When I think of motion, I think change. It seems to me that change occurs by logical necessity following two of the most sublime concepts, the lack of which are unimaginable for any reality in which intellectual beings like ourselves are capable of abstraction, though this is often called into question, perhaps(?) with some justification: temporal succession and spatial movement. In other words, you can't imagine the absolute absence of space and time. The very attempt seems to require the involvement of at least one of these. From this follows motion, which in the world experienced by us was described by Heraclitus as "perpetual flux," by Zeno as non-existent, the latter which just seems too weird. If the world of motion, spatially and temporally, is something like a river in which the singular instance overlaps with something of "past time" or "future time," apparently always co-joined with some object that is relocating its precise position in space, then motion, I contend, must be one of two kinds:

Moved by a mover or self-moved. In the first case, motion always involves mover and moved, or rather it is determined by a prior mover, its antecedent, and each motion includes something that is both moved and mover, and this in some sense is similar to the ambiguous connection between this moment and that moment in succession. There is, in this case, an infinite regress of moved movers. Otherwise, the chain of movement must ultimately terminate in self-motion, indeterministic, random, resulting from an internal principle or impulse, that, if it had any type of cause or mover to move it, externally, would necessarily be determined by the mover, and not random per se. The difference between motion that I call both moved and mover is the presence of a necessary connection between two distinct states, either physical or logical, while idea of the self-motion as such is that it only relates two distinct states by a relation of temporal succession; it is the creation ex niliho, in contradistinction to its counterpart, the ancient rule that "from nothing, nothing comes."

Is it possible to conceive of a third option vis-à-vis motion?

I think you're saying that, muck like time is how the Universe keeps everything from happening at once, motions is how the Universe keeps everything from happening in the same place. I think.

Boru

I thought he was asking whether to buy a manual push lawn mower or a self propelled one?
Maybe it's just me ...

This is unreadable. Edit it.

(December 29, 2015 at 4:18 am)Nestor Wrote: Is it possible to conceive of a third option vis-à-vis motion?

I think "conceive" is the magic word.  In an idealistic reality, in which all objects are symbolic representations of underlying principles, then movement is really a change in the interaction of principle over time. 

Imagine a car seen in a dream.  Clearly, it is not moving under its own volition, since it is only an idea.  However, is my mind moving it?  I'd argue that the motion is itself only an idea, and that in fact the car is not moving, but rather that the mind is applying the idea of motion to the idea of the car.

So I'd suggest this third option: that reality is idealistic, and that motion is therefore a representation of ideas rather than a property of an object-- self-possessed OR imbued by any second object.  Or, in short, motion is illusory.

(December 29, 2015 at 4:35 am)BrianSoddingBoru4 Wrote: I think you're saying that, muck like time is how the Universe keeps everything from happening at once, motions is how the Universe keeps everything from happening in the same place.  I think.

Boru

I thought that was what space was for.

(December 29, 2015 at 4:35 am)BrianSoddingBoru4 Wrote: I think you're saying that, muck like time is how the Universe keeps everything from happening at once, motions is how the Universe keeps everything from happening in the same place.  I think.

Boru

I spent longer than I should trying to work out how muck was like time.

If space suddenly vanishes and we are all jammed up together at some point, I hope I'm standing next to Harrison Ford when it happens.

WOOT !!

(December 29, 2015 at 11:55 am)bennyboy Wrote:

(December 29, 2015 at 4:18 am)Nestor Wrote: Is it possible to conceive of a third option vis-à-vis motion?

I think "conceive" is the magic word.  In an idealistic reality, in which all objects are symbolic representations of underlying principles, then movement is really a change in the interaction of principle over time. 

Imagine a car seen in a dream.  Clearly, it is not moving under its own volition, since it is only an idea.  However, is my mind moving it?  I'd argue that the motion is itself only an idea, and that in fact the car is not moving, but rather that the mind is applying the idea of motion to the idea of the car.

So I'd suggest this third option: that reality is idealistic, and that motion is therefore a representation of ideas rather than a property of an object-- self-possessed OR imbued by any second object.  Or, in short, motion is illusory.

This works whether reality is idealistic, or the reality is that we are brains isolated from our percepts.

Btw, self-movement may be constrained by geometry, and thus not random.

(December 29, 2015 at 4:18 am)Nestor Wrote: Moved by a mover or self-moved. In the first case, motion always involves mover and moved, or rather it is determined by a prior mover, its antecedent, and each motion includes something that is both moved and mover, and this in some sense is similar to the ambiguous connection between this moment and that moment in succession. There is, in this case, an infinite regress of moved movers. Otherwise, the chain of movement must ultimately terminate in self-motion, indeterministic, random, resulting from an internal principle or impulse, that, if it had any type of cause or mover to move it, externally, would necessarily be determined by the mover, and not random per se. The difference between motion that I call both moved and mover is the presence of a necessary connection between two distinct states, either physical or logical, while idea of the self-motion as such is that it only relates two distinct states by a relation of temporal succession; it is the creation ex niliho, in contradistinction to its counterpart, the ancient rule that "from nothing, nothing comes."

Is it possible to conceive of a third option vis-à-vis motion?

I confess I'm not understanding the choices.  Is this a contrast between viewing the movement of objects as entirely the result of earlier, determinative motions -vs- objects as subjects with intentions whose motion are reflection of those intentions (wherever those may have come from).  So the motion of inanimate objects is to be understood by looking backward toward earlier impacts while the motion of (at least some) animate objects is to be understood by looking forward toward the ends which are the goal of intentions.  Am I close?