a credible offense against it.....with any of your comments here, to me, on AF.com. Neither Harris nor myself being the most skillful advocates. Try Kagan.

[bennyboy]

Many goals exist in the universe.  I can point to the goal you have of out arguing me on some simple point, awfully quick, huh?  That exists, it's here in the universe.

It exists here in my mind as an arbitrary fact of my mind, that doesn't make it exist out there or make it objective.  Now you're just being disingenuous.  Fallacy of contextotomy.  See, I can be a dick, too.

Best new word this year.

[Angrboda]

That is the contention of an intuitivist argument, Jorg.  To then respond that this is circular because they're saying that harm is bad because "blah blah blah" is straw.  It's not about misrepresenting you, I'm pointing out that you've -profoundly- misrepresented them.    Your arguments...your arguments that harm is bad because x y and z may in fact be circular, but they are yours.  

No, Khem, they are yours. You only brought out the notion of brute fact after I pointed out that neither of your arguments showed harm to be objective because those were the only arguments you presented for harm being objective. My only argument was that subjective reasons cannot make harm an objective fact, not that harm is bad because of those reasons. How could I possibly be arguing that harm is bad because of those reasons when I'm not arguing that harm is bad at all? Your complaint makes no sense. What I was pointing out was that the reasons you were giving for concluding that harm has an objective definition, that something is immoral regardless of whether something was desired or not, can only appeal to your belief that harm is immoral because there is no other appeal in any of your arguments. If that's not your foundation for asserting that harm has an objective definition, then fine, harm is not objective on that account. I'm cheap. I'm easy. But here's the problem, Khem, you haven't established that harm has an objective description on any other account either. So straw man or no, your argument still fails. I think this whole spiel about how something is not necessarily immoral because someone has reasons was an implicit appeal to the idea that I was responsible for establishing that harm is not objectively immoral, and for that to be the case, you would have to be implicitly claiming that harm is immoral and therefore my pointing out the subjective nature of having reasons for viewing something as harm does not refute that position. There. Circle squared! You were implying that. (ETA: And I'll also point out that you brought out the dictionary in order to show that harm is bad because it meets the dictionary definition of bad. That move was quickly scuttled when it was shown that harm met the dictionary definition of bad because the dictionary defined bad as "contrary to specific [subjective] reasons." So, again no, you were explicitly trying to claim that the things the dictionary mentioned were an objective description of bad and so you explicitly made "harm is bad because of reasons" your position by doing so. I can quote the post where you vomited up the dictionary definition if you need proof. Otherwise your dictionary episode makes no sense. You're just backpedaling fiercely, but I really don't care. You haven't established your conclusion elsewise, so backing away from your own arguments is just a silly and laughable escapade.)

And, sure, brute facts do need to be agreed upon.  Do you disagree with Harris formation of the brute fact of harm?  That the greatest suffering for the greatest number of things, if bad means anything, is bad?  I'm sure that you can appreciate the absurd position that disagreement with this very sensible statement will put you in.  This, alone, is enough to establish that harm is morally relevant...and since harm at least -can be- objectively quantified..you would have to put yourself into further absurdity to disagree with it's validity as an objective metric.  As an evaluative premise.  You further contend that there is no agreement of harm..and that's a claim, and an assertion (so there's no hiding behind "well, I'm not claiming anything".,.yes, yes you are)..and it would take alot of discussion to unpack that one...but at least, for the moment, consider that you may be wrong there as well.

Again, you are confused. I am not saying that harm is bad is not a brute fact because we have subjective reasons for not wanting harm. I'm saying that harm is bad is not a brute fact because it has no objective definition. Something must actually correspond to some state of affairs before one can even postulate that said state of affairs is bad. Harm does not objectively pick out a specific state of affairs and so it cannot be anything but a subjectively held idea, unless, and until, you can establish that it does pick out an objectively identifiable state of affairs. Your claiming that harm is bad is a brute fact does not accomplish this feat. Neither does any of the other rot that you've tried to suggest objectively defines harm. If harm doesn't refer to an objective state of affairs in the world, then the proposition that harm is bad cannot be a brute fact because it is not even a fact, brute or not. My objection, and that of many philosophers is that harm and well-being are subjective values, and so their existence or non-existence is only good or bad from a subjective viewpoint. It may be a widely held viewpoint, and it may be a universally held viewpoint, but that does not change the fact that it is in fact a viewpoint and nothing more than a viewpoint. As a matter of fact, it probably is universally held among humans by virtue of us having the same psychology. A lion or a flesh eating bacteria is not likely to agree that you having a wound is a bad thing. The idea that harm is bad is only true from the perspective that it is bad in relation to the things humans want, and that makes it subjective.

It's still unsatisfying.  Harris argument does not give me, or you, the warm fuzzies and fill us with certainty in the accuracy of our moral propositions.  Oh well.

I don't give a fucking rat's ass whether it's satisfying or not. After all the years you've known me for you to accuse me of dismissing something solely because it does not give me the warm fuzzies can only be presumed to be trolling, because you know goddamn well I don't swing that way. Nihilism doesn't give me the warm fuzzies. I don't dismiss it on that account. Now you've gone from bad to worse.

That still leaves you with the easiest avenue of criticism, though.  Our agency.  Our spotty ability to see harm, or care when we do.  This is exactly where you went, though you confused our agency or compulsion for the foundations of objective justification.

That you think my objection rested upon epistemological difficulties clearly shows that you are out to lunch. My objection lies on two prongs: a) the lack of an objective definition for harm, and b) your inability to provide an example of something that is objectively harmful. Since you can establish the truth of your assertion in neither the specific nor the general, I'm dismissing it as unfounded.

And you didn't bother to provide any explanation for why your previous response to me involved such an egregious misunderstanding and misrepresentation of what I had argued. Were you just going to quietly distance yourself from that by talking about other things? The sheer balls of you accusing me of a straw man argument after having made such a blatantly obvious straw man argument yourself is the sheerest hypocrisy.

And I'm going to be out of this conversation for a few days because of football and other things. In the meantime I suggest you get your head together and think up an objective definition of harm, because you haven't provided one yet, and if harm has no objective definition then arguing that harm is objectively bad is simply moronic. Note that this doesn't commit me to showing that harm doesn't have an objective definition or that harm is not objectively immoral, because I'm not making either claim. I am claiming that you can't rationally assert that harm is objectively immoral. If your assertion is not a rational one, I just don't care.

[The Grand Nudger]

If you're looking for what realists ground their moral systems in, it's just not the thing you thought it was, and intuitivism is the very first stop.  It's laying there under the notion of an observed fact, any observed fact, in and of itself.  There are other stops on that line, but I couldn't begin to establish any of them, anyway, if you have an issue with facts. It doesn't require that you concede some argument over the nature of morality to concede that intuitivism is at least as compelling and at least as rational an explanation of harm as it is of anything else. It may not be enough for you, it may not be enough for me, but it is sensible. There's nothing obviously wrong with it, no fallacy in it's construction, etc. You'd have to refer to intuitivism, yourself, if I asked you similar questions about the system you're using to object to intuitivism, ultimately.

Take it away, again, webster.

: physical or mental damage or injury : something that causes someone or something to be hurt, broken, made less valuable or successful, etc.

• No harm was done.
  
• I never meant to do/cause you any harm. [=I never meant to harm/hurt you in any way]
  
• They threatened him with bodily harm.
  

[+] more examples

Yes, I do think that you dismiss it out of a lack of satisfaction, particularly in that people have an idea of what an objective morality would be that is entirely more, and more satisfying, than what it actually is. I don't think I've misunderstood any of your objections, I think that you misunderstand what moral theorists are discussing, and the related but distinct subjects that you've conflated for each other, and as though one created some necessary and troubling state of x for the other. We could go over all of them, again, if you like. Or, you could point to some specific thing that really irked you and I'll just say it again.

Here, I'll add a new one. A lion or a flesh eating bacteria most certainly wouldn't care whether or not I have a wound..but I'll still have one..I'll still have been harmed. Is there some objection you'd like to field to this? You're confusing agency and compulsion and caring, again, for the basis of both harm and objective moral propositions. That is, again, simply not what realism..or I, am talking about. I could, ofc, offer you many ways that realists handle those other things, but they are not the base of the realists moral position.

That something can be subjectively valued does not mean that the thing subjectively valued cannot be an objective thing. There is no valid inference from one directly to the other. It gives us reason, ofc, to go over our moral propositions to see if the specific example is, properly and meaningfully, ethically subjective..but it simply doesn;t help to establish that -all- moral values are subjective because some can be or because many are subjectively valued. Realists also agree with you, additionally, that intersubjectivity is not objectivity.

[Angrboda]

If you're looking for what realists ground their moral systems in, it's just not the thing you thought it was, and intuitivism is the very first stop.  It's laying there under the notion of an observed fact, any observed fact, in and of itself.  There are other stops on that line, but I couldn't begin to establish any of them, anyway, if you have an issue with facts.  It doesn't require that you concede some argument over the nature of morality to concede that intuitivism is at least as compelling and at least as rational an explanation of harm as it is of anything else.  It may not be enough for you, it may not be enough for me, but it is sensible.  There's nothing obviously wrong with it, no fallacy in it's construction, etc.  You'd have to refer to intuitivism, yourself, if I asked you similar questions about the system you're using to object to intuitivism, ultimately.  

No, moral realists do not depend upon the type of argument you're engaged in here. Actual moral realists assert that there is some objective feature of the world which makes moral propositions true. Actual moral realists reject constructs such as yours and Harris' because they realize that harm and well-being are subjective and thus they don't pick out objective features of the world and so they cannot form the basis of any moral realism. As has been said of Harris, you think that you've solved the perennial problem of objectively grounding morals when instead you've simply done philosophy badly. And here we have you simply reasserting what has already been shown to be wrong. You're like Drich and Christians in thinking that simply reasserting something will make it true. You've even said as much with your claim about having continually posted the same thing. What you're not doing is actually answering objections, such as those given in my last post. You didn't answer any of the objections there, or my Yoda objection to your rebuttal to my point about whether a wound constitutes harm or not, you're simply repeating yourself like an idiot.

Take it away, again, webster.

: physical or mental damage or injury : something that causes someone or something to be hurt, broken, made less valuable or successful, etc.

• No harm was done.
  
• I never meant to do/cause you any harm. [=I never meant to harm/hurt you in any way]
  
• They threatened him with bodily harm.
  

[+] more examples

I was going to go through each of these, and I will in a limited fashion, but it's not really my job. Apparently you didn't learn nothing from your last attempt at this and think that simply repeating your prior argument will somehow magically make it right this time when it wasn't last time.

All of the definitions given above either lead nowhere or to something subjective. Why is damage or injury harm? Because they negatively impact the desired function of a system. You cannot damage a rock because a rock isn't a system and has no desired function. As shown with the bloke who shot himself in the face, damage or injury is only harm if it is negative, otherwise it is neither harm nor damage or injury. One simply has to consider it from a mereological perspective. Something is damaged or injured if some of its parts are missing or non-functional. How do we determine what are the appropriate and required parts of a thing? By reference to its intended function. I'm missing nine fingers. That's only damage if I want to do something with those nine fingers. And you chopping the fingers off a dead person isn't harm at all because you can't harm a dead person, regardless of whether you might through some teleological notion consider it damage or injury. So both damage and injury necessarily refer to the purpose or function of a thing, and that is a teleological notion, and not an objective definition.

Hurt is simply a a near synonym for harm which leads nowhere.

Broken again refers to function, and function is another teleological notion which relies on intent and so is subjective.

Made less valuable or successful? Please. These are obvious subjective measures. Value is subjective. What counts as success is subjective.

But we went through all this with your prior dictionary episode in which the definitions for bad were all shown to be subjective. As noted above, you're simply repeating the same wrong arguments, ignoring and not grappling with the objections, and walking away with a smile on your face thinking that you have done well. Instead, you're just behaving like an idiot. As noted, it's not my job to show that all of the above definitions ultimately rely on subjective ideas, but your job to show that any of these definitions have an objective measure as a measure of harm. Quoting the dictionary doesn't do that. That you think it would, especially given your prior failure at this is astounding.

Yes, I do think that you dismiss it out of a lack of satisfaction, particularly in that people have an idea of what an objective morality would be that is entirely more, and more satisfying, than what it actually is.  I don't think I've misunderstood any of your objections, I think that you misunderstand what moral theorists are discussing, and the related but distinct subjects that you've conflated for each other, and as though one created some necessary and troubling state of x for the other.  We could go over all of them, again, if you like.  Or, you could point to some specific thing that really irked you and I'll just say it again.

Why not, instead of repeating the assertions you've made before you try doing actual work and answering the objections given. We can start with my objection that a wound is not an example of harm if the person desired a wound in their face. Is that not true? You responded to the trailer and insurance example by claiming that it was not what you wanted. But that's just a subjective idea as to what should be desired, not an objective one. In the case of the man whose trailer you burned down, who collected the insurance money, you did him no harm but actually helped him. If harm is objective as you say, you need to show that the burned out trailer constitutes harm for the man who wanted his trailer burned down, because objective notions require the ability to show that someone was harmed in spite of them having a desire for the action to occur. Get to work and show that.

As to whether I dismiss it out of satisfaction, I'll tell you the same thing that I told Drich and Huggy, even if I had such feelings, it would be irrelevant to the discussion as appeal to motive is a fallacy. I've told you that it is not true. The only reason you are repeating the suggestion is because you need to find some explanation for my refusal to accept your assertions that doesn't involve those assertions being wrong. And so, obviously, you explain it by asserting and believing that my emotions and my feelings are interfering with my ability to reason properly about the subject. This story has only one purpose, to make you feel better about your conclusion that you are right and put away any doubts that you are wrong prompted by an intelligent and philosophically astute interrogator disagreeing with you. So far from me having such a motive, which you just dredged up out of your ass because you want or need it to be true, it's actually you that is showing himself to be lead around by his emotional needs and desires. And I'll tell you the same thing that I told Drich. Even if I had the motives you suggest that I have, it would not in any sense lead to the conclusion that those feelings were interfering with my ability to reason about the subject and come to correct conclusions. But the fact is it's not true, I don't have such feelings, and this bullshit is just a comforting story that you are telling yourself so that you can feel better.

And now you have joined the ranks of Drich and Huggy with the quality of your arguments. Proud of yourself?

Here, I'll add a new one.  A lion or a flesh eating bacteria most certainly wouldn't care whether or not I have a wound..but I'll still have one..I'll still have been harmed.  Is there some objection you'd like to field to this?  You're confusing agency and compulsion and caring, again, for the basis of both harm and objective moral propositions.  That is, again, simply not what realism..or I, am talking about.  I could, ofc, offer you many ways that realists handle those other things, but they are not the base of the realists moral position.  

You're still confused. It's not that you don't have a wound or that the bacteria or lion care about such, it's that a wound isn't harm unless its undesirable, and that makes the notion of harm subjective. A wound, by itself, without reference to the wants and desires of some thing is neither good or bad. Since it's neither good or bad on its own, it isn't harm because harm requires that it be bad (as well as your larger argument that harm is bad; if the wound isn't bad, and you consider the wound harm then that refutes your claim that harm is bad). You're also confused about who has the burden of proof here. You keep casting this as my attempting to prove that a wound has a subjective element and is therefore subjective. You're right that this would not show that it is subjective. However, I'm not saying that. What I am saying is that any reason you can give for considering any state of affairs harm or bad is subjective, and my pointing out those subjective aspects is simply to show that the things you think are objective actually are subjective. You haven't given me an example of objective harm, and until you do, all this talk of how these things are subjective and not objective is just refuting your attempts to prove your point, not my attempts to prove the reverse.

You talk about moral realists above without realizing that it is actual moral realists who have problems with notions such as yours and Harris' being valid examples of moral realism. I don't know exactly where the failure lies, but I suspect that you've mistaken common sense notions for the objective nature of harm or bad with actual philosophically rigorous ones. Actual moral realists realize that you can't define bad so simply and have an objective definition of it. That's why actual moral realists reject ideas like yours and Harris' because they see the problems with it even if you don't. You, in your delusion, think this is because you have succeeded where others have failed when in reality it's simply that you don't recognize that you have failed.

That something can be subjectively valued does not mean that the thing subjectively valued cannot be an objective thing.  There is no valid inference from one directly to the other.  It gives us reason, ofc, to go over our moral propositions to see if the specific example is, properly and meaningfully, ethically subjective..but it simply doesn;t help to establish that -all- moral values are subjective because some can be or because many are subjectively valued.  Realists also agree with you, additionally, that intersubjectivity is not objectivity.

No, that something can be subjectively valued does not mean that it cannot be an objective thing. I readily admit that it could be an objective thing. However, the fact that it could be an objective thing doesn't show that it is an objective thing. You have to remember context. You have been asked to show an example of harm that is objective and objectively bad. You gave subjective accounts of its badness, primarily by citing your desire to burn down my trailer house. I have, and will point out again, that your burning down my trailer house is only bad if you assume a certain perspective, and therefore it's only subjectively bad. This does not show that burning down the trailer is not objectively bad, but what it does show is that your wanting to burn down my trailer is not objectively bad, which is a refutation of your point. You're terribly confused about who is making the positive case. I am not trying to establish that all harm is subjective in the case that you cited but rather that you have not given an objective account of how burning down the trailer house is bad or harm. Those are your responsibilities, and you haven't fulfilled them.

Now, if you like, feel free to show how any of the above dictionary definitions are objectively bad and harmful. I suspect your primary attempt will be to focus on damage, but keep in mind the proviso above that damage isn't harm unless it's negative. That essentially simply loops us back to the concept of bad, which we've already been through once, and to which it seems your only reply is to again axiomatically assert that harm is bad. (And note that I don't need to show that damage has to be negative to qualify as harm even if the dictionary doesn't explicitly mention it because you do: you have asserted that harm is bad. If damage isn't bad, then by your own definition it isn't harm.)


Now, you've got a lot of work ahead of you, and as noted, I won't have many opportunities to read and respond for a few days, so you're on your own for a while. Make good use of your time. Do not simply reassert your prior failed arguments but actually tackle the substance of my rebuttals. And don't you worry about what motivates me, I'm a big girl and can handle myself, squirrely emotions and all, and besides, you've shown that you don't have the first clue about what I actually feel.