Proving What We Already "Know"

[bennyboy]

Here's one to ponder, though-- feelings of distrust exist due to their evolutionary value.  Being an open-hearted unconditional lover of all mankind is fine and well, but it doesn't help your genetic fitness when your offspring is rotting face-down in a secluded swamp with a load of jizz up its ass.

/end disconnected random rant

One of the many...many reasons neither I nor objectivism consider a thing moral or immoral based on it's utility to me or whether I feel a certain way as a product of my biological origin.  

"I don't just hunt animals for food, I hunt them for fun."

I suspect you may, in fact, have as feelings-based a moral system as the "squee" that makes people fall in love with baby animals.  But your instincts don't say "squee" they say "rawr" in that context.  I'm trying to give you a moral escape, in that your "rawr" instinct is external to your conscious awareness-- it is part of your mental environment, let's say, and those feelings are a product of billions of years of animal interactions that you have nothign to do with.  But if you don't think its emotions that serve as the differential basis for your moral calculation, then what, objectively, IS?

But maybe, as you say, I don't understand anything about anything.  Certainly, I have little regard for the terms "subjectivist, objectivist, realist" etc. that you keep applying to me and then telling me I don't understand. Tell me, then, on what objecitve basis is your willingness to harm some organisms but not others not considered "moral or immoral based on it's [sic] utility to me or whether I feel a certain way as a product of my biological origin."

And before you start mocking me for being a bleeding-heart, I'm not particularly emotional about animals.  But I was quite young when I realized that I could not find any rational basis for preferring humans to animals in my moral calculus-- what objective difference exists between humans and other mammals that would make the suffering of one sacrosanct, and the other unworthy of regard?

[The Grand Nudger]

One of the many...many reasons neither I nor objectivism consider a thing moral or immoral based on it's utility to me or whether I feel a certain way as a product of my biological origin.  

"I don't just hunt animals for food, I hunt them for fun."

I suspect you may, in fact, have as feelings-based a moral system as the "squee" that makes people fall in love with baby animals. 

You must mean to say that you suspect I have feelings - but ofc - that's not in dispute by me or any of these different propositions about moral statements.  I could do, and enjoy, all sorts of bad shit, and do.  I could do, and hate, all sorts of good shit - and do.  I can be made to feel shame for doing something that I know is not wrong, and I can be made to feel shame for -failing- to do a thing I know is wrong.

But your instincts don't say "squee" they say "rawr" in that context.  I'm trying to give you a moral escape, in that your "rawr" instinct is external to your conscious awareness-- it is part of your mental environment, let's say, and those feelings are a product of billions of years of animal interactions that you have nothign to do with.  But if you don't think its emotions that serve as the differential basis for your moral calculation, then what, objectively, IS?

You're looking for moral escape.  I'm focused on factual accuracy.  That's a running issue.  That a person has some instinct to do x will not answer the question of whether or not that thing x is good or bad.  

But maybe, as you say, I don't understand anything about anything.  Tell me, then, on what objecitve basis is your willingness to harm some organisms but not others not considered "moral or immoral based on it's [sic] utility to me or whether I feel a certain way as a product of my biological origin."

You should ask if, before you ask how.  I've yet to find an organism that I'm not willing to harm..and I don't need to consult any moral system for that.  The things I'm willing to do, as a set, overlaps with good and bad, as sets, just as it overlaps with what I like and what I don't.  

And before you start mocking me for being a bleeding-heart, I'm not particularly emotional about animals.  But I was quite young when I realized that I could not find any rational basis for preferring humans to animals in my moral calculus-- what objective difference exists between humans and other mammals that would make the suffering of one sacrosanct, and the other unworthy of regard?

Why would I mock you for being a bleeding heart?  I like bleeding hearts.  Yet another example of a thing I like..that I still wouldn't say is explicitly moral or good for a fact because I like it, and yet another place where you might have wanted to try if, before how.  I don't think that there's anything about human beings that makes us sacrosanct, or uniquely deserving of consideration.  

If the sorts of things you're objecting to are the reason you think something is askew with moral realism..then there's no maybe.  You misunderstand..completely.

[bennyboy]

"I don't just hunt animals for food, I hunt them for fun."

I suspect you may, in fact, have as feelings-based a moral system as the "squee" that makes people fall in love with baby animals. 

You must mean to say that you suspect I have feelings - but ofc - that's not in dispute by me or any of these different propositions about moral statements.  I could do, and enjoy, all sorts of bad shit, and do.  I could do, and hate, all sorts of good shit - and do.  I can be made to feel shame for doing something that I know is not wrong, and I can be made to feel shame for -failing- to do a thing I know is wrong.  

It's not that I suspect you have feelings. It's that I doubt there's any other basis for your moral positions. I think rationale comes at the tail end of the formation of moral positions, not at the beginning.

But your instincts don't say "squee" they say "rawr" in that context.  I'm trying to give you a moral escape, in that your "rawr" instinct is external to your conscious awareness-- it is part of your mental environment, let's say, and those feelings are a product of billions of years of animal interactions that you have nothign to do with.  But if you don't think its emotions that serve as the differential basis for your moral calculation, then what, objectively, IS?

You're looking for moral escape.  I'm focused on factual accuracy.  That's a running issue.  That a person has some instinct to do x will not answer the question of whether or not that thing x is good or bad.  

No, but whether the people around him have the same BALANCE of instinctive feelings certainly will. People have "squee" and "rawr" instinct to varying degrees, and in different ages, they take turns coming to the forefront.

But maybe, as you say, I don't understand anything about anything.  Tell me, then, on what objecitve basis is your willingness to harm some organisms but not others not considered "moral or immoral based on it's [sic] utility to me or whether I feel a certain way as a product of my biological origin."

You should ask if, before you ask how.  I've yet to find an organism that I'm not willing to harm..and I don't need to consult any moral system for that.  The things I'm willing to do, as a set, overlaps with good and bad, as sets, just as it overlaps with what I like and what I don't.   

Well, what makes the good and bad good and bad? Societal norms? Other people's opinions?

It was once pretty normal to disregard the feelings and well-being of black people on the basis of difference, though some might have "hunted niggers just for the fun of it, and don't need to consult any moral system for that." Now, it's pretty normal to disregard the feelings and well-being of animals, presumably on the basis of difference. What makes you so sure that a hundred years from now, YOU won't be portrayed as an uncivilized brute, and the statues of everyone you ever admired torn down because they were cross-species cannibals?

[The Grand Nudger]

You must mean to say that you suspect I have feelings - but ofc - that's not in dispute by me or any of these different propositions about moral statements.  I could do, and enjoy, all sorts of bad shit, and do.  I could do, and hate, all sorts of good shit - and do.  I can be made to feel shame for doing something that I know is not wrong, and I can be made to feel shame for -failing- to do a thing I know is wrong.  

It's not that I suspect you have feelings.  It's that I doubt there's any other basis for your moral positions.  I think rationale comes at the tail end of the formation of moral positions, not at the beginning.

You can doubt it, but you set such a high bar for you doubt examples to the contrary will never be exhausted, in fact.  

No, but whether the people around him have the same BALANCE of instinctive feelings certainly will.  People have "squee" and "rawr" instinct to varying degrees, and in different ages, they take turns coming to the forefront.

We do, and even in a realist understanding, these are taken into account, just not on the initial consideration of the item in question.  

Well, what makes the good and bad good and bad? Societal norms? Other people's opinions?

-not in any objectivist understanding.  Emphatically not that, and any instance of that, is simply wrong.

If I say I'm right about about x because of peoples opinions about x, or because of societies norms about x...I am materially wrong..and...logically wrong....and...in fact.... not an objectivist. It happens to all of us. I think we both agree that we have to be aware to know..and to avoid it.

need to consult any moral system for that.  The things I'm willing to do, as a set, overlaps with good and bad, as sets, just as it overlaps with what I like and what I don't.   
Well, what makes the good and bad good and bad?  Societal norms?  Other people's opinions?

Negatron.  Any hypothetical facts of an objective system do not need..and are not advanced by, any reference to any particular moral system held by any given moral agent.  They are just true statements about things of a moral import.

It was once pretty normal to disregard the feelings and well-being of black people on the basis of difference, though some might have "hunted niggers just for the fun of it, and don't need to consult any moral system for that."  Now, it's pretty normal to disregard the feelings and well-being of animals, presumably on the basis of difference.  What makes you so sure that a hundred years from now, YOU won't be portrayed as an uncivilized brute, and the statues of everyone you ever admired torn down because they were cross-species cannibals?

It could be historically normal or abnormal to disregard the feeling and well being of black people - but neither thing, is relevant to any objective moral system.

As I said - if these are the reasons - you misunderstand.  Not maybe.  Do.

[bennyboy]

Well, what makes the good and bad good and bad? Societal norms? Other people's opinions?

-not in any objectivist understanding.  Emphatically not that, and any instance of that, is simply wrong.

If I say I'm right about about x because of peoples opinions about x, or because of societies norms about x...I am materially wrong..and...logically wrong....and...in fact.... not an objectivist.  It happens to all of us.   I think we both agree that we have to be aware to know..and to avoid it.  

I'm confused how a moral system works, in your view. I agree that a social consensus is a poor basis for objective morality-- because if you look at the objective mores across time, they are often polar opposites. One would assume that truth itself is unambiguous.

But I can only see an objective MECHANISM for morality-- feelings predicated on hormones predicated on brain function predicated on DNA predicated on pre-humans, pre-mammals, pre-vertebrates and so on. An incredible amount of living and dying has gone into every SHOULD decision that we make.

What would an objective fact be, and how would it do anything other than sway which subjective mores we adopt in a particular culture, clime or era? (not an argument, by the way, but I need some simple and concrete examples in order to really understand what you're saying)

[The Grand Nudger]

-not in any objectivist understanding.  Emphatically not that, and any instance of that, is simply wrong.

If I say I'm right about about x because of peoples opinions about x, or because of societies norms about x...I am materially wrong..and...logically wrong....and...in fact.... not an objectivist.  It happens to all of us.   I think we both agree that we have to be aware to know..and to avoid it.  

I'm confused how a moral system works, in your view.  I agree that a social consensus is a poor basis for objective morality-- because if you look at the objective mores across time, they are often polar opposites.  One would assume that truth itself is unambiguous.

Not, not poor, completely invalid.  That's not what objectivism is.  Moralities of social consensus are moral relativism.

But I can only see an objective MECHANISM for morality-- feelings predicated on hormones predicated on brain function predicated on DNA predicated on pre-humans, pre-mammals, pre-vertebrates and so on.  An incredible amount of living and dying has gone into every SHOULD decision that we make.

Feelings predicated on hormones is not an objective mechanism.  That's noncognitivism - distinct from realism, relativism, and subjectivism..because it's not about truth apt statements at all - emotivism, instinctualism, etc. "Yuck!" "Yay!" and "Rawr!" are not true or false propositions about anything.

What would an objective fact be, and how would it do anything other than sway which subjective mores we adopt in a particular culture, clime or era?  (not an argument, by the way, but I need some simple and concrete examples in order to really understand what you're saying)

You see all the claims to fact you've made in this post?  That's you purporting to report facts.  Realism or objectivism are systems in which moral statements are handled the same way.  That's it, that's all.

Is a realist understanding that important or useful? Sometimes. Let's ask the witches.

[bennyboy]

I'm confused how a moral system works, in your view.  I agree that a social consensus is a poor basis for objective morality-- because if you look at the objective mores across time, they are often polar opposites.  One would assume that truth itself is unambiguous.

Not, not poor, completely invalid.  That's not what objectivism is.  Moralities of social consensus are moral relativism.  

But I can only see an objective MECHANISM for morality-- feelings predicated on hormones predicated on brain function predicated on DNA predicated on pre-humans, pre-mammals, pre-vertebrates and so on.  An incredible amount of living and dying has gone into every SHOULD decision that we make.

Feelings predicated on hormones is not an objective mechanism.  That's noncognitivism - distinct from realism, relativism, and subjectivism..because it's not about truth apt statements at all - emotivism, instinctualism, etc.  "Yuck!" "Yay!" and "Rawr!" are not true or false propositions about anything.  

What would an objective fact be, and how would it do anything other than sway which subjective mores we adopt in a particular culture, clime or era?  (not an argument, by the way, but I need some simple and concrete examples in order to really understand what you're saying)

You see all the claims to fact you've made in this post?  That's you purporting to report facts.  Realism or objectivism are systems in which moral statements are handled the same way.  That's it, that's all.

Is a realist understanding that important or useful?  Sometimes.  Let's ask the witches.

I've never been too much a fan of "-isms."  Overcategorization always reminds me of when I read 20,000 Leagues under the sea as a kid.  There would be several pages of exciting, swashbuckling adventure, and then Verne would make a big point of cataloguing a few dozen fucking sea creatures by their Latin names.

The problem is that "-isms" gloss over or straight-up amplify the kinds of categorical conflations that we're talking about-- putting an idea in a box doesn't actually give us any useful tools for approaching knowledge, or for proving anything other than which "-ism" cranks our respective shafts.

Or to bring things back to the OP thesis-- they represent academic contexts, and if the truths held in one are to be useful among the others, the question remains-- how do we do that?

[The Grand Nudger]

I've never been too much a fan of "-isms."  Overcategorization always reminds me of when I read 20,000 Leagues under the sea as a kid.  There would be several pages of exciting, swashbuckling adventure, and then Verne would make a big point of cataloguing a few dozen fucking sea creatures by their Latin names.

The problem is that "-isms" gloss over or straight-up amplify the kinds of categorical conflations that we're talking about-- putting an idea in a box doesn't actually give us any useful tools for approaching knowledge, or for proving anything other than which "-ism" cranks our respective shafts.

That would be noncognitiv-ism and/or some error theories:  that these things x cannot be known in the logical sense because they are not truth apt statements to begin with.  

Or to bring things back to the OP thesis-- they represent academic contexts, and if the truths held in one are to be useful among the others, the question remains-- how do we do that?

Alot of ways - from every moral system.  Utilitarianism is a form of cognitivism, and objectivism, itself.  Asking me the usefulness of x presupposes that there can be some factual state of affairs about it's utility...yay or nay.  Let's say (just for purposes of conversation) that there really can be something bad about x.  That moral realism is true.  So, we know that - but don't we also know about all of the subjective and emotivist "failures" of the human animal in that hypothetical context?   So we include those as a consideration when (and or if) we dole out reward and punishment.  Just about all of these schemes are derived from and primarily engaged in (so we suppose) benefiting society - a relativist goal. Understanding what we're doing, why we're doing it, when..and what-for speak to expectations of competence, neatly circling right back around to utilitarianism.

I can expand on this to no end - and so could you...but discussions of the utility of x are not interchangeable with discussions of the truth of x. Conceivably, a false assertion may be useful, and a true assertion useless.

[bennyboy]

I've never been too much a fan of "-isms."  Overcategorization always reminds me of when I read 20,000 Leagues under the sea as a kid.  There would be several pages of exciting, swashbuckling adventure, and then Verne would make a big point of cataloguing a few dozen fucking sea creatures by their Latin names.

The problem is that "-isms" gloss over or straight-up amplify the kinds of categorical conflations that we're talking about-- putting an idea in a box doesn't actually give us any useful tools for approaching knowledge, or for proving anything other than which "-ism" cranks our respective shafts.

That would be noncognitiv-ism and/or some error theories:  that these things x cannot be known in the logical sense because they are not truth apt statements to begin with.  

Or to bring things back to the OP thesis-- they represent academic contexts, and if the truths held in one are to be useful among the others, the question remains-- how do we do that?

Alot of ways - from every moral system.  Utilitarianism is a form of cognitivism, and objectivism, itself.  Asking me the usefulness of x presupposes that there can be some factual state of affairs about it's utility...yay or nay.  Let's say (just for purposes of conversation) that there really can be something bad about x.  That moral realism is true.  So, we know that - but don't we also know about all of the subjective and emotivist "failures" of the human animal in that hypothetical context?   So we include those as a consideration when (and or if) we dole out reward and punishment.  Just about all of these schemes are derived from and primarily engaged in (so we suppose) benefiting society - a relativist goal. Understanding what we're doing, why we're doing it, when..and what-for speak to expectations of competence, neatly circling right back around to utilitarianism.

I can expand on this to no end - and so could you...but discussions of the utility of x are not interchangeable with discussions of the truth of x.  Conceivably, a false assertion may be useful, and a true assertion useless.

The "isms" are breeding like rabbits now.

[The Grand Nudger]

They proliferate insomuch as meaningful distinctions can be made between them. Aren't they the contexts in your own "truth in context"?

Probably not credible to clutch at the pearls about it now.