(September 1, 2021 at 11:51 am)vulcanlogician Wrote:

(September 1, 2021 at 11:11 am)Angrboda Wrote: Except that you can't show the failure of reductionism except by an argument from ignorance, which is invalid.  So Nagel's challenge leads nowhere.

What about qualia? Qualia are not explained by brain states. I think that's one of Nagel's main points.

To return to Searle, conscious states are causally reducible to brain states (I agree with that). But they aren't ontologically reducible (because of qualia). So the point is: reductionism fails here. Searle believes it is simply a gap in our scientific knowledge, and that the reductionism fails simply because of our ignorance of the natural world... ie... it doesn't necessarily fail. I'm not sure I completely agree with Searle here. But I like his analysis.

I'm also interested in your take on the dualism paper, Angrboda, if you happened to read it.

I'm only part way through it. Having read the summary, it seems to ignore the inductive argument from brain interaction (drugs, trauma) and evolution and focuses on arguments which are not as strong to begin with. I assume he's responding to the literature, so maybe those arguments aren't popular in philosophy for one reason or another. I think ultimately the main arguments are going to revolve around whether one posits mental events a place in one's ontology or not. The problem with that is that consciousness observation (phenomenological observation) and other forms of observation aren't equivalent. I don't accept observation of one's mental states a place in my ontology, so I would have a seemingly intractable disagreement with someone who does.

(September 1, 2021 at 11:51 am)vulcanlogician Wrote: To return to Searle, conscious states are causally reducible to brain states (I agree with that). But they aren't ontologically reducible (because of qualia). So the point is: reductionism fails here.

Is it fair to say that according to Searle, brain-states are necessary, but insufficient causes for qualitative experiences?

(September 1, 2021 at 1:10 pm)Neo-Scholastic Wrote:

(September 1, 2021 at 11:51 am)vulcanlogician Wrote: To return to Searle, conscious states are causally reducible to brain states (I agree with that). But they aren't ontologically reducible (because of qualia). So the point is: reductionism fails here.

Is it fair to say that according to Searle, brain-states are necessary, but insufficient causes for qualitative experiences?

That's a really good question. And I'm not 100% sure he'd agree with that assessment. 

Searle's position (Biological Naturalism) says pretty much what I said before: conscious states are causally reducible to brain states, but not ontologically reducible. He does concede this irreducibility. But I want to say ultimately he thinks brain states are sufficient.

There is some ambiguity... or at least something unresolved in Searle's position... hence Feser's accusation that Searle is a property dualist. (An accusation Searle denies, of course.)

(September 1, 2021 at 11:51 am)vulcanlogician Wrote: What about qualia? Qualia are not explained by brain states. I think that's one of Nagel's main points.

To return to Searle, conscious states are causally reducible to brain states (I agree with that). But they aren't ontologically reducible (because of qualia). So the point is: reductionism fails here. Searle believes it is simply a gap in our scientific knowledge, and that the reductionism fails simply because of our ignorance of the natural world... ie... it doesn't necessarily fail. I'm not sure I completely agree with Searle here. But I like his analysis.

I have never understood the qualia argument.  One has to completely misunderstand what the mind is to make the argument.

The mind is experiential.  It experiences its own recreations of the past, present, and future.  Qualia are part of that experience.  They are the mind's experience of the sensory inputs.

Do qualia need to exist in a computing machine?  No, if it is not organized like the mind, but yes if does operate like the mind.  The mind is far more than a computing machine.

(September 1, 2021 at 4:15 pm)HappySkeptic Wrote:

(September 1, 2021 at 11:51 am)vulcanlogician Wrote: What about qualia? Qualia are not explained by brain states. I think that's one of Nagel's main points.

To return to Searle, conscious states are causally reducible to brain states (I agree with that). But they aren't ontologically reducible (because of qualia). So the point is: reductionism fails here. Searle believes it is simply a gap in our scientific knowledge, and that the reductionism fails simply because of our ignorance of the natural world... ie... it doesn't necessarily fail. I'm not sure I completely agree with Searle here. But I like his analysis.

I have never understood the qualia argument.  One has to completely misunderstand what the mind is to make the argument.

The mind is experiential.  It experiences its own recreations of the past, present, and future.  Qualia are part of that experience.  They are the mind's experience of the sensory inputs.

Do qualia need to exist in a computing machine?  No, if it is not organized like the mind, but yes if does operate like the mind.  The mind is far more than a computing machine.

You might be a functionalist. Functionalists tend to take a "yeah whatever" attitude to qualia. I like functionalism. It's a tidy view. Very appealing to those with scientific sensibilities.

What makes qualia interesting to metaphysicians is that we have zero understanding about it. Yes, yes, we know the causal mechanism by which these conscious states are produced, but why we see red as red... (the actual world is colorless)... things like that... if you really think about it, it's quite mysterious that we experience things the way we do. It seems reasonable to want to ask questions about it.

The functionalist wants to say that qualia are perceived the way they are because they serve that function to the organism. For instance, a pin prick to the finger produces pain. Pain (a qualitative experience) serves a function...-- and the function explains the quality of the experience. The problem with functionalism (to me) is that it works just as well without consciousness. The functionalist wants to "explain the mind away" so to speak.... when what's really at issue is that consciousness is a huge mystery.

But, again, I like functionalism. It's a pretty solid theory IMO.

(September 1, 2021 at 4:49 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote: You might be a functionalist. Functionalists tend to take a "yeah whatever" attitude to qualia. I like functionalism. It's a tidy view. Very appealing to those with scientific sensibilities.

What makes qualia interesting to metaphysicians is that we have zero understanding about it. Yes, yes, we know the causal mechanism by which these conscious states are produced, but why we see red as red... (the actual world is colorless)... things like that... if you really think about it, it's quite mysterious that we experience things the way we do. It seems reasonable to want to ask questions about it.

The functionalist wants to say that qualia are perceived the way they are because they serve that function to the organism. For instance, a pin prick to the finger produces pain. Pain (a qualitative experience) serves a function...-- and the function explains the quality of the experience. The problem with functionalism (to me) is that it works just as well without consciousness. The functionalist wants to "explain the mind away" so to speak.... when what's really at issue is that consciousness is a huge mystery.

But, again, I like functionalism. It's a pretty solid theory IMO.

Perhaps I am a functionalist.  The senses have to perceived in some way.  They have to illicit some response from the conscious mind to be part of our experience.  I just don't see the magic in it.  Again, experience is a dynamic process.  Someone may look at what parts of the brain light up when we see (or imagine) red as opposed to blue, but that is like trying to infer the full experience of a baseball game from examining the skid marks on the infield.

(September 1, 2021 at 5:03 pm)HappySkeptic Wrote: Perhaps I am a functionalist.  The senses have to perceived in some way.  They have to illicit some response from the conscious mind to be part of our experience.  I just don't see the magic in it.  Again, experience is a dynamic process.  Someone may look at what parts of the brain light up when we see (or imagine) red as opposed to blue, but that is like trying to infer the full experience of a baseball game from examining the skid marks on the infield.

I don't think there is anything magical about consciousness. But it is a mystery. For example, some people think that a computer with sufficient complexity might become conscious. Is that how consciousness works? We don't know. What if it is just something related to biological entities? Then the question is: why? What is it about biological entities that produces consciousness?

Consciousness is a mundane thing. Nothing magical about it. But there is something about it we don't quite understand. Maybe something fundamental to reality. And those sorts of things get philosophers very interested. If we knew, for example, that a computer of sufficient complexity would or would not be conscious, that'd be a different story. But we have no idea.

(September 1, 2021 at 5:34 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote: I don't think there is anything magical about consciousness. But it is a mystery. For example, some people think that a computer with sufficient complexity might become conscious. Is that how consciousness works? We don't know. What if it is just something related to biological entities? Then the question is: why? What is it about biological entities that produces consciousness?

Consciousness is a mundane thing. Nothing magical about it. But there is something about it we don't quite understand. Maybe something fundamental to reality. And those sorts of things get philosophers very interested. If we knew, for example, that a computer of sufficient complexity would or would not be conscious, that'd be a different story. But we have no idea.

Complexity (for instance, larger brains with more connections) may have something to do with the richness of conscious experience, and the level of intelligence, but I think it is a particular mode of operation that results in conscious experience.  Once we understand it, re-creating that mode of operation should be entirely possible in a machine.  It may require creating a brain analog that starts as a baby and learns to experience the world, and it may require some sort of body analog to gain a sense of self.

As some have pointed out, this is scary, as the rate of learning could become exponential, and there is no way of knowing how it will turn out.  Just don't connect it to the nukes.

(September 1, 2021 at 5:53 pm)HappySkeptic Wrote: ...
Just don't connect it to the nukes.

Also, don't allow AgI to control replication otherwise the systems will decide that humans are more useful as sterile drones.

I mean look how RNA got subordinated by DNA.

(September 1, 2021 at 4:15 pm)HappySkeptic Wrote: The mind is experiential.  It experiences its own recreations of the past, present, and future.  Qualia are part of that experience.  They are the mind's experience of the sensory inputs.

Do qualia need to exist in a computing machine?  No, if it is not organized like the mind, but yes if does operate like the mind.  The mind is far more than a computing machine.

b-mine

Need to, no.  Would it be useful..yes - particularly if "mind" is a control schema.  Just as any computing machine that needs to navigate in the world is greatly aided by a simulation of it's body - a computing machine which attends to detail would be greatly aided by a simulation of it's attention.

(September 1, 2021 at 4:49 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote: You might be a functionalist. Functionalists tend to take a "yeah whatever" attitude to qualia. I like functionalism. It's a tidy view. Very appealing to those with scientific sensibilities.

What makes qualia interesting to metaphysicians is that we have zero understanding about it. Yes, yes, we know the causal mechanism by which these conscious states are produced, but why we see red as red... (the actual world is colorless)... things like that... if you really think about it, it's quite mysterious that we experience things the way we do. It seems reasonable to want to ask questions about it.

b-mine

quick note about this....

The world isn't colorless, but human night vision is.  You see red because one of three spectrum filtering cone structures in your retina picks up red.  Counterintuitively, the rods responsible for night vision are more sensitive, but occupy a space mostly outside of the three cones structures.  If we really wanted to posit a mystery to seeing color, it wouldn't be on account of the world being colorless or seeing red, imo. 

Those rods, responsible for colorless night vision.....they're also responsible for the perception of purple - a non-color that none of us actually sees.   We experience purple when our cones and brain can't tell what's going on - but the rods are still detecting some radiation - and this is why a dark night has a purple tint...experientially, but not in mere reality as with red in a dying leaf, for example.

It's funny, because our brains don't explicitly inform us "I don't know what's going on, we're getting conflicting signals and dead spots" - they don't have that particular function or sensor - they just say...

"purplish?"

Quote:The functionalist wants to say that qualia are perceived the way they are because they serve that function to the organism. For instance, a pin prick to the finger produces pain. Pain (a qualitative experience) serves a function...-- and the function explains the quality of the experience. The problem with functionalism (to me) is that it works just as well without consciousness. The functionalist wants to "explain the mind away" so to speak.... when what's really at issue is that consciousness is a huge mystery.

But, again, I like functionalism. It's a pretty solid theory IMO.

Is that what functionalists do? If I told you that mind was an attention schema, and seeing red was attending to the details of a top end ping from one of three color filtering structures as a means of simulating yourself and your attention in the environment - all in a high stakes game of control and sensory ability...in what way has mind been explained away?

Functionalism applied to mind doesn't work equally well without consciousness. We don't expect a creature or machine with no body schema (or attention schema) to perform as well as one that has either - and that's actually what we see in our own technologies and...at least hypothetically, in life.

FWIW, there are probably other ways to attend to detail (functonalists would call this multiple realizability), and we could at least argue that some of those other ways in some scenarios would be equal to if not greater than our way - but this way wasn't arrived at in a vacuum with full freedom to choose the method or manner in which it arose. It's not designed. The world looks, to us, exactly as we would predict the world to look to any creature like us. Some alien species somewhere with better vision than us would be laughing it's ass off if it heard us positing the mystery of consciousness by way of the biological production of the experience of the color red...or the idea that we would work equally well without whatever a mind is or provides...in short. In human beings, seeing red is the processed product of rods and cones - but to some other creature (or machine - the distinction is a bit murky, really) with a different structure or biology - seeing red could be arrived at some other way - perhaps something like the way that seeing purple is...to us. There's no reason that a creature with no eyes to see red couldn't experience red, seeing as how we don't have eyes to see purple, and still do. One might wonder if it looked the same - it may not as the modification and combination of color values probably depends on the available set of reference colors in perception - but they would be attending to the same detail, and same sort of detail, and probably for the same reasons.

To dive even deeper with this talk of sight and color and experience - some of the earliest precursors to the way we do sight were photoreceptors hardwired to motors. If something blocked the light, it triggered an automatic response. Some connections were single surface - a geotropic organism with a photoreceptor "up" connected to a motor pushing down is a way to avoid predation and to swim deeper if you get to close to surface - but these systems are easily manipulated to the detriment of the organism. They can be spoofed or herded. Some mediation between sensory input and motor ability provides immediate and obvious advantage. Is that signal from the photorecptor a cloud or a predator? What's a cloud? What's a predator? Are there more of them....am I being directed into the mouths of their friends? What am I? What's a friend? Who's a friend? What was I just thinking, again?

So, without mind or consciousness or attention control, you might be able to swim up and down equally well - but you'll be able to answer none of those other equally important questions - and even if you were somehow magically gifted with sensors muuuuuuuuuch better than the photoreceptor/motor combo, you wouldn't be able to do anything with them.