Illustrating the burden of proof - pay me!

[LadyForCamus]

The question could (and would) be repeated in the case of a multiverse as well.  It's a throwaway objection at any rate.

If we are genuinely concerned about arbitrary or accidental whatsits - then we would be concerned about those issues in any context they present themselves.  If we're unconcerned about the arbitrary or accidental nature of a god or a god made universe, we are not genuinely concerned with the real, perceived, or asserted arbitrary or accidental nature of a physical model either.

If a multiverse exists, perhaps it couldn’t have existed in any form other than the form it’s manifestly in. The same could be said about this universe. I don’t personally find “it appears that way,” to be all that persuasive of a reason to take one position over the other. 

In any case, as you mentioned, if we can imagine the possibility that a god could have been some other way, or until someone can demonstrate that universes can be some way other than the way they are, then no progress has been made.

[The Grand Nudger]

I think we make progress in considering these things when it comes to working out what issue(s) we are genuinely concerned with in a given proposition. It's difficult to imagine how we could have a productive discussion, let alone resolve those issues (if they're resolvable) if we routinely fail to accurately communicate them.

A god or a universe that can't be any other way proposes a fundamental accident of circumstance or nature to explain the present conditions.

I think that it's probably difficult for people, even believing people, to articulate their issues with physicalism or empiricism or evidence. We're all pretty well indoctrinated into thinking in those terms here. So much so that our objections to those things commonly boil down to affirmations of the very principles to which we might wish to object. John attempts an evidentiary case for his position against the very term evidence. Neo explains that the arbitrary and accidental gods we've so long conceived of are poor propositions. It was very clearly neither mans intention to do so, and yet....

[John 6IX Breezy]

How should we resolve any dispute over real estate between two models?  What would you refer to?

By testing their conflicting hypotheses. And referring to falsifying observations.

[The Grand Nudger]

Why would that help resolve the issue? Are those things evidence, and if so, of what?

[Anomalocaris]

Physical models closely approximate said reality, or they wouldn't be models thereof.

Models don't approximate reality—they interpret it. That's how two competing models end up fighting over the same real estate.

no, interpretation is what allows the model to be built.  the model actually test whether the interpretation is faithful enough to the original to the extent modeled.  it doesn’t do interpretation.

[John 6IX Breezy]

no, interpretation is what allows the model to be built.  the model actually test whether the interpretation is faithful enough to the original to the extent modeled.  it doesn’t do interpretation.

That makes sense; I can see that being the case from a physicist's point of view.

(A psychologist would look at a physical model as an extension of our mental representations. In other words, both are the thing that does the interpreting. To illustrate, I was told an anecdote once about Richard Feynman, in which someone found his notes when developing Feynman Diagrams. The person remarked how they wish they could see how his mind worked. And Feynman responded that the notes were his work—that his thinking occurred on the page.)

[GrandizerII]

The question could (and would) be repeated in the case of a multiverse as well.  It's a throwaway objection at any rate.

If we are genuinely concerned about arbitrary or accidental whatsits - then we would be concerned about those issues in any context they present themselves.  If we're unconcerned about the arbitrary or accidental nature of a god or a god made universe, we are not genuinely concerned with the real, perceived, or asserted arbitrary or accidental nature of a physical model either.

If a multiverse exists, perhaps it couldn’t have existed in any form other than the form it’s manifestly in.

Even with a multiverse, you could still ponder whether it could've had more or less universes than whatever number of universes it contains. In the case of a multiverse with infinite number of universes, you could still ponder a different collection of infinite universes. I think if you want to go with the route of physical reality being metaphysically necessary, you'd have to go with a radical view of modality. For example, the ultimate multiverse, however it may manifest, in which all [metaphysical] possibilities are realized, no exception. That way, it seems not so compelling to ask the question "why this rather than that" because why have an incomplete multiverse instead of a complete one?

The same could be said about this universe. I don’t personally find “it appears that way,” to be all that persuasive of a reason to take one position over the other.

Well, we can imagine a universe in place of this with slightly different initial conditions leading to a slightly different universe from this one. If we can imagine such an alternative with relative ease, and we don't have persuasive reasons to think that such an alternative is metaphysically impossible, then ...? Seems easier to go with contingent in this case, rather than necessitarianism.

Anyway, no matter what approach one takes, you're still going to end up with something that's never going to be 100% satisfactory. This includes theistic views as well. Contingent or necessary, God or multiverse or sole universe, there is some brute fact we end up having to grapple with here.

[The Grand Nudger]

One candidate for that brute fact is nature. That nature exhausts the set of metaphysical possibility and always would, no matter what that set is contended to (or does) contain. Even in our hypothetical different universe, whatever the contents of that universe where - however it behaved or could behave, would be described by the conceptual equivalent of what we call nature.

[LadyForCamus]

If a multiverse exists, perhaps it couldn’t have existed in any form other than the form it’s manifestly in.

Even with a multiverse, you could still ponder whether it could've had more or less universes than whatever number of universes it contains. In the case of a multiverse with infinite number of universes, you could still ponder a different collection of infinite universes. I think if you want to go with the route of physical reality being metaphysically necessary, you'd have to go with a radical view of modality. For example, the ultimate multiverse, however it may manifest, in which all [metaphysical] possibilities are realized, no exception. That way, it seems not so compelling to ask the question "why this rather than that" because why have an incomplete multiverse instead of a complete one?

The same could be said about this universe. I don’t personally find “it appears that way,” to be all that persuasive of a reason to take one position over the other.

Well, we can imagine a universe in place of this with slightly different initial conditions leading to a slightly different universe from this one. If we can imagine such an alternative with relative ease, and we don't have persuasive reasons to think that such an alternative is metaphysically impossible, then ...? Seems easier to go with contingent in this case, rather than necessitarianism.

Anyway, no matter what approach one takes, you're still going to end up with something that's never going to be 100% satisfactory. This includes theistic views as well. Contingent or necessary, God or multiverse or sole universe, there is some brute fact we end up having to grapple with here.

But that some thing exists at all, in any form that is possible, seems to be necessary. What is the alternative? The existence of non-existence? Or, the existence of nothing?

[GrandizerII]

Even with a multiverse, you could still ponder whether it could've had more or less universes than whatever number of universes it contains. In the case of a multiverse with infinite number of universes, you could still ponder a different collection of infinite universes. I think if you want to go with the route of physical reality being metaphysically necessary, you'd have to go with a radical view of modality. For example, the ultimate multiverse, however it may manifest, in which all [metaphysical] possibilities are realized, no exception. That way, it seems not so compelling to ask the question "why this rather than that" because why have an incomplete multiverse instead of a complete one?


Well, we can imagine a universe in place of this with slightly different initial conditions leading to a slightly different universe from this one. If we can imagine such an alternative with relative ease, and we don't have persuasive reasons to think that such an alternative is metaphysically impossible, then ...? Seems easier to go with contingent in this case, rather than necessitarianism.

Anyway, no matter what approach one takes, you're still going to end up with something that's never going to be 100% satisfactory. This includes theistic views as well. Contingent or necessary, God or multiverse or sole universe, there is some brute fact we end up having to grapple with here.

But that some thing exists at all, in any form that is possible, seems to be necessary. What is the alternative? The existence of non-existence? Or, the existence of nothing?

With regards to the universe, it's not X vs non-X. It's also just as important to consider X vs. Y vs. Z vs. ...

Something is contingent if it could have been another way instead, not merely if it could not existed at all.

One doesn't need to accept the universe is contingent, of course, but we need to consider and anticipate what theists would counter with if one were to argue for the universe being non-contingent. Saying non-existence is impossible isn't a sufficient defense of the non-contingency of the universe.