Objectivist metrics and objective metrics are not the same thing. Relativists have use of every fact a realist does to make whatever case they choose to make. Perhaps fuzziness is a component of your view of relativism, not a consequence of relativism?

That, for example, somethings harmfulness or misery is the reason that a culture has a prohibition against it - the contents of harm, the contents of misery. Why do you and I see harm where others do not, and why do we fail to see the harm that others do? Or, to put it more specifically in a limited context, if it's not realism, and it's not nihilism - do we think that our tendencies to see X can truly be explained by individual preference, and what sense, then, do we make of the sheer existence of cultural agreement?

-and all of that, premised on the notion only that fuzziness would be an issue - it's all moot if fuzziness is the true state of affairs. Not a problem, just an accurate description.

To the OP:

Vulcan, I would like to suggest a pragmatic compromise of sorts. In the same way that anyone can know that something is without knowing what the thing is, people can have objective moral theories (in the sense that such hypotheses are derived from experience, properly basic beliefs*, and objective facts) but because uncertainty is part of the human condition the best we can do is make moral systems (in the the same way we devise systems to perform complex processes with greater reliability)...and most so-called moral systems are basically heuristics of various accuracy and helpfulness.

I say helpfulness because, as I see it, the value of a heuristic comes from its reliability and fittingness for various intellectual tasks, not necessarily its veracity or insight into fundamental reality. For example, it seems right and proper for policy makers and public servants to adopt Utilitarianism and Rawlsian "veils of ignorance", whereas, a captain of industry may attribute his or her success to steadfast adherence to "common sense" principles summarized by catchy aphorisms and traditional proverbs. Or as another example, the dramatic testimonies of people whose turn to Christ turned their lives. The truth is everyone navigates the moral landscape using multiple heuristics everyday. My driving behavior during the morning commute reflects the Kantian approach of "what if everyone drove like that?" - keep up with the pace of traffic, share the road, etc. My work opinions are often informed by utilitarian considerations within the limits of inviolate guidelines. That vacillation between various ethic systems could be considered a limited form of moral relativism. I.e. there are moral facts that are easy to discern but creating a system that readily and infallibly produces morally acceptable outcomes for all circumstance is IMHO impossible. The best to which we can aspire for any system is to make morally acceptable choices most of the time under most circumstances.

But doesn't my use of value-laden terms like "best" and "acceptable" imply a meta-moral system to decide between moral systems. A skeptic might say that I am just pushing the problem back. To this I say, our common humanity adequately serves as an objective moral standard. It means something to be human.  And because it means something to be human, there is an empirical data set to which everyone can refer. When we try to convince others to "do the right thing" we generally appeal to their humanity. I suspect if there actually were Klingons, we would fully expect their morality would reflect something of what it essentially means to be Klingon.

In summary, I could consider myself a moral relativist in the sense that no one system is sufficient to cover all the nuance of a truly human life experience but...that does not mean that all moral systems are equal...So deciding which moral system to apply, in my estimation, is more like cultivating a discernment of one's own humanity and that of others. Wisdom. Here I'd like to speak to you, vulcanlogic, because the Ephesians quote you hate tacitly accepts the institution of slavery, it plants a idea that once acknowledged makes slavery abhorrent and that idea is that slaves and masters share a common humanity.


* which are many such as the belief in the following: 1) independent physical reality, 2) other minds, 3) the efficacy of reason, etc.

(June 14, 2021 at 1:20 am)vulcanlogician Wrote: I did manage to dig up an article by Boghossian where he argues my thesis. The thesis is: realism and nihilism are tenable positions (ie coherent positions that take a clear stance on the status of moral facts) while relativism is not. Why? Because relativism simply lists what is permitted according to the values of culture x, y, or z. And thus gives only a factual account of these cultures' beliefs. But the debate about moral realism's status isn't a debate about what a given culture believes. It is a debate about whether there can be any truth value in a normative claim.

Relativism accepts this claim, as a cognitive theory.  Affirmatively stating that moral utterances are statements which can be true or false, and at least some of which are true, of a given subjects societal arrangement.  They could conceivably get it wrong.  Mistake the disposition of their society or another's toward a given act or state of affairs, and so, be morally mistaken.

Quote:Or put better:

Quote:Most moral relativists say that moral right and wrong are to be relativized to a community’s “moral code.” According to some such codes, eating beef is permissible; according to others, it is an abomination and must never be allowed.  The relativist proposal is that we must never talk simply about what’s right or wrong, but only about what’s “right or wrong relative to a particular moral code.”

The trouble is that while “Eating beef is wrong” is clearly a normative statement, “Eating beef is wrong relative to the moral code of the Hindus” is just a descriptive remark that carries no normative import whatsoever.  It’s just a way of characterizing what is claimed by a particular moral code, that of the Hindus.  We can see this from the fact that anyone, regardless of their views about eating beef, can agree that eating beef is wrong relative to the moral code of the Hindus.

It's manifestly clear, even in the statement above, that eating beef carries normative import in hindu society.  If we drilled a little deeper, we might find a generalizable statement that applies more broadly and beyond hindu society.  Eating beef is a threat to the good order of hindu society, and threats to the good order of society are routinely taboo in moral systems.  

These objections all seem to boil down to the idea that relativistic utterances carry no normative import and are in some sense fact free, but only fact free in the novel sense of the term which excludes those sets of facts the critic deems unworthy or insufficient. Facts of a society may not be facts of an act, but relativism is not objectivism.

I can't stress enough that there is no disagreement between any cognitivist position as to whether or not there is or at least can be truth or moral import to a statement. Cognitive theories are distinguished by their referents. I get that these objections express the dispute between objectivism and relativism, but again suggest that they can be reduced to something like "relativism is not objectivism, therefore relativism is false" - "or "relativism refers to the wrong set of facts, therefore is false". That it is a form of psuedo realism. In command of some body of true statements, but not the proper one - and perhaps this is why we believe (or some of us believe) that morality is objective. It presents itself that way, in subtle error.

-and I want to point out, that the essay above is arguing for absolute moral facts, which is a bigger lift than bog standard realism. OFC no contingent fact will satisfy a person looking for absolutes. Most of the positions under realism wouldn't satisfy that criteria.

(June 14, 2021 at 1:40 am)vulcanlogician Wrote: I did manage to dig up an article by Boghossian where he argues my thesis. The thesis is: realism and nihilism are tenable positions (ie coherent positions that take a clear stance on the status of moral facts) while relativism is not. Why? Because relativism simply lists what is permitted according to the values of culture x, y, or z. And thus gives only a factual account of these cultures' beliefs. But the debate about moral realism's status isn't a debate about what a given culture believes. It is a debate about normative claims.

If there are absolute moral truths, then one of two things must also be true

1) There is a reason for that truth that cannot be determined by humans (i.e. God-given and God-understood only)
or
2) There is a reason for that truth that can be determined.

If 1) is true, then we simply have to accept the moral truths given by gods.  If 2) is true, then we must be able to reason why the moral truth is "true".  It must either be a scientific statement that can be tested, or it must follow from some higher-level values.

I have yet to find many statements of morality that can be scientifically or logically tested beyond Sam Harris' "maximal unhappiness is bad" - and that even assumes that unhappiness is bad (a value statement, linked to biology).

Moral "truths" must be inferred from human nature, and societal interaction.  Human-nature comes with a wide variance, so that can only rarely used as some sort of objective argument for moral truth.  Cultural interaction has some similarities among cultures, but also has a wide variance.  Again, culture cannot provide objective moral truth.

Unless we defer to gods, the only things we have for judging morality is values.  Sometimes we can agree on values, owing to our common nature.  Sometimes we can't.  Either way "common agreement" is not the same as objective morality.

Well, no to one. Absolute moral facts are a contention that stands alone. There could be gods, and absolute moral facts..or no gods...and still absolute moral facts. I don't think that there are any, but finding or not finding a god would have no effect on finding or not finding such facts. If we found no gods, we could not rationally conclude, on that basis, that there were no or could be no moral absolutes.

It's unclear, btw, how god morals could amount to absolute morals. They're pretty much the opposite thing. Contingent vs non contingent facts.

---

I think that a more promising question or comment  is not whether shared opinions amount to an objective morality, but whether or not were capable..and if, in that event, some portion, however small..of our shared moralizing..is an objective apprehension.   Not absolute, perhaps, but objective.

(June 15, 2021 at 9:43 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote: Moral relativism sounds appealing because buried in it is the notion that "One should not judge other cultures or consider them evil because their practices seem abhorrent from your point of view."

Let me repeat that: "One should not judge other cultures or consider them evil because their practices seem abhorrent from your point of view." The irony is: that's a realist statement. Many cultures the world over do not believe such a thing. But if such a thing is true, then the opinion of any culture isn't going to change that.

THAT is where I'm coming from. Maybe "incoherent" is too strong a word, but that is my main issue with relativism, and I think it's reasonable to have this issue with it. Realist and nihilistic claims BOTH say something tangible about the possible existence of moral facts. Relativism does not.
 

A cultural relativist can make any criticism of any moral system that a realist might, and, like a realist, believe that a person can be morally incorrect.  Relativism is a position on the referent of those facts, just as any other moral position.  That being said, suppose we found a relativist who gave us that advice.  It's good advice, isn't it?  To be mindful of the judgements we make.  A realist would have the same problems with a judgement specifically dependent on an individual pov that a cultural relativist would. Relativists and realists agree, together, that subjectivism is wrong.