A Necessary Being?

[wiploc]

Is there anything wrong with a Necessary Being per se?

If you mean to ask whether something like that could exist, the answer is no.  

A necessary thing is a thing that exists in every possible world, but some possible worlds don't include necessary things.

We know this by definition:  A possible world is any world that doesn't include any logical contradictions (think square circles and married bachelors).  There is nothing contradictory about worlds without necessary beings.  Therefore, such worlds are, by definition, possible.  

Since some possible worlds don't include necessary beings, there can't be a necessary being in every possible world.  Yet that is the definition of necessary being: "a being that exists in all possible worlds." 

So, 
1. the NB must (by definition of "necessary") exist in every possible world if it exists at all, and
2. the NB does not (by definition of "possible world") exist in every possible world.  

Therefore, necessary beings do not exist.  

Is there really anything incoherent or illogical about the very concept of a Necessary Being?

I have trouble with transworld identity.  I am skeptical of the concept, at least as explained by Plantinga.  I am not in a position to call it incoherent, but I remain skeptical.  

But, again, if what you're really asking is whether one could exist, the answer is no.  

In other words, can anyone come up with reasons why a Necessary Being is impossible?

Yes.  See above.

Or have we now accepted that it is certainly possible for there to be a Necessary Being?

It is not possible.  It is impossible.  It can't happen.  It would be logically self-contradictory.  There is no possible world in which a necessary being is possible.  



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Can anyone show what exactly such a being would be necessary for?

We're talking about something that cannot logically not exist.  Or, in possible-world-speak, it exists in every possible world.  That's all we're talking about.  Said a third way, we are refuting the modal ontological argument. 

That's all that's being discussed here.   Angles are "necessary" to triangles in the sense that an angle-less triangle would be contradictory.  We aren't talking about something necessary in the sense of being needed.  We're talking only about something that cannot logically fail to exist. 

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Something is necessary implies it has a purpose, and if by definition it has to exist, then there is nothing inherently wrong about it existing so long as the purpose exists.

Purpose is not in issue.  A radius is necessary to a circle, but that doesn't mean the circle has purpose.  The question before us is whether a god can be "necessary" to all possible worlds in the same sense that a radius is necessary to a circle.  Purpose doesn't come into it.

[Aoi Magi]

Something is necessary implies it has a purpose, and if by definition it has to exist, then there is nothing inherently wrong about it existing so long as the purpose exists.

Purpose is not in issue.  A radius is necessary to a circle, but that doesn't mean the circle has purpose.  The question before us is whether a god can be "necessary" to all possible worlds in the same sense that a radius is necessary to a circle.  Purpose doesn't come into it.

The radius does have a purpose, of maintaining the circle, after all a circle without a radius isn't a circle, right?

[Whateverist]

Can anyone show what exactly such a being would be necessary for?

We're talking about something that cannot logically not exist.  Or, in possible-world-speak, it exists in every possible world.  That's all we're talking about.  Said a third way, we are refuting the modal ontological argument. 

That's all that's being discussed here.   Angles are "necessary" to triangles in the sense that an angle-less triangle would be contradictory.  We aren't talking about something necessary in the sense of being needed.  We're talking only about something that cannot logically fail to exist.

Who among us is in any position to know not just what is in the world but also what must be in the world. The conceit of pretending to know such a thing is breath taking. I haven't finished figuring what's up with this world. Don't think I'll be deducing anything so esoteric as possible worlds or what is necessary to any of them anytime soon.

[wiploc]

The radius does have a purpose, of maintaining the circle, after all a circle without a radius isn't a circle, right?

Myself, I've never met a radius with that much personality.

[Arkilogue]

Purpose is not in issue.  A radius is necessary to a circle, but that doesn't mean the circle has purpose.  The question before us is whether a god can be "necessary" to all possible worlds in the same sense that a radius is necessary to a circle.  Purpose doesn't come into it.

The radius does have a purpose, of maintaining the circle, after all a circle without a radius isn't a circle, right?

A radius by itself is just a line.

Without anchoring one end to a still point and spinning the other end all the way around the point....there is no circle.

The purpose of a radius is to be in motion while remaining still.

[TheMuslim]

Is there anything wrong with a Necessary Being per se?

If you mean to ask whether something like that could exist, the answer is no.  

A necessary thing is a thing that exists in every possible world, but some possible worlds don't include necessary things.

We know this by definition:  A possible world is any world that doesn't include any logical contradictions (think square circles and married bachelors).  There is nothing contradictory about worlds without necessary beings.  Therefore, such worlds are, by definition, possible.  

Since some possible worlds don't include necessary beings, there can't be a necessary being in every possible world.  Yet that is the definition of necessary being: "a being that exists in all possible worlds." 

So, 
1. the NB must (by definition of "necessary") exist in every possible world if it exists at all, and
2. the NB does not (by definition of "possible world") exist in every possible world.  

Therefore, necessary beings do not exist.  

Is there really anything incoherent or illogical about the very concept of a Necessary Being?

I have trouble with transworld identity.  I am skeptical of the concept, at least as explained by Plantinga.  I am not in a position to call it incoherent, but I remain skeptical.  

But, again, if what you're really asking is whether one could exist, the answer is no.  

In other words, can anyone come up with reasons why a Necessary Being is impossible?

Yes.  See above.

Or have we now accepted that it is certainly possible for there to be a Necessary Being?

It is not possible.  It is impossible.  It can't happen.  It would be logically self-contradictory.  There is no possible world in which a necessary being is possible.  

You honed in on the question and didn't mindlessly sidetrack with puerile rants. I applaud you for that.

You, however, failed to differentiate between two different types of predication, just like Anselm and Kant did (or, shall I say, because Anselm and Kant did). There is a difference between "essential predication" and "accidental predication."

When I speak of a "Necessary Being," or "something that must have existence," I am predicating existence to it as essential predication (not as accidental predication). In other words, I am not saying that a Necessary Being must exist in the real world; I am simply saying that it - by its essential definition - cannot not exist. Despite the way it sounds to the mind at first glance, the definition isn't really making any claims about whether this thing exists in the real world(s).


Let's say I define a triangle as "a shape that has three sides." Now, whether or not a triangle actually exists in the real world - this is not the realm or the concern of the definition. The most that the definition can imply is that if a triangle exists, it must have three sides.

Similarly, when I define a Necessary Being as "a thing that exists in all possible worlds," my mere act of defining does not intend to imply that a Necessary Being actually exists in all possible worlds. The most that its definition can imply is that if a Necessary Being exists, it must exist in all possible worlds.


So it is indeed possible for the Necessary Being to not actually exist. However, once we find out that it exists, its definition would imply that it exists in all possible worlds (not just ours); it would imply that this known Necessary Being is eternal and did not ever not exist (and will not ever not exist), because it cannot not exist.

So the Necessary Being is not necessary in the sense that it must exist in the real world. It's necessary in the sense that if it exists, it must exist in all possible worlds - because that is in its definition. So once it is known that it exists, all possible worlds must have it.

I hope you understand the point I am trying to make. When looked at from this proper perspective, there really is nothing contradictory about the mere concept of a Necessary Being.

And just for the record, I do not believe that the modal ontological argument is sound. Anselm confuses essential predication with accidental predication; his argument is nothing more than an essential predication of existence to a concept.

[robvalue]

I just like having a little fun. I mean no offense.

I find it amusing when philosophy is used not only to try and break the boundaries of our reality, but to try and "investigate" other "potential" realities that aren't in fact real at all. It's rather a laborious way of trying to establish something, and it still doesn't work even after all that.

[Whateverist]

I'm also sorry if I've given offense and I admit I haven't taken the topic seriously. The truth is I just find defining notions into being a silly idea. But if there is a chance you actually can get somewhere with this line of reasoning please proceed. People certainly do plenty of things which from the outside would seem silly. I will endeavor to withhold judgment.

[Neo-Scholastic]

No need to get all worked up, fellas. I did not say or imply anything about whether a Necessary Being actually exists. In this thread, I am not trying to prove or assert that a Necessary Being exists. I am simply wondering if the very concept of a Necessary Being is logically impossible.

Its pretty simple, if there were no necessary being there would now be nothing.

[LostLocke]

Let's say I define a triangle as "a shape that has three sides." Now, whether or not a triangle actually exists in the real world - this is not the realm or the concern of the definition. The most that the definition can imply is that if a triangle exists, it must have three sides.

Similarly, when I define a Necessary Being as "a thing that exists in all possible worlds," my mere act of defining does not intend to imply that a Necessary Being actually exists in all possible worlds. The most that its definition can imply is that if a Necessary Being exists, it must exist in all possible worlds.


So it is indeed possible for the Necessary Being to not actually exist. However, once we find out that it exists, its definition would imply that it exists in all possible worlds (not just ours); it would imply that this known Necessary Being is eternal and did not ever not exist (and will not ever not exist), because it cannot not exist.

Why must a necessary being exist in all worlds?
Triangles are well defined because they actually exist. They can be demonstrated. That's why we can define them with "three sides".
A necessary being is just someone saying, "I think this about it, therefore that is the reality about it.", but without any ability to demonstrate that that is actually the "reality" of a necessary being.
I can say, "A necessary being can exist in some realities, but also not exist in other realities.", and I have exactly as much evidence to back that claim up as a person who says a necessary must exist in ALL realities.