Is Moral Nihilism a Morality?

[The Grand Nudger]

We've briefly touched on this earlier in thread, but it may be the case that no metaethical position properly understood and genuinely held lacks a normative function, not even in an error theory, as even pointing out error provides normative function.

[SenseMaker007]

After all, aren't the GOOD arguments also the most convincing? 

Unfortunately not. Almost everybody is more likely to be convinced by appeals to emotion or fallacies that argue in favor of what they already agree with than a genuinely logically valid and sound argument. Just read Thinking Fast and Slow. System 2 is precise and logical but it's the irrational System 1 that holds the most power over us. And as David Hume observed long before: reason is the slave of the passions.

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We've briefly touched on this earlier in thread, but it may be the case that no metaethical position properly understood and genuinely held lacks a normative function,

It is indeed the case that moral realism is true but that doesn't mean that all metaethical viewpoints are implicitly making normative evaluations.

not even in an error theory, as even pointing out error provides normative function.

But Error Theory is not nihilism. Error theory says that all moral claims are false.

[vulcanlogician]

That's not moral nihilism.

So, I guess what you're saying is that there is no ought thinking that necessarily belongs to nihilism such as belongs to realism.

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But Error Theory is not nihilism. Error theory says that all moral claims are false.

According to Russ Shafer-Landau, error theory is a form of nihilism.

[SenseMaker007]

So, I guess what you're saying is that there is no ought thinking that necessarily belongs to nihilism such as belongs to realism.

If it involves that we ought to do or not do X then it precisely can't be nihilistic.

It would be more accurate to say that ethical nihilism is impossible than to say that nihilism is making normative statements.

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According to Russ Shafer-Landau, error theory is a form of nihilism.

It is a strange definition of nihilism to say that a non-empty evaluation is nihilistic.

[vulcanlogician]

It would be more accurate to say that ethical nihilism is impossible than to say that nihilism is making normative statements.

Ok. That's an interesting idea. But I'm curious:

How is ethical nihilism impossible?

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It is a strange definition of nihilism to say that a non-empty evaluation is nihilistic.

But nihilists make the claim that there is no moral knowledge.

Error theorists say the same thing: "there are no moral features in the world" and "all moral judgments are false"

It makes sense to say that error theorists are nihilists.

[SenseMaker007]

How is ethical nihilism impossible?

Well, it depends what we mean.

If somebody thinks that they hold a truly nihilistic viewpoint and claims loudly that their viewpoint is nihilistic, then does that mean they really hold a nhilistic viewpoint? Or is it possible that their viewpoint is less nihilistic than they think it is? Is it possible that they are implicitly making evaluations without realizing it?

If it's possible for such people to be wrong about their viewpoint then ethical nihilism is impossible because it's meaningless to say that a statement is meaningless. Nihilists claim that X is neither true nor false but nothing is neither true nor false. Something is either true or it isn't. So they're simply mistaken about their own nihilism.

But that is because I hold to a specific theory of truth. Under some theories of truth ethical nihilism is possible because under some theories of truth things can be neither true nor false. But those theories of truth make no sense to me.

[vulcanlogician]

How is ethical nihilism impossible?

Well, it depends what we mean.

If somebody thinks that they hold a truly nihilistic viewpoint and claims loudly that their viewpoint is nihilistic, then does that mean they really hold a nhilistic viewpoint? Or is it possible that their viewpoint is less nihilistic than they think it is? Is it possible that they are implicitly making evaluations without realizing it?

If it's possible for such people to be wrong about their viewpoint then ethical nihilism is impossible because it's meaningless to say that a statement is meaningless. Nihilists claim that X is neither true nor false but nothing is neither true or false. Something is either true or it isn't. So they're simply mistaken about their own nihilism.

But that is because I hold to a specific theory of truth. Under some theories of truth ethical nihilism is possible because under some theories of truth things can be neither true nor false. But those theories of truth make no sense to me.

I think what you say applies to general nihilists. But if someone claims that they are an ethical nihilist, then they can indeed have beliefs about x and y. The only thing they think is untrue is morality.

[SenseMaker007]

But nihilists make the claim that there is no moral knowledge.

It's more accurate to say that they claim that the very concept of moral knowledge is completely meaningless because moral claims aren't addressing matters of fact (according to them).

Error theorists say the same thing: "there are no moral features in the world" and "all moral judgments are false"

It makes sense to say that error theorists are nihilists.

I think that philosophers have miscategorized Error Theory when they've said it's a form of moral nihilism because I think to be nihilistic about X is to say that X is without meaning ... and to say that X is false is to give it meaning.

I think what you say applies to general nihilists. But if someone claims that they are an ethical nihilist, then they can indeed have beliefs about x and y. The only thing they think is untrue is morality.

I don't think outright denying X is the same as being nihilistic about X.

Think of it like how strong gnostic/atheism is not the same as weak/agnostic atheism. Merely lacking a belief in God is more theologically nihilistic than positively believing that God does not exist. Do you see a flaw in that analogy?

[vulcanlogician]

EDIT: think of it like how strong gnostic/atheism is not the same as weak/agnostic atheism. Not having a belief in God is more nihilistic than positively believing that God does not exist.

You see, though, that's how I think of moral nihilists. They are "atheists" about morality. I think error theorists qualify.

Any atheist, whether agnostic or gnostic is going to claim (really by default) that all statements of fact about gods are false. If they believed otherwise, (ie. that certain statements about God can be/are true) then they would necessarily be theists. Likewise with error theorists...

[SenseMaker007]

You see, though, that's how I think of moral nihilists. They are "atheists" about morality. I think error theorists qualify.

I don't see gnostic/strong atheists as nihilistic about God if they have positive reasons and evaluations to believe that God doesn't exist.

Any atheist, whether agnostic or gnostic is going to claim (really by default) that all statements of fact about gods are false. If they believed otherwise, (ie. that certain statements about God can be/are true) then they would necessarily be theists. Likewise with error theorists...

Babies are atheists and they don't make any claims or evaluations at all.

Do you not think there's a difference between denying X and thinking X isn't the sort of thing that can be affirmed or denied?

Perhaps an even better analogy is that a moral nihilist is to morality as a theological noncognitivist is to God.

Error Theory is a form of cognitivism ... and that's why I don't think it can be truly nihilistic. I think that all forms of nihilism about X must necessarily be noncognitivist about X otherwise it's not empty enough to be nihilistic.

I also think that the reason why nihilism about anything ultimately makes no sense is because noncognitivism makes no sense.