Kalam

[LinuxGal]

If God is the uncaused cause, as neo-Thomists and others assert, then his existence has no reason.  His existence is simply a brute fact. 

And if God's existence has no basis in reason, then there is also no reason to assert he is the solitary uncaused cause.  He may very well be one of many uncaused causes.

[Belacqua]

If God is the uncaused cause, as neo-Thomists and others assert, then his existence has no reason.  His existence is simply a brute fact. 

And if God's existence has no basis in reason, then there is also no reason to assert he is the solitary uncaused cause.  He may very well be one of many uncaused causes.

Thomists reject Kalam.

[LinuxGal]

If God is the uncaused cause, as neo-Thomists and others assert, then his existence has no reason.  His existence is simply a brute fact. 

And if God's existence has no basis in reason, then there is also no reason to assert he is the solitary uncaused cause.  He may very well be one of many uncaused causes.

Thomists reject Kalam.

On the contrary, it is written (Summa P1 Q3 A3):

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

[Belacqua]

Thomists reject Kalam.

On the contrary, it is written (Summa P1 Q3 A3):

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

Kalam is about a temporal chain of causation. The Thomist ways are about essential chains. 

Thomas argues that we cannot prove a first temporal cause. Therefore, no Kalam. 

If you want to argue about the Second Way, you could do that. But it's not Kalam.

[LinuxGal]

On the contrary, it is written (Summa P1 Q3 A3):

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

Kalam is about a temporal chain of causation. The Thomist ways are about essential chains. 

"First efficient cause" and "ultimate effect" and "intermediate efficient causes" and "following in order" all of which appear in the argument above implies a temporal chain structure.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

On the contrary, it is written (Summa P1 Q3 A3):

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

Kalam is about a temporal chain of causation. The Thomist ways are about essential chains. 

Thomas argues that we cannot prove a first temporal cause. Therefore, no Kalam. 

If you want to argue about the Second Way, you could do that. But it's not Kalam.

Actually, Kalam is ALL about temporal causes and excusing God for not being one.

You're the first person I've ever heard claim that Thomist philosophers reject Kalam.

Boru

[Belacqua]

Kalam is about a temporal chain of causation. The Thomist ways are about essential chains. 

"First efficient cause" and "ultimate effect" and "intermediate efficient causes" and "following in order"  all of which appear in the argument above implies a temporal chain structure.

It sounds that way to modern ears, because we tend to think of causal chains as temporal things. Aquinas is concerned with what is essentially prior. His vocabulary is more Aristotelian, so it sounds unfamiliar to modern people.

Aquinas is writing about a series per se, not per accidens. 

If a thing is "prior" in this sense, it is necessary for it to exist in order for the following things in the chain to exist, simultaneously. If the essentially prior object disappeared, so would all the following things. 

This is the difference between all of Aquinas' arguments and Kalam. Kalam posits a beginning point in time which sets in motion a series per accidens. This does not depend on the continued existence of the First Cause for the rest of the chain to continue existing. It is compatible with Deism, where Aquinas' First Cause is not.

[Belacqua]

In Aristotelian/Thomist language, the causes of X are all the things that must be the case for X to exist, and to continue to exist.

What is the cause of the warmth on my face? It is, among other things, the heat from the sun. What is the cause of the heat from the sun? It is, among other things, the nuclear reactions within the sun. What is the cause of the nuclear reactions within the sun? It is, among other things, hydrogen. What is the cause of hydrogen? It is, among other things, subatomic particles. What is the cause of subatomic particles? It is, among other things, space/time. What is the cause of space/time?...... That is, what must be in existence for space/time to continue in existence? This is Aquinas' First Cause.

Notice that in this essential chain if any step disappeared, all of the consequent steps would also immediately cease.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

In Aristotelian/Thomist language, the causes of X are all the things that must be the case for X to exist, and to continue to exist.

What is the cause of the warmth on my face? It is, among other things, the heat from the sun. What is the cause of the heat from the sun? It is, among other things, the nuclear reactions within the sun. What is the cause of the nuclear reactions within the sun? It is, among other things, hydrogen. What is the cause of hydrogen? It is, among other things, subatomic particles. What is the cause of subatomic particles? It is, among other things, space/time. What is the cause of space/time?...... That is, what must be in existence for space/time to continue in existence? This is Aquinas' First Cause.

Notice that in this essential chain if any step disappeared, all of the consequent steps would also immediately cease.

You just described a temporal chain of causes.

Boru

[Angrboda]

"First efficient cause" and "ultimate effect" and "intermediate efficient causes" and "following in order"  all of which appear in the argument above implies a temporal chain structure.

It sounds that way to modern ears, because we tend to think of causal chains as temporal things. Aquinas is concerned with what is essentially prior. His vocabulary is more Aristotelian, so it sounds unfamiliar to modern people.

Yes, because causation is temporal. It's an analytic truth of Aquinas' statement that he's referring to temporal succession as all succession involving causes is temporal. If you want to argue that there can be causal sequences that are not temporal, the burden is on you to show that such is possible. Until you do, your claim that Aquinas was not speaking of a temporal series fails. It has absolutely dick to do with Thomism and Aristotle.