So, how do you then explain morale tendencies as emerging through evolutionary processes without the theist making you out to be a solipsist? In other words, how can you explain away peoples perceptions of objective morales as merely illusions caused by evolution yet at the same time, affirm that we know truth despite our evolution? The social biological answer to morality needs to be conceived and explained in such a way that the theist cannot make you out to be doubting everything.

The theist is wanting to say that the atheist's answer of "your revulsion of [insert something most find abhorrent] is just the result of evolution" is hardly different from the atheist saying "your understanding of everything is just the result of evolution."

A boundary between morality and knowledge and reason needs to be shown when explaining the evolutionary account of morality I guess is what I'm saying.

(April 18, 2012 at 11:04 am)FallentoReason Wrote: Darwin himself feared that our cognitive faculties aren't reliable. Here's the beast that we're dealing with that explains why your reasoning is circular reasoning:

http://atheistforums.com/viewtopic.php?f...+cognitive Wrote:The worry can be put as follows. According to orthodox Darwinism, the process of evolution is driven mainly by two mechanisms: random genetic mutation and natural selection. The former is the chief source of genetic variability; by virtue of the latter, a mutation resulting in a heritable, fitness-enhancing trait is likely to spread through that population and be preserved as part of the genome. It is fitness-enhancing behavior and traits that get rewarded by natural selection; what get penalized are maladaptive traits and behaviors. In crafting our cognitive faculties, natural selection will favor cognitive faculties and processes that result in adaptive behavior; it cares not a whit about true belief (as such) or about cognitive faculties that reliably give rise to true belief. As evolutionary psychologist Donald Sloan Wilson puts it, “the well-adapted mind is ultimately an organ of survival and reproduction” (Wilson 2002, 228). What our minds are for (if anything) is not the production of true beliefs, but the production of adaptive behavior: that our species has survived and evolved at most guarantees that our behavior is adaptive; it does not guarantee or even make it likely that our belief-producing processes are for the most part reliable, or that our beliefs are for the most part true. That is because our behavior could perfectly well be adaptive, but our beliefs false as often as true. Darwin himself apparently worried about this question: “With me,” says Darwin,

the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind? (Darwin 1887)

We can briefly state Darwin's doubt as follows. Let R be the proposition that our cognitive faculties are reliable, N the proposition that naturalism is true and E the proposition that we and our cognitive faculties have come to be by way of the processes to which contemporary evolutionary theory points us: what is the conditional probability of R on N&E? I.e., what is P(R | N&E)? Darwin fears it may be rather low.

We can state the argument schematically as follows:

1. P(R | N&E) is low.
2. Anyone who accepts N&E and sees that (1) is true has a defeater for R.
3. Anyone who has a defeater for R has a defeater for any other belief she holds, including N&E itself.
Therefore

Anyone who accepts N&E and sees that (1) is true has a defeater for N&E; hence N&E can't be rationally accepted.

I've already answered this. What is being done in your argument is that we are trying to determine the reliability of our cognitive faculties ® upon the premises of naturalism and evolution (N & E). That would, in fact, be circular reasoning and incorrect.

I'm saying that the reliability of our cognitive facilities can be established without referring to to those premises. Let me put it this way. Because evolutionary processes move towards survival value rather than truth value, we cannot conclude that the function of the product of this process (cognitive faculty) would necessarily be to give us the truth value. However, whether or not it does not can be established independently from how it came about.

(April 18, 2012 at 11:04 am)FallentoReason Wrote: Agreed. All I was saying was that you went the extra step and made a baseless assertion that God cannot exist if what is good is apart from him. I don't see that as a reasonable conclusion, that is all.

I had already acknowledged that even before you came into the discussion.

(April 18, 2012 at 5:16 am)NoMoreFaith Wrote: In order to reason, we make basic assumptions that are unfalsifiable. I'll warn you now.. this is not going to be a short answer, and I duly credit thunderf00t as a reference for these ideas.

Firstly, we assume reality exists,
Secondly, we assume we can create models on this reality which have predictive effects.

Quite simply we create a model that a rock when thrown will fly through the air and hit the ground. We can further refine this model with physics and mathematics.

So we have the assumptions that must be taken in order to reason on anything. Including God and including Evolution, and including everything in reality.
Some models are more simplistic than others, and the only way to create a model based on reality is to apply boolean operators such as "true" and "false" and to have a model with a predictable outcome that can be tested (thats not to say an outcome cannot be "mostly true" or "slightly false").

What Platinga and Craig propose here is that we must be skeptical about all things, even where we have supporting evidence, because we assume reality is real, and we assume we can build predictive models on reality.

Shocking answer; He's right. We cannot know that Evolution is real, nor can we know that your breakfast was real, or the universe is real, we can't know earth is real, or the animals, or the plants, or you. We should be skeptical about such things, however, being skeptical about the fundamental nature of reality does not allow us to answer questions about what we perceive as reality.

That is the basis of the trickery in the argument. We can easily be skeptical about everything because we make base assumption about reality and what we can predict from that reality.
The trick is equating assumption with faith in this little word game.

Why do we assume things? Because we can test their validity and they are "true enough". We know we exist, although we cannot prove it, we simply have "faith" we actually exist at all.
So the real question is, what is reasonable to have faith in as a basic structure for the universe we are able to reason in?

Atheists propose Assumption 1, and Assumption 2. What Craig and Platinga are trying to sneak in, is that God should be Assumption 3, faith without basis, just like reality and just like the ability to create predictive models.

This defies occams razor, we must take the bare minimum on faith alone, and that only include reality, and prediction based on reality. Adding God to this equation is no more sensible than adding faeries.

Evolution allows for prediction based upon the model we have created. We can predict chromosome similarities and disparities, we can predict the genetic similarity between mother and child, we can predict genetic drift, and we can predict what fossils to expect to find for the ancestors of a modern creature.

We can test these predictions based on assumption 2, and call them True, based on assumption 1, Reality.

What Craig proposes is that we should be skeptical about these assumptions, however, the argument only works in favour of "God" if you add in base assumption 3, God.
To do so is fruitless and unnecessary, when the only faith we NEED is in assumption 1 and 2.

I'll say a few things about your assumptions here, because I think that you are missing a few key characteristics about them.

Firstly, none of the scientific standards such as falsifiability, proof or truth would be applicable to them because these standards use those statements as premises. That also does not mean that they are taken on faith. These statements are axiomatic, which means not only can we not show them to be either true or false, the very concept of truth and falsehood depend upon them.

The first statement here is a metaphysical statement - reality exists. The second is an epistemological one - we can know reality. Now, forget about skepticism and ask if you can make any statement about knowledge - irrespective of whether it is based on reason or faith - which does not directly or indirectly assume these statements. The easiest way to see this is to check if these statements can ever be denied without the denial being self-refuting.

If someone says "we cannot know about reality", he is making a statement of knowledge regarding reality, thus showing that it is possible to know reality. If he says "We don't know if reality exists", we can say "How do you know that?". If he says "We cannot know if we know reality" - once again he's saying something about reality which we apparently can know. There axioms are not accepted because we need to, they are accepted because they are inescapable. You don't need to depend on Occam's razor to ask whether a statement should be considered axiomatic, just apply the test of self-evidence vs self-refutation.

I don't think you've added anything to the original statement to be honest, other than clarification that skepticism about all things is indeed self-refuting.

This is precisely my point, the refutation to the argument lies not solely in showing Morality is proven through evolution, although that's more than feasible, but the assumption that we should be skeptical about all things.

I use the word faith very loosely certainly, as an indication that the only things we can believe without evidence (i.e. have faith in) are those that WOULD be self-refuting to deny, although we cannot prove them. Axiomatic principles as you put it.

What the argument in the OP states is that we should be skeptical about the evolutionary account itself, which I attempt to show is an asinine argument as there is a basis for that "belief" based upon the axiomatic principles we MUST adher to in order to infer knowledge of anything.

Skepticism does therefore not infer that we should be skeptical about all things, merely that we should reasonably expect to be able to make a predictive statement about its effects, and if we cannot, we should not assign it with a label of "true".

What Platinga and Lane seem to want to do, is insert God as a base assumption because the God principle offers us no predictive abilities about reality.
The God hypothesis can predict nothing, and therefore fails to adher to the basic principles of knowledge, and the only way to crowbar him into the world, is to set him up as a base assumption, which doesn't work, because the hypothesis is not inescapable in the way that the first assumptions are made.

(April 18, 2012 at 11:55 am)teaearlgreyhot Wrote: So, how do you then explain morale tendencies as emerging through evolutionary processes without the theist making you out to be a solipsist? In other words, how can you explain away peoples perceptions of objective morales as merely illusions caused by evolution yet at the same time, affirm that we know truth despite our evolution? The social biological answer to morality needs to be conceived and explained in such a way that the theist cannot make you out to be doubting everything.

The theist is wanting to say that the atheist's answer of "your revulsion of [insert something most find abhorrent] is just the result of evolution" is hardly different from the atheist saying "your understanding of everything is just the result of evolution."

A boundary between morality and knowledge and reason needs to be shown when explaining the evolutionary account of morality I guess is what I'm saying.

That we can know, not that we do. Why does an explanation that doesn't make us look like we're "doubting everything" need to be offered? Why does any explanation for anything need to be offered? "Everything we know is wrong, absolute bullshit..now tell me why you are correct" doesn't work for you? This seems to be a weak "You can't explain this to my satisfaction ergo god", well, I don't know that I'd want to be the one making such an argument.

(April 18, 2012 at 2:22 pm)NoMoreFaith Wrote: I don't think you've added anything to the original statement to be honest, other than clarification that skepticism about all things is indeed self-refuting.

This is precisely my point, the refutation to the argument lies not solely in showing Morality is proven through evolution, although that's more than feasible, but the assumption that we should be skeptical about all things.

I use the word faith very loosely certainly, as an indication that the only things we can believe without evidence (i.e. have faith in) are those that WOULD be self-refuting to deny, although we cannot prove them. Axiomatic principles as you put it.

What the argument in the OP states is that we should be skeptical about the evolutionary account itself, which I attempt to show is an asinine argument as there is a basis for that "belief" based upon the axiomatic principles we MUST adher to in order to infer knowledge of anything.

Skepticism does therefore not infer that we should be skeptical about all things, merely that we should reasonably expect to be able to make a predictive statement about its effects, and if we cannot, we should not assign it with a label of "true".

What Platinga and Lane seem to want to do, is insert God as a base assumption because the God principle offers us no predictive abilities about reality.
The God hypothesis can predict nothing, and therefore fails to adher to the basic principles of knowledge, and the only way to crowbar him into the world, is to set him up as a base assumption, which doesn't work, because the hypothesis is not inescapable in the way that the first assumptions are made.

I think that the identification of those assumptions as axiomatic and the explanation of why these should be considered axiomatic was called for in order to preemptively exclude inclusion of any arbitrary statements (such as god) as axiomatic concepts as well. I didn't think I was adding anything new here, only explicitly identifying certain statements that were implicit in your argument - primarily, the identification of those assumptions as axiomatic.

genkaus Wrote:I'm saying that the reliability of our cognitive facilities can be established without referring to to those premises. Let me put it this way. Because evolutionary processes move towards survival value rather than truth value, we cannot conclude that the function of the product of this process (cognitive faculty) would necessarily be to give us the truth value. However, whether or not it does not can be established independently from how it came about.

...independenty establish how it came about using our cognitive faculties. That's the thing, you cannot escape the fact that by default it is through our cognitive faculties that we're trying to justify our cognitive faculties..

Can it be said that empirical evidence can be used, despite the fact that, again, it is through our cognitive faculties that we process it?

(April 18, 2012 at 8:14 pm)FallentoReason Wrote: ...independenty establish how it came about using our cognitive faculties. That's the thing, you cannot escape the fact that by default it is through our cognitive faculties that we're trying to justify our cognitive faculties..

Can it be said that empirical evidence can be used, despite the fact that, again, it is through our cognitive faculties that we process it?

That explanation was given in post #11. I'll requote it here for your convenience and we can discuss any issues with it.

Quote:Whether or not we actually have the capacity to know the truth cannot be determined by where that capacity came from. The only way to determine it is by finding out if that capacity actually works.

Now, how do we determine if we actually have that capacity or not? You do it by measuring your knowledge against reality and seeing if measures up. To start measuring, you first need a starting point.

Let's start by asking how do we determine truth? Forget for a moment whether we actually have the capacity to know the truth and ask how any entity having this capacity would determine what is true. It would check the statement made against what is real. Suppose the statement is "an apple is red", then the entity would check whether a real, physical apple is actually red or not.

Now, let's go a step further and look at the example you provided. "Can X equal non-X"? Suppose, in reality, X can equal non-X. If this is possible in reality, then something can and cannot be itself at the same time. A statement can be true and false at the same time. This would mean that there can be no such statement such as truth. Then it wouldn't matter if you have the capacity to know the truth or not, because there wouldn't be such a thing as "truth" to begin with. Therefore, we can establish X is not non-X as a basic fact of reality that doesn't depend on whether we know it. Incidentally, this is the Law of Identity, the basic premise of all logic.

So, we've determined that for there to be such a thing as truth, the X can only be equal to X and since we have used our reasoning faculties to determine this, we can say that they work pretty-fucking-well. We have established two lines of reasoning here:
1. If there is such a thing as truth, then we have the capacity to know it. (as demonstrated here).
2. If there is no such thing as truth, then there is such a thing as truth (basically a self-refuting and meaningless statement).

Does this clear up why we safely say that our rational faculties actually determine the truth irrespective of where they came from? If this is too complex, there is a simpler argument, though I don't think it'd be as convincing. I'm presenting it anyway.

Can you actually know the truth?

1. There are only two possible options. Either you can know the truth or you cannot know the truth.

2. If you cannot know the truth, then all statements of knowledge you make are false.

3. This includes the statement of knowledge that "You cannot know the truth".

4. Therefore, that position is essentially self-refuting and the only option you are left with is "you can know the truth".

genkaus Wrote:Whether or not we actually have the capacity to know the truth cannot be determined by where that capacity came from. The only way to determine it is by finding out if that capacity actually works.

Agreed, but again, the only way I know how to do that is by using the thing I'm trying to prove is reliable. Circular reasoning.

Quote:Now, how do we determine if we actually have that capacity or not? You do it by measuring your knowledge against reality and seeing if measures up. To start measuring, you first need a starting point.

Well, what is reality? I forgot the person's name, but someone throughout history started questioning his very own existence. He argued that reality was playing tricks on him e.g. a cup looks circular from the top but looks rectangular from the side, and flat in both instances which it is not. Let's see if you've defined reality.

Quote:Let's start by asking how do we determine truth? Forget for a moment whether we actually have the capacity to know the truth and ask how any entity having this capacity would determine what is true. It would check the statement made against what is real. Suppose the statement is "an apple is red", then the entity would check whether a real, physical apple is actually red or not.

You're taking so much for granted here, as if it's obvious. What is the colour red? For all you know you've been taught that an apple is red but your red registers as green in my brain. We have no way of knowing how someone percieves something. Only they know what 'reality' looks to them but there's no way of measuring that against a 'universal' standard so that we can determine it is in fact reality. If you think there is such a thing, then please describe 'red' to me.

I'm at university at the moment an I have to get going. I'll discuss the second half when I'm free.

(April 18, 2012 at 11:51 pm)FallentoReason Wrote: Agreed, but again, the only way I know how to do that is by using the thing I'm trying to prove is reliable. Circular reasoning.

No, another way of proving is that no other alternative is possible.

(April 18, 2012 at 11:51 pm)FallentoReason Wrote: Well, what is reality? I forgot the person's name, but someone throughout history started questioning his very own existence. He argued that reality was playing tricks on him e.g. a cup looks circular from the top but looks rectangular from the side, and flat in both instances which it is not. Let's see if you've defined reality.

Reality is what exists independent of anyone's perception of it. The guy in your example was making the mistake of thinking that it was his perception that was determining reality - that if it looked circular and rectangular form different perspectives then that made it both.

(April 18, 2012 at 11:51 pm)FallentoReason Wrote: You're taking so much for granted here, as if it's obvious. What is the colour red? For all you know you've been taught that an apple is red but your red registers as green in my brain. We have no way of knowing how someone percieves something. Only they know what 'reality' looks to them but there's no way of measuring that against a 'universal' standard so that we can determine it is in fact reality. If you think there is such a thing, then please describe 'red' to me.

The way it "registers" in one's brain is irrelevant. The attribute of being red is intrinsic to the apple and is determined by the wavelength of light it reflects. Regardless of how it registers or if it registers, the apple would remain red.

If and when something like that perception registers, we give it a descriptive tag identifying that intrinsic property. That tag is objective in nature because it depends upon the object of perception rather than us. It doesn't matter if in our internal model this tag corresponds to different things as long as externally it corresponds to the same thing.