Van Tillian/Clarkian Presuppositional Apologetics.

[Captain Scarlet]

...theological terms logic is a "communicable attribute" of God, which is distinguished from his "incommunicable attributes" (e.g., aseity); thus it is a divine attribute with which creation has an analogical relationship (as distinct from an identical relationship). ..........
This is why we see Van Til say things like, "The law of contradiction cannot be thought of as operating anywhere except against the background of the nature of God."

As for your argument on why logic is not arbitrary but necessary. It does not refute the arbitrary nature of logic (assuming TAG is true), but instead merely replaces it by specifying the detail of the associated subjectivity (in this case the xtian god). Protesting that god is necessary and so is logic, is an ad hoc rationalisation. Furthermore your argument demonstrates logic is not intrinsic at all to the natural world, because it requires a personal being to instantiate it. As a naturalist I cannot accept that.

Thank you for taking the time to explain your perspective. I probably didn't explain well enough why I cannot grasp the meaning of that phrase. Again I think what you have done is clearly explain why you believe logic is necessary and that you believe it comes from the nature of the xtian god. What I cannot grasp is what the nature is that would give rise to logic in the first place. It is a form of words with no meaning. Some reasons I have trouble with this approach:

1) it lacks specificity. The words grounding and nature convey something more tangible than, 'it comes with god/as god/as part of god'. Those terms expressly suggest a relationship between an attribute (logic in this case) and a cause of that attributes existence which you describe as nature (but what is that in this case). A trivial but specific example: the webbing of the space between your thumb and index finger on your right hand is a direct result of the human genome expressed through your personal DNA. This would describe a grounded reality (the webbing) and a cause in your own 'nature' (your biological humanity). What 'nature' within god which would give rise to logic?, it appears to me to be merely asserted as one of his attributes and just left there as a mysterious property.
2) the concept of god seems so far from our experience that to comprehend the nature of such a 'thing', let alone what could spring forth from that nature, is impossible. Yet we are told we are in the image of that god. I can't reconcile that.
3) you have no grounds to posit the nature and properties of a being which is sovereign and beyond your comprehension
4) the method of transmission through this nature of logic into the universe from the supernatural realm is problematic. You cannot just argue that it is transmitted through us as the image of god, as that implies no us, no logic (at least in the natural realm). But that is a ridiculous state of affairs (and I can avoid this as a naturalist), but you are unable to provide ANY rough sketch of how it gets here, ie radiation, imposition, command, just in time delivery, woven into space time.

There are some further problems nothing about a god suggests they are necessarily rational/logical:
5) Humans are not always logical so it seems odd that a more powerful being cannot at least ape humans, let alone beat them. The theist notion appears to me to be ad-hoc again.
6) TAG is arguing that logic is part of gods nature but also created by him. It cannot be both.
7) you cannot demonstrate that this being is not misleading you into thinking that he is logical and is the source of logic

That is exactly the problem, though. That the universe could sustain itself apart from God is NOT logically possible from my arguments. For example, your thought experiment works only if God is "separate from his creation," which is precisely antithetical to my argument...

This is a surprising argument, I'll come to why in a moment. But, it is also part of your argument that the same god is omnipotent and whilst he may not be separate from his creation now and everything may be dependent on him now and also in the past, it doesn't follow that he cannot be separated from it and leave it self sustaining. He has that power and that doesn't contradict his being, it is therefore logically possible and you have not addressed this.

But for the sake of this argument lets move the discussion forward and say that this is indeed logically impossible. It is also part of your argument that god is immutable and omnipresent. If god is not separate from the universe AND also cannot be separated from it AND also sustains it; god must undergo change, as the universe itself changes.

Consider an example, god is omnipresent and is currently at the centre of a star (as he is everywhere else in the universe) and is sustaining his creation. He is sustaining, in this case, 2 hydrogen atoms which are about to fuse to form one helium atom. God now has a trilemma:
- god must either separate/withdraw from this part of the universe and allow them to fuse, or
- change his attitude wrt currently sustaining those 2 atoms and fuse them himself, or
- continue to sustain those 2 atoms and prevent the fusion.

Now the last position won't give rise to a contradiction nor any problems wrt to withdrawing his influence. Even though it is a tremendously improbable event (given what we know about fusion), we also know fusion happens at the centre of every star (billions of them in each of the billions of galaxies) a fantastically high number of times per second, so if this god exists he must be taking one of the other 2 routes regularly.

It gets worse, in addition an omnipresent, omniscient, all observing, god bound into his creation as his creation is bound into him, must be able to observe everything. We know from quantum mechanics that observation collapses the wave function of photons (or other particle/waves) leading to no superposition. But we know superposition exists. Therefore this god with those attributes cannot.

God it seems goes out of his way to make himself unavailable to most acts of cognition.

And it seems to me that you are conflating logically impossible and metaphysically impossible. In order for that statement to be recognizable to my view, I would reword it thus: "It is metaphysically impossible for the nature of God not to include logic." As an attribute of God coterminus with his being, the issue is thus metaphysical.

Yes I see that may be a problem for pursuing this argument, if given your argument you could separate the metaphysically impossible from the logically impossible. But given your position how can you do that? You have to antecedently assume that logic exists to discuss metaphysical issues about logic/god, else you could not have a discussion about whether it/they exist or not. Rephrasing your sentence above:

"It is metaphysically impossible [and also logically impossible because god is a simple being who is by definition logic itself and his thoughts, actions and being are entirely logical] for the nature of God not to include logic." As an attribute of God coterminus with his being, the issue is thus metaphysical [and also a logical problem because god is a simple being who is by definition logic itself and his thoughts, actions and being are entirely logical]"

Although we presuppose a host of things (typically arguendo), none of them are axiomatic save one: the truth of God as revealed in Scripture. That is our sole axiomatic presupposition. Anything else that we assume arguendo, whether theological, Christological, soteriological or what have you, is not axiomatic but rather deduced from the sole presupposition that is. I will not prevent you from demonstrating how it is not axiomatic, unless your attempt commits an error in reasoning (such as begging the question).

I have not heard you argue for this. It seems to me you need to. How does "the truth of God as revealed in Scripture" qualify as axiomatic? At the moment it is asserted but not argued for as an axiom.

Also if I claim that 1) god is not self evident to my acts of cognition 2) I can deny the existence of god without violating any rational axioms (such as existence, consciousness, logic). I think you are saying I am begging the question, because under your view even to reason at all we must assume god?[hope I have that right?]. If you are to argue that I do need to assume god to challenge your axioms, you would have to prove it, and you have not.

Jesus is not reducible to the Godhead; that is the modalist heresy of Sabellius. Nor is the Godhead reducible to Jesus; God is three persons and Jesus is not. While I can appreciate that you struggle to see how the Trinity works, what I cannot overlook is the persistent appearance of an error after it has been identified as one. No, he is not; that is the monist heresy of Arius.

So lets assume my ignorance of the trinity renders my point obsolete. It seems a small concession to make. Outside the questions of the trinity you have not answered why Jesus/ god cannot be reduced to an immaterial mind, thus this point still stands. Also Ryft I am not asking you to overlook anything. I was restating my position. If (and I take your word for it) Jesus does not reduce to the godhead, then my assumption was that it could work in reverse, ie that the godhead can be reduced to Jesus, then Jesus to man, ie it was a different point. As for heresy, they are also another mans truth.

Except I did; namely, it follows by necessity from God being the necessary precondition of intelligibility.

This seems to be swapping one bare assertion for another. What you appear to be arguing for here is that in order to have this or any discussion at all we must assume the existence of god. This seems to me to be clearly false for a number of reasons, notably:

1) An example: An Atlanteanist could state that we have good grounds to know of the existence of Atlantis, from the works of Plato. Using such an argument says nothing about Atlantis' metaphysical status, but it still argues that its potential existence should be taken seriously. But if I was to assert the only way to come to know Atlantis exists, is to know Atlantis exists, I would probably be pulled up for circular reasoning and confusing metaphysics and epistemology. In a similar manner arguing that one must presume god, to make an argument for god commits similar errors. It means you are excluding the classical theistic and [atheistic] arguments. But these classical arguments, argue there is a way to know/[know there is no] god, outside of the metaphysics of the matter. And if any of these arguments are true, it says nothing amiss about whether a god actually exists.
2) As a non-believer my lack of cognition of the god of scripture could be said to render me less able to interpret the world around me correctly. But it would be hard for you to argue that I cannot interpret anything correctly. Even an athiest must have some grip on the realities of the universe. You as a theist would have to concede that you lack omniscience. The difference between us then is a matter of degree and not of truth or falsity. It is at this point your system seems to break down as you would need to establish that it is by ONLY believing in the xtian god of scripture, that you can know anything of the universe at all.
3) We managed before the [I would say invention] of the Judeo-Christian faith to comprehend the world around enough to advance humanity from its state 200k years ago to 198k years ago. The reasoning skills of early humans did not seem to need an assumption of a pre-existing Jesus.

Even if we assumed for the sake of argument that those arguments succeed (and they do not), they commit the fallacy of stolen concept by using induction as a valid epistemic heuristic device while denying the very thing upon which it logically and genetically depends, God as the necessary precondition of intelligibility.

Well we'll not agree on whether those arguments succeed. I have criticised the precondition of intelligibility above, I don't think its true and I beleive from my naturalist standpoint there are still powerful inductive reasons which are at odds with presuppositionalism.

On the contrary, the mere fact that we can argue over God's existence proves that I am right, as the whole enterprise presupposes the existence of God (apart from whom nothing is intelligible). It is akin to trying to "invalidate logic," as invalidating is a logical function (i.e., the attempt itself uses logic). This is why Frame responded to Martin, "To deny that such a necessary condition exists while engaging in supposedly meaningful discourse is to contradict oneself."

See above comments.

That God is undeniable follows by necessity from God being the necessary precondition of intelligibility. In this discussion—wherein the truth of presuppositionalism is the question—the burden of proof falls upon whoever seeks to deny, for example, that logic depends on the nature and character of God, which requires demonstrating that it cannot. You attempted to do this by arguing that if logic depends on God then such things as the law of contradiction would be contingently true rather than necessarily true. I have shown how that fails because logic depends on God in the sense that it is grounded in his very nature and character (thus it cannot be arbitrary and cannot fail to be necessarily true, as God himself is necessary being). The only recourse you have left is showing that the nature of God cannot be necessary being.

And I have challenged the assertion that they are grounded in the nature of god. You have asserted this and offered no rough sketch as to the meaning of this phrase nor how this is known. You have in detailed re-iterated the argument that it is necessarily the case that both god and logic exists, but how does that in anyway demonstrate that its true?