I don't disagree with you.  We're just talking past each other, I think.

(June 11, 2019 at 12:55 pm)Gae Bolga Wrote: I don't disagree with you.  We're just talking past each other, I think.

Well, to be clear, I'm not saying that it's impermissible to label things permissible and I'm not making any normative statements.

To get back to the question of the thread: Is moral nihilism a morality? No. Moralities are normative positions and moral nihilism is a metaethical position.

For moral nihilism to be a morality it would have to implicitly be claiming that you ought to do or avoid doing something ... but moral nihilism doesn't do that. if it did ... it wouldn't be moral nihilism.

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I have thought about it and I have altered my view on one matter now, though: I now do think that the denial of the existence of something can be to be nihilistic about it. I just think it's nihilism in a looser sense. I think noncognitivism is the ultimate form of nihilism. To say regarding X that "X is completely meaningless", I would consider to be strongly nihilistic about X. But to say, regarding X, that "X does not exist" is to be nihilistic about it in a weaker sense. So I guess I consider noncognitivism about moral issues to be strong ethical nihilism and error theory to be weak ethical nihilism. Why? Because if you deem ethical statements to be completely without meaning then your view is more empty, and hence more nihilistic, than if you view them to be false.

(June 11, 2019 at 5:52 am)SenseMaker007 Wrote:

Quote:So, okay. Error theory is cognitivist. We're on the same page there. But I don't get why nihilists must be noncognitivists in your conception. It seems arbitrary really.

Error Theory says all statements about morality are wrong but according to Wikipedia:

Wikipedia Wrote:Moral nihilism (also known as ethical nihilism) is the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or wrong.

(my emphasis)

You see, I agree with Wikipedia's definition of moral nihilism and that's exactly why I don't think Error Theory is a form of nihilism.

Now, a response would be if you were to say something like "Error Theory doesn't deem all statements to be morally wrong, so it can still be nihilistic, it just says that they are logically wrong from a metaethical standpoint." But then I'd just respond with "That's exactly why it isn't expressing anything normative." This is where I think the confusion resides.

In my conception, error theory qualifies according to Wikipedia's definition because it doesn't deem any moral action to be right or wrong. All error theory posits is that all statements of moral fact are in error. If all moral statements of fact are in error, then nothing can be deemed right or wrong.

Quote:Well, I've explained why I don't think evaluating something to be false, rather than meaningless, is nihilistic. But I think it would be helpful if we got past this purely semantic disagreement, do you agree?

Yes, I do. So I'm going to explain the substance of my categorizations at the bottom of this post.

Quote:(1) How exactly can a noncognitivist metaethical theory express normative function?

All noncognitivist theories are nihilistic. None of them allows that a moral statement can even be a belief, let alone a fact. If there are no moral facts, then a normative analysis becomes impossible.

Quote:(2) How exactly does saying that all statements about morality are false (Error Theory) express normative function?

Unless you think that erroneous factual information can express a normative function, error theory fails.


***

To get over our semantic disagreement-


Basically, as I divide things, there are three main categories: realists, relativists, and nihilists. Realists think that moral statements can be true, so error theorists (who think the opposite) don't belong here. Relativists think that moral statements are matters of opinion (cultural or individual) and --since opinions can't be false-- error theorists don't belong here either. Thus, the only category we have left is nihilism which says that moral facts cannot be true either because they are expressions of something (as per noncognitivism) or, as the error theorists say because they don't relate to any real feature of the world.

I suppose our semantic difference could be resolved by making error theory a distinct category, but that's hardly worthwhile. Or we could try to shove error theory into realist or relativist categories which doesn't make sense.

I say we just proceed in our ethical discourse, keeping in mind that we don't share the exact definition for nihilism. It doesn't actually matter anyway since we are both realists at the end of the day, and we both reject all forms of moral skepticism, nihilistic or otherwise.

(June 11, 2019 at 7:05 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote: In my conception, error theory qualifies according to Wikipedia's definition because it doesn't deem any moral action to be right or wrong. All error theory posits is that all statements of moral fact are in error. If all moral statements of fact are in error, then nothing can be deemed right or wrong.

I agree.

(June 11, 2019 at 5:52 am)SenseMaker007 Wrote: Now, a response would be if you were to say something like "Error Theory doesn't deem all statements to be morally wrong, so it can still be nihilistic, it just says that they are logically wrong from a metaethical standpoint." But then I'd just respond with "That's exactly why it isn't expressing anything normative." This is where I think the confusion resides.

So, do we agree that Error Theory isn't implicitly normative?

(June 11, 2019 at 7:05 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote: Yes, I do. So I'm going to explain the substance of my categorizations at the bottom of this post.

Great!

Quote:All noncognitivist theories are nihilistic. None of them allows that a moral statement can even be a belief, let alone a fact. If there are no moral facts, then a normative analysis becomes impossible.

I agree with this 100%.

I've been trying to get Gae to answer this correctly but he just keeps saying that even noncognitivism implicitly expresses normativity, that I've implicitly made normative statements and that I said that it's impermissible to label things permissible. Have you debated with him much before? Is he usually like this? It's very difficult to explain my view to him.

Quote:Unless you think that erroneous factual information can express a normative function, error theory fails.

I agree that it fails and, no, I don't think that it can express normative function.

Quote:***

To get over our semantic disagreement-


Basically, as I divide things, there are three main categories: realists, relativists, and nihilists. Realists think that moral statements can be true, so error theorists (who think the opposite) don't belong here.

Agreed.

Quote: Relativists think that moral statements are matters of opinion (cultural or individual) and --since opinions can't be false-- error theorists don't belong here either.

Agreed.

Quote:Thus, the only category we have left is nihilism which says that moral facts cannot be true either because they are expressions of something (as per noncognitivism) or, as the error theorists say because they don't relate to any real feature of the world.

I suppose our semantic difference could be resolved by making error theory a distinct category, but that's hardly worthwhile. Or we could try to shove error theory into realist or relativist categories which doesn't make sense.

I've since changed my mind about Error Theory not being a form of nihilism. I now think it's what I would call weak nihilism because I can understand why denying the existence of something is nihilistic ... I just think that saying "the whole thing is completely meaningless" is a stronger form of nihilism, as then you aren't even acknowledging that there's any meaningful concept to evaluate.

Quote:I say we just proceed in our ethical discourse, keeping in mind that we don't share the exact definition for nihilism. It doesn't actually matter anyway since we are both realists at the end of the day, and we both reject all forms of moral skepticism, nihilistic or otherwise.

We could hold identical views on this matter in spite of defining things slightly differently.

I think for moral nihilism to be a morality it would have to make at least one normative statement ... but if it does it is no longer nihilistic. So I don't think that's possible.

Nihilists can be moral but nihilism can't, basically.

To take the example of Nietzsche that Gae brought up as a supposed example of somebody who has nihilism as a morality:

Nietzsche believed that if you become a nihilist and face things honesty then that will lead to a re-evaluation of values and you'll come up with your own meaningful morality that is best for you (best for you in terms of being able to fulfill your will to power).

Nietzche may not have believed in an objective morality, but he did believe in a morality, but the values he espoused ultimately weren't nihilistic at all. You can't have nihilistic values or nihilistic meaning because values and meaning aren't nihilistic.

It reminds me of Brave New World, which was supposedly an example of a paradise of pleasure that wasn't good enough. But in reality it just wasn't a paradise of pleasure. They supposedly had the perfect drug, Soma, for example, but it had nasty side effects. They were supposedly perfectly satisfied, but they craved something that the so-called "savage" people had. So they obviously weren't really satisfied.

So, just like Brave New World isn't a true hedonistic paradise, Nietzche's nihilism isn't truly nihilistic.

And if the only way to have a nihilistic morality is to have a morality that may, at a glance, seem nihilistic but on closer inspection isn't fully nihilistic ... then I think it's clear that nihilism isn't a morality.

I mean, the very notion of a fully nihilistic morality is pretty much a contradiction in terms, as far as I'm concerned.

Can nihilism lead to a paradigm shift, a breakthrough, a life-changing moment, a re-evaluation of values whereby you come to develop a morality? Sure. But it's not in itself a morality. So I disagree with Cooper and I don't really see how it's possible for anybody to give a knockdown argument for why ethical nihilism is normative. Without redefining ethical nihilism altogether to be something not totally nihilistic. Do you agree?

(June 12, 2019 at 7:13 am)SenseMaker007 Wrote: We could hold identical views on this matter in spite of defining things slightly differently.

I think for moral nihilism to be a morality it would have to make at least one normative statement ... but if it does it is no longer nihilistic. So I don't think that's possible.

IOW you think it would be incoherent with respect to the premise of nihilism as you see it. 

That doesn't mean it's impossible for nihilism to do so (only impermissible, lol), as we've discussed, only that the consequences for doing so is a meaningful incoherence. Yet nihilism does carry at least a minimal set of normatives that can't be denied -coherently, by a rational person - even if a person doesn't agree with them.. It has struck others as capable of being a moral framework. People do wonder if any comment on morality can be divorced from normative implications.

Yes, I'm always like this, are you?

If permissibility is meaningless x because y, then it is not permissible to label things x permissible because y. That would be meaningless. If all moral statements are wrong, then x does not deserve z for y. It's a tight knot, but that's nihilism for ya. Obviously we can do it, so that's not a comment on our ability, but on what we should or shouldn't do, if we properly understand nihilism and genuinely hold it to be true. It's not that we can't, or that nihilism can't. It's not impossible. You think that a nihilist shouldn't. You think that it's wrong to do so. All things beings equal, you think that an "emptier" position deserves the title "nihilism" more than a comparatively fuller one.

Do you see why people wonder whether normativity and desert can be divorced from comments on morality, even metaethical positions? Some people have been conditioned to think that there's a special sauce in normative propositions - but there isn't. Just trying to discuss something logically imposes categorical normatives. I know, I know, but those are logically normative.

I'll ask again, whats the difference in, say, moral realism..between the logically and the morally normative? How about relativism? If three systems all present normative functions and all make use of the language of desert in fundamentally identically ways, implicitly or explicitly, in what way are the two of them moral systems that the third isn't or can't be? Perhaps one is "fuller", perhaps one is more coherent. Fullness and coherence, however, are not requirements of moral systems. As I mentioned, it's not that I disagree with you about the coherence of nihilism, or how..in a sense, nihilist normatives could be seen to erode the credibility of nihilism as a position.

If nothing else, you could add this to the list of reasons why you think nihilism is self defeating. Even as the attempted antithesis of moral positions it somehow manages to create normatives and provide assessments of desert. We could rephrase the entire discussion simply by asking the same question of two different positions.

Is there a list of things that a nihilist can't do* - while remaining consistent with their properly understood and genuinely held nihilism.
Is there a list of things that a utilitarian hedonist can't do* - while remaining consistent with their properly understood and genuinely held utilitarian hedonism?

(June 12, 2019 at 8:22 am)Gae Bolga Wrote: IOW you think it would be incoherent with respect to the premise of nihilism as you see it. 

No. It's incoherent for nihilism to be a morality because then it wouldn't be nihilism. It has nothing to do with how I see it and everything to do with what nihilism means.

Quote:That doesn't mean it's impossible for nihilism to do so (only impermissible, lol), as we've discussed, only that the consequences for doing so is a meaningful incoherence.

That is not what I've said. I don't agree with you. On the contrary, it's nihilism that's incoherent and it has nothing to do with consequences. I don't agree with you.

Quote: Yet nihilism does carry at least a minimal set of normatives that can't be denied -coherently, by a rational person.  It has struck others as capable of being a moral framework.  People do wonder if any comment on morality can be divorced from normative implications.

Yes, I'm always like this, are you?  

Well, if you're always like this then you're not worth discussing with because you can't make yourself clear nor answer questions clearly.

Quote:If permissibility is meaningless x because y,

What does "If permissibility is meaningless x because y" mean? It doesn't appear to make any sense.

Quote: then it is not permissible to label things x permissible because y.

When your conclusion is suppose to follow from a premise that doesn't make sense then it's hard to evaluate your conclusion.

Quote: That would be meaningless.

What would be? You're not being clear.

Quote: If all moral statements are wrong, then x does not deserve z for y.

What does "X does not derserve Z for Y" mean? Let's say we replaced it with "Individual does not deserve life for bad behavior" ... even that doesn't quite make sense.

Quote:  It's a tight knot, but that's nihilism for ya.

What is?

The point is that you have consistently failed to demonstrate how ethical nihilism, noncognitivism and error theory ever implicitly makes any normative statements. 

Quote:Obviously we can do it, so that's not a comment on our ability, but on what we should or shouldn't do, if we properly understand nihilism and genuinely hold it to be true.

Are you trying to say that we can obviously contradict our beliefs? I.e. as I said, someone can be a nihilist but still make statements that aren't nihilistic.

Quote:You think that a nihilist shouldn't.

I never said that I think a nihilist shouldn't make normative statements. I said a nihilist can make normative statements but nihilism doesn't implicitly make normative statements. If it did, it wouldn't be nihilism.

Quote: You think that it's wrong to do so.

I never said that.

Quote: All things beings equal, you think that an "emptier" position deserves the title "nihilism" more than a comparatively fuller one.

I like to use the word nihilism to mean what it means, yes.

I think you are struggling to understand this topic.

Quote:Do you see why people wonder whether normativity and desert can be divorced from comments on morality, even metaethical positions?

What people wonder is not relevant. You can't back up your claim that I have made normative statements and back up your claim that nihilism is implicitly normative. All you can do is assert them.

 

Quote:Some people have been conditioned to think that there's a special sauce in normative propositions - but there isn't.

That has nothing to do with any of my questions and doesn't back up your claim that nihilism is implicitly normative or that I've made any normative statements.

You struggle with relevance.

Perhaps it would help if you imagine, just for a moment, that I'm relating a current topic in ethical theory to you?

(June 12, 2019 at 9:08 am)Gae Bolga Wrote: Perhaps it would help if you imagine, just for a moment, that I'm relating a current topic in ethical theory to you?

Imagining it doesn't make it so. I ask a question and you talk about something else.

You're talking about ethical theory but you're not conversing with me because you're not properly interacting with me. Every time I ask a question you change the subject and you haven't actually defended your claim that nihilism implicitly makes normative statements and that's because you can't do it.

@Gae Bolga @SenseMaker007

I haven't been tracking the discussion between the two of you, but there IS something that rings somewhat true to me in the statement "in the broadest sense of the term, moral nihilism is a morality."

Keeping in mind the qualifier "in the broadest sense of the term" let's look at emotivism. When an emotivistic nihilist says, "moral judgments are nothing but expressions of feelings," he is evaluating moral judgments in a qualitative way and in the broadest sense of the term performing a normative evaluation. Basically, nihilists criticize moral judgments for their lack of truth value or non-relation to facts. In that, there is a sort of ought statement... as in "we ought to take moral judgments less seriously" or "we ought not treat moral statements as fact."

But Jorm made a good point about that line of reasoning being fallacious.

As for Nietzsche, I'm hard pressed to shove his ethics into any tidy category. He was a creative philosopher as much as an evaluative one (he evaluated to create much of the time). Having a coherent ethics wasn't really his gig.

That being said, most of his philosophy is criticism of standard ethics and creation of an entirely new ethics at the same time. It's three dimensional too. From one perspective it appears nihilistic, from another perspective relativist or even realist.

(June 12, 2019 at 8:22 am)Gae Bolga Wrote: I'll ask again, whats the difference in, say, moral realism..between the logically and the morally normative?

Why are you asking again as if I avoided your question when I directly answered your question? I've answered that question already, but you still haven't answered any of mine. You keep responding with irrelevance.

Quote:  How about relativism?  If three systems all present normative functions and all make use of the language of desert in fundamentally identically ways, implicitly or explicitly, in what way are the two of them moral systems that the third isn't or can't be?

So basically, if you are right then how are you wrong? The point is that you haven't actually supported that you're right. You're merely question begging here. The point is that you haven't actually demonstrated how niihilism can possibly be implicitly normative. And rambling on about what Nietzsche believed doesn't do that.

Stay on topic and address what you've repeatedly failed to address rather than just moving on to other things without addressing anything.

Quote:  
If nothing else, you could add this to the list of reasons why you think nihilism is self defeating.

Nihilism is incoherent, that's already enough reasons. And this still just you dodging. You repeatedly fail to answer my questions and you repeatedly fail to back up your claim that nihilism implicitly makes normative statements and your claim that I have made normative statements.

Quote: Even as the attempted antithesis of moral positions it somehow manages to create normatives and provide assessments of desert.

This is just your assertion again, with zero backing. It's time to move on because you're a waste of time. You won't back yourself up because you can't.

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(June 12, 2019 at 9:11 am)vulcanlogician Wrote: Keeping in mind the qualifier "in the broadest sense of the term" let's look at emotivism. When an emotivistic nihilist says, "moral judgments are nothing but expressions of feelings," he is evaluating moral judgments in a qualitative way and in the broadest sense of the term performing a normative evaluation.

But this is precisely why I said that error theory isn't nihilism, because it makes an evaulation. I now think that an evaulation of nonexistence doesn't really count. But an evaluation of nonexistence of X is a weaker form of nihilism than saying that X is too meaningless to even be evaluated in the first place.

But if you say X exists but it's mere feelings ... that's not nihilism.

Quote: Basically, nihilists criticize moral judgments for their lack of truth value or non-relation to facts. In that, there is a sort of ought statement... as in "we ought to take moral judgments less seriously" or "we ought not treat moral statements as fact."

Isn't emotivism a form of relativism rather than a form of nihilism? Because emotivism says that when somebody makes a statement that is supposedly about morality they are just expressing their true feelings on the matter. In other words something might feel right or wrong for them.

Ethical nihilism is the view that nothing is normatively right or wrong. How is that normative? it can't be. And that's why ethical nihilism is not a morality.

Quote:That being said, most of his philosophy is criticism of standard ethics and creation of an entirely new ethics at the same time. It's three dimensional too. From one perspective it appears nihilistic, from another perspective relativist or even realist.

I agree that it's important for philosophers to criticise philosophy. Which is why I have no qualms about the fact that I think that philosophers sometimes miscategorize things because, in spite of their reputation for being pedantic, philosophers are sometimes not pedantic enough.

Finally, the fact that emotivism makes a qualitative evaluation is a better argument for it not being nihilistic than for it being normative. There's nothing about emotivism that implicitly says that you ought to do or not do anything ... so it can't be normative. It may not be nihilistic, because it's making a normative evaluation, but it isn't actually making any normative ought-statements. And if emotivism is normative simply because it isn't nihilistic then that can't be an argument for nihilism being normative.

If a metaethical viewpoint doesn't even allow norms to be true or false then it certainly can't express the truth or falsehood of any norms from an normative point of view.